State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0557

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ronald Ezel Scott,
Appellant.

Filed February 5, 2018
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-1803

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer , Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Reyes, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of controlled-substance crimes on the ground
that the district court abused its discretion by (1) making several evidentiary rulings,

2
(2) admitting an unavailable wit ness’s jail-call statements, (3) excluding defense-witness
testimony, (4) admitting impeachment evidence, and (5) denying a pretrial motion to
suppress evidence seized from an allegedly unlawful traffic stop. In his pro se
supplemental and reply briefs, a ppellant also asserts claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, judicial bias, and that the district court erred in its
evidentiary rulings. We affirm.
FACTS
In January 2015, two Minneapolis police o fficers were patrolling a high -crime
neighborhood when they observed a slow-moving vehicle approach a woman standing on
the street. When the vehicle turned into an alley, t he woman followed. After the officers
also turned into the alley, they observed the woman get into the backseat of the vehicle.
The driver of the vehicle drove down the alley at an above-average speed and turned
right onto a street, at which point t he officers observed that none of the occupants was
wearing a seatbelt. The officers signaled the vehicle to pull over. The driver stopped but
then started driving away. Moments later, the driver pulled over again and stop ped. The
officers approached the vehicle in a parallel fashion with their guns drawn but pointed
toward the ground . The officers holstered their guns upon reaching the passenger - and
driver-side windows.
One officer saw marijuana sitting on passenger D.P.’s lap, so the officer ordered
D.P. out of the vehicle , put him in handcuffs, and brought him around the back of the
vehicle. Meanwhile, appellant Ronald Ezel Scott threw something between the driver seat
and driver door. The officers ordered Scott out of the vehicle and conducted a pat-down

3
search, recovering more than $4,500 in cash from inside Scott’s jacket. When an officer
tried to handcuff Scott, Scott broke free and ran from the scene. After giving chase, t he
officers found Scott hiding underneath a vehicle p arked on a different street and arrested
him. The officers seized more than 9 grams of methamphetam ine, 5 grams of powder
cocaine, 13 grams of cooked cocaine, latex rubber gloves, a scale, and clear plastic baggies
from the vehicle.
The state charged Scott with first -degree cocaine sale in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 152.021, subd. 1(1) (2014); second-degree cocaine possession in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 152.022, subd. 2(a)(1) (2014); second-degree methamphetamine possession in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 2(a)(1); and second-degree methamphetamine sale in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 1(1) (2014).
Before trial, Scott moved to suppress all evidence , arguing that the officers used
excessive force by drawing their guns for a seatbelt violation. The district court denied
Scott’s motion. The state noticed its intent to impeach Scott with three prior felony drug
convictions and Scott’s parole status. The district court excluded two of the convictions
but admitted the third in addition to Scott’s parole status.
R.F., an acquaintance of Scott’s who was not present at the scene on the night of his
arrest, filed an affidavit through Scott’s counsel admitting liability for the drugs:
On Monday, January 19, 2015, at approximately 7:15-7:35 PM
I went to drop my vehicle off to my friend, Ronald Scott, so
that he could go and wo rk out. I then had another individual
pick me up and give me a ride home. The car was parked on
the 35th block of Portland Ave in South Minneapolis, I left my
keys in the visor for [Scott] to retrieve in order to use the
vehicle. As time went by (I woul d say 30 -45 minutes) I

4
checked my purse for a black “blood pressure” pouch which
contained cocaine and methamphetamine inside. When I
noticed that I didn’t have the pouch on me I immediately
phoned [Scott] and received no answer. I remember calling
him numerous times to let him know I had left those contents,
so he could quickly return my car. I never got a response. I
then used one of my friend’s cars to drive back over to South
Minneapolis in hopes that he didn’t already pick the vehicle up
and he did , I also went to the gym where he generally works
out and he was not there either. The next morning I learned
that he had been pulled over in my vehicle which contained my
drugs in it.

At trial, Scott maintained that the drugs belonged to R.F., introduced R.F.’s affidavit
as evidence, and called J.A., D.P., and R.F in support. J.A. testified that Scott was carrying
a large amount of cash because he was buying a used vehicle from J.A. that day. D.P.
attempted to offer an explanation as to why Scott fled from the police. But the prosecutor
objected on relevancy grounds, and the district court sustained the objection. R.F. testified
consistent with her affidavit. But as soon as R.F. finished testifying, the state arrested her
for aiding an offender. Both sides rested, and R.F. spent the weekend in jail.
Before closing argume nts on Monday, the prosecutor moved to reopen the state’s
case in order to rebut R.F.’s testimony. The prosecutor advised the district court and
appellant’s counsel that, during two jail calls recorded the same day that R.F. testified, she
said on the phone to someone familiar with Scott’s trial, “[W]e had an agreement,” “I kept
my end of the bargain,” and “[H]e said [he] was not going to hang [me] like Cookie.” The
prosecutor argued that these statements established that R.F. lied about owning the drugs
so as to take the fall for Scott. Scott moved for a continuance in order to listen to the tapes,
which the district court granted.

5
The following morning, t he district court g ranted the state’s motion to re-open its
case. Scott again requested a continuance, but the district court denied the motion.
When t he prosecutor called R.F. in rebuttal , she invoked her Fifth Amendment
privilege against self -incrimination. The prosecutor offered the jail calls as statement s
against R.F.’s penal interest. Scott’s counsel objected, arguing that R.F.’s unavailability
violated Scott’s confrontation rights. After concluding that the jail calls were not
testimonial, the district court admi tted them into evidence. The prosecutor subsequently
distributed copies of the transcripts, played the calls in their entirety, and argued during
closing that R.F. took the fall for Scott. The jury convicted Scott on all four counts. This
appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I.

A. Admission of R.F.’s Jail Calls
Scott first argues that the district court deprived him of a fair trial and abused its
discretion by admitting the jail calls as statements against R.F.’s penal interest, reasoning
R.F.’s statements were “an attempt at self -exculpation.” “Evidentiary rulings rest within
the sound discretion of the [district] court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of
discretion. On appeal, the appellant has the burden of establishing that the [district] court
abused its discretion and that appellant was thereby prejudiced.” State v. Amos , 658
N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003) (citation omitted).
In two jail calls recorded the same day that R.F. testified, she made several
statements to another person who was familiar with Scott’s trial. R.F. said in one call,

6
“Like we had an agreement man,” and in another call, “I kept my end of the bargain,” “I
don’t think he gonna get mad, cause I swear to God . . . he said, you know I’m . . . not
going to hang you like Cookie right?” and “[Y]ou watch Empire, right?” R.F. also
expressed overall discontent with her attorn ey, Scott’s attorney, and Scott , complaining
about the need to testify on a Friday, getting arrested after stepping down from the witness
stand, and being held in jail over the weekend. Over Scott’s objection, the district court
admitted the jail calls as statements against R.F.’s penal interest.
Hearsay, which is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hea ring, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted,” Minn. R. Evid. 801(c), is inadmissible unless an exception applies , Minn. R.
Evid. 802. One exception is for statements made against a declarant’s penal or pecuniary
interest. Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).
The rule states that if a declarant is unavailable, a statement is
admissible if, at the time of its making, it “so far tended to
subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability . . . that a
reasonable person in the declara nt’s position would not have
made the statement unless believing it to be true.”

State v. Morales, 788 N.W.2d 737, 762 (Minn. 2010) (quoting Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)).
Before admitting a statement under Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3), a district court must
(1) determine that the declarant is unavailable to testify; (2) conclude that the statement, at
the time of its making, so far tend ed to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability
that a rea sonable person in the declarant ’s position would not hav e made the statement

7
unless believing it to be true ; and (3) scrutinize the statement so as to avoid violating the
Confrontation Clause.1 Id.
As to the second step, the supreme court concluded in Morales that a declarant ’s
self-incriminating statements are admissible if , “in light of all the surrounding
circumstances, they are sufficiently against the declarant’s penal interest that a reasonable
person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to
be true, ” even if the statements also incriminate the accused. Id. at 763 (quotations
omitted). The supreme court reasoned that the declarant’s statements, although implicating
the defendant in the crime, were truly inculpatory and not attempts to “shift blame or curry
favor,” Williamson v. United States , 512 U.S. 594, 603, 114 S. Ct. 2431 , 2436 (1994),
“secure a plea bargain in exchange for informing on accomplices ” or “ lessen his
culpability,” Morales, 788 N.W.2d at 765. “Instead, [the declarant] was conversing with a
friend, without any expectation that his statements could be used to ‘curry favor’ with law
enforcement.” Morales, 788 N.W.2d at 765.

1 At the time of Scott’s trial in 2015, Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) provided that a statement
offered to exculpate the accused was “not admissible unless corroborating circumstances
clearly indicate [its] trustworthiness.” Ferguson v. State , 826 N.W.2d 808, 81 3 (Minn.
2013) (quotation omitted) . Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) was amended, effective 2016, to
provide that a statement offered in a criminal case is not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate its trustworthiness. See Minn. R. Evid. 804 2016 advisory
comm. cmt. Rules of evidence are “applicable to any trial held after the effective date of
the amendment.” State v. Friend, 385 N.W.2d 313, 319 (Minn. App. 1986), review denied
(Minn. May 22, 1986) . Because Scott’s trial was in 2015, we apply the pre -2016-
amendments version of Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). And because the statement was not
offered to exculpate the accused —Scott—the corroborating circumstances requirement
does not apply.

8
Here, R.F. said , “We had an agreement,” discussed holding up her end of a
“bargain,” and told the person on the phone that Scott was not going to “hang [her] like
Cookie,” referencing the television show Empire. In Empire, “the audience learns that
Lucious and Cookie were both involved in drug dealing, and that Cookie pled guilty so that
Lucious could pursue his music ca reer and take care of their children.” See Tanksley v.
Daniels, No. 16-CV-0081, 2017 WL 1735257, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2017) ( describing
the plot for Empire within copyright-infringement context). Scott maintains that R.F. made
these statements as a way to lessen her culpability. We disagree.
The district court determined that R.F. did not make those statements as a way to
minimize her culpability. Rather, R.F. was “conversing with a friend, without any
expectation that [her] statements could be used to ‘curry favor’ with law enforcement.”
Morales, 788 N.W.2d at 765. R.F.’s statements are self -incriminating as evidence of
perjury or aiding an offender. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.48, subd. 1 (criminalizing the making
of a false material statement “in or for an action, hearing or proceeding of any kind in which
the statement is required or authorized by law to be made under oath or affirmation”), .495,
subd. 3(a) (criminalizing “intentionally aid[ing] another person whom the actor knows or
has reason to know h as committed a criminal act, by . . . providing false or misleading
information about that crime . . . or otherwise obstructing the investigat ion or
prosecution”), subd. 4(a) (criminalizing “assum[ing] responsibility for a criminal act with
the intent to obstruct, impede, or prevent a criminal investigation”) (2014). In light of all
surrounding circumstances, the statements , at the time of their making, so far tended to
subject R.F. to criminal pe nalty such that a reasonable person in her position would not

9
have made those statements had they not been true. Morales, 788 N.W.2d at 767; see State
v. Usee, 800 N.W.2d 192, 199 (Minn. App. 2011) (concluding that the district court did
not err in admitt ing statement subjecting declarant to criminal liability equally with the
defendant); see also Fed. R. Evid. 804 1972 advisory comm. cmt. (“[A] statement
admitting guilt and implicating another person, made while in custody, may well be
motivated by a desi re to curry favor with the authorities and hence fail to qualify as [a
statement] against interest. . . . On the other hand, the same words spoken . . . to an
acquaintance[] would have no difficulty in qualifying.”).
But instead of analyzing each individual statement in the jail calls, the district court
admitted the jail calls in their entirety . In State v. Ford, the Minnesota Supreme Court
adopted the United States Supreme Court’s rule from Williamson for determining which
statements meet the Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) hearsay exception. 539 N.W.2d 214, 227
(Minn. 1995). “In Williamson v. United States, the Supreme Court concluded that the word
‘statement,’ as used in the statement -against-interest exception . . . should be narrowly
construed as ‘a single declaration or remark ’ rather than an entire confession narrative. ”
Morales, 788 N.W.2d at 763. “ Williamson provides that the appropriate analysis under
Rule 804(b)(3) does not consider whether an entire confession is, on balance, against the
declarant’s interest . . . . Rather, courts must analyze whether individual declarations or
remarks within a confession or conversation are each against the declarant’s interest.” Id.
(citations omitted). The supreme court concluded in Ford that the district court abused its
discretion for failing to conduct a Williamson analysis on the record but determined that
the error was harmless. 539 N.W.2d at 227.

10
The supreme court has at least twice concluded that a district court erred for failing
to parse out non-self-incriminating statements before admitting a statement under Minn. R.
Evid. 804(b)(3). See State v. Keeton, 589 N.W.2d 85, 89 (Minn. 1998); Ford, 539 N.W.2d
at 227; see also State v. Jones , 556 N.W.2d 903, 909 n.4 (Minn. 1996) (“ Prior to [the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s] adoption, in Ford, of the Williamson reasoning, a Minnesota
trial court was under no obligation to attempt to parse out a witness’ or co-defendant’s
statement to separate inculpatory from noninculpa tory portions of the statement.”). As in
Keeton, “nothing in the record indicates that the trial court applied the Williamson analysis
in determining that the entir e statements were admissible.” 589 N.W.2d at 89 ; see also
Ford, 539 N.W.2d at 227 (concluding same). The district court therefore plainly erred by
failing to conduct a Williamson analysis and not analyzing each individual statement in the
jail calls.
Having concluded the district court erred, w e must determine if that error was
harmless. Scott maintains that admission of the jail calls undermined his most compelling
defense evidence because the jail calls gave the jury “a reason to discount [R.F.’s]
testimony” and gave the prosecutor “ammunition to argue there was an agreement between
[R.F.] and Scott, she was taking the fall for him, and they had a scheme or plan.”
“An error is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that it substantially
influence[d] the jury’s decision.” State v. Taylor , 869 N.W.2d 1, 14 (Minn. 2015)
(alteration in original) (quotation omitted). The prosecutor introduced evidence that Scott
was the driver, exhibited furtive movements, and threw something between the door and
seat which later turned out to be the drug bag. Minnesota law provides that the “presence

11
of a controlled substance in a passenger automobile permits the fact finder to infer knowing
possession of the controlled substance by the driver or person in control of the automobile
when the controlled substance was in the automobile. ” Minn. Stat. § 152.028, subd. 2
(2014). Scott also evaded handcuffs, broke free from the officers, and fled from the scene,
all of which is “evidence of consciousness of guilt.” State v. Caine, 746 N.W.2d 339, 356
(Minn. 2008). In addition, a person may also “constructively possess contraband jointl y
with another person.” State v. Ortega , 770 N.W.2d 145, 150 (Minn. 2009). Even if the
jury believed R.F.’s testimony, the jury could st ill have convicted Scott of the controlled-
substance sale and possession crimes. Where the “weight of the evidence is so great that
it justifies the verdict regardless of the erroneous admission, [the Minnesota Supreme Court
has] concluded the erroneous admission was harmless.” Ford, 539 N.W.2d at 227.
Because there is no reasonable probability that the district court’s failure to parse the jail
call statements substantially influenced the jury’s decision, th e district court’s error is at
most harmless.
B. Scott’s Mid-Trial Motion for a Continuance
Scott also argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his mid-trial
motion for a continuance. A ruling on a request for a continuance is within the district
court’s discretion, and a conviction will not be reversed for denial of a motion for a
continuance unless the den ial is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Rainer, 411 N.W.2d
490, 495 (Minn. 1987). On appeal, we consider “the circumstances before the [district]
court at the time the motion [for a continuance] was made to determine whether the

12
[district] court’s d ecision prejudiced [the] defendant by materially affecting the outcome
of the trial.” State v. Turnipseed, 297 N.W.2d 308, 311 (Minn. 1980).
In response to the prosecutor’s motion to reopen the state’s case, the district court
continued the trial for one day. That evening, the district court emailed counsel:
To expedite things for tomorrow, I intend to allow the state to
reopen but they will not be able to impeach [R.F.] with jail calls
pursuant to the Rules of Evidence 613 because a witness
cannot be impeached by extrinsic evidence. She is not a party
opponent which is the exception. If the state wants to further
impeach the witness she must be present on the witness stand
and have an opportunity to explain before she is impeached
with a prior inconsistent statement. Her lawyer should be there
to advise her. See you all at 8:45 in the morning.

The following morning, Scott’s counsel requested a one-day continuance because he had
not listened to or investigated the calls . The district court denied the motion. Scott now
argues that the district court’s email can reasonably be interpreted as the district court
ruling that the jail calls were inadmissible for any reason and, as a result, his counsel did
not listen to the calls . We disagree. C onsidering the circumstances, including that the
district court had already continued the trial in response to this issue, the district court did
not abuse its discretion by denying Scott’s additional request for a continuance.
II.
Scott argues that the district court deprived him of his constitutional right to put
forth a complete defense and abused its discretion by excluding D.P.’s testimony . We
review the district court’s decision to exclude D.P.’s testimony for abuse of discretion.
Amos, 658 N.W.2d at 203. Although a “defendant has the constitutional right to present a
complete defense, ” that right is not absolute. State v. Atkinson , 774 N.W.2d 584, 589

13
(Minn. 2009). The accused “must comply with established rules of procedure and
evidence,” State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 195 (Minn. 1992) (quotation omitted), and
courts may “limit the scope of a defendant’s arguments to ensure that the defendant does
not confuse the jury with misleading inferences,” Atkinson, 774 N.W.2d at 589.
At trial, D.P. testified at length concerning the traffic stop, the events leading to it,
and the officers’ actions toward him and Scott. On direct-examination, Scott’s counsel
asked D.P. what concerned him during the traffic stop. D.P. began to testify that he feared
for his safety because of recent police shootings of unarmed black men. The prosecutor
objected. Scott argued that D.P.’s response explained why Scott fled from the police. The
district court concluded that D.P. could testify as to “what he did, to what he saw and to
what he observed” but could not testify as to “what was going on in the world” because it
was “not relevant to whether . . . or not [Scott] was guilty of anything.”
We agree with the district court. D.P.’s frame of mind on police shootings o f
unarmed black men is irrelevant to proving or disproving Scott’s frame of mind. See Minn.
R. Evid. 401 (defining relevant evidence a s “evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the acti on more
probable or less probable than it would be without the e vidence”); see also State v. Lee ,
282 N.W.2d 896, 901 (Minn. 1979) (“Whether evidence of past events and practices
objected to on the ground of relevancy is admissible is a decision within the discretion of
the trial court.”). We, therefore, conclude that the district court acted within its discretion
by excluding D.P.’s testimony on recent police shootings.

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III.

Scott argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his
2012 felony drug-possession conviction and his parole status as impeachment. “We will
not reverse a district court’s ruling on the impeachment of a witness by prior conviction
absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Hill , 801 N.W.2d 646, 651 (Minn. 2011)
(quotation omitted). Prior-conviction evidence is admissible under Minn. R. Evid.
609(a)(1) if the crime is a felony “and the court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect” by considering five factors: (1) the
impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the date of conviction and defendant’s
subsequent history, (3) the similarity of past crime and charged crime, (4) the importance
of defendant’s testimony, and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue. State v. Jones, 271
N.W.2d 534, 537-38 (Minn. 1978). “[A] district court should demonstrate on the record
that it has considered and weighed the Jones factors.” State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645,
654 (Minn. 2006). But because the district court is in “a unique position” to assess and
weigh the Jones factors, “it must be accorded broad discretion.” State v. Hochstein , 623
N.W.2d 617, 625 (Minn. App. 2001). Whether the probative value of the prior conviction
outweighs its prejudicial effect is a matter within the discretion of the district court. State
v. Graham, 371 N.W.2d 204, 208 (Minn. 1985).
Here, the district court engaged in a thorough Jones analysis, concluding that the
prosecutor could not impeach Scott with a 2002 third -degree controlled -substance
possession conviction because it was too old or a 2012 first-degree controlled-substance
sale because it was too similar, but could impeach Scott with a 2012 third -degree

15
controlled-substance possession conviction because of the importance of Scott’s testimony,
the centrality of credibility, and its recency.
The supreme court has held that “any felony conviction is probative of a witness’s
credibility, and the mere fact that a witness is a convicted felon holds impeachment value.”
Hill, 801 N.W.2d at 652. Even if the third factor weighed against admitting the conviction,
“[d]epending on the particular facts of the case, the trial court may assign different weights
to different factors. ” See Hochstein, 623 N.W.2d at 625. And if “credibility is a central
issue in the case, the fourth and fifth Jones factors weigh in favor of admission of the prior
convictions.” Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 655. The district court therefore did not abuse its
broad discretion by admitting Scott’s 2012 drug possession crime as impeachment
evidence.
Scott also argues that the district court prevented him from testifying and erred by
admitting impeachment evidence on Scott’s parole status . We disagree. Scott chose not
to testify. See State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 587 (Minn. 1998) (concluding that defendant
was not kept from testifying but instead chose not to testify based on impeachment
evidence). And a defendant’s probationary status is admissible as impeachment evidence
to show a motive to lie . State v. Johnson , 699 N.W.2d 335, 338 -39 (Minn. App. 2005),
review denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 2005). The district court did not abuse its discretion by
these rulings.
IV.

Scott contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to
suppress all evidence seized during the traffic stop . We review the factual findings

16
underlying a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence for clear error
and the district court’s legal determinations de novo. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d at 149. When
a defendant challenges a police officer’s use of force, we determine if the officer’s actions
were “objectively unreasonable.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S. Ct. 1865,
1872 (1989). The analysis requires “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of
each particular case , including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect
pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he [was]
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396, 109 S. Ct. at
1872. “[T]he use of force reasonable under the circumstances will be permitted without
a showing of probable cause when force is necessary for the protection of the investigating
officers and the degree of force used [was] reasonable.” State v. Balenger, 667 N.W.2d
133, 139 (Minn. App. 2003) , review denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 2003) . On review, we will
not “engage in second-guessing.” Id. at 141.
Scott argues that the officers “had no reason to suspect the occupants were armed
or presented a threat.” In its order denying Scott’s motion to suppress evidence, the district
court stated that
even though the initial stop was for a seat belt violation, the
officers had reasonable conc erns for their safety because the
stop took place at night where there was little ambient lighting,
in a high crime area, after the vehicle stopped briefly and then
continued to drive around the corner. These actions allowed
the officers to approach the v ehicle with guns removed from
their holsters, but not pointed at the suspects.

Considering the circumstances , the officers’ actions of pointing their guns toward
the ground while approaching the vehicle and holstering the guns as they arrived at the

17
front windows were objectively reasonable. See State v. Munson , 594 N.W.2d 128, 137
(Minn. 1999) (concluding that officers’ actions “approaching the [car] with weapons
drawn, removing the occupants from the [car], frisking them, placing them in the back seat
of squad cars and even handcuffing them briefly until it was determined they were not
armed” were reasonable); Balenger, 667 N.W.2d at 141 (determining that officer who
grabbed a person by the jersey acted reasonably whe n officer “harbored a reasonable
suspicion that [the person] was armed, reasonably feared for his safety and the safety of
the public at large, and used an amount of force that was proportionate to the initial
justification for the stop”). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Scott’s
motion to suppress evidence obtained from the traffic stop.
V.

In his pro se supplemental and reply briefs, Scott alleges that (1) his trial counsel
was ineffective because his counsel failed to assert an impossibility defense, request jury
instructions on circumstantial evidence, request that R.F.’s jail calls be redacted, object to
the calls as hearsay, or object to an upward durational departure for sentencing; (2) R.F.’s
jail calls were inadmissible h earsay, lacked foundation , and were testimonial; (3) the
prosecutor injected her own credibility during closing argument ; (4) the district court
exhibited racial bias toward Scott by discussing the plot for Empire; (5) the police did not
have an adequate basis for the traffic stop; and (6) the drugs lacked a proper chain of
custody. After thoroughly considering Scott’s pro se arguments, we conclude that they are
without merit.
Affirmed.