State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0644

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Troy Donald Emmons,
Appellant.

Filed March 20, 2017
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge

Isanti County District Court
File No. 30-CR-15-584

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Edwin W. Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jeffrey Edblad, Isanti County Attorney, Cambridge, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appella te Public Defender, Melissa Sheridan, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KIRK, Judge
Appellant Troy Donald Emmons challenges his conviction of fifth-degree
controlled-substance crime , in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(a)(1) (2014).

2
Appellant asserts that the district court erred when it admitted a lab report into evidence
over his chain -of-custody objection, and the evidence was insu fficient to support his
conviction. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded the lab
report was admissible evidence and the record evidence supports appellant’s conviction,
we affirm.
FACTS
Testimony at appellant’ s two-day court trial established that , on August 18, 2015 ,
at approximately 6:00 p.m., Officer Chad Meyer with the Isanti County Sheriff’s
Department observed a car parked at the Dalbo Wildlife Management Area. Officer Meyer
testified that it seemed “peculiar” that the car was in the parking lot because it was not
hunting season. Officer Meyer approa ched the car and saw a male , who appeared to be
sleeping in the driver’s seat. After waking the driver and speaking with him, Officer Meyer
identified him as appellant. During their interaction, Officer Meyer noted that Emmons
was missing teeth, had sunken cheeks, pinpoint pupils, and a nervous demeanor . Officer
Meyer believed appellant’s physical appearance and demeanor indicated
methamphetamine use.
Officer Meyer asked appellant if he had ever used methamphetamine. Appellant
responded that he had used methamphetamine in the past. Officer Meyer asked appellant
if he could search the car , and Emmons stated that he could. During the search, Officer
Meyer found a light bulb and a glass pipe wrapped in a paper towel in the glove box. Both
items had a residue on them that field-tested positive for methamphetamine. Appellant was

3
arrested and charged with fifth -degree controlled -substance crime and driving after
suspension.1
Officer Meyer testified that after he dropped appellant off for booking at the county
jail, he brought the light bulb and pipe to the Isanti County Sheriff’s Department and
conducted a second field test on them “to make sure I wasn’t getting any false positives.”
Officer Meyer then placed the evidence into evidence bags, “sealed them,” placed the bags
inside evidence locker number five, shut and locked the locker door, and put the key into
the locker through the vent. Officer Meyer also filled out an evidence sheet that is given to
an investigator.
The next day , Isanti County Investigator Robert Bowker, who is the custodian of
the evidence room, received the evidence sheet left in his mailbox by Officer Meyer. He
took the evidence from locker five and moved it to property room B, where he placed both
items into file cabinet drawer four.
On August 24 , Isanti County Deputy Sheriff Sean Hartneck asked Investigat or
Bowker to remove the items from the evidence room so he could perform additional testing
on them. Investigator Bowker retrieved the items and watched Deputy Hartneck perform
the tests. Investigator Bowker did not make any notations or logs for this event on the chain
of custody report because the evidence “did not leave the building.”

1 The driving-after-suspension charge was dismissed by directed verdict after a court trial
and is not relevant to this appeal.

4
During the first week of October, Investigator Bowker placed both items , which
were separately packaged, into an envelope and mailed them to the Minnesota Bureau of
Criminal Apprehension (BCA) for further testing. The BCA received the items on
October 7. Michele Stachowiak, a BCA lab technician, testified that she received the items,
removed them from the envelope , initialed each piece of evidence, and pu t them in the
central drug vault. She also made a chain -of-custody report and a laboratory -analysis
request.
According to th e notations on the evidence and the BCA chain -of-custody report,
on October 9, Julie Dornseif, a BCA employee who works in evidence intake, removed the
items from the central drug vault and took them to the third -floor vault for testing .
According to the evidence logs, the evidence was in her possession for seven minutes. Later
that same day, BCA forensic scientist Rebecca Willis removed the items from the vault for
testing. Willis testified that, in accordance with BCA policy, she tested only the glass pipe
because it had the most visible residue on it . Willis performed a “confirmatory analysis”
on the residue, which revealed the presence of methamphetamine. Willis did not scrape the
residue to measure its weight. On October 21, Stachowiak placed the items back into a
sealed envelope and mailed th e items, along with an evidence -release form, back to the
Isanti County Sheriff’s Department.
The district court admitt ed the following items into evidence: the Isanti County
Sheriff’s Department custody report; the BCA laboratory-analysis request, custody report,
and evidence-release form; and the envelope used to mail the evidence to the BCA and
back to Isanti County. Deputy Meyer testified that he opened the sealed envelope

5
containing the evidence from the BCA. Deputy Hartneck and Dornseif did not testify at
trial.
Appellant objected to the admission of the BCA laboratory report, asserting lack of
foundation and authentication. Appellant argued that the state provided insufficient chain-
of-custody evidence and he requested a not-guilty directed verdict. The district court noted
its concerns on the record with the chain of custody and the lack of testimony regarding
the procedure used by Deputy Hartneck to test the evidence for residue. But the district
court concluded that “given the totality of the circumstances . . . the chain of evidence was
appropriate, was not adulterated.” It denied appellant’s suppression motion and his request
for a not -guilty directed verdict. The district court found appellant guilty of fifth -degree
controlled-substance crime and sentenced him to 21 months in prison, with credit for 157
days in jail. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the BCA lab report.
A determination as to foundation or the chain of custody is an evidentiary ruling.
State v. Farah, 855 N.W.2d 317, 321 (Minn. App. 2014), review denied (Minn. Dec. 30,
2014). “Evidentiary rulings are within the discretion of the district court and will not be
overturned absent an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Jenkins , 782 N.W.2d 211, 224
(Minn. 2010); see also McDonald v. State , 351 N.W.2d 658, 660 (Minn. App. 1984)
(holding that chain-of-custody issues are within the sound discretion of the district court),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 1984).

6
The chain-of-custody rule requires “the prosecution to account for the whereabouts
of physical evidence connected with a crime from the time of its seizure to its offer at trial.”
State v. Johnson , 307 Minn. 501, 504, 239 N.W.2d 239, 242 (1976). “All possibility of
alteration, substitution, or change of condition need not be eliminated in laying a chain-of-
custody foundation. ” State v. Hager , 325 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Minn. 1982) (quotations
omitted). The rule requires the district court to “be satisfied that, in all reasonable
probability, the item offered is the same as the item seized and is substantially unchanged
in condition.” Johnson, 307 Minn. at 505, 239 N.W.2d at 242; see also Minn. R. Evid.
901(a) (“The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to
admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims.”). If evidence is admitted at trial, any contrary
speculation as to the evidence is weighed by the factfinder, but it does not affect it s
admissibility. Id.
Appellant argues that the district erred by admitting the BCA lab results in evidence
because there were two gaps in the chain of custody that “raise a substantial concern” that
the evidence could have been tampered with. Appellant poi nts to the notation on the
evidence bag dated August 24, 2015, but the state offered no evidence of who made the
notation and there is no c orresponding entry on the chain -of-custody sheet. Second, the
BCA chain-of-custody report noted that Dornseif handled the evidence before it was tested,
but she did not testify regarding this event or the procedures she used to handle the
evidence.

7
The district court expressed concerns about the absence of testimony regarding the
additional testing procedures used by Deputy Hartneck. Specifically, the district court was
concerned about cross-contamination from the tool or tools that Deputy Hartneck used to
conduct the additional test. The district court, however, ruled that the BCA lab report was
admissible, concluding that the evidence had not been adulterated and that the chain of
custody was appropriate.
State v. Bellikka is instructive. 490 N.W.2d 660 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied
(Minn. Nov. 25, 1992). In Bellikka, the appellant objected to the testimony of the forensic
scientist who determine d that glass fragments found on the appellant’s clothes and those
from a burglarized store were cons istent because the state failed to establish a chain of
custody when “two individuals who handled the evidenc e failed to testify in court.” Id. at
663. The district cou rt determined the evidence was admissible. Id. at 664. This court
affirmed, first concluding that the glass was unusual enough that “a chain of custody was
not required to authenticate the evidence .” Id. This court also noted that even if the glass
had not been identifiable because of its distinctive appearance, “the fact that everyone who
handled the evidence did not testify is not fatal to establishment of a chain of custody.” Id.
This court reasoned that the items of evidence were sealed and labeled in separate
containers and sent to the BCA together; further, the seals were unbroken when received
by the BCA. Id. Moreover, the appellant offered no evidence of tampering. Id. This court
concluded that the record established a chain of custody, and the district court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting the evidence. Id.

8
Similarly to Bellikka, the items collected here were sealed in separate evidence bags
and placed in the evidence room by Investigator Bowker. The record establishes that
Investigator Bowker watched Deputy Hartneck perform tests on the evidence on
August 24, 2015, which corresponds to the notation made on the evidence bags. The record
further shows that Investigator Bowker placed the separately sealed pieces of evidence into
an envelope and mailed them to the BCA, where Stachowiak received the still -sealed
evidence envelopes. Willis testified that the envelopes were still sealed when she retrieved
them for testing.
Appellant argues that Bellikka is inapplicable because he offered evidence of
tampering, but appellant only speculates that tampering could have occurred when the
evidence was in Deputy Hartneck’s or Dornseif’s possession.2 We understand appellant’s
concern, and we note that trace amounts of evidence may be more easily altered , which
makes this issue a close call. In the future, the state would be well -advised to make all
parties who handle evidence in such cases available for testimony. But taking into account
that not “all possibility of alteration” must be eliminated, and that the evidence, “including
issues of credibility,” must be viewed in the light most favorable to the proponent, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the BCA lab r eport into evidence.
Hager, 325 N.W.2d at 44–45.

2 Appellant does not argue, for example, that there were anomalies in the procedur e used
by Hartneck or Dornseif. R ather, he asserts we do not know what procedures they used.
The record evidence, however, establishes otherwise.

9
II. There was sufficient evidence to convict appellant of fifth -degree controlled-
substance crime.

When considering a claim of insufficient evidence, this court conducts a thorough
analysis of the record and determines if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to
the conviction, was sufficient to convict. State v. Webb , 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn.
1989). A verdict will be upheld where the evidence shows the factfinder, acting with due
regard for the presumption of innocence and the necessity of the state providing proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably find the defendant guilty of the charged
offense. Bernhardt v. State , 684 N.W.2d 465, 476 –77 (Minn. 2004). We assume the
factfinder believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary. State
v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). We apply the same standard of review in
bench trials and in jury trials in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Palmer,
803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011).
Appellant next argues that the state presented insufficient evidence to support his
conviction for possession of methamphetamine because a test result from a substance that
cannot be “collected or weighed” is n ot an “amount” under Minn . Stat. § 152.025, subd.
2(a)(1). The state asserts that appellate courts have previously rejected this argument.
This issue turns on the interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(a)(1).
Statutory interpretation is an issue that this court reviews de novo. State v. Hayes , 826
N.W.2d 799, 803 (Minn. 2013). When a statute is unambiguous, the plain language of a
statute will be enforced, and this court will not look into its spirit or purpose. In re Welfare
of J.J.P ., 831 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. 2013). When a person possesses “one or more

10
mixtures containing a controlled substance” classified as either a schedule I, II, III, or IV,
they are guilty of a fifth -degree controlled-substance crime. Minn. Stat. § 152.025 , subd.
2(a)(1) (emphasis added). Methamphetamine is a schedule II drug. Minn. Stat. § 152.02,
subd. 3(d)(2) (2014). A mixture is “a preparation, compound, mixture, or substance
containing a controlled substance.” Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 9a (2014). The state need
not prove that an individual possessed a weighable amount of a controlled substance in
order to prove guilt under Minn . Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(a)(1). State v. Traxler , 583
N.W.2d 556, 562 (Minn. 1998).
The statute does not require an individual to possess a s pecific amount of a
controlled substance. Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(a)(1). Rather, it requires only that an
individual possess a substance containing methamphetamine. Id. (emphasis added).
Caselaw also establishes that a specific or weighable amount o f a substance need not be
present to uphold a conviction under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd . 2(a)(1). Traxler, 583
N.W.2d at 562. Here, appellant possessed a glass pipe containing a residue that tested
positive for methamphetamine in the BCA laboratory analysis. In order to test a substance,
it is axiomatic that an amount of that substance be present for testing. Thus, because the
state provided evidence that appellant possessed a substance that tested positive for
methamphetamine, appellant’s argument fails.
Affirmed.