In re the Marriage of: Joanna Brooks Benson, f/k/a Joanna Lee Brooks, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1967

In re the Marriage of: Joanna Brooks Benson,
f/k/a Joanna Lee Brooks, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Carl Grant Peterson,
Respondent.

Filed March 6, 2017
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Reyes, Judge
Concurring in part, dissenting in part, Johnson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-FA-08-3227

Kristen C. Bullock, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Susan A. Daudelin, Henschel Moberg Goff, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Tracy M. Smith, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Reyes, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
In this appeal, the mother ch allenges three rulings of the district court. First, the
district court determined that distributions the father received from an inherited
individual retirement account were not part of his gross income and denied the mother’s
2
motion to modify the father’s child-support obligation. Second, the district court ordered
each of the parties to pay half of the travel expenses related to the father’s unsupervised
parenting time in California, where he resides. Third, the district court granted the
father’s motion for disclosure of the names and addresses of the child’s school and
medical providers. We affirm in part with respect to the second ruling, reverse in part
with respect to the first and third rulings, and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
Appellant-mother Joanna Brooks Benson and respondent-father Carl Grant
Peterson were married in California in December 2007. They resided together in
California until March 2008, when Benson moved to Minnesota. They have one child
together, S.B., who was born in August 2008.
The marriage was dissolved by the Ramsey County District Court in January 2010.
In the dissolution decree, the district cour t awarded Benson sole legal custody and sole
physical custody of S.B. and awarded Peterson parenting time in an amount that increased
incrementally with S.B.’s age. The parties stipulated that Peterson would pay Benson $385
per month in child support, based on his gross monthly income of $2,555.
The parties had a dispute concerning Peterson’s parenting time in 2013, which was
resolved by an agreement that was reflected in a stipulated order filed in July 2013.
Additional issues arose in September 2014, which the parties were unable to resolve in
mediation. Each of the parties sought relief from the district court in July 2015. After a
referee conducted a hearing on the parties’ respective motions in July 2015, the district
3
court issued an order in October 2015. Benson appeals from that order. The facts
relevant to each of the issues raised by Benson are described in detail below.
D E C I S I O N
I. Child Support
Benson argues that the district court erred in denying her motion to modify
Peterson’s child-support obligation by failing to consider his IRA distributions as gross
income and ordering her to pay half of the travel expenses related to Peterson’s parenting
time in California. We address each argument in turn.
To determine the existence and amount of a basic child-support obligation, a
district court must determine the gross income of each parent. Minn. Stat. § 518A.29
(2016); Minn. Stat. § 518A.34(a), (b)(1) (2016). The district court must subtract certain
credits from gross income to determine each parent’s parental income for determining
child support (PICS). Minn. Stat. § 518A.34(b)(1), (2). The district court then refers to
statutory guidelines to determine each parent’s proportional share of the total PICS
amount. Minn. Stat. § 518A.35, subd. 2 (2016). The district court must also “consider
certain statutory factors in addition to gross income and the child-support guidelines to
determine whether to depart from the presumptive child-support obligation.” Haefele v.
Haefele, 837 N.W.2d 703, 708-09 (Minn. 2013) (citing Minn. Stat. § 518A.43 (2012)).
The state has a strong interest in assuring that non-custodial parents provide for their
children. Murphy v. Murphy, 574 N.W.2d 77, 81, 82 (Minn. App. 1998); see also
Schaefer v. Weber, 567 N.W.2d 29, 33 (Minn. 1997) (noting “strong state policy of
assuring that children have the adequate and timely economic support of their parents”).
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A district court may modify an existing child-support obligation if the moving
party shows that a parent experiences “substantially increased or decreased gross
income” that makes the existing support obligation unreasonable and unfair. Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.39, subd. 2(a) (2016). An irrebuttable presumption of a substantial change in
circumstances arises if a new application of the child-support guidelines would result in a
child-support obligation that is at least 20 percent more or less and at least $75 more or
less than the amount specified in the prior child-support order. Id., subd. 2(b)(1); Rose v.
Rose, 765 N.W.2d 142, 145 (Minn. App. 2009). The moving party bears the burden of
showing a substantial change in circumstances and showing the resulting
unreasonableness and unfairness of the existing child-support order. Bormann v.
Bormann, 644 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. App. 2002).
This court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s
ruling on a motion to modify a child-support order. Putz v. Putz, 645 N.W.2d 343, 347
(Minn. 2002); Brazinsky v. Brazinsky, 610 N.W.2d 707, 710 (Minn. App. 2000). We
apply a de novo standard of review to a district court’s ruling on such a motion to the
extent it is based on an interpretation of the child-support statute. Hubbard Cty. Health
& Human Servs. v. Zacher, 742 N.W.2d 223, 227 (Minn. 2007).
A. IRA Distributions
Benson argues that the district court erred by not considering Peterson’s
distributions from an inherited individual retirement account (IRA) when determining his
“gross income” for purposes of the PICS calculation. The district court disagreed,
reasoning that the distributions were not gross income and concluding that Benson had
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not established a substantial change in circumstances warranting a modification of
Peterson’s child-support obligation.
In 2012, Peterson inherited an IRA worth $307,914.97 from his mother after her
death. Peterson, who has not been employed since 2011, received ten distributions from
the inherited IRA in 2014 and 2015 at various intervals totaling $77,614 to pay for his
living expenses, travel expenses, attorney fees, and to “purchase other assets.”
Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo.
Haefele, 837 N.W.2d at 708. The goal of statutory interpretation “is to ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2016); Haefele, 837
N.W.2d at 708. “If the meaning of a statute is unambiguous, we interpret the statute’s
text according to its plain language. If a statute is ambiguous, we apply other canons of
construction to discern the legislature’s intent.” Brua v. Minn. Joint Underwriting Ass’n,
778 N.W.2d 294, 300 (Minn. 2010) (citation omitted).
The definition of “gross income” for purposes of calculating child support is as
follows:
Subject to the exclusions and deductions in this section, gross
income includes any form of periodic payment to an individual,
including, but not limited to , salaries, wages, commissions,
self-employment income . . . , workers’ compensation,
unemployment benefits, annuity payments, military and naval
retirement, pension and disability payments, spousal
maintenance received under a previous order or the current
proceeding, Social Security or veterans benefits provided for a
joint child . . . , and potential income . . . . Salaries, wages,
commissions, or other compensation paid by third parties shall
be based upon gross income before participation in an
employer-sponsored benefit plan that allows an employee to
pay for a benefit or expense us ing pretax dollars, such as
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flexible spending plans and he alth savings accounts. No
deductions shall be allowed for contributions to pensions, 401-
K, IRA, or other retirement benefits.

Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a) (emphasis added). This court has described the definition of
income
1 as “broad.” Sherburne Cty. Social Servs. v. Riedle, 481 N.W.2d 111, 112 (Minn.
App. 1992).
Neither party argues that section 518A.29(a) is ambiguous; rather, they dispute
how broadly or narrowly to interpret it. Benson argues for a broad interpretation of
“gross income” that would include the periodic distributions Peterson receives from the
IRA account, which are subject to income tax, and that would result in a substantial
change in circumstances. Benson cites to Black’s Law Dictionary defining “periodic
payment” as “[o]ne of a series of payments made over time instead of a one-time
payment for the full amount.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1310 (10th ed. 2014).
Conversely, Peterson argues that the distributions are not gross income because he does
not receive them from a third party and they are not regularly made, referring to
“periodic” to mean “[r]ecurring at fixed intervals; to be made or done, or to happen, at
successive periods separated by determined intervals of time, as periodic payments of
interest on a bond, or periodic alimony payments.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1138 (6th ed.
1990). Under either definition his argument fails. Under operation of federal tax law,
Peterson must receive yearly distributions from the IRA he inherited from his mother, a

1 What the pre-2005 Child Support Statute defined as “income” is analogous to what is
now defined by statute as “gross income.”
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third party, and these distributions constitute “periodic payments” that qualify as “gross
income” under section 518A.29(a).
Under Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regulations, Peterson is the beneficiary of
the IRA he inherited from his deceased mother, who was the owner of the IRA, and he
“cannot treat [it] as [his] own” and he “must include in [his] gross income any taxable
distributions [he] receive[s].” See IRS, Publication 590-B: Distributions from Individual
Retirements Arrangements (IRAs) 5 (2016) (emphasis added).2 Peterson “cannot treat the
inherited IRA as [his] own,” and, as such, the distributions he receives are from a third
party. Id.; see also Barnier v. Wells, 476 N.W.2d 795, 796-97 (Minn. App. 1991)
(payments received from relatives). Furthermore, under IRS regulations, Peterson must
begin receiving distributions each year from the inherited IRA, which are referred to as
“minimum required distributions.” Publication 590-B, at 8. As a result, these
distributions he must receive on a yearly basis are “periodic payment[s]” under section
518A.29(a) and thus constitute “gross income.” See Mower Cty. Human Servs. v.
Hueman, 543 N.W.2d 682, 683-84 (Minn. App. 1996) (considering lump-sum payments
received every five years pursuant to two annuity contracts from tort litigation as income
for child-support purposes); Barnier, 476 N.W.2d at 796-97 (considering payments
received monthly and annually as income). Finally, because Peterson is required to

2 We take judicial notice of the IRS regulations despite the fact that such materials were
not presented to the district court. See Fairview Hosp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
535 N.W.2d 337, 340 n.3 (Minn. 1995) (noting that an appellate court may consider rules
and proposed rules set out in the Federal Register as well as publicly available articles
that were not previously presented to the district court).
8
receive annual distributions, he is receiving periodic payments, and the fact that he may
receive additional distributions does not mean that those distributions are not periodic.
We conclude that the distributions Peterson received were periodic payments
qualifying as gross income for purposes of calculating child support under Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.29(a). Therefore, we reverse and remand3 to the district court for a determination
of whether the distributions result in a substantial change of circumstances requiring
modification of his child-support payments.
B. Travel Expenses Re lated to Parenting Time
Benson argues that the district court erre d by ordering her to pay half of the travel
expenses related to Peterson’s parenting time (which we assume to be principally airfare)
on the ground that the district court increased her responsibility for travel expenses
without making a finding of a substantial change in circumstances.
The dissolution decree allowed Peterson to have parenting time in Minnesota, in
increasing amounts, until S.B. reached the age of five. After S.B.’s fifth birthday, in
August 2013, the decree also allowed Peterson two non-consecutive weeks of parenting
time, which he could exercise in Minnesota or outside Minnesota. The decree states that
Peterson was responsible for the expenses of his own travel to Minnesota for purposes of
parenting time and for any expenses associated with S.B.’s travel during his two non-
consecutive weeks of parenting time.

3 We also note that, under Haefele, in addition to performing the gross-income and the
presumptive child-support analysis, the district court is required under Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.43 to consider certain statutory factors to determine whether a deviation from the
presumptive child-support obligation is appropriate. 837 N.W.2d at 708.
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In July 2013, the parties entered into an agreement concerning parenting time in
Minnesota in the latter half of 2013 and early 2014 and, for the first time, parenting time
in California in the summer of 2014. The parties agreed that if Peterson consistently
exercised his right to parenting time in Minnesota, he would have two non-consecutive
weeks of parenting time in California in the summer of 2014. With respect to the
expenses of such parenting time, the parties agreed that Benson would be responsible for
paying her own travel expenses in accompanying S.B. on both legs of her first visit to
California, that Peterson would be responsible for paying his own travel expenses in
accompanying S.B. on both legs of her second visit, and that Peterson would be
responsible for paying S.B.’s travel expenses for both visits. The stipulated order
provides that all provisions in the original decree “not otherwise modified herein remain
in full force and effect.”
In his 2015 motion, Peterson asked the district court to award him, among other
things, parenting time in Minnesota and, in addition, four weeks of parenting time in
California each year. He also asked the district court to order each party to pay half of
the travel expenses associated with his parenting time in California. In response, Benson
asked the district court to restrict Peterson’s parenting time to Minnesota. She also asked
the district court to order Peterson to pay all travel expenses related to his parenting time.
The district court ruled that Peterson could have two non-consecutive weeks of parenting
time in California in 2016. The district court ordered the parties to evenly divide the
travel expenses related to Peterson’s parenting time in California, thereby adopting
Peterson’s position with respect to the allocation of travel expenses. The district court
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reasoned that the “parents have demonstrated an ability to participate in and pay for
parenting time transportation.”
Benson contends that the district court erred by shifting some travel expenses from
Peterson to her without making a finding of a substantial change in circumstances. She
relies on Kellen v. Kellen, 367 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. App. 1985), in which this court
concluded that a district court erred by shifting to the custodial parent all responsibility
for transporting a child to and from Marshall after the custodial parent had moved only
three miles, from East Grand Forks, Minnesota, to Grand Forks, North Dakota, while the
parenting-time schedule had remained the same. Id. at 650-51. We reasoned that there
was no meaningful increase in the total amount of travel expenses, so the district court’s
re-allocation of existing travel expenses effectively modified the existing child-support
order, thereby triggering the requirement of a substantial change in circumstances. Id. at
649-51. Benson asserts that, under the terms of the 2010 decree, Peterson was
responsible for all travel expenses related to his parenting time but that, under the 2015
order, she is responsible for half of the expenses necessary to facilitate his parenting time
in California. She contends that the additional travel expenses effectively decrease her
receipt of child support, in the same manner as in Kellen.
In response, Peterson cites Ballard v. Wold, 486 N.W.2d 161 (Minn. App. 1992),
in which one parent’s move from the Twin Cities to Winona gave rise to additional travel
expenses relating to parenting time. Id. at 162-63. We concluded that a substantial
change in circumstances was not required as in Kellen. Id. at 163. We reasoned that
“Kellen’s holding was unique to its circumstances and does not control here.” Id. We
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stated that the issue in Ballard was “the more neutral question of apportioning the costs
of new visitation expenses.” Id. (emphasis added). We reasoned that if a district court
makes adjustments to an existing parenting time schedule, the court “should allocate new
transportation expenses equitably.” Id. We explained that issues concerning new
transportation expenses (by which we meant either a new parenting schedule or an
expansion of an existing parenting schedule) “must be adjudicated without rigidly
applying statutes normally governing changed circumstances.” Id. (citing Auge v. Auge,
334 N.W.2d 393, 400 (Minn. 1983)).
In this case, the 2010 decree initially provided Peterson with a right to a limited
amount of parenting time in Minnesota. The decree expressly stated that Peterson was
responsible for the expenses of his own travel, which presumably refers to the need to
travel from California to Minnesota and back. After S.B. turned five, Peterson also had a
right under the decree to two non-consecutive summer weeks of parenting time in
Minnesota or outside Minnesota. Peterson again was responsible for the expenses of his
own travel as well as the expenses of S.B.’s travel, if any such expenses were incurred.
The decree appears to assume that Peterson would pick up and drop off S.B. in
Minnesota at the beginning and end of each of those non-consecutive weeks. The 2015
order expressly provides, for the first time, that Peterson has a right to parenting time in
California and that each party is responsible for accompanying S.B. to and from
California for one of the two summertime visits. In other words, the 2015 order requires
S.B. to travel from Minnesota to California two times each summer and requires Benson
to make at least one round-trip with respect to one of S.B.’s visits to California, whereas
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S.B. and Benson were not required to travel to California under the 2010 decree. Thus,
the 2015 order necessarily gives rise to a new form of travel expense.4
The facts of this case are more like the facts of Ballard, in which changing
circumstances gave rise to a need for the children to be transported to places where
parenting time previously had not occurred, which gave rise to additional transportation
expenses. See 486 N.W.2d at 163. For that reason, in Ballard, we reasoned that the new
transportation expenses may be allocated to both parties in an equitable manner without
considering whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances. See id.; see
also Danielson v. Danielson, 393 N.W.2d 405, 407 (Minn. App. 1986) (concluding that
district court did not abuse its discretion by evenly allocating new parenting-time travel
expenses after mother relocated to Montana). The Kellen opinion is inapplicable here for
the same reasons that it was inapplicable in Ballard. See Ballard, 486 N.W.2d at 163.
Thus, the district court did not err by allocating travel expenses related to
Peterson’s parenting time in California without finding a substantial change in
circumstances. Therefore, the district court did not err by denying Benson’s motion to
modify child support.5

4 Both parties compare the 2015 order to the original decree. They acknowledge that,
although the 2013 stipulated order expressly contemplated that S.B. would travel to
California and expressly allocated responsibility for those expenses, the 2013 stipulated
order governed the issue only with respect to the summer of 2014. The parties essentially
agree that, for summers after 2014, Peterson’s right to out-of-state parenting time again
was governed by the original decree. Accordingly, our analysis ignores the 2013
stipulated order, which was temporary in duration and no longer was in effect at the time
of the district court’s ruling.
5 Benson makes one additional argument, which we do not consider. She argues that the
district court erred by not ordering Peterson to contribute to the expenses of S.B.’s health
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II. Confidentiality
Benson argues that the district court erred by requiring her to disclose to Peterson
the name and address of S.B.’s school and the names and addresses of S.B.’s medical
providers. She argues that she should not be required to make those disclosures to
Peterson and that Peterson should not be able to otherwise obtain that information
because she is a participant in a state-sponsored program, referred to by the secretary of
state as the “Safe at Home” program, that is designed to maintain the confidentiality of
the addresses of persons who wish to avoid actual or threatened domestic violence. See
Minn. R. 8920.0100, subp. 18.
A. Safe At Home Program
Benson’s argument is based on chapter 5B of the Minnesota Statutes, which is
captioned “Data Protection for Victims of Violence.” Chapter 5B was enacted into law
in 2006 and became effective September 1, 2007. 2006 Minn. Laws ch. 242, §§ 1-8. The
purpose of chapter 5B is stated in the first section of the chapter:
The legislature finds that individuals attempting to
escape from actual or threaten ed domestic violence, sexual
assault, or stalking frequently establish new addresses in order
to prevent their assailants or probable assailants from finding

insurance and dental insurance. In response, Peterson argues that Benson did not
adequately present this argument to the district court. Peterson is correct that Benson did
not include this issue among the 17 issues that she enumerated in her July 2015 motion.
She did not submit a memorandum of law in support of the motion. She submitted an 18-
page, 55-paragraph affidavit in which she alluded only briefly to the costs of health
insurance and dental insurance. She did not present any argument on the issue at the
motion hearing. In these circumstances, Benson failed to preserve the argument by
presenting it to the district court and expressly asking for a ruling in her favor. See Thiele
v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988); Doe 175 ex rel. Doe 175 v. Columbia
Heights Sch. Dist., 842 N.W.2d 38, 43 n.1 (Minn. App. 2014).
14
them. The purpose of this chapter is to en able state and local
agencies to respond to requests for data without disclosing the
location of a victim of domestic violence, sexual assault, or
stalking; to enable interagenc y cooperation with the secretary
of state in providing address confidentiality for victims of
domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking; and to enable
program participants to use an address designated by the
secretary of state as a substitute mailing address for all
purposes.
Minn. Stat. § 5B.01 (2016); see also Jonathan Grant, Note, Address Confidentiality and
Real Property Records: Safeguarding Interests in Land While Protecting Battered
Women, 100 Minn. L. Rev. 2577, 2584-87 (2016) (describing address-confidentiality
programs in multiple states).
A Minnesota resident is eligible for participation in the Safe at Home program if
there is good reason to believe (i ) that the [person] is a victim
of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking, or (ii) that the
[person] fears for the person’s safety, the safety of another
person who resides in the same household, or the safety of
persons on whose behalf the application is made.

Minn. Stat. § 5B.02(e) (2016). An eligible person may enroll in the program by
submitting an application to the secretary of state, who “shall certify an eligible person as
a program participant,” so long as the application contains ten specified categories of
information. Minn. Stat. § 5B.03, subd. 1 (2016). “The secretary of state must designate
a mailing address to which all mail for program participants is to be sent.” Id. subd. 4
(2016).
If the secretary of state designates a mailing address for a program participant, the
participant is entitled to use the designated mailing address in lieu of a street address that
would disclose the participant’s residence:
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When a program participan t presents the address
designated by the secretary of state to any person, that address
must be accepted as the address of the program participant.
The person may not require the pr ogram participant to submit
any address that could be used to physically locate the
participant either as a substitute or in addition to the designated
address, or as a condition of r eceiving a service or benefit,
unless the service or benefit wo uld be impossible to provide
without knowledge of the pr ogram participant’s physical
location.
Minn. Stat. § 5B.05(a) (2016). In addition, “A program participant may use the address
designated by the secretary of state as the program participant’s work address.” Minn.
Stat. § 5B.05(b). The secretary of state is required to “forward all mail sent to the
designated address to the proper program participants.” Minn. Stat. § 5B.05(c). A
person who has received formal notice of a person’s participation in the program
generally is forbidden from disclosing to others the actual location of the participant’s
home, work, or school. See Minn. Stat. § 5B.05(d).
Notwithstanding the confidentiality protections described above, chapter 5B
contains other provisions that allow for limited disclosures of a program participant’s
addresses in a judicial proceeding in certain circumstances:
If a program participant’s address is protected under
section 5B.05, no person or entity shall be compelled to
disclose the participant’s actu al address during the discovery
phase of or during a proceeding before a court or other tribunal
unless the court or tribunal finds that:

(1) there is a reasonable belief that the address is
needed to obtain information or evidence with out which the
investigation, prosecution, or litigation cannot proceed; and

(2) there is no other prac ticable way of obtaining the
information or evidence.
16

The court must provide th e program participant with
notice that address disclosure is sought and an opportunity to
present evidence regarding the potential harm to the safety of
the program participant if the address is disclosed. In
determining whether to compel disclosure, the court must
consider whether the potential harm to the safety of the
participant is outweighed by the interest in disclosure. . . .
Disclosure of a participant’s actual address under this
section shall be limited under th e terms of the order to ensure
that the disclosure and dissemination of the actual address will
be no wider than necessary for the purposes of the
investigation, prosecution, or litigation.
Minn. Stat. § 5B.11 (2016).
The legislature authorized the promulgation of administrative rules “to facilitate
the administration of” chapter 5B. Minn. Stat. § 5B.08 (2016). The secretary of state has
promulgated administrative rules for that purpose. See Minn. R. 8920.0100-.1500
(2015). By administrative rule, both an eligible adult and “a minor child residing at the
actual address for whom a properly completed application or renewal is filed shall be
certified by the secretary of state as a program participant.” Minn. R. 8290.0300, subp. 1.

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B. Child-Custody Statute
Peterson argues in response that the district court did not err because he is entitled
by statute to information relevant to S.B.’s school activities and health, notwithstanding
Benson’s and S.B.’s participation in the Safe at Home program. Peterson bases his
argument on a provision in the child-custody statute, which provides: “The court shall
grant the rights listed in subdivision 3a to each of the parties, regardless of custodial
designation, unless specific findings are made under section 518.68, subdivision 1.”
Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 3(b) (2016). The rights listed in section 518.17, subdivision
3a, are as follows:
(1) right of access to, and to receive copies of,
school, medical, dental, religious training, police reports, and
other important records and information about the minor
children;

(2) right of access to inform ation regarding health or
dental insurance available to the minor children;

(3) right to be informed by the other party as to the
name and address of the school of attendance of the minor
children;

(4) right to be informed by school officials about the
children’s welfare, educationa l progress and status, and to
attend school and parent-teacher conferences. The school is
not required to hold a separate conference for each party,
unless attending the same conference would result in violation
of a court order prohibiting contact with a party;

(5) right to be notified by the other party of an
accident or serious illness of a minor child, including the name
of the health care provider and the place of treatment;

(6) right to be notified by the other party if the minor
child is the victim of an allege d crime, including the name of
18
the investigating law enforcement officer or agency. There is
no duty to notify if the party to be notified is the alleged
perpetrator; and

(7) right to reasonable acce ss and telephone or other
electronic contact with the minor children.

Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 3a (2016).
Section 518.17 contemplates that a parent might be a participant in the Safe at
Home program authorized by chapter 5B. In doing so, it refers to both the parent who is
a program participant and the parent who is not: “If one of the parties is a program
participant under chapter 5B, the other party shall send all information and notifications
required under subdivision 3a, clauses (1), (2), (3), (5), and (6), to the participant’s
designated address. The program participant is exempted from the requirements of
subdivision 3a.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 3(e).
C. Domestic Abuse Allegatio ns and Order for Protection
In the district court, Benson submitted an affidavit in which she stated that she
separated from Peterson in early 2008 and moved to Minnesota because Peterson had
engaged in domestic abuse against her. She stated that Peterson was convicted in a
California court of committing felony domestic assault in December 2007. Benson stated
further that a California court issued an order for protection (OFP), which was in effect
when she moved to Minnesota.
Because of the OFP, the district court allowed Benson to keep her home address
confidential during dissolution proceedings. In 2013, Benson still used a post-office box
for correspondence. In early June 2015, Benson applied to the secretary of state for
19
participation in its Safe at Home program on behalf of S.B. and herself. The secretary of
state certified both Benson and S.B. as program participants. The secretary of state
provided them with a designated mailing address, which is a post office box, and issued
them wallet-sized cards with the designated mailing address.
In his motion, Peterson asked the district court to, among other things, require
Benson to disclose to him S.B.’s home address and the names and addresses of S.B.’s
school and medical providers. In response, Benson asked the district court to deny
Peterson’s request for any location-identifying information concerning S.B. Benson’s
motion papers noted that she and S.B. are participants in the Safe at Home program.
At the hearing, Peterson abandoned his request for S.B.’s home address because
he had discovered it “through his own research.” With respect to the addresses of S.B.’s
school and medical providers, the district court orally acknowledged Benson’s safety
concerns, noted Peterson’s statutory rights, stated that Benson had requested “an extreme
remedy” that was not justified under the circumstances, and emphasized the importance
of allowing direct communication between Peterson and S.B.’s school and medical
providers. Accordingly, the district court granted that part of Peterson’s motion and
ordered Benson to disclose “the name, address, and telephone number of the minor
child’s school and all medical professionals who have worked with or are working with
the minor child.” The district court ordered Benson to provide the information to
Peterson through a web-based co-parenting application that the parties previously were
ordered to use. In its written order, the district court stated that Benson’s “participation
in the Safe at Home program does not impact [Peterson]’s right to know where the
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parties’ child goes to school and who provides medical treatment on her behalf” and that
“[i]t is in the best interest of the minor child for both parents to have school and health
information.”
D. Statutory Interpretation
To resolve the parties’ respective arguments, we must engage in statutory
interpretation. We begin the task of interpreting a statute by asking “whether the statute’s
language, on its face, is ambiguous.” American Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636
N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 2001). A statute is unambiguous if it “is susceptible to only one
reasonable interpretation.” Nelson v. Schlerer, 859 N.W.2d 288, 292 (Minn. 2015). If a
statute is unambiguous, we “interpret the words and phrases in the statute according to
their plain and ordinary meanings.” Graves v. Wayman, 859 N.W.2d 791, 798 (Minn.
2015). A statute is ambiguous, however, if it has “more than one interpretation.” Lietz v.
Northern States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d 865, 870 (Minn. 2006). If a statute is
ambiguous, we apply “the canons of statutory construction to determine its meaning.”
County of Dakota v. Cameron, 839 N.W.2d 700, 705 (Minn. 2013). We apply a de novo
standard of review to a district court’s interpretation of a statute. Caldas v. Affordable
Granite & Stone Inc., 820 N.W.2d 826, 836 (Minn. 2012).
The statutory provision that is most relevant to the parties’ dispute is the sentence
that concerns both the Safe at Home program of chapter 5B and the rights of a non-
custodial parent in section 518.17, subdivision 3a. That provision states, “The program
participant is exempted from the requirements of subdivision 3a.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17,
subd. 3(e). Benson contends that this provision means that she has no obligation to
21
provide Peterson with any of the information listed in subdivision 3a. Benson argues
further that her participation in the Safe at Home program effectively nullifies Peterson’s
rights to the information described in subdivision 3a such that the district court has no
authority to order her to provide such information to him.
Benson’s contention requires us to identify “the requirements of subdivision 3a.”
See Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 3(e). Subdivision 3a consists of a list of rights, without
any express statement of requirements. See id. We are mindful, however, of the canon of
statutory interpretation that states, “A statute should be interpreted, whenever possible, to
give effect to all of its provisions” such that “‘no word, phrase, or sentence should be
deemed superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” American Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616
N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000) (quoting Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379,
384 (Minn. 1999)). Furthermore, if two statutory provisions appear to conflict, we must
interpret them in a manner that gives effect to both provisions. State by Beaulieu v.
Independent Sch. Dist. No. 624, 533 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1995); Appeal of Crow
Wing Cty. Atty., 552 N.W.2d 278, 279-80 (Minn. App. 1996), review denied (Minn. Oct.
29, 1996). With those canons in mind, we interpret subdivision 3(e) to mean that a parent
ordinarily is required to share information with the other parent to ensure that the other
parent enjoys the rights described in subdivision 3a, but in light of the exemption in
subdivision 3(e), the participating parent has no obligation, absent court intervention, to
provide the other parent with the information necessary to vindicate his rights under
subdivision 3a.
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That interpretation of subdivision 3(e) does not answer the question of whether the
other parent’s rights to the information described in subdivision 3a may be vindicated in
other ways. As stated above, chapter 5B contains provisions that expressly allow court-
ordered disclosures of addresses of program participants in certain circumstances. Those
provisions expressly allow the disclosure of information concerning a program
participant’s address in the discovery process and in a court proceeding. Minn. Stat.
§ 5B.11. Those provisions may be applied to the particular circumstances of this case, in
which a parent has made a request in a court proceeding for information protected by
chapter 5B. See id. Thus, a parent’s participation in the Safe at Home program
authorized by chapter 5B does not preclude another parent from vindicating the rights
described in subdivision 3a. A parent may vindicate those rights by bringing an
appropriate motion, as Peterson did in this case. Upon such a motion, a district court
should consider whether the moving party’s rights to the information described in
subdivision 3a may be reconciled with the purpose of chapter 5B and, if so, may order
appropriate relief.
Benson contends that there should be no disclosure whatsoever of the address of a
person participating in the Safe at Home program because such a disclosure is likely to
result in subsequent disclosures of the address to others, thereby compromising the
protections of chapter 5B. But, as Peterson contends, that potential problem can be
avoided. Another provision of chapter 5B allows a program participant to give notice to
third parties (such as schools and medical providers) of the person’s participation in the
23
Safe at Home program, thereby imposing on the third party an obligation to not disclose
the confidential address to any other person. See Minn. Stat. § 5B.05(d).
In this case, the district court considered both Benson’s safety concerns and
Peterson’s rights to information relevant to S.B.’s education and health. But the district
court did not make any findings concerning the statute’s two threshold requirements: that
“the address is needed to obtain information or evidence without which the investigation,
prosecution, or litigation cannot proceed” and that “there is no other practicable way of
obtaining the information or evidence.” Minn. Stat. § 5B.11. The district court also did
not make any express findings on the ultimate question specifically required by the
statute: “whether the potential harm to the safety of the participant is outweighed by the
interest in disclosure.” Id.
Thus, the district court committed reversible error by requiring Benson to disclose
to Peterson the names and addresses of S.B.’s school and medical providers,
notwithstanding Benson’s and S.B.’s participation in the Safe at Home program
authorized by chapter 5B, without making the findings required by section 5B.11.
Therefore, we remand the matter to the district court for further consideration of the
applicable law and for additional findings.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
C/D-1

JOHNSON, Judge (concurring in part, dissenting in part)
I concur in part I.B. and part II of the opi nion of the court, but I respectfully dissent
from part I.A. In my view, Peterson’s inherite d IRA is an asset that belongs to him such
that he may take distributions from it without increasing his “gross income,” as that term
is used for purposes of calculating child support.
“Gross income” is defined to mean “any form of periodic payment to an individual.”
Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a) (2016 ). Peterson contends that his receipt of the inherited IRA
was not a periodic payment and that his subse quent distributions from the inherited IRA
were not periodic payments of the type define d by the statute. The text of the statute
supports Peterson’s contention. The statute requires a “periodic payment to an individual.”
Id. (emphasis added). The preposition “to” w ith reference to the indirect object “an
individual” implies that the payment must come from another person. See id. A person
does not make a “payment” to himself or hers elf. Indeed, all of the examples of gross
income in section 518A.29(a) are transfers of money from another pe rson or entity to a
parent. Thus, no “payment” was made when Peterson merely transferred funds from one
of his accounts (the inherited IRA) to another one of his accounts (presumably a checking
account).
The assets in Peterson’s inherited IRA should be treated in the same manner as other
forms of inherited assets, such as cash or se curities. If Peterson had inherited a savings
account with a balance of $300 ,000, he would not receive in come, in any sense of that
word, by withdrawing funds from his savings account. Likewise, if Peterson had inherited
corporate stock worth $300,000, he would not receive income by selling shares in exchange
C/D-2

for cash. See Duffney v. Duffney, 625 N.W.2d 839, 842-43 (Minn. App. 2001) (concluding
that proceeds of sale of timber from obligor’s land was not income for purposes of child
support). To be sure, intere st paid on funds in a saving s account and divi dends paid on
shares of stock are included in gross income. See Dinwiddie v. Dinwiddie , 379 N.W.2d
227, 230 (Minn. App. 1985) (noting that district court “erred in deducting interest income
and dividends from [obligor’s] total income”). But a person’s taking of a distribution from
his own IRA is merely a conversion of an asset from one form to a different form and, thus,
is not a “payment to an individual.” See Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a).
Federal tax law provides no reason to take a different approach. As an initial matter,
there is no authority for the proposition that the gross-income determination under section
518A.29 depends on whether a taxable event has occurred for purposes of federal income
tax. In addition, it is irrelevant whether Peterson funded the IRA, inherited it from a spouse,
or inherited it from his mother. Regardless of the original source, the assets in the IRA, for
all practical purposes, belong to him. He presumably exercises sole control over how funds
are invested and over the frequ ency, timing, and amount of di stributions, so long as his
distributions equal or exceed the amount of his annual required minimum distribution, see
I.R.C. § 401(a)(9) (2012); I.R.C. § 408(b)(3) (2012); Treas. Re g. § 1.401(a)(9)-6 (2015).
Whether the inherited IRA may or may not be “t reated as his own” is relevant only to the
calculation of the amount of his required minimum distribution, which is a consequence of
federal tax policy concerning th e extent to which income taxe s on contributions to IRAs
may be deferred.
C/D-3

It must be remembered that a finding of each parent’s gross income is merely the
starting point of the determination of a child-support obligation. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.34
(2016). Before making a determination, a district court also “must take into consideration”
certain statutory factors “in setting or modify ing child support or in determining whether
to deviate upward or downwa rd from the presump tive child support obligation.” Minn.
Stat. § 518A.43, subd. 1 (2016). One of thos e statutory factors is the “earnings, income,
circumstances, and resources of each parent , including real and personal property.” Id.
subd. 1(1). It is not difficult to imagine that, in appropriate circumstances, the existence of
an IRA or the taking of dist ributions from an IRA might justify a deviation from the
presumptive child-support amount, so long as the deviation served the purpose of the
deviation statute, i.e., to “encourage prompt and regular payments of child support and to
prevent either parent or the join t children from living in poverty.” Id. subd. 1. But IRA
distributions should not be considered at the first step of the child-support analysis, where
a district court makes findings of gross income. See Minn. Stat. §§ 518A.29(a), .34(b)(1).
In this particular case, Benson does not argue that the district court erred by not
making a deviation, most likely because, at the time of district court proceedings, Peterson
was current on his child-support obligation, which was determined based on the income he
earned before he became unempl oyed. Furthermore, Peterson is not seeking to avoid or
reduce his child-support obligatio n. If an obligor attempted to avoid or reduce a child-
support obligation by becoming unemployed and living off an IRA, the child-support
statutes would provide a means of setting or maintaining an appropriate amount of child
support: the district court could find the obligo r’s potential income and use that figure in
C/D-4

lieu of actual income. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.32 (2016). The record in this case indicates
that Peterson apparently is drawing down his inherited IRA instead of engaging in
remunerative employment. But Benson is not relying on Peterson’s IRA distributions as
an alternative basis of a finding of gross income. Rather, she is seeking a finding that his
gross income is equal to both the income he previously earned and the distributions he is
taking from his IRA. Such a finding of gross income proba bly would exceed the income
Peterson ever has earned, thereby giving Benson a windfall in the child-support calculation.
In sum, I would conclude that the district court did not err by ruling that Peterson’s
distributions from his inherited IRA are not included in his “gross income” for purposes of
determining child support and by denying Be nson’s motion to modify Peterson’s child-
support obligation for that reason.