State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-0976

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Sean Patrick Brinkman,
Appellant.

Filed August 21, 2017
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

Carlton County District Court
File No. 09-CR-13-967

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Thomas H. Pertler, Carlton County Attorney, Jesse D. Be rglund, Assist ant County
Attorney, Carlton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Charles F. Clippert, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cleary, Chie f Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Randall,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant argues that (1) the district cour t abused its discretion by admitting certain
witness testimony, and (2) the district court erred by denying his petition for postconviction
relief based upon newly discovered evidence in the form of recanted trial testimony. We
affirm.
FACTS
In November 2012, Minnesota Sex Offe nder Program (MSOP) resident, T.C.,
submitted a written report to MSOP staff, alle ging that fellow MSOP resident, appellant
Sean Brinkman, threatened T.C. that he would “get mess[ed] up you know how Latin Kings
do it in the joint get shanked up” if T.C. did not pay Brinkman money that he owed him.
In May 2013, T.C. recanted the allegations in his report by signing a notarized affidavit in
which he stated that Brinkman never threatened him or forced him to pay him money, and
that T.C. was “under no compulsion, coerci on, or undue influence to produce this
affidavit.” In an interview at MSOP in July 2013, T.C. affirmed the truth and accuracy of
the statements in his affidavit and maintained that no one ha d made any threats to him to
make the statements in his affidavit. Despite T.C.’s recantation, respondent State of
Minnesota charged Brinkman with making terroristic threats against T.C., in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2012).
The district court conducted a jury trial on the charge against Brinkman in February
2014. T.C. testified at trial consistently w ith the content of his recantation affidavit,
denying that he ever owed Brinkman money, th at Brinkman ever threatened him, or that

3
he ever had any type of conflict with Brin kman. He admitted that he had submitted to
MSOP staff the November 2012 report about Br inkman but claimed that he “wrote that
kite to get off the unit.” He testified that his May 2013 reca ntation affidavit was typed at
his direction, although he did not know by whom, and that he created the affidavit “[t]o try
to clear things up, ‘cause I never wanted part of it in the first place.” When asked about the
specific content of the affidavit, such as statute and case numbers, T.C. testified that he did
not know the meaning of those numbers but received advice about the legal aspects of the
affidavit from “[p]eople I was asking, basica lly.” MSOP residents T.B. and K.C. also
testified for the state.1
The jury found Brinkman gu ilty as charged, and the district court sentenced
Brinkman to 15 months’ in prison, stayed fo r three years with an interim sanction of 90
days of local incarceration and credit of 90 days for time serv ed. Brinkman filed a direct
appeal of his conviction. This court stayed that appeal while Brinkman petitioned for
postconviction relief. The postconviction court denied Brinkman’s pe tition. This appeal
follows.
D E C I S I O N
Challenge to Admission of T.B.’s Testimony
Appellate courts “review a [d istrict] court’s decision to admit evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Campbell, 861 N.W.2d 95, 102

1 After a contested Spreigl hearing, the district court orde red that the state could offer at
trial the testimony of MSOP residents J.B. (not T.B.) and K.C. about Brinkman’s
threatening behavior about debts owed as Spreigl evidence. Brinkman does not challenge
on appeal the admission of either J.B.’s or K.C.’s Spreigl testimony at trial.

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(Minn. 2015). “Such evid ence, commonly known as Spreigl evidence, is in admissible to
prove a defendant’s character, but may be ad mitted to show motive , intent, absence of
mistake, identity, or plan.” Id. (citing Minn. R. Evid. 404(b); State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn.
488, 491 139 N.W.2d 167, 169 (1965)).
On appeal, the appellant “must show that the [district] court abused its discretion by
admitting the evidence an d that the erroneous ad mission was prejudicial.” Id. “The
erroneous admission of Spreigl evidence is harmless unless it substantially influenced the
verdict.” Id. “In determining whether the erroneous admission of Spreigl evidence
substantially influenced the verdict, we cons ider several factors, including whether the
[district] court provided the jurors a cautionary instruction and whether the evidence was
central to the State’s case.” Id. Appellate courts also c onsider “the existence of
overwhelming evidence of guilt.” Id.
After T.C. testified, MSOP resident T.B. testified th at, like T.C., he also had
reported to MSOP staff that Brinkman had threatened him about paying a debt and that he
feared that Brinkman would assault him if he did not pay. Also like T.C., T.B. later
submitted three affidavits recanting the alle gations in his report to MSOP staff. T.B.
testified that he signed one of the affida vits because MSOP resident E.P., one of
Brinkman’s alleged “associates,” told him to sign it. T.B. said that he had no input into the
content or creation of the first affidavit, and that he signed the other two affidavits because
E.P. told him how to do it on his computer. T.B. testified that he thought E.P. asked him to
submit affidavits for Brinkman because E.P. and Brinkman are “homeboys,” meaning that
they have the “[s]ame affiliation in gangs.” T.B. further testified that he was afraid of E.P.

5
because E.P. was physically larger than he. But, when asked if he was afraid of Brinkman,
T.B. said, “Not as much. I wa s afraid of his associates mo re than him.” Finally, T.B.
testified that his original report about Brinkm an’s threats and his fear of Brinkman were
truthful, not the content of his recantation affidavits.
Initially, the state intended to offer T.B.’s testimony as Spreigl evidence but changed
its course after the distri ct court indicated at the Spreigl hearing that it did not view the
proffered evidence as Spreigl. On appeal, Brinkman maintain s his argument that T.B.’s
testimony constituted Spreigl evidence, and that the district court abused its discretion by
admitting the testimony.
The record demonstrates that the state offered T.B.’s testimony to raise the inference
that Brinkman’s threatening conduct toward T.C. conformed to his past threatening
conduct toward T.B., who testif ied about his fear of Brinkman and similar response, i.e.,
submitting reports of fear to MSOP staff a nd then submitting recantation affidavits to
MSOP staff. We conclude that T.B.’s testimony constituted Spreigl evidence because it
was offered to show Brinkman’s propensity to engage in threaten ing behavior, and we
therefore conclude that the district court erred by not determining whether the evidence
was admissible before allowing its admission. See State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 685−86
(Minn. 2006) (discussing “a five-step process to determine whether to admit other-acts
evidence”). Significantly, the court did not de termine whether the probative value of the
evidence was substantially outweighed by its tendency to unfairly prejudice the jury. See
id.

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But we conclude that the erroneous admission of the Spreigl evidence was not
prejudicial because no reasona ble possibility exists that the inadmissibl e evidence
substantially influenced the verdict. See State v. Thao, 875 N.W.2d 834, 839 (Minn. 2016)
(“An error is harmful if there is a reasona ble possibility that th e wrongfully admitted
evidence significantly affected the verdict.” (quotation omitted)). T.B.’s testimony was not
central to the state’s case because even without T.B.’s testimony, the jury was able to view
T.C.’s written report and statements and asse ss T.C.’s credibility when he testified. Our
review of the record confirms the existence of substantial evidence in the record, aside
from T.B.’s testimony, from which the jury could determine th at Brinkman was guilty of
making terroristic threats against T.C. Any error in the admission of the evidence therefore
was harmless.
Denial of New Trial
Brinkman argues that the district cour t abused its discre tion by denying his
postconviction petition for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence of false trial
testimony. He claims that T.B. and K.C. testified falsely at trial and that the postconviction
court erred by rejecting his argument. “The decision whether to grant a new trial based
upon newly discovered evidence rests with the court and will not be disturbed unless there
is an abuse of discretion.” Pederson v. State, 649 N.W.2d 161, 163 (Minn. 2002). “[This
court] will not reverse an order unless the pos tconviction court exercised its discretion in
an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made
clearly erroneous factual findings.” Matakis v. State , 862 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. 2015)
(quotation omitted).

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When assessing the merits of a claim base d on false or recanted testimony, the
reviewing court “follow[s] the three-prong test set forth in Larrison v. United States , 24
F.2d 82, 87–88 (7th Cir. 1928).” Ortega v. State, 856 N.W.2d 98, 103, 103 (Minn. 2014).
A new trial based on false testimony may be granted where (1) the court is reasonably well
satisfied the testimony was fals e; (2) the jury might have re ached a different conclusion
without the testimony; and (3) the petitioner was surprised by the testimony and was unable
to counteract it or did not know it was false until after the trial. State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d
493, 511 (Minn. 2013). “The first two prongs of the Larrison test are compulsory. The third
prong is relevant but is not an absolute condition precedent to granting relief.” Dobbins v.
State, 845 N.W.2d 148, 151 (Minn. 2013) (quotation and citation omitted). “Courts
generally view recanting affidavits and testimony with suspicion.” State v. Ferguson, 742
N.W.2d 651, 659 (Minn. 2007). Appellate courts defer to the district court’s credibility
determinations. State v. Dickerson , 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992), aff’d, 508 U.S.
366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
Brinkman argues that the postconviction court should have found T.B.’s recanting
testimony at the postconviction evidentiary hearing, that he made up his trial testimony
because he was “mad at” Brinkman, to be persuasive because T.B. offered that testimony
against his penal interest and faced prosecution for perjury by admitting that he testified
falsely at trial. But the postconviction court thoroughly analyzed T.B.’s statements in “[t]he
records submitted in support of and in opposition to” Brinkman’s postconviction petition,
continuing through T.B.’s testimony at the postconviction hearing to establish a summary
of the timeline of T.B.’s statements. Based on the evidence, the court found that T.B. “has

8
displayed a pattern of inconsistent testimony, often claiming to do so because he was under
the threat of [Brinkman]” so “[t]here is no ‘newly discovered evid ence’ suggesting that
[T.B.] will testify one way or . . . another in . . . a subsequent trial.”
The postconviction court was not reasonabl y well-satisfied that T.B.’s testimony
was false and denied Brinkman’s postconviction petition for a new trial based upon newly
discovered evidence because Brinkman failed to meet the first prong of the Larrison test.
The court found that T.B.’s testimony at the postconviction evidentiary hearing was
“incredible.” Moreover, the court found that T. B.’s assertion that when he was off his
“meds,” he got “mad and lie[d] about Brinkman” was not convincing. The court noted that
T.B. had testified before the court “on num erous occasions” and found that, “given the
environment of coercion surrounding the events in this case, it is not clear or even
reasonable to assume that [T.B.] gave false testimony during the trial.”
Brinkman also argues that K.C. testified falsely at trial when he testified that
Brinkman threatened him during May to June of 2013 because Brinkman was housed in a
different MSOP unit at that time. The postconviction court concluded that the evidence
was insufficient to support a conclusion th at T.C.’s trial testimony was false because
“nothing in the record suggest[s] that [T.C.] testified falsely at trial and it has not been
established that [Brinkman] was unable to co mmunicate threats, on his behalf, to people
outside of his living unit.” Our review of the record supports this conclusion. K.C. testified
at trial that E.P. threatened him in the “chow hall” by approaching him, touching him, and
telling him that he was there to collect for Brinkman because Brinkman was “in the hole”
at the time and could not collect the money. An d K.C. later clarified in his testimony that

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both E.P. and Brinkman had th reatened him in person, expl aining that Brinkman had
threatened him when they lived on the same unit in approximately February 2013. Beyond
that incident, K.C. testified that, since he stopped paying the debt to Brinkman, his only
personal encounters with him occurred “out in the hallways, in passing,” when Brinkman
called him a snitch even though K.C. was being escorted by guards at the time.
Because the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting
Brinkman’s purported newly discovered evidence of false trial testimony of T.B. and K.C.,
we conclude that the distri ct court did not abuse its di scretion by denying Brinkman’s
requests for a new trial.
Brinkman also argues in a pro se reply brief that this court should strike a portion of
the state’s brief because it “misstated and assumed facts not in evidence and not argued in
appellant’s brief.” We conclude that Brinkm an’s argument is without merit. Brinkman
admits that “counsel correctly recited the record” and a review of the contested portions of
the state’s brief confirms that the contested portions contain reasonable inferences from the
facts in the record.
Affirmed.