Cited by

Together, the length and variety of Torgerson’s misconduct distinguishes this case from others involving a “brief lapse in judgment or a single, isolated incident.”

Conduct 1.15(a) (generally prohibiting a lawyer from keeping funds belonging to the 1 (stating that misappropriation of client funds occurs when client “funds are not kept in trust and are used for a purpose other than one specified by the client”).

(second alteration in original) ().

As to the cumulative weight of the violations, “ ‘we distinguish between a single, isolated incident’ ” and “ ‘multiple instances of mis[conduct] occurring over a substantial 14 amount of time.’ ” (alteration in original) ().

(concluding that attorney showed remorse when she testified that “her actions were ‘just not right’ and ‘horrible’ ”); (concluding that attorney did not show remorse when he “expressed remorse for the consequences of his misconduct, but not remorse for his

Regarding misappropriation, we have distinguished “a brief lapse in judgment or a single, isolated incident of misappropriation from multiple instances of misappropriation occurring over a substantial amount of time or involving significant amounts of money.” d at 681 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); (stating that six acts of misappropriation totaling $144,000 and two acts of unintentional misappropriation over the course of nearly 13 months were not isolated incidents or a

Our precedent indicates that “[t]o fulfill the causation requirement under Weyhrich, an attorney’s severe psychological disorder must directly cause the misconduct.” see also Mayne, d at 160 (“[Ijndirect causation is not enough to justify a finding of causation under Weyhrich.”).

“The purpose of disciplinary sanctions is not to punish the attorney, but rather ‘to protect the public, to protect the judicial system, and to deter future misconduct by the disciplined attorney as well as by other attorneys.’ ” ().

See, -46 (Minn.2011) (finding an attorney was remorseful and entitled to mitigation because the attorney testified that her actions were “just not right” and “horrible”).

First, we have traditionally concluded that misappropriation of client funds occurs when “funds are not kept in trust and are used for a purpose other than one specified by the client.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Because we distinguish between multiple acts of misconduct and “brief lapse[s] in judgment” or “single, isolated incidents],” (citation omitted), the fact that Grigsby’s single instance of misconduct violated multiple rules does not warrant enhanced discipline.

For example, we distinguish “a brief lapse in judgment or a single, isolated incident of misappropriation from multiple instances of misappropriation occurring over a substantial amount of time or involving significant amounts of money.” (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).

We have held that “misappropriation of client funds is particularly serious misconduct and usually warrants disbarment absent clear and convincing evidence of substantial mitigating factors.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); -47 (Minn.2011) (holding that an attorney should not be disbarred for misappropriation of client funds where there were no aggravating factors, the attorney’s clients did not suffer actual harm, and the attorney established several mitigating factors);