Cited by

d 349, 356–57 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. June 28, 2011).

“A single behavioral incident is the result of a single motivation directed towards a single criminal goal.” State v. Infante , (), rev. denied (Minn. June 28, 2011); (where the defendant’s actions in obstructing-legal-process case were part of a “single behavioral incident,” jury was not required to unani

-57 (Minn. App. 2011) (noting that while the concept of single-behavioral incident is generally employed in the sentencing context, the Minnesota Supreme Court has also used the concept in the context of jury-unanimity arguments).

ed by any of three different means”—“taking any action with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death, intentionally inflicting bodily harm upon another, or attempting to inflict bodily harm upon another”— we have straightforwardly defined the elements of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon as: “(1) assault; and (2) with a dangerous weapon.” d 349, 358 (Minn. App. 2011) (citing Minn. Stat. §§ 609.02, subd.

However, “[t]he jury need not unanimously agree on each element’s underlying facts.” (concluding that the district court did not err when it did not give a specific-unanimity instruction requiring the jury to agree as to which of the defendant’s actions constituted assault), rev. denied (Minn. 8 June 28, 2011); see Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 632 (1991) (plurality opinio

“ A single behavioral incident is the result of a single motivation directed towards a single criminal goal.” -57 (Minn. App. 2011) (holding that two acts of assault that occurred over a short time period, for the purpose of a “single criminal goal,” were a single behavioral incident); see, e.g., Dalbec, d at 512-13 (holding that no specific-unanimity instruction was required when a defendant committed multip

Although a party usually must preserve a challenge to jury instructions by objecting to them before they are given, we “may consider plain error not brought to the district court’s attention if the error affects substantial rights.” (citing State v. Pendleton , (citing Minn. R. Crim.

See, -57 (Minn. App. 2011) (dis tinguishing Stempf and holding that a unanimity instruction is not required when two alleged acts are part of same incident).

at 45, 104 S. Ct. at 2215; Fageroos, d at 200, 202-03

–57 (Minn. App. 2011) (distinguishing Stempf and 6 not requiring unanimity instruction in assault trial where the two alleged actions were part of the same behavioral incident rather than two independent acts constituting separate crimes).

See, e.g, -34 (Minn. 2014); State v. Infante , -57 (Minn. App. 2011) .

(holding that actions that constitute a means of committing an element of a crime, rather than two distinct instances of an element of the crime itself do not require a specific unanimity instruction).

(quoting Richardson v. United States , 526 U.S. 813, 817, 119 S. Ct. 1707, 1710 (1999)).

(holding that jury instructions need not include a unanimity instruction because the defendant’s different acts “were committed as part of a single behavioral incident”).

-57 (Minn. App. 2011) (distinguishing Stempf on ground that defendant was alleged to have engaged in single behavioral incident); (concluding that right to unanimous verdict was not violated because appellant threatened both wife and husband), review denied

State v. Infante , -57 (Minn. App. 2011).

Stated somewhat differently, “the jury need not unanimously agree on each element’s underlying facts so long as the differing factual circumstances show ‘equivalent blameworthiness or culpability.’” (), review denied (Minn. June 28, 2011).

-57 (Minn. App. 2011); see Dalbec, d at 509-10 (holding district court did not err by failing to give unanimity instruction when defendant was charged with one count of assault for acts occurring over a 24–hour period).

The OFP prohibited West from contacting A.L. by phone or “any other means.” “[T]he two acts in Stempf were elements of the crime, whereas [appellant’s] actions in this case were mere means for accomplishing an element.”

uring jury instructions); Bobo, d at 139 (discussing closure during a witness’s second testimony); Mahkuk, d at 683-85 (removal of gang members from courtroom during lay-witness testimony); Lindsey, d at 660-62 (discussing exclusion of two minors from the entire trial); Fageroos, d at 201 (discussing closure during testimony of two witnesses); (excluding defendant’s sister and child during closing arguments); (discussing closure during sentencing hearing).