, A17-0220, A17-0222

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0268, A17-0220, A17-0222

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Emanuel Lydell Collier,
Appellant,

and

Emanuel Lydell Collier, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent

Filed December 4, 2017
Affirmed
Worke, Judge
Concurring specially, Cleary, Chief Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-14-10939

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Cheri A. Townsend, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Bradford Colbert, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

2

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Worke, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
In this consolidated appeal of the district court’s order denying his postconviction
petition and the district court’s sentencing order, appellant argues that the predatory -
offender-registration statute violates his right to substantive and procedural due process as
well as the separation -of-powers doctrine , and also that the district court abused its
discretion by imposing a top-of-the-box sentence. Appellant raises additional claims in his
pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
FACTS
On April 21, 2014, appellant Emanuel Lydell Collier was charged with first-degree
aggravated robbery. The complaint alleged that Collier and another man ente red a
restaurant carrying handguns, forced several people to lie down, and then tied them up in
a storage area.
During plea negotiations, the state was prepared to amend the complaint to add
charges for assault and kidnapping or false imprisonment if the parties were unable to reach
an agreement. The state explained on the record that amending the complaint to include
kidnapping or false -imprisonment charges would result in Collier having to register as a
predatory offender for a period of time.
The parties were unable to reach a n agreement. The state filed an amended
complaint adding five counts of kidnapping, five counts of second-degree assault, and one

3
count of first-degree assault. The amended complaint alleged that Collier and another man
held five victi ms at gunpoint and that several of the victims had their hands tied behind
their backs. It also alleged that Collier and another man prevented the victims from leaving,
brought three victims to a stock room against their will, and forced them to lie on the floor.
The other two victims were taken against their will, tied up, and confined in a cooler.
During Collier’s jury trial, he agreed to plead guilty to the sole count of aiding and
abetting first-degree aggravated robbery in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining 11
counts and a sentence in the range of 88 to 105 months, as well as the dismissal of another
unrelated charge. Collier asked the district court if he would still be required to register as
a predatory offender despite the dismissal of t he kidnapping charges, to which the district
court answered affirmatively. Collier pleaded guilty to first -degree aggravated robbery,
and the district court sentenced him to 105 months in prison.
Approximately eight months later, Collier filed a petition for postconviction relief,
arguing that: (1) requiring him to register as a predatory offender based upon dismissed
charges violated his substantive and procedural due -process rights; (2) the district court
violated separation -of-powers-principles by re quiring him to register as a predatory
offender; (3) the district court erred in imposing a top -of-the-box sentence; and (4) the
district court erroneously calculated his criminal -history score with regard to two Illinois
convictions. The district court granted Collier’s petition only as it related to correcting his
criminal-history score. The district court resentenced Collier to 81 months in prison, the
top-of-the-box sentence based on his recalculated criminal -history score. This appeal
followed.

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D E C I S I O N
Due Process1
Collier argues that the predatory-offender registration statute is unconstitutional
because it violates his right to due process. The constitutionality of a statute is a question
of law that appellate courts review de novo. State v. Ness, 834 N.W.2d 177, 181 (Minn.
2013). Appellate courts exercise their power to declare statutes unconstitutional “with
extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary.” In re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363,
364 (Minn. 1989). This court will uphold a statute as constitutional unless the challenging
party demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that it is unconstitutional. Soohoo v.
Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 821 (Minn. 2007).
Substantive due process
Collier asserts that the predatory -offender registratio n statute infringes his
substantive due-process rights by requiring registration based on dismissed charges. The
Due Process Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit “certain
arbitrary, wrongful government actions, regardless of t he fairness of the procedures used
to implement them.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S. Ct. 975, 983 (1990)
(quotation omitted); Sartori v. Harnischfeger Corp. , 432 N.W.2d 448, 453 (Minn. 1988)
(stating that due-process protections under the Minnesota and United States Constitutions
are identical). If a statute implicates a fundamental right, “the state must show a legitimate
and compelling interest for abridging that right.” Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 716

1 Collier did not present a due-process challenge in his petition, but he reserved his right to
raise substantive and procedural due-process challenges on appeal.

5
(Minn. 1999). Whe n a statute does not implicate a fundamental right, the statute must
“provide a reasonable means to a permissible objective.” Id.
In Boutin, the supreme court ruled that the registration statute at issue in this case
did not violate substantive due process. Id. at 718. Specifically, the Boutin court concluded
that the registration statute did not implicate a fundamental right and that it was rationally
related to the legitimate state interest of solving crimes. Id. at 717-18.
Collier argues that since the Boutin decision in 1999, a series of local community
ordinances were enacted that severely restrict the rights of a registered predatory offender.
Collier argues that these ordinances implicate fundamental rights because they “impact
every aspect . . . of a person’s life—where to live, where to work, where to travel, and with
whom to associate.” However, whether these ordinances implicate Collier’s fundamental
rights is not properly before this court, as Collier does not argue that he is personally
affected by any of these ordinances. Collier lacks standing to challenge these ordinance s
because he offers no argument that he has suffered or is in immediate danger of suffering
some direct injury. See Paulson v. Lapa, Inc. , 450 N.W.2d 374, 380 (Minn. App. 1990),
review denied (Minn. Mar. 22, 1990) (stating that an individual challenging a statute’s
constitutionality must show that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining a
direct injury resulting from the statute’s enforcement).
Collier also argues that the registration statute restricts his right to interstate travel,
does not serve a compelling government interest, and is not narrowly tailored.
“The right to interstate travel is a fundamental right recognized by the United States
Constitution.” Schatz v. Interfaith Care Ctr., 811 N.W.2d 643, 654 (Minn. 2012). A statute

6

does not burden the right to interstate travel unless it affects one of the three components
of that right: (1) the right of a citi zen of one state to enter and leave another state; (2) the
right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien; and (3) for travelers
who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that
state. Id. (citing Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500, 119 S. Ct. 1518, 1525 (1999)).
Collier implicitly invokes all three components by arguing that the registration
statute makes interstate travel “more complicated for him” due to burdens imposed by other
states on registrants. As the supreme court noted in Boutin, however, “the registration
statute does not restrict [a registrant’s] ability . . . to move out of state.” 591 N.W.2d at
717.
Collier expressed a desire to travel to Indiana. Collier argues that because he is
required to register as a predatory offender in Minnesota, he would be required to register
as a “sex offender” in Indiana. See Ind. Code § 11-8-8-5(a), (b)(1) (2016) (defining “sex
or violent offender” to include “a person who is required to register as a sex or violent
offender in any ju risdiction”). However, if Collier moved to Indiana, the Minnesota
registration statute would not require him to register there. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166,
subd. 3(b) (2016). Rather, if an offender moves to a new state and that state has a
registration requirement, the Minnesota statute requires the offender to give written notice
of his new address to the designated registration agency in that state as a prerequisite for
the suspension of registration requirements in Minnesota. Id. The fact that a statute makes
interstate travel “more complicated” does not indicate a constitutional infirmity. Cf.
Schatz, 811 N.W.2d at 655 -56 (rejecting the argument that a Minnesota statute burdened

7
an injured worker’s right to travel to Wyoming because she received a d iminution in her
workers’ compensation rights under Wyoming law). Consequently, Collier has not
demonstrated that the registration statute impairs his right to interstate travel.
Because the registration statute does not implicate a fundamental right, it need only
“provide a reasonable means to a permissible objective.” Boutin, 591 N.W.2d at 716. In
Boutin, the supreme court noted that “the primary purpose of the [registration] statute is to
create an offender registry to assist law enforcement with inve stigations.” Id. at 717.
Furthermore, the supreme court concluded that such a list is rationally related to the
legitimate state interest of solving crimes. Id. at 718.
An individual must register as a predatory offender if that person was charged with
a qualifying felony and convicted of that offense or another offense arising out of the same
set of circumstances. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1) (2016). Collier does not
dispute that he was charged with kidnapping, a predatory felony, and that he was convicted
of an offense arising out of the same circumstances. See id., subd. 1b(a)(1)(ii). Rather, he
disputes the rationality of requiring him to register as a result of a charge that was
dismissed. However, the supreme court has rejected that argument. See Boutin , 591
N.W.2d at 718 (reasoning that keeping a list of offenders convicted of offenses arising out
of the same set of circumstances as qualifying pred atory offenses “is rationally related to
the legitimate state interest of solving crimes”). Because Collier has failed to demonstrate
that the registration statute implicates a fundamental right and that the statute is not
rationally related to a legitimate state interest, he has failed to establish that the registration
statute violates his right to substantive due process.

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Procedural due process
Collier argues that the district court violated his right to procedural due process by
requiring him to register as a predatory offender based on a charge that was dismissed, thus
depriving him an opportunity to contest the charge.
The Due Process Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit
the deprivation of constitutionally protected interests in life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125, 110 S. Ct. at 983 (quotation omitted);
Sartori, 432 N.W.2d at 453 . “When procedural due process is at issue, [this court] must
first determine whether a protectable liberty interest is at stake.” Boutin, 591 N.W.2d at
718. If the interest at stake is a person’s reputation, a complainant must demonstrate a loss
of reputation coupled with the loss of some other tangible interest—the “stigma-plus” test.
Id. (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-02, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1160-61 (1976)).
In Boutin, the supreme court held that although being labeled a predatory offender
is injurious to one’s reputation, that injury must still be coupled with the loss of some other
recognizable interest. Id. The supreme court also rejected the argument that complying
with the requirements of the registration statute constitutes the loss of a recognizable
interest. Id. The court concluded that “there is no recognizable interest in being free from
having to update address information” and that such a minimal burden is insufficient to
satisfy the “stigma -plus” test. Id. Consequently, the supreme court held that the
registration statute did not violate the registrant’s right to procedural due process. Id. at
719.

9
Collier argues that since Boutin, the legislature has subst antially expanded the
predatory-offender-registration requirements. He identifies numerous changes to the
registration s tatute that he claims restrict offenders’ liberty: (1) an of fender lacking a
primary address must report weekly to law enforcement in the jurisdiction in which he is
staying; (2) an offender working or attending school in Minnesota who was convicted of a
predatory offense in another state or another offense arising out of the same set of
circumstances must register with law enforcement in the area where he works or attends
school; (3) an offender working or attending school outside of Minnesota must registe r in
the state where he works or attends school; (4) an offender must provide a primary address,
any secondary addresses in Minnesota , addresses of all property owned, leased, or rented
in Minnesota, addresses of employment and schools , and the year, model, make, license
plate number, and color of all motor vehicles owned or regular ly driven by the offender;
(5) offenders must consent to a treatment facility or residential housing unit releasing
information to law enforcement; (6) p rior to admission to a health-care facility, offenders
must notify the facility of their registration status and inform law enforcement that inpatient
admission will occur; and (7) c orrections agencies supervising offenders must notify a
child-protection agency before authorizing the offender to live in a household with
children. See Minn. Stat. §§ 243.166 (predatory offender registration), 244.057 (predatory
offender household with children) (2016).
With the exception of the health -care and child -protection agency notification s,
these requirements are reminiscent of updating address information, which the supreme
court in Boutin determined was “a minimal burden” and “clearly not the sufficiently

10

important interest th e ‘stigma -plus’ test requires.” 591 N.W.2d at 718. Although t he
registration statute now requires offenders to provide more information than in 1999, these
changes still impose only a minimal burden on offenders. Consequently, these changes to
the registration statute do not sufficiently burden Collier’s liberty in terest to constitute a
due-process violation.
Collier argues that the health-care notification burdens his liberty interest because it
authorizes dissemination of offender information to the general public. In Boutin, the
supreme court acknowledged that while the dissemination of information about a registered
offender is injurious to the offender’s reputation, to succeed on a due-process challenge, a
person must suffer more than mere stigma. Id. Collier has not demonstrated that he has
been or is likely to be deprived of health care or any other recognizable interest as a result
of the dissemination of his registration information to individuals who do not work in law
enforcement. Similarly, Collier has not demonstrated that he has been or is likely to be
deprived of housing as a result of the child-protection agency notification. Collier has not
established that the registration statute restricts his liberty now more than it did when the
supreme court decided Boutin.
Collier also argues that he was den ied due process because he never had an
opportunity to contest the predatory charges against him, as those charges were dismissed.
“[I]t is the judiciary’s determination of probable cause . . . that triggers the statutory
basis for sex-offender registration.” State v. Haukos, 847 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Minn. App.
2014). In State v. Lopez, 778 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn. 2010), the supreme court recognized
that the registration statute mandates registration for offenders charged with, but not

11
necessarily convicted of, predatory offenses to “ensure that true predatory offenders cannot
plead out of the registration requirements.”
Here, the district court concluded that probable cause existed to support each charge
of the amended complaint. Collie r never challenged t he probable -cause determination
regarding the kidnapping charges despite having an opportunity to do so. Furthermore,
Collier pleaded guilty after sever al days of trial. Collier had sufficient opportunity to
contest the kidnapping charges that triggered the registration requirement. On this record,
Collier has not demonstrated that the registration statute violates his right to procedural due
process.
Separation of powers
Collier argues that the registration statute violates the separation-of-powers doctrine
by placing complete power to require registration in the hands of the prosecution —the
executive branch. However, “it is the judiciary’s determination of probable cause, not the
prosecutor’s bringing of a charge, that triggers . . . registration.” Haukos, 847 N.W.2d at
273. While the prosecutor may exercise discretion to charge offenses that could trigger
predatory-offender registration, that discretion is checked by the judiciary. Collier has
failed to establish that the registration statute violates the separation-of-powers doctrine.
Sentence
Collier argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a top -of-the-
box sentence. This court affords the district court great discretion in the imposition of
sentences and will reverse sen tencing decisions only for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307 -08 (Minn. 2014). A sentence within the guidelines range is

12

presumed to be appropriate. Mi nn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1 (2013 ); see State v. Jackson ,
749 N.W.2d 353, 359 n .2 (Minn. 2008) . Because the district court imposed a sentence
within the guidelines range, the district court did not abuse its discretion. See State v.
Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 -8 (Minn. 1981) (stating that although reasons may support
departing downward, the district court is not required to depart).
Pro se supplemental brief
In his pro se supplemental brief, Collier argues that the district court did not properly
consider the suppression of a 911 -call transcript and “caller ID” in a prior order and
improperly calculated his criminal-history score by failing to account for time served on a
prior probation revocation. This court does not consider pro se claims that are unsupported
by either arguments or citations to legal authority. State v. Bartylla , 755 N.W.2d 8, 22
(Minn. 2008). Collier cites no legal argument or legal authority in his pro se supplemental
brief. Collier is not entitled to relief based on the claims in his pro se supplemental brief.
Affirmed.

CS-1
CLEARY, Chief Judge (concurring specially)
While I concur with the majority that, under Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711
(Minn. 1999) and Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2003), appellant’s req uired
registration does not deny him his constitutional right to procedural due process, I write
separately to suggest that while the consequence of registration was once arguably limited
to a loss of reputation, the consequences are now coming dangerously close to the loss of
other tangible liberty interests, as required for a finding of “stigma -plus” under Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
Since the Boutin court rejected the argument that the “stigma -plus” test had been
met by a requirement of updated a ddress information in 1999, registration requirements
have expanded significantly, penalties for failure to register have become more severe, and
those who are labelled as predatory offenders (level III or not) have become true pariahs.
The majority sugge sts such additional requirements impose “an additional, but still
minimal, burden upon offenders.” Arguably so, but “minimal” is reaching the tipping point
into “substantial.”
Most concerning is the new health care facility requirement. Unlike the statut es
considered in Boutin and Gunderson, the law now provides that if appellant were ever to
be admitted to a hospital or other health care facility, his information, including his
demographics, conviction history, risk level classification, and profile of possible victims,
would be distributed to several of the facility’s staff as well as the facility’s entire
residential population, including any resident’s next of kin or emergency contact in the
event of that resident’s unstable status. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 4b(c), (d) (2016).

CS-2

Law enforcement, and indeed government officials, are no longer the only recipients
of a registrant’s information: a registrant’s information is now subject to any and every
health care facility resident’s possession. While the law limits the government recipients’
use of the information to law enforcement and corrections purposes only, Minn. Stat.
§ 243.166, subd. 7(b) (2016), we are left with the mere hope that the civilian recipients will
use the information in the same fashion.
One is forced to conclude that when it comes to a “stigma-plus” test, one must start
by recognizing that in this day and age, simply being labelled a predatory offender, with
all that connotes, is more than sufficient to satisfy the “stigma” portion of the analysis.
Developments in registration requirements have increased the burden on registrants while
these same registrants are finding new and even more burdensome restrictions on where
they are allowed to live and work, if they can find employment . And, in appellant’s case,
all of these consequences resulted from a finding of probable cause on charges later
dismissed.
While existing caselaw suggests that appellant has not been denied his constitutional
right to procedural due process, that caselaw is arguably outdated, overtaken by what it
means to be labelled a predatory offender in 2017, subjected to new and more invasive
registration requirements and living restrictions, eighteen years after Boutin.