David John Anderson v. Commissioner of Public Safety
Opinion text
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1378
David John Anderson, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.
Filed May 9, 2016
Affirmed
Cleary, Chief Judge
Polk County District Court
File No. 60-CV-15-630
Kevin T. Duffy, Duffy Law Office, Thief River Falls, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Smith, John, Judge.
SYLLABUS
A district court in an implied-consent proceeding lacks jurisdiction to hear an
untimely petition to rescind the revocation of a driver’s license, including where a driver
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
is mentally incompetent at the time of the revocation. However, in a subsequent criminal
proceeding, a driver may challenge the state’s use of such a revocation to enhance charges.
OPINION
CLEARY, Chief Judge
Appellant David John Anderson was charged in 2006 and 2008 with misdemeanor
driving while impaired (DWI) but was found mentally incompetent to stand trial for those
crimes. The commissioner revoked appellant’s driver’s license in response to each failed
sobriety test. Appellant filed a petition to rescind the revocations in 2015. He argues on
appeal that the district court erred by denying this petition. Because the district court lacked
jurisdiction over the untimely petition, we affirm.
FACTS
On December 14, 2006, appellant was charged with fourth-degree DWI. He
received a 30-day driver’s license revocation notice, but did not file a petition for judicial
review. In 2007, his license was revoked. On March 3, 2008, appellant was charged with
third-degree DWI. He received a 30-day license revocation notice, did not file a petition
for judicial review, and again his license was revoked.
While these DWI charges were pending, appellant underwent a rule 20 mental
evaluation. On October 24, 2008, the district court found that appellant “lack[ed] sufficient
ability to consult with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” in his defense and
was “mentally deficient so as to be incapable of participating in his defense.” Because he
was not competent to stand trial, and because both were misdemeanor charges, the 2006
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and 2008 DWI charges were dismissed. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 6(b). Soon after,
appellant was civilly committed as mentally ill and chemically dependent.
On December 22, 2012, appellant was arrested and charged with felony DWI -
refusal to submit to a chemical test, felony DWI - operating a motor vehicle under the
influence of alcohol, and gross misdemeanor driving after cancellation. Appellant claims
that the state is now using the 2007 and 2008 driver’s license revocations to enhance the
pending DWI charges.1
On April 16, 2015, appellant filed a petition for judicial review of the license
revocations, seeking to rescind the revocations. The petition was filed as an implied-
consent proceeding separate from the criminal proceeding. Appellant argued that, because
he was found mentally incompetent to face the 2006 and 2008 DWI charges, the related
revocations should be rescinded. The district court denied appellant’s petition. The court
reasoned that the 30-day period to file for judicial review of a revocation is jurisdictional
and is strictly enforced. Appellant filed his petition years beyond this deadline, and the
district court concluded that it was jurisdictionally barred from considering the petition.
This appeal followed.
ISSUE
Did the district court err by concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider
appellant’s untimely petition to rescind the revocations of his driver’s license?
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Appellant failed to cite anything in the record that establishes that the state is using the
revocations to enhance the charges against him. For the purposes of this appeal, we will
assume the truth of that unsupported assertion.
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ANALYSIS
Appellant contends that because he was found mentally incompetent to face
criminal charges stemming from his 2006 and 2008 DWI arrests, he was also mentally
incompetent to request judicial review of the corresponding license-revocation
proceedings. Therefore, he reasons, because the revocations are now being used by the
state to enhance a pending DWI prosecution, the revocations violate his due-process rights
and should be rescinded.
“We review due-process challenges de novo.” Thole v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 831
N.W.2d 17, 19 (Minn. App. 2013), review denied (Minn. July 16, 2013). Questions of
state-court jurisdiction are also reviewed de novo. State v. Barrett, 694 N.W.2d 783, 785
(Minn. 2005).
A driver may petition for judicial review of a driver’s license revocation within 30
days after receipt of a notice and order of revocation. Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 2(a)
(2014). A driver’s license represents a limited property right, and therefore revocation
proceedings are subject to certain due-process requirements, although these protections are
less stringent than the protections afforded to defendants in criminal proceedings. See
Davis v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 509 N.W.2d 380, 388 (Minn. App. 1993), aff’d, 517
N.W.2d 901 (Minn. 1994). Implied-consent cases, including drivers-license revocations,
are civil proceedings. State v. Dumas, 587 N.W.2d 299, 303 (Minn. App. 1998), review
denied (Minn. Feb. 24, 1999); Davis, 509 N.W.2d at 392. “In no case does incarceration
result from these proceedings.” Dumas, 587 N.W.2d at 303.
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However, a revocation may be used to enhance the penalties for a later DWI
conviction. State v. Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d 561, 569 (Minn. 2007). Because of the liberty
interests at stake, the use of a license revocation as an aggravating factor is limited “to a
situation where judicial review has already occurred or been waived by the failure to file a
timely petition.” Id. at 571.
Appellant makes two different arguments in support of his claim that his due-
process rights were violated. First, he argues that, because license revocations may be used
to enhance criminal charges, all revocation proceedings must satisfy the due-process
protections required in criminal prosecutions. Minnesota courts have rejected this
argument. Nordvick v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 610 N.W.2d 659, 663 (Minn. App. 2000).
Second, appellant argues that the use of the revocations as criminal enhancements
violates his due-process rights because he was mentally incompetent during the 30-day
periods in which he could timely request judicial review of the revocations. Driver’s
license revocations are civil proceedings designed to protect public safety, and “the 30-day
limitations period will be strictly construed even if a delay in filing is not the driver’s fault.”
McShane v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 377 N.W.2d 479, 482 (Minn. App. 1985), review
denied (Minn. Jan. 23, 1986); see State v. Hanson, 543 N.W.2d 84, 89 (Minn. 1996)
(stating that “the primary purpose of the [driver’s license revocation] law is to protect the
public by removing from Minnesota’s streets and highways those who drive under the
influence of alcohol”). “A failure to file a petition for judicial review within the 30-day
statutory period deprives the district court of jurisdiction to hear the petition.” Thole, 831
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N.W.2d at 19. Appellant does not dispute that he received notice of the proceedings and
failed to request judicial review of either revocation within the statutory 30-day periods.
Appellant appears to suggest that because of his mental incompetence at the times
he received notice of the revocations, he was not given adequate notice to seek judicial
review. Therefore, he argues, enforcing the 30-day jurisdictional bar would violate his
due-process rights. Notice is adequate in an implied-consent proceeding where the state
provides “[n]otice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.” McShane, 377 N.W.2d at 482-83 (quotation omitted). “Actual receipt of the
notice is not required to meet the due process requirement.” State v. Green, 351 N.W.2d
42, 44 (Minn. App. 1984). Courts have found notice to be adequate even where the
petitioner did not receive actual notice or claimed not to understand the notice. Id.; Johnson
v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 394 N.W.2d 867, 868-69 (Minn. App. 1986). So long as notice
of the opportunity to seek judicial review of a revocation is “reasonably calculated” to
reach the driver, it may satisfy due process even if it never, in fact, reaches that driver.
Green, 351 N.W.2d at 44.
Appellant does not dispute that he was provided notice, nor does he argue that the
commissioner’s method or execution of notice for implied-consent proceedings is
generally inadequate. Appellant believes that because he was incapable of understanding
the notice due to his mental incompetence, he did not receive actual notice of the
opportunity for judicial review. However, in a civil implied-consent proceeding, actual
notice is not required to satisfy due process. Here, the state provided notice that was
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reasonably calculated to reach appellant and it did, in fact, reach him. This is sufficient to
satisfy due process in the context of the civil implied-consent proceeding.
Because the notice to appellant was sufficient to satisfy due process and appellant
did not exercise his right to request judicial review within the 30-day period, the district
court did not have jurisdiction to hear the petition. “If the result now seems harsh, it is a
criticism that may be levelled against many statutes of limitation. Furthermore, as a matter
of public policy D.W.I. laws, including the implied consent statute, are liberally construed
in the public’s favor and are strictly applied.” Qualley v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 349
N.W.2d 305, 307 (Minn. App. 1984).
Nonetheless, we note that the state’s enhancement of criminal charges based on
revocations that occurred when a petitioner was mentally incompetent to seek judicial
review may constitute a violation of due process. State v. Warren, 419 N.W.2d 795, 798
(Minn. 1988) (holding that a defendant may challenge the state’s use of a prior
misdemeanor conviction as an enhancement where defendant had waived the right to
counsel in that earlier proceeding). However, an implied-consent proceeding “is not the
proper forum in which to raise” a challenge to the state’s use of a revocation as a criminal
enhancement. Davis, 509 N.W.2d at 389. “Instead, such arguments should be raised at
the time a person is charged with” a crime. Id. District courts in criminal cases must
scrutinize the use of such enhancements. The circumstances in this case may well
constitute one of the “unique” cases in which a criminal defendant may collaterally attack
a revocation to prevent it from serving as an enhancement. See State v. Schmidt, 712
N.W.2d 530, 538 (Minn. 2006) (stating that prior convictions may be collaterally attacked
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“only in unique cases” (quotation omitted)); Warren, 419 N.W.2d at 798 (holding that the
violation of a defendant’s right to counsel is a “pivotal constitutional right” that may justify
a collateral attack on a prior conviction); State v. Loeffel, 749 N.W.2d 115, 117 (Minn.
App. 2008) (holding that Schmidt also controls a defendant’s challenge to enhancements
based on a civil revocation proceeding), review denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2008). We express
no opinion as to the outcome of this analysis, but note that the proper proceeding in which
to raise this issue is a pending criminal action.
DECISION
The district court did not err by concluding it lacked jurisdiction over appellant’s
petition for rescission of his past license revocations, despite appellant’s claim that he was
unable to timely request judicial review due to mental incompetence. However, when the
state uses such a revocation to enhance criminal charges, appellant may challenge the use
of the revocation in the criminal proceeding.
Affirmed.
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