State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0639

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Andre Lorenzo Watts,
Appellant.

Filed March 13, 2017
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-21777

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Cheri A. Townsend, Assistant County
Attorney (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Pr esiding Judge; Reilly , Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Andre Lorenzo Wa tts appeals his conviction of criminal vehicular
operation. Watts argues that (1) the district court plainly erred by allowing the state to

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constructively amend the complaint during the court trial and (2) the evidence was
insufficient to establish that his driving was the proximate cause of the collision. Because
we conclude that the complaint was not co nstructively amended and that the evidence
supports the finding that appellant caused the collision, we affirm.
FACTS
At approximately 5:00 p.m. on August 5, 2015, Watts was driving a rented U-Haul
van on a residential street in Minneapolis. There were cars parked, and people standing,
on both sides of the street. Four-year-old K.J. was near the street with family members in
front of her grandmother’s home. K.J.’s father T.E., K.J.’s aunt T.D.E., and S.L.F. were
among those gathered in the general area. When Watts turned onto th e residential street,
he noticed multiple people, including K.J., standing on the side of the street. While driving
up the street, Watts struck K.J. after she ente red the street from between two parked cars.
Watts knew that he had hit K.J. and that he had likely caused her some type of injury.
After hitting K.J., Watts slowed but then accelerated away from the scene after
forming a subjective belief that people in the area were going to physically harm him.
Watts testified that he fled after hearing someone threaten his safety and seeing people rush
into the street and point towards the U-Haul. T.E. pursued Watts in a minivan, but he lost
sight of the U-Haul after approximately five minutes and returned to the scene of the
collision. As a result of the collision, K.J. suffered several fractures, received stitches,
required the use of a wheelchair for several months, and underwent physical therapy.
After leaving the scene, Watts did not immediately attempt to communicate with
police. Rather, Watts parked the U-Haul an d contacted his brother to tell him what had

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happened. Watts then met his brother, and they drove past the scene in a different car to
see what they could learn about the outcome of the collision. Next, Watts went to his
brother’s house where, between 50 minutes a nd one hour after the collision, Watts called
911 to report his involvement.
Watts was charged with criminal vehi cular operation (great bodily harm) in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2113, subd. 1(7) (2014). The complaint stated:
Charge: Criminal Vehicular Operation - Great Bodily Harm -
Driver Who Causes Collision Leaves Scene
Minnesota Statute: 609.2113. 1(7), with reference to:
609.2113.1
Maximum Sentence: 5 YEARS AND/OR $10,000
Offense Level: Felony

Offense Date (on or about): 08/05/2015
. . .
Charge Description: That on or about 8/5/2015, in Hennepin
County, Minnesota, ANDRE LORENZO WATTS did, by
operating a motor vehicle, cause a collision that caused great
bodily harm to Victim a nd ANDRE LORENZO WATTS left
the scene of that collision.

Watts waived his right to a jury trial. During the court tria l, T.D.E.—the only
witness to see the collision—testified that Watts was driving between 30 and 35 miles per
hour when he hit K.J. In add ition, S.L.F. told police that he was standing 10 to 15 feet
away when he heard “the thump from the van hitting [K.J.]” and turned to see “[K.J. come]
out of the tail end of the van.” S.L.F. estimated that Watts was driving between 20 and 25
miles per hour at the time. Watts testified that he had slowed down and was traveling
below 10 miles per hour at the time of the collision.

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After the state had presented the testimony of four witnesses, there was a discussion
on the record regarding the state’s case and th e two alternative ways in which a person
commits criminal vehicular operation under Minn. Stat. § 609.2113, subd. 1(7). The state
observed that this statute references leaving the scene of the accident in violation of either
subdivision 1 or subdivision 6 of Minn. Stat. § 169.09 (20 14), and asserted that it “is
alleging that both of those provisions have been violated.” Watts’s attorney stated that he
did not have any objection to proceeding under the complain t as initially charged or to
amending the complaint to expressly reference section 169.09, subdivisions 1 and 6. The
district court concluded this discussion by stating:
As long as the charging statut e was correct in the complaint,
which I understand that it was, and, Defense Counsel doesn’t
have any objection, I won’t re quire an amendment to the
complaint. Everybody I think has notice of, of what the
charges are; and it doesn’t sound like . . . there’s anything that
we need to do in addition.

The district court found Watts not guilty of criminal vehicular operation (great
bodily harm) in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2113, subd. 1(7), but found him guilty of the
lesser-included crime of criminal vehicular operation (substantial bodily harm) in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 609.2113, subd. 2(7) (2014). In finding that each of the requisite elements
of the lesser-included offense had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the district court
found that Watts failed to immediately stop at the scene of the collis ion in violation of
section 169.09, subdivision 1, and that he also failed to give notice of the collision to police
by the quickest means of communication in violation of section 169.09, subdivision 6.
Watts appeals.

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D E C I S I O N
I. The state did not constructively amend the complaint during trial.

Watts argues that the district court comm itted plain error and deprived him fair
notice of the charges against him by allowi ng the state to constructively amend the
complaint during trial to allege that he co mmitted criminal vehicular operation by failing
to call police after the collision by the quickest means available in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 169.09, subd. 6. Watts ma intains that the co mplaint’s initial alle gation was limited to
him failing to stop in violation of section 169.09, subdivisi on 1. Because Watts did not
object to the district court c onsidering violations of both subdivision 1 and subdivision 6
of section 169.09, we apply a plain error standard of review in determining whether Watts
is entitled to relief. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Minn. 2006) (citing Minn. R.
Crim. P. 31.02). “Under the plain-error doctrin e, the appellant must show that there was
(1) an error; (2) that is plain; and (3) the error must affect substantial rights.” State v.
Kelley, 855 N.W.2d 269, 273-74 (Minn. 2014).
The complaint alleged that Watts committed criminal vehicular operation by leaving
the scene of the collision in vi olation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2113, subd. 1( 7). That statute
establishes that criminal vehicular operation occurs “where the driver who causes the
accident leaves the scene of the accident in violation of section 1 69.09, subdivision 1 or
6.” Minn. Stat. § 609.2113, subd. 1(7). Th e complaint’s citation to section 609.2113,
subdivision 1(7), plainly indicated that Wa tts was charged with criminal vehicular
operation by leaving the scene of the accident, which, by the terms of that statute, could be
established through a violation of either subdivision 1 or subdivision 6 of section 169.09.

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The respective portions of section 169.09 state:
Subdivision 1. Driver to stop for collision; injury or death.
The driver of any motor vehicl e involved in a collision shall
immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the collision, or as
close to the scene as possible, and reasonably investigate what
was struck. If the driver kn ows or has reason to know the
collision resulted in injury to or death of another, the driver in
every event shall remain at the scene of the collision until the
driver has fulfilled the requirements of this section as to the
giving of information. The stop must be made without
unnecessarily obstructing traffic.

. . . .

Subdivision 6. Notice of personal injury. The driver of a
vehicle involved in a collision re sulting in bodily injury to or
death of another shall, after compliance with this section and
by the quickest means of communication, give notice of the
collision to the local police department if the collision occurs
within a municipality, to a State Patrol officer if the collision
occurs on a trunk highway, or to the office of the sheriff of the
county.

Minn. Stat. § 169.09, subds. 1, 6.
Although the complaint did not quote language from section 609.2113, subdivision
1(7), or expressly reference or quote language from section 169.09, subdivisions 1 or 6, the
accompanying statement of probab le cause included specific allegations indicating that
Watts’s actions—his failure to stop after the collision and his failure to notify police by the
quickest means—were both within the scope of the charged offense. Notably, regarding
Watts’s failure to notify police by the quickest means, the statemen t of probable cause
alleged that approximately one hour elapse d between Watts leaving the scene of the
collision and his call to police, and that “[Wa tts] was not able to answer why he took so

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much time to drive around, why he did not just call police or why he did not just drive to
the police station to report the incident.”
The complaint alleged that Watts violated section 609.2113, subdivision 1(7), which
plainly indicates that criminal vehicular operation by leaving the scene involves a violation
of either subdivision 1 or subdivision 6 of se ction 169.09. And the statement of probable
cause included allegations regarding Watts’s violation of both subdivision 1 and
subdivision 6 of Minn. Stat. § 169.09. We ther efore conclude that the state gave proper
notice of the changes and did not amend the complaint—constructively or otherwise—to
include an additional charge based on a violation of section 169.09, subd. 6. Accordingly,
the district court did not err by considering the two ways that Watts could have committed
criminal vehicular operation.
II. The evidence was sufficient to support the district co urt’s determination that
Watts committed criminal vehicular operation.

Watts argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction of criminal
vehicular homicide (substantial bodily harm) because he was driving prudently and K.J.’s
conduct of entering the street constituted an independent, supe rseding cause. Therefore,
according to Watts, his driving conduct was not the proximate cause of the collision.
This court analyzes insuffi cient-evidence arguments by determining “whether the
evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to
the verdict, were sufficient to allow the [fact-finder] to reach its verdict.” Staunton v. State,
784 N.W.2d 289, 297 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). A guilty verdict will remain
undisturbed if the fact-finder, “acting with du e regard for the presumption of innocence

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and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could
reasonably conclude that [the ] defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged.” Id.
(quotation omitted). “The district court’s factual findings will not be disturbed unless they
are clearly erroneous.” State v. Andersen, 871 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn. 2015). This court
assumes that the district court believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary
evidence. State v. Brocks, 587 N.W.2d 37, 42 (Minn. 1998).
A driver is guilty of criminal vehicular operation (substantial bodily harm) “where
the driver who causes the accident leaves the scene of the accident in violation of section
169.09, subdivision 1 or 6.” Minn. Stat. § 609.2113, subd. 1(7). Watts’s insufficient-
evidence argument focuses on section 609.2113, subdivision 1(7)’s causation requirement.
While the statute does not define “cause,” Minnesota law requir es the state to prove that
Watts’s driving was the proxim ate cause of the collision. See State v. Jaworsky , 505
N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. App. 1993) (stating that in a criminal vehicle homicide case, the
defendant’s act must have been the proximate cause of the injury), review denied (Minn.
Sept. 30, 1993). A proximate cause is “something that played a substantial part in bringing
about the death or injury.” State v. Nelson , 806 N.W.2d 558, 562 (Minn. App. 2011)
(quotation omitted) (explaining that Minnesota courts apply the civil substantial-factor
definition of causation in criminal vehicular homicide and operation cases), review denied
(Minn. Feb. 14, 2012).
Watts argues that he was not the proximate cause of the collision because he was
driving prudently and below th e speed limit. The district court expressly discredited
Watts’s testimony that he had slowed down to below ten miles per hour as he approached

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the site of the collision and found that he was driving a large vehicle too fast for the
conditions presented on the residential street. This finding is consistent with Watts’s own
testimony in which he acknowledged seeing people—including K.J.—standing on the side
of the street prior to the collision. Moreover, multiple witnesses estimated that Watts was
traveling between 20 and 35 miles per hour prior to the collision. Accordingly, the district
court’s factual findings regarding Watts’s driving are not clearly erroneous and are
consistent with the determination that his dr iving conduct played a substantial part in
bringing about K.J.’s injuries.
Watts further argues that he was not the proximate cause of the collision because
K.J.’s conduct constituted an intervening, superseding cause. An intervening, superseding
act relieves a defendant of criminal liability where it breaks the chain of causation set in
operation by a defendant’s negligence. State v. Hofer, 614 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Minn. App.
2000), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 2000). Under Minnesota law,
[f]or an intervening cause to be considered a superseding
cause, the intervening cause must satisfy four elements: (1) its
harmful effects must have occurred after the original
negligence; (2) it must not ha ve been brought about by the
original negligence; (3) it must have actively worked to bring
about a result which would not otherwise have followed from
the original negligence; and (4) it must not have been
reasonably foreseeable by the original wrongdoer.

Id. (quotation omitted). Here, as previously noted, Watts’s own testimony established that
he observed K.J. and others sta nding near the street before the collision. Consistent with
this testimony, the district court found that Watts “was aware there were people standing
on the side of the street, including a young girl, who could foreseeably step into the driving

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lane. Those conditions dictated that he proceed at a very slow speed, which he did not do.”
Because the record supports th e district court’s determina tion that K.J.’s action was
reasonably foreseeable, Watts is unable to establish that such conduct breaks the chain of
causation and relieves him of criminal liability. See id. at 738 (rejecting driver’s argument
that victim’s act of crossing street in violation of traffic signal was a superseding cause in
collision relieving driver of criminal liability for criminal vehicular homicide).
Accordingly, the evidence presented and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,
when viewed in a light most favorable to the court’s findings, are sufficient to support the
district court’s determination. See Staunton, 784 N.W.2d at 297. We therefore affirm
Watts’s conviction.
Affirmed.