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amend the second-degree assault charge did not “contravene[] case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” Webster, d at 787 (quotation omitted) (holding that a jury instruction did “not contravene existing case law” 12 because the Minnesota Supreme Court had “never held that a district court [was] required” to instruct the jury with certain language); (stating that the district court’s jury instruction was not plain error when the law was “cloudy” or “unsettled”), rev. denied (Minn. Aug.

(stating that plain error did not exist because “neither this court nor the federal courts have conclusively resolved this issue ”); (reasoning that, even if jury instruction was erroneous, error was not plain because applicability of Stempf in case of conspiracy to commit first-degree drug crime was “‘cloudy’ or ‘unsettled’”), rev. denied (Minn. Aug.

11 Ayala-Leyva, (stating that the district court’s jury instruction was not plain error when the law was “cloudy” or “unsettled.”), rev. denied (Minn. Aug.

25, 2008) ; (three or more active participants), rev. denied (Minn. Minn. Aug.

review denied (Minn. Aug.

“The presence of a single aggrava ting factor is sufficient to uphold an upward departure.” (“[A] departure can be affirmed even if based on a single aggravating factor.”).

-55 (Minn. Ap p. 2014) (holding that the jury was not required to unanimously agree on which of 20 overt acts appellant had committed in furtherance of a conspiracy because “each overt act provided alternative means to prove the element”), review denied (Minn. Aug.

wo aggravating factors), (“After Blakely, we no longer independently review the record for evidence to justify a departure because the issue of whether additional facts exist to support the departure is a question of fact for a Blakely jury, unless the defendant has waived his or her right to a Blakely jury.”), and (“A greater -than-double durational sentenci ng departure must be supported by severe aggravating factors, and factual findings to support those factors must be found by a sentencing

555 (Minn. App. 2014) (concluding that the appellant could not demonstrate prejudice as a result of the district court’s failure to give a specific - unanimity instruction because “[t]he evidence of [the] appellant’s guilt was overwhelming” 6 and “it [wa]s clear that the jury rejected [his] defense as unbe

review denied (Minn. Aug.

At Ayala -Leyva’s jury trial , the state presented extensive evidence of the methamphetamine conspiracy, which we set forth in detail in our earlier opinion , review denied (Minn. Aug.

d 546, 558 (Minn. App. 2014), review denied (Minn. Aug.

“A greater than double departure is warranted only in the rare case where severe aggravating circumstances exist.” (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Aug.

See Rucker, d at 548; In addressing whether the defendant was in a position of authority over the victim, Rucker refers to Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd.

d 546, 555 (Minn. App. 2014) (finding no plain error in jury instruction when the state of the law was “cloudy” or “unsettled”), review denied (Minn. Aug.

See, review denied (Minn. Aug.

(reversing the sentence because the sentencing jury did not make proper factual findings), review granted (Minn. Aug.

Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817, 119 S. Ct. 1707, 1710 (1999); –55 (Minn. App. 2014) (concluding that the district court did not plainly err by failing to instruct the jury that it was required to identify which of 20 overt acts supported the overt-acts requirement of conspiracy), review granted (Minn. Aug.

“[A] departure can be affirmed even if based on a single aggravating factor,” and “[a] double durational departure is generally the ‘upper limit’ of a sentencing departure.” review granted on other grounds (Minn. Aug.