Goerke Family Partnership, Donald Shelstad v. Lac qui Parle-Yellow Bank Watershed District, William Croatt
Opinion text
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-0603
Goerke Family Partnership,
Appellant,
Donald Shelstad, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
Lac qui Parle-Yellow Bank Watershed District,
Respondent,
William Croatt,
Respondent.
Filed December 15, 2014
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge
Lac qui Parle County District Court
File No. 37-CV-12-104
Dennis H. Simpson, Quarnstrom & Doering, P.A., Marshall, Minnesota (for appellant)
Jason J. Kuboushek, Iverson Reuvers, LLC, Bloomington, Minnesota (for respondent Lac
qui Parle-Yellow Bank Watershed District)
Matthew P. Franzese, Traverse County Attorney, Alexandria, Minnesota (for respondent
William Croatt)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
SYLLABUS
1. When a watershed district’s board of managers makes a permitting decision
without considering a material issue, the district court hearing a declaratory judgment
action challenging the permitting decision must remand the issue to the board for
consideration.
2. The scope of review that applies to agency decisions applies to permit
decisions by a watershed district’s board of managers.
OPINION
PETERSON, Judge
Appellant landowner brought this declaratory-judgment action in district court
challenging respondent watershed district’s approval of respondent landowner’s
application for a drainage permit. Following a remand to the watershed district’s board
of managers for a determination whether the proposed drainage system would be a
reasonable use, the district court affirmed the approval of the drainage permit. Appellant
argues that (1) the district court erred in remanding the reasonable-use issue to the
watershed-district board, and (2) the drainage system should not be allowed because it
expands the slope and highway easements burdening appellant’s property. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent William Croatt applied to respondent Lac qui Parle-Yellow Bank
Watershed District for a drainage permit for an agricultural tiling system that would drain
about 60 acres of land in the northeast quarter of section 11 in Arena Township. The
water drained from the 60 acres would be directed to a pumping station that would pump
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the water to a grove in the northeast corner of section 11 at the intersection of 270th
Street and County State Aid Highway 17. From the grove, the water would flow north in
the west ditch of highway 17 for about one-quarter mile, east through a culvert, and into
an established ditch system.
The proposed drainage system was addressed at meetings of the watershed-district
board of managers during the spring and summer of 2011. Downstream property owners,
including appellant Goerke Family Partnership, objected to the permit application. The
downstream property owners were concerned that the culvert could not handle the water
from the drainage system and that the amount of water draining onto their properties
would increase. The board declined to approve Croatt’s permit application due to the
opposition of the downstream property owners.
In response to that opposition, Croatt contacted Professional Engineer Erik Jones,
who reviewed the proposed system and concluded that the ditch along highway 17 had
adequate capacity to handle the drained water and that an adequate outlet existed
downstream. The board requested additional information from Jones about the water
flowing through the culvert. Jones concluded that Croatt’s proposed drainage system
would not change the amount of water flowing through the culvert. The county engineer
signed the application, indicating that the proposed drainage system would not affect the
roadway. After receiving this additional information, the board approved Croatt’s permit
application.
Appellant brought this declaratory-judgment action in district court challenging
the board’s approval of Croatt’s permit application. Appellant asserted that the board
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acted improperly in approving the permit because appellant had not granted a drainage
easement over its property along highway 17. Croatt moved for summary judgment. The
district court denied summary judgment on the ground that a question of material fact
existed on “whether draining water from Croatt’s land into the [highway] 17 road ditch is
a ‘reasonable use’ as that term has been developed under Minnesota case law.” Croatt
requested reconsideration because the summary-judgment order did not address the
procedure for resolving the fact issue. The district court granted reconsideration and, on
reconsideration, remanded the case to the watershed-district board “for specific factual
findings on whether granting the proposed permit constitutes a reasonable use.” On
remand, the board found that the proposed drainage system would be a reasonable use.
The district court rejected appellant’s argument that the remand was improper and
affirmed the board’s decision to issue the permit to Croatt because the decision was
supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. This appeal
followed.
ISSUES
I. Did the district court err in allowing reconsideration and remanding the
issue of reasonable use to the watershed-district board of managers?
II. Did the board of managers err in determining that the drainage system
would be a reasonable use and granting the permit application?
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ANALYSIS
I.
Reconsideration
“Motions to reconsider are prohibited except by express permission of the court,
which will be granted only upon a showing of compelling circumstances.” Minn. R. Gen.
Pract. 115.11. We review a district court’s decision to allow a motion for reconsideration
for an abuse of discretion. See In re Welfare of S.M.E., 725 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Minn.
2007) (stating that motions for reconsideration “are considered only at the district court’s
discretion”); Peterson v. Hinz, 605 N.W.2d 414, 417-18 (Minn. App. 2000) (concluding
that district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing motion to reconsider and
reversing its earlier order imposing sanctions), review denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 2000).
The initial order denying summary judgment did not specify the procedure for
determining whether the proposed drainage system would be a reasonable use. Under
these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
reconsideration.
Remand to watershed-district board of managers
Appellant argues that, in a declaratory-judgment action, a plaintiff is entitled to a
trial, and the district court did not have authority to remand the case to the watershed-
district board of managers for a determination regarding the reasonable-use doctrine. We
disagree. The Minnesota Watershed Law, Minn. Stat. §§ 103D.001-925 (2012) states:
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“[A]n interested party may appeal a permit decision or order made by the managers1 by a
declaratory judgment action brought under chapter 555. . . . The decision on appeal must
be based on the record made in the proceeding before the managers.” Minn. Stat.
§ 103D.537(a) (emphasis added).
In Honn v. City of Coon Rapids, which involved a challenge to a city council’s
denial of an application for rezoning, the district court declined to conduct a trial and
limited its review to the record before the city council. 313 N.W.2d 409, 412-13 (Minn.
1981). On appeal, the supreme court held that “[r]eview of a decision on rezoning may
be obtained by a declaratory judgment action” and that the parties were entitled to a trial
and could present evidence in addition to that presented to the municipal body, provided
that the evidence was relevant to issues raised before and considered by the municipal
body. Id. at 416. The court noted that a city council often “conducts its hearings in
informal fashion, with no accurate verbatim record kept and with relatively few remarks
in its minutes to suffice as its findings of fact and conclusions.” Id. at 415. The purpose
of the trial was to determine whether there was a legally sufficient basis for the municipal
body’s decision. Id. at 418-19.
But in Swanson v. City of Bloomington, which involved a challenge to a city
council’s denial of an application to subdivide a residential lot, the supreme court limited
the holding in Honn. 421 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 1988). After stating that Honn did not
1
“‘Managers’ means the board of managers of a watershed district.” Minn. Stat.
§ 103D.011, subd. 15.
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require “a trial or augmentation of the record in every case,” the supreme court explained
the procedure for review of a permit decision:
[A] district court should establish the scope and conduct of its
review of a municipality’s zoning decision by considering the
nature, fairness and adequacy of the proceeding at the local
level and the adequacy of the factual and decisional record of
the local proceeding. Where the municipal proceeding was
fair and the record clear and complete, review should be on
the record. . . .
....
Where the municipal proceeding has not been fair or
the record of that proceeding is not clear and complete, Honn
applies and the parties are entitled to a trial or an opportunity
to augment the record in district court.
Id. at 312-13.
The supreme court addressed the issue of a remand to a zoning authority to further
develop the record in Earthburners, Inc. v. Cnty. of Carlton, which involved a
declaratory-judgment action challenging a county board’s denial of a conditional-use
permit. 513 N.W.2d 460 (Minn. 1994). Because the county board’s record indicated that
its decision was premature and the decision did not show that the board considered the
relevant ordinance criteria, the supreme court remanded to the board so that it could
reconsider the permit application. Id. at 461-63. The supreme court explained:
[W]e have been reluctant to allow local boards an opportunity
after the fact to substantiate or justify earlier decisions.
However, where, as here, the board has failed to discharge its
responsibilities in connection with this application, we are
compelled to offer it the opportunity to do so and to develop a
record to allow meaningful appellate review. However, to
prevent any unfairness to the applicant, the board must
confine its inquiry to those issues raised in earlier proceedings
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before the planning commission and county board while
allowing adequate opportunity for a meaningful discussion of
those issues.
Id. at 463 (citation omitted).
Minnesota law permits a property owner to drain surface waters onto another’s
land if the elements of the reasonable-use doctrine are met. Kral v. Boesch, 557 N.W.2d
597, 598-99 (Minn. App. 1996). Therefore, because the watershed-district board did not
consider the reasonable-use doctrine and the record was inadequate to allow meaningful
appellate review by the district court, the parties were not entitled to a trial, and a remand
to the board of managers was permitted. The right to a trial was also restricted by the
statement in Minn. Stat. § 103D.537(a) that “[t]he decision on appeal must be based on
the record made in the proceeding before the managers.”
Under the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 103D.537(a), the district court is limited
on appeal to review of the record made before the board of managers. Therefore, the
district court acted properly by remanding the issue of reasonable use to the watershed-
district board of managers for determination and creation of a record. Following the
remand, the district court properly reviewed the record to determine whether the
watershed district’s decision to issue the permit was reasonable. See Swanson, 421
N.W.2d at 311 (stating that the standard of review of a zoning authority’s action is
whether there is “a reasonable basis for the decision” (quotation omitted)).
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II.
Scope of Review
In Northwestern College v. City of Arden Hills, the supreme court explained an
appellate court’s scope of review in zoning matters as follows:
Although earlier decisions may have left some doubt
with regard to the appropriate scope of review in such cases,
no doubt can remain in the wake of this court’s clarification
of the issue in Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d
808, 822 (Minn. 1977). In that case, addressing the issue of
the proper scope of review of an agency decision, we wrote:
“We . . . expressly adopt a rule which we have heretofore
tacitly accepted, that it is our function to make an independent
examination of an administrative agency’s record and
decision and arrive at our own conclusions as to the propriety
of that determination without according any special deference
to the same review conducted by the [district] court.” 256
N.W.2d 824. Although Reserve Mining only addressed the
review of agency decisions, the articulated reasons for the
rule enunciated make clear that the same scope is appropriate
in reviewing the decisions of local governing bodies in zoning
matters. See, also, Barton Contracting Co. Inc. v. City of
Afton, 268 N.W.2d 712 (Minn. 1978), and Amdahl v. County
of Fillmore, 258 N.W.2d 869 (Minn. 1977), in which we
independently examined the action of the local governing
body to determine its propriety, rather than merely reviewing
the decision of the district court for clear error. Thus, in light
of Reserve Mining, Amdahl, and Barton, it is clear that this
court’s role in the present case is to review the decision of the
Arden Hills City Council, independent of the findings and
conclusions of the district court.
281 N.W.2d 865, 868 (Minn. 1979) (citations omitted).
Northwestern College and the cases cited therein involved the review of city-
council or county-board decisions. Like those bodies, a watershed district is a political
subdivision of the state. Minn. Stat. § 103D.225, subd. 6. We, therefore, conclude that
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the scope of review that applies to agency decisions applies to permit decisions of a
watershed district’s board of managers, and we review the decision of the board of
managers, independent of the findings and conclusions of the district court.
Standard of review
Although caselaw distinguishes between zoning matters that are legislative in
nature, such as rezoning, and those that are quasi-judicial, such as variances and special-
use permits, “the standard of review is the same for all zoning matters, namely, whether
the zoning authority’s action was reasonable.” Honn, 313 N.W.2d at 416-17. This
standard has been expressed in various ways: “Is there a ‘reasonable basis’ for the
decision? Or is the decision ‘unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious’? Or is the decision
‘reasonably debatable’?” Id. at 417. “[T]he nature of the matter under review has a
bearing on what is reasonable.” Id. In granting or denying a permit, the inquiry is more
judicial because the decision involves “applying specific standards to a particular
individual use.” Id.
With respect to the reasonable-use issue that was remanded to the watershed-
district board, the applicable standards are set forth in caselaw. A property owner may
drain surface waters onto another’s land if the elements of the reasonable-use doctrine are
met.
The rule is that in effecting a reasonable use for a legitimate
purpose a landowner, acting in good faith, may drain his land
of surface waters and cast them as a burden upon the land of
another, although such drainage carries with it some waters
which would otherwise have never gone that way if
(a) there is a reasonable necessity for such drainage;
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(b) reasonable care be taken to avoid unnecessary injury to
the land receiving the burden;
(c) the utility or benefit accruing to the land drained
reasonably outweighs the gravity of the harm resulting to the
land receiving the burden;
(d) where practicable, it is accomplished by reasonably
improving and aiding the normal and natural system of
drainage according to its reasonable carrying capacity, or if,
in the absence of a practicable natural drain, a reasonable and
feasible artificial drainage system is adopted.
In determining reasonableness, a court should consider the
extent of harm caused, its foreseeability, and the landowner’s
motive for the action taken. No one factor or circumstance is
controlling and what is a reasonable use is a fact question to
be resolved depending on the facts of each case.
Kral, 557 N.W.2d at 598-99 (quotations and citation omitted).
Appellant argues that the board erred in granting Croatt’s permit application
because the highway easement burdening appellant’s property was not intended for
agricultural drainage purposes. But with respect to Croatt’s permit application, the board
found:
There is a reasonable necessity for such drainage.
Evidence was presented which shows the land to be tiled is in
need of additional drainage to improve its crop output. No
evidence was presented which disputed the need for
additional drainage.
Reasonable care is being taken to avoid unnecessary
injury to the land receiving the burden. [Jones’s] hydrology
studies show the proposed additional drainage from the Croatt
land would result in only a 458 gpm pumping rate and
indicated the ditch to which the water is to be drained
“appears to have more than 10 times the capacity of the tile
pump.” The studies further indicated the additional water
from the Croatt land “to be essentially unchanged from the
existing conditions” and “the capacity of the soil to absorb
more runoff than it currently does should be enhanced during
the growing season since the soil profile should be drier prior
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to summer rainfall events as a result of the tile.” While there
were photographs showing the [highway] 17 ditch full of
water during a major flooding [event], there was no evidence
presented which disputed the hydrological findings.
The utility or benefit accruing to the land drained
reasonably outweighs the gravity of the harm resulting to the
land receiving the burden. The hydrology studies indicate
there will be no harm to the land receiving the burden.
Additionally, there was evidence presented that the Croatt
land will receive a benefit and be better utilized with
additional drainage.
The proposed drainage is a reasonable and artificial
drainage system. All evidence, including the hydrology
studies, indicates the proposed drainage is a reasonable and
artificial system because it will not exceed the capacity of the
current ditch system and because the soil has the capacity to
absorb the additional water.
Evidence supports the board’s findings, and the board’s decision addresses the elements
of the reasonable-use doctrine. There was a reasonable basis for the board’s decision to
grant a permit for Croatt’s proposed drainage system, and the decision was not
unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.
DECISION
Because the board initially failed to consider the reasonable-use doctrine, the
district court properly remanded the issue of reasonable use to the board for
determination. The board’s decision finding that Croatt’s proposed drainage system
meets the elements of the reasonable-use doctrine and granting his permit application was
reasonable.
Affirmed.
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