State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0394

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lynette Marie Robbins,
Appellant.

Filed May 22, 2017
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Lyon County District Court
File No. 42-CR-15-457

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Michael Everson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Rick Maes, Lyon County Attorney, Marshall, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges her conviction of first-degree controlled-substance crime and
the subsequent denial of postconviction relief. Appellant argues that the district court erred
by denying her request to suppress evidence as a discovery sanction and by granting the
state’s request to impeach her with prior convictions if she testified at trial. Appellant also
argues that the postconviction court erred by refusing to resentence her under the
Minnesota Drug Sentencing Reform Act. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Lynette Marie Robbins was convicted of first -degree controlled -
substance crime (methamphetamine sale) after a jury trial. Before trial, the district court
denied Robbins’s request to suppress photographs of text messages between J.A. (an
informant) and Robbins as a discovery sanction. The district court also ruled that the state
could introduce Robbins’s theft, larceny, and burglary convictions as impeachment
evidence. Robbins did not testify, and the convictions were not introduced.
The evidence at trial showed that in 2014, Robbins’s neighbor, J.A., contacted law
enforcement and offered to act as an informant because he was concerned about criminal
activity in his apartment building. On December 2, 2014, J.A. arranged to purchase one
half of an ounce of methamphetamine from Robbins for $700. Although law enforcement
arranged a controlled buy between J.A. and Robbins , Robbins sent J.A. a text message
indicating that her plans had changed. She informed J.A. that she was going to run errands,
would give J.A. the methamphetamine before she left, and would get the money from him
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when she returned. J.A. picked up the methamphetamine from Robbins as agreed, met
with a law-enforcement officer promptly thereafter, and gave the officer approximately 14
grams of methamphetamine. At that time, the officer gave J.A. $700 in recorded bills to
pay for the methamphetamine. The officer also fitted J.A. with a recording device.
The officer dropped J.A. off near Robbins’s apartment building, watched J.A. walk
into the building, and listened to a conversation between Robbins and J.A., which occurred
in Robbins’s apartment. J.A. questioned the quality of the methamphetamine, suggesting
that a friend had suffered negative side effects after using it . He also tried to convince
Robbins to accept a lower price. J.A. eventually gave Robbins the $700 in recorded bills
as payment for the methamphetamine. An audio recording of this transaction was played
at trial.
The jury found Robbins guilty as charged. Robbins co mpleted a presentence
investigation and moved for downward dispositional and durational departures. The
district court denied both requests and sentenced Robbins to a presumptive sentence of 135
months in prison.
Robbins appealed to this court, and we st ayed the appeal so she could seek
postconviction relief. Robbins petitioned for postconviction relief, seeking a downward
dispositional departure or a sentence reduction on the grounds that “[f]ollowing
[Robbins’s] conviction, the Minnesota legislature a mended Minnesota controlled
substance laws and the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission enacted changes
that lowered presumptive sentences for controlled substance convictions.” The
postconviction court denied relief, reasoning that Robbins’s conviction was for an offense
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that predated the effective date of the amendments and that the amendments therefore did
not apply. This court reinstated the appeal.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Robbins’s request for
a discovery sanction.

One week before trial, the state disclosed the existence of photographs of text
messages between J.A. and Robbins regarding the drug transaction. Robbins moved to
suppress the photographs as a discovery sanction for late disclos ure, and the district court
denied her request. The state agrees that the late disclosure was a discovery violation.
Whether or not to impose a sanction for a discovery violation “is a matter
particularly suited to the judgment and discretion of the [district] court.” State v. Patterson,
587 N.W.2d 45, 50 (Minn. 1998) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, an appellate court will
not overturn such a ruling “absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Id. (quotation omitted).
When considering a sanction for a discovery violation, the district court should “take
into account: (1) the reason why disclosure was not made; (2) the extent of prejudice to the
opposing party; (3) the feasibility of rectifying that prejudice by a continuance; and (4) any
other relevant factors.” State v. Lindsey, 284 N.W.2d 368, 373 (Minn. 1979). “Preclusion
of evidence is a severe sanction which should not be lightly invoked.” Id. at 374.
In denying Robbins’s request , the district court applied the Lindsey factors and
reasoned:
Here, the disclosure was not made because law enforcement
did not provide the information to the State. There is no excuse
for law enforcement’s failure to provide their full investigative
file to the prosecution in this case. Certainly, more care and
5
effort should be taken in the future to avoid late disclosure of
evidence. There is, however, no demonstrable prejudice to the
Defense due to the late disclosure. The existence and general
nature of the text messages were noted in the police reports
which were timely disclosed. The Defense has no objection if
[J.A.] testifies about the text messages. The text messages,
then, presumably only tend to corroborate [J.A.’s] anticipated
testimony. Due to the lack of any prejudice and taking into
consideration th at the Defendant remains in custody, a
continuance is neither feasible nor necessary. In any event, the
Defense has not requested a continuance of the trial. Based
upon the totality of the circumstances, the Defense’s motion to
exclude the [photographs] is denied.

The state argues that the “district court correctly exercised its discretion . . . because
the untimely disclosure was inadvertent and did not prejudice [Robbins].” Robbins argues
that the district court’s refusal to suppress the photographs was an abuse of discretion and
that she was prejudiced by this error because “[t]he late disclosure prevented the defense
from preparing adequately and might hav e affected plea negotiations.” The state has the
better argument.
Generally, a defendant must show prejudice to obtain a new trial based on a
discovery violation. State v. Boldman, 813 N.W.2d 102, 109 (Minn. 2012). “To establish
prejudice, a defendant must show that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of
the trial would have been different [if the discovery violation had not occurred].” Id.
The record establishes that the state timely disclosed the existence of the text
messages and that it intended to offer evidence regarding the text messages at trial. The
photographs merely confirmed the existence of the previously disclosed text messages.
Moreover, Robbins did not request a continuance to further prepare for trial. Lastly, the
state kept its plea offer open after it disclosed the photographs, and Robbins ultimately
6
rejected the offer . Under the circumstances, we are not persuaded that Robbins did not
have adequate time to prepare after disclosure of the photographs or that the late disclosure
impacted plea negotiations.
The record does not otherwise suggest that Robbins was prejudiced by the discovery
violation. The jury heard testimony regarding the text messages. In addition, J.A. testified
regarding the drug transaction and explained that he was wearing a recording device when
he paid Robbins f or the methamphetamine. The jury heard the audio recording of a
conversation between J.A. and Robbins regarding the purchase price and quality of the
methamphetamine. Lastly, Robbins’s roommate, T.B., testified that Robbins told him that
she had provided methamphetamine to J.A. Given the strength of the evidence against
Robbins, we are not persuaded that the outcome of the trial would have been different if
the photographs of the text messages had not been admitted.
In sum, Robbins has not demonstrate d prejudicial error, and she therefore is not
entitled to relief based on the district court’s refusal to suppress the photographs as a
discovery sanction.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the state could
introduce Robbins’s prior theft and burglary convictions as impeachment
evidence.
The district court ruled that if Robbins testified, the state could introduce her felony-
level convictions of second-degree burglary (2006), theft (2006), and facilitation of larceny
7
(2014) as impeachment evidence.1 Robbins assigns error to this ruling.
Under Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(1):
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall
be admitted only if the crime . . . was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which
the witness was convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect[.]

When balancing the probati ve value and prejudicial effect, courts consider five
factors:
(1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the date of
the conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history, (3) the
similarity of the past crime with the charged crime (the greater
the similarity, the greater the reason for not permitting use of
the prior crime to impeach), (4) the importance of [the]
defendant’s testimony, and (5) the centrality of the credibility
issue.

State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 534, 537-38 (Minn. 1978).
“[A] district court should demonstrate on the record that it has considered and
weighed the Jones factors.” State v. Swanson , 707 N.W.2d 645, 655 (Minn. 2006). A
district court’s ruling regarding impeachment of a testifying defendant by prior conviction
is reviewed for a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Ihnot , 575 N.W.2d 581, 584 (Minn.
1998).

1 The district court also ruled that a 2002 second -degree-burglary conviction would be
admissible for impeachment purposes if the state could “demonstrate that the date of
discharge occurred sometime after November 4, 2005.”
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The district court considered each of the Jones factors before ruling that Robbins
could be impeached with her prior convictions. Robbins concedes that fact ors 2, 3, and 5
“might have weighed in favor of admission,” but she argues that the district court abused
its discretion because “the impeachment value was minimal, at best, and [her] testimony
was important to her defense.”
As to the first Jones factor, the district court followed the whole -person approach,
which recognizes that “impeachment by prior crime aids the jury by allowing it to see the
‘whole person’ and thus to judge better the truth of [her] testimony.” State v. Brouillette,
286 N.W.2d 702, 707 (Minn. 1979) (quotation omitted). Robbins complains that under
this approach, “any crime could be relevant to veracity” and argues that her “prior felony
convictions were not related to her veracity.” Robbins’s position is inconsistent with the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s continued reliance on the whole-person approach as explained
in State v. Hill:
Under both our approach to Rule 609(a) and the common law
tradition, it is the general lack of respect for the law, rather than
the specific nature of the convicti on, that informs the
fact-finder about a witness’s credibility, at least with respect to
convictions other than those involving dishonesty or false
statements. In other words, any felony conviction is probative
of a witness’s credibility, and the mere fact that a witness is a
convicted felon holds impeachment value.

801 N.W.2d 646, 652 (Minn. 2011) (emphasis added).
As to the fourth Jones factor, the importance of the defendant’s testimony, the
district court noted that it was “unknown what [Robbins’s] likely testimony could be.” “It
is, of course, the responsibility of the defendant to make an offer of proof as to what would
9
have been the substance of the testimony, had it been provided.” Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d at 587
n.3. But Robbins did not make an offer of proof to enable the district court to assess the
importance of her testimony. Unsurprisingly, the district court did not indicate whether
the fourth factor weighed for or against admission. Instead, it considered the fourth and
fifth factors together and reasoned that “if [Robbins] decides to testify and offers testimony
that conflicts with the State’s witnesses, her credibility would certainly be central to her
case.” See Swanson , 707 N.W.2d at 655 (analyzing the fourth and fifth Jones factors
together); State v. Gassler , 505 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Minn. 1993) (considering the fourth and
fifth Jones factors simultaneously).
Robbins argues that “because [her] testimony was critical [the fourth Jones] factor
also weighed against admission.” But as was the c ase in the district court, Robbins does
not describe her proposed testimony. We are hard -pressed to conclude that Robbins’s
testimony was “critical ,” and that it therefore weighed against admission of the
impeachment evidence , when Robbins has not provide d any insight regarding the
substance of her proposed testimony. Robbins’s failure to make an offer of proof —in
district court and in this court —weighs against her assertion of error. See Gassler, 505
N.W.2d at 67 (stating that “n o offer of proof was mad e as to any additional testimony
appellant would have added if he had taken the stand,” which “support[s] the [district]
court’s decision to admit the evidence for impeachment”).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the
state could impeach Robbins with the designated convictions if she testified. Even if the
district court had abused its discretion, we would not reverse if the error were harmless.
10
See State v. Vanhouse, 634 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. App. 2001) (indicating that we review
an erroneous ruling under rule 609 under the harmless -error standard) , review denied
(Minn. Dec. 11, 2011). “An error is harmless when there is no reasonable possibility that
the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” Id.
Robbins argues that “[h]ad [she] been able to testify in her own defense without the
fear of impeachment, it is reasonably likely that the jury would have reached a different
conclusion.” We are not persuaded. As described in the previous section of this opinion,
the evidence against Robbins was strong. Robbins does not explain how her undescribed
testimony could have created a reasonable doubt in the mind of a juror despite the strong
evidence against her . In sum, Robbins has no t esta blished that the district court’s
impeachment ruling constitutes reversible error.
III. The postconviction court did not err by denying Robbins’s request for relief
under the Minnesota Drug Sentencing Reform Act.

This court reviews a postconviction court’s denial of postconviction relief for an
abuse of discretion. Wayne v. State , 870 N.W.2d 389, 392 (Minn. 2015). “A
postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view
of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162,
167 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). “The retroactivity of a statute is a matter of statutory
interpretation, which [this court] review[s] de novo.” State v. Basal, 763 N.W.2d 328, 335
(Minn. App. 2009).
Robbins contends that she should have been resentenced under the Minnesota Drug
Sentencing Reform Act. The postconviction court concluded that the “2016 statutory
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amendments to Minn. Stat. [§] 152 do not apply to [Robbins] because the offense occurred
prior to August 1, 2016,” that the “Sentencing Guidelines that should have been a nd were
applied to [Robbins’s] sentence were those that were in effect at the time of the offense,”
and that “[t]here are no substantial and compelling reasons to depart durationally or
dispositionally from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.”
Robbins argues that the Minnesota Drug Sentencing Reform Act
impacts [her] sentence in two ways. First, because the goal of
this legislation is to focus on rehabilitation and tr eatment of
drug offenders, and [she] is eligible for treatment, this court
should resentence [her] and impose a downward dispositional
departure. Second, even if this Court does not resentence [her]
to a probationary term, she is entitled to a reduction in her
sentence to a term of 92 months, which represents the “bottom-
of-the-box” term under the new guidelines.

The Minnesota Drug Sentencing Reform Act included amendments changing the
quantity thresholds for certain controlled-substance crimes and directed reductions in some
presumptive sentences for controlled-substance crimes. 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, § 3, at
577-82; § 18, at 590-91. The Act provides that it is “effective August 1, 2016, and applies
to crimes committed on or after that date.” Id. at §§ 1-10, at 576-86.
“No law shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so
intended by the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.21 (2016). Robbins relies on an exception
to this principle, which was established in State v. Coolidge, 282 N.W.2d 511, 514 (Minn.
1979), arguing that “[n]otwithstanding the stated effective date, the Drug Sentencing
Reform Act applies to pending cases under the common law amelioration doctrine.”
12
In Coolidge, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that “a statute mitigating
punishment is applied to acts committed before its effective date, as long as no final
judgment has been reached. The rationale for such a rule is that the legislature has
manifested its belief that the prior punishment is too severe and a lig hter sentence is
sufficient.” Id. (citation omitted). But in Edstrom v. State, the supreme court clarified that
the Coolidge rule applies “absent a contrary statement of intent by the legislature” and did
not apply the rule because “the legislature ha [d] clearly indicated its intent that the
[mitigating statutes at issue] have no effect on crimes committed before [their] effective
date[s].” 326 N.W.2d 10, 10 (Minn. 1982). Id. The relevant statutory language in Edstrom
provided that “crimes committed prior to [a certain date] are not affected” by the relevant
amending act’s provisions. Minn. Stat. § 609.351 (1980); see also Edstrom, 326 N.W.2d
at 10.
In Basal, this court noted that Edstrom “substantially narrowed Coolidge’s scope.”
763 N.W.2d at 336. This court applied Edstrom and concluded that “[b]ecause the
legislature provided for a specific effective date for the . . . amendment, the legislature did
not intend for the amendment to apply to conduct occurring before the effective date.” Id.
The relevant statutory language in Basal “expressly provided that the 2007 amendment . . .
would become effective January 1, 2008.” Id.
Robbins argues that Basal “cannot be squared with Coolidge” because Basal did
not contain the statutory language in Edstrom that expressly pr ohibited retroactive
application. She refers to Minn. Stat. § 609.351, which provides that certain “crimes
committed prior to [a certain date] are not affected” by a particular amending act’s
13
provisions. Robbins’s argument is un availing because in Basal, this court said that
language setting forth the effective date of an amendment “is equivalent to the language
that was at issue in Edstrom.” Basal, 763 N.W.2d at 336.
Once again, the relevant portions of the Minnesota Drug Sentencing Reform Act are
“effective August 1, 2016, and appl [y] to crimes committed on or after that date.” 2016
Minn. Laws ch. 160, § 3, at 577 -79. This language, like the effective -date language in
Basal, indicates that the legislature did not intend the Act to apply retroactively. In fact,
we have previously held that nearly identical language did not result in retroactive
application. In State v. McDonnell, we held that a 2003 amendment did not apply to an
offense that occurred before August 1, 2003, because the statute’s effective-date provision
provided that the amendment “is effective August 1, 2003, and applies to violations
committed on or after that date.” 686 N.W.2d 841, 846 (Minn. App. 2004) (quotation
omitted), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2004).
Because the legislature has clearly indicated its intent that the relevant portions of
the Minnesota Drug Sentencing Reform Act do not apply retroactively and because
Robbins committed her offense before the effective date of the Act, the postconvic tion
court did not err by denying her request for relief under the Act.
Robbins also argues that the district cou rt “did not have the benefit of considering
[her downward dispositional departure] request in light of the Drug Sentencing Reform
Act, which prioritizes treatment as a more effective response than prison for convicted drug
offenders” and “favors treatment over excessively harsh terms of incarceration.”
Essentially, Robbins argues that she should have received a downward dispositional
14
departure based on the policies underlying the Minnesota Drug Sentencing Reform Act.
We disagree. As explained by the postconviction court:
The Court, having reviewed the record in this matter and
the current arguments of counsel, concludes, as it did at the
time of sentencing, that there are no substantial and compelling
reasons to support either a durational or dispositional departure
from the Guidelines. The Court noted at the time of sentencing
that it did not consider [Robbins] particularly amenable to
treatment or to probation based upon the fact that [she] had not
complied with probation supervision in the past, had not
complied with her conditions of release, and had left inpatient
treatment (which had been a condition of release). The
preference for treatment over incarceration for drug offenders
does not equate to a presumptive basis for a departure from the
Guidelines. For example, there may be violent drug offenders
for whom treatment may be beneficial and less costly than a
commitment to pri son; however, incarceration may be
necessary for protection of the public and appropriate based
upon the circumstances of the offense. In this case, the Court
considered the benefits of treatment over incarceration. Here,
[Robbins’s] history did not support the proposition that she was
serious about complying with treatment or probation.
Certainly, [Robbins] voiced a desire for treatment. [She] had
done so in the past in this case when arrested on a warrant
issued for failure to appear at a hearing and for violating her
conditions of release by using methamphetamine. The Court,
giving credence to [Robbins’s] expressed desire for treatment,
released [her] so she could enter treatment. Mere days later,
[she] walked out of treatment and was on warrant sta tus for
approximately two months. The Court remains unconvinced
that [Robbins], based upon her conduct, is amenable to
probation or to treatment. The Court also concludes that there
is nothing about the circumstances of this offense that makes it
less onerous than the typical controlled substance offense. The
Court further concludes that [Robbins] did not play a minor or
passive role in the commission of the offense. After careful
consideration of [Robbins’s] arguments and the record, there
simply are no substantial and compelling reasons to depart
from the Guidelines in this matter.

15
“Only in a rare case will a reviewing court reverse a district court’s imposition of
[a] presumptive sentence.” State v. Olson , 765 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Minn. App. 2009)
(quotation omitted). Whatever the policy goals of the Minnesota Drug Sentencing Reform
Act may be, they do not surpass the district court’s sound rejection of Robbins’s request
for a downward dispositional departure.
Affirmed.