State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0744

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Corie Demetrius Bass,
Appellant.

Filed April 3, 2017
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-14-21669

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Francine Kuplic (certified stude nt attorney), Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Eric L. Newmark, Newmark Storms Law Office LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Pr esiding Judge; Reilly , Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Appellant Corie Demetrius Bass was char ged as a prohibited person in possession
of a firearm, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd . 1(2) (2016). Bass moved to

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suppress the gun evidence, arguing that the search was unlawful because the police lacked
a sufficient basis for the stop. The district court denied the motion, and Bass appealed.
Because we conclude that the police had reas onable, articulable suspicion to suspect one
of the vehicle occupants of criminal activity, and because the officers’ show of force and
intrusion upon the entire group was a reas onable means of ensuring officer safety, we
affirm.
FACTS
Around midnight on July 24, 2014, an un identified individual called the
Minneapolis 911 Call Center and the following conversation ensued:
OPERATOR: 911, what’s the address of [the] emergency?
CALLER: Yes, I stay at [near First Avenue and Eighth Street].
OPERATOR: Mm-hmm.
CALLER: And I’m looking out my window and in the parking
lot there’s a lot of guys, and I’m, it’s a blue car and a, I wanna
say gold Mustang.
OPERATOR: Ok.
CALLER: And I just seen em pass a gun to each other.
OPERATOR: And a gold mu, ok, the one that did, that passed
the weapon, can you tell what race they were?
CALLER: They’re black. They’re all black.
OPERATOR: Ok but . . .
CALLER: It’s a lot, it’s, it’s a lot of females in this parking
lot.
OPERATOR: Ok, but was it males that, that passed the gun or
females?
CALLER: I, I believe he, it looked like a female, but it’s a, a
guy. I don’t know.
OPERATOR: Ok, could you tell wh at color shirt or jacket or
anything they were wearing? Just so, I mean it’s a huge
officer’s safety thing. That’s like the one . . .
CALLER: They sitting in the ca r, they sitting in the car right
now. They sitting in a car right now. The one has on, I think
this is a gold Mustang, has [on] a white tank top.
OPERATOR: And that’s the one with the gun?

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CALLER: Yes.
OPERATOR: That’s the gun, ok.
CALLER: The blue, the blue car just passed it to the one in
the gold car.
OPERATOR: Ok and the one in the gold car, the white tank
top, is a, you’re not sure if it’s a male or a female?
CALLER: Yes.
OPERATOR: But [they’re] African American?
CALLER: Yes.
OPERATOR: Ok. They, in the driver’s or the passenger’s
seat?
CALLER: The driver’s seat.
OPERATOR: Driver’s? Ok and what is your name?
CALLER: I rather not say.
OPERATOR: You wanna be anonymous? Ok. I’ll get em right
out there . . .
CALLER: Yes.
OPERATOR: . . . in the parkin g lot. [Near First Avenue and
Eighth Street], ok.
CALLER: Oh, alright.
OPERATOR: Thank you, bye-bye.

The 911 operator then dispatched officers to the scene. When the dispatcher tried to return
the 911 call, it went to the caller’s voicemail.
Officers Tobias Anderson, Sherry Appled orn, and Aaron Morrison responded to the
radio transmission “[t]hat there was a possible person with a gun inside of a vehicle” in the
parking ramp near First Avenue and Eighth St reet. Upon arrival, th e officers saw a gold
Mustang parked along the wall of the ramp. A blue sedan was parked directly to the right
of the gold Mustang, and a white Cadillac was parked adjacent to the blue sedan. An
unidentified woman was sitting in the front dr iver’s seat of the gol d Mustang, a second
unidentified woman was standing between the gold Mustang and blue sedan, and two men,
one of whom was later identified as Bass, were sitting in the front seat of the white Cadillac.
The three cars were backed into the parking spots, with the tr unk of their cars against the

4
wall. The responding officers di d not see any other individual s in close proximity to the
gold Mustang and blue sedan. To approach the blue sedan and gold Mustang, the officers
had to walk in front of the white Cadillac.
After arriving at the scene, the officers de termined that officer safety required they
“treat it all as one threat.” Engaging in what Officer Anderson described as a “systematic
left-to-right elimination of any possible threat,” the officers secured the white Cadillac first
because it was “the most accessible vehicle. ” At gunpoint, the officers ordered the two
men out of the white Cadillac, handcuffed the men, and placed them in the back of one of
the squad cars. The officers then handcuffed the woman standing between the blue sedan
and the gold Mustang, and placed her in a squad car. While Officer Anderson walked the
woman to a squad car, she stated, without prompting, that if the officers were looking for
a gun they should check the white vehicle. When Officer Appledorn later asked the woman
if she knew why the officers were on the scene, she replied “yes,” and stated that there was
a gun wrapped in a towel in the white Cadillac. After detaining the first woman, the officers
ordered the second woma n out of the gold Must ang and placed her in handcuffs. Officer
Morrison then conducted a wa rrantless search of the white Cadillac and recovered a
handgun; the gun was wrapped in a black sock and tucked between the seat and center
console.
The state charged Bass with possession of a firearm by a proh ibited person, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2). Bass moved to suppress the gun discovered
during the search, and the district court deni ed his motion. Bass then waived his rights
under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 1(2)(a) and 3(a), and stipulated to the state’s evidence

5
under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4.1 The district court subsequently found Bass guilty
and sentenced him to 60 months in prison.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
A. Standard of Review
Because Bass stipulated to the evidence against him pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P.
26.01, subd. 4, our review is limited to whether the district court properly denied his pretrial
suppression motion. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4(f). When reviewing the district
court’s order, we review findings of fact for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.
State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009). We may also independently review
facts that are undisputed and de termine if the evidence seiz ed must be suppressed as a
matter of law. Id.

1 Despite the district court’s order titled “Findings Pursuant to Lothenbach Procedure” and
amended order titled “New Findings Pursuant to Lothenbach Procedure,” it appears that
the parties intended to proceed under Minn. R. Crim . P. 26.01, subd. 4. This rule of
criminal procedure permits a defendant to enter a plea of not guilty; waive all rights related
to trial, including the right to a jury trial; stipulate to the st ate’s evidence in a court-trial;
and immediately appeal a dispositive, pretrial ruling. Although Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01,
subd. 4, replaced the so-called Lothenbach procedure in 2007, the record is replete with
references to Lothenbach. In this case, Bass entered a pl ea of not guilty, waived all jury-
related rights, and stipulated to the state’s evidence. Both parties acknowledged that Bass
may appeal the dispositive pretrial issue, but he may not appeal the court’s finding of guilt
or other issues that could be ra ised at a contested trial. As Lothenbach has not been the
law in Minnesota since 2007, we caution the parties and the district court against continued
use of the term and suggest instead that the pa rties and district court refer to the rule of
criminal procedure.

6
B. The officers had reasonable, articula ble suspicion to stop and temporarily
detain Bass.

The United States and Minnesota Constitu tions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Cons t. art. I, § 10. When determining whether
this constitutional prohibition was violated, we examine the reliability of the anonymous
tip and the specific police conduct at issue. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269-70, 120
S. Ct. 1375, 1378 (2000); see also State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008).
The conduct at issue here is the investigatory stop of the white Cadillac.
An officer may conduct “a brief, inve stigatory stop when the officer has a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528
U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct.
1868, 1884 (1968)). While the reasonable, artic ulable suspicion sta ndard is “not high,”
State v. Bourke , 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006) (q uotation omitted), it “requires at
least a minimal level of objective justification” for the stop, Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123, 120
S. Ct. at 676. To satisfy the standard, officer s “must be able to ar ticulate more than an
inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.” Id. at 123-24, 120
S. Ct. at 676 (quotation omitted). The reason able-articulable-suspicion standard may be
met when an officer “observes unusual cond uct that leads the officer to reasonably
conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” In re Welfare
of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. 1997). Information provided by a reliable informant
may also satisfy the standard. Id. “But information given by an informant must bear indicia

7
of reliability that make the alleged criminal conduct sufficiently likely to justify an
investigatory stop by police.” Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d at 393-94.
Generally, anonymous tips are less relia ble than tips provided by identified
informants and therefore may provide the ba sis for the stop “only if accompanied by
specific indicia of reliability.” J.L., 529 U.S. at 269, 120 S. Ct . at 1378. In essence, “an
anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity”
because an unknown informant may not be held responsible for fabricated allegations and
the informant’s reputation may not be assessed. Id. at 270, 120 S. Ct. at 1378 (quotation
omitted). However, an anonymous tip may exhibit sufficient indicia of reliability if the tip
is suitably corroborated. Id.
In Florida v. J.L., the United States Supreme Cour t reexamined its holding in
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990), and classified White as a “close
case.” 529 U. S. at 271, 120 S. Ct. at 1379. In White, the police received an anonymous
tip noting that a woman carrying cocaine would leave her apartment at a specific time, get
into a particular car, and drive to a named motel. 496 U.S. at 327, 110 S. Ct. at 2412. The
Court in J.L. stated that “[s]tanding alone, th e tip would not have justified a Terry stop.”
529 U.S. at 270, 120 S. Ct. at 1378. On ly after police observation verified “that the
informant had accurately predicted the woman’s movements . . . did it become reasonable
to think the tipster had insi de knowledge about the suspect and therefore to credit his
assertion about the cocaine.” Id.
Unlike White, the Supreme Court determined that the anonymous tip in J.L. lacked
the moderate indicia of reliability. Id. at 271, 120 S. Ct. at 1379. In J.L., the police received

8
an anonymous tip asserting that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and
wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun. Id. at 268, 120 S. Ct. at 1377. But the anonymous
tip provided no predictive in formation, leaving the police without a means to test the
informant’s knowledge or credibility. Id. The Court therefore determined that the Terry
stop was unconstitutional. Id. at 271, 120 S. Ct. at 1379.
Here, the state contends that the tip was reliable because the tipster was identifiable
and the tipster’s description proved accurate. Tips from private citizens are presumed
reliable and these tips are particularly reliabl e “when informants give information about
their identity so that the police can locate them if necessary.” State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d
173, 178, 183 (Minn. 2007) (citing City of Minnetonka v. Shepherd, 420 N.W.2d 887, 888,
890 (Minn. 1988)). In this case, the tip ster was an eyewitne ss who called from an
unblocked number and provided his address, but he stated that he wished to remain
anonymous. The Supreme Court recently held that use of a 911 call system is an “indicator
of veracity,” as these systems have “features that allow for identifying and tracing callers,
. . . provid[ing] some safeguards against making false reports with immunity.” Navarette
v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1689 (20 14). Informants are also considered particularly
reliable if they provide identifying information. Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 183. And
eyewitness observation “lends significant support to the tip’s reliability,” even if the tip is
anonymous. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689. The tipster here called 911 from an unblocked
number, provided his address, and witnessed the events reported in the 911 call. This lends
credence to the reliability of the tip.

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“An accurate description of a subject’s readily observable location and appearance
is of course reliable in this limited sense: It will help the police correctly identify the person
whom the tipster means to accuse.” J.L., 529 U.S. at 272, 120 S. Ct. at 1379. But such a
limited description does not demonstrate that the tipster has sufficient knowledge of
criminal activity—the reasonable suspicion standard here “requires that a tip be reliable in
its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.” Id. In
this case, the tip’s description proved accur ate; responding officers observed two black
women near a blue sedan a nd gold Mustang in the identified parking lot. And the
Minnesota Supreme Court clarified in State v. Timberlake that a reliable informant’s tip
that a defendant is carrying a gun in a moto r vehicle provides reasonable, articulable
suspicion that a defendant is engaged in criminal activity, even if the tip does not indicate
the presence of illegal activity. 744 N.W.2d at 394-95, 397. Like Timberlake, the 911 call
and corroborating circumstances provided re asonable, articulable suspicion that the
individuals in the blue sedan and gold Mustang were engaged in criminal activity.
The 911 call alone, however, did not provide reasonable, articulable suspicion that
the men in the white Cadillac were similarl y involved in crimin al activity. But once
officers have some articulable su spicion of criminal activity, the Terry balancing test
applies to allow officers to reasonably conduc t a stop and temporarily detain or seize an
individual. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1879-80. Under the test, courts determine
the reasonableness of officer action by bala ncing the importance of the governmental
interests at stake against the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests. Id. Governmental
interests generally include the interest in in vestigating potential criminal activity and the

10
need for law enforcement safety. Id. at 22-24, 88 S. Ct. at 1880-81. In Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333 (1 977), the Supreme Court held that an
officer’s command that a driver ex it the vehicle during a legitimate Terry stop was
reasonable given the balancing of officer safety against the intrusion on the driver’s liberty.
In Maryland v. Wilson , 519 U.S. 408, 413-15, 117 S. Ct. 882, 886 (1997), the Court
affirmed that Mimms applies to vehicle occupants.
To prove a Terry stop was supported by reasonabl e suspicion, an officer must
“point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.
When evaluating the validity of a Terry stop, we consider the totality of the circumstances.
United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1981). An officer may
have reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop based on a combination of factors even
where no single factor, considered alone, would justify a stop. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.
Ct. at 1880-81. “Factors that may reasonably lead an experienced officer to investigate
include time of day or night, location of the suspect parties, and the parties’ behavior when
they become aware of the officer’s presence.” United States v. Quinn, 812 F.3d 694, 697-
98 (8th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). Mo reover, “a person’s temporal and geographic
proximity to a crime scene, co mbined with a matching desc ription of the subject, can
support a finding of reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 698.
In this case, the district court found that: Bass was at the scene when officers arrived;
he was parked next to the blue sedan, which was parked to the right of the gold Mustang;
no other individuals were observed in close proximity to the gold Mustang and blue sedan;

11
the stop occurred late at night; and the offi cers were concerned about law enforcement
safety. Applying the factors discussed in Quinn, we conclude that the district court did not
err by determining that the tip provided the officers with reasonable suspicion to conduct
a Terry stop of all three cars found at the scene
Moreover, we note that the stop was not unlawful merely because Bass was detained
at gunpoint. When the circumstances warrant a show of force to en sure officer safety, a
lawful stop or limited investigatory detenti on is not converted into an unlawful arrest
simply because the individual stopped is not free to terminate the encounter or was stopped
by a show of force. See, e.g., State v. Nading, 320 N.W.2d 82, 84 (Minn. 1982) (holding
that where officers have reas onable suspicion that a defendant is armed and dangerous,
officers may take reasonable precautions during temporary detention); State v. Ailport, 413
N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn. App. 1987) (“An officer is justified in proceeding cautiously with
weapons ready if he is making a reasonable investigatory stop and has cause to believe an
individual may be armed.”), review denied (Minn. Nov. 18, 1987). “[B]riefly handcuffing
a suspect while the police sort out the scene of an investiga tion does not per se transform
an investigatory detention into an arrest, nor does placing the suspect in the back of a squad
car while the investigation proceeds.” State v. Munson , 594 N.W.2d 128, 137 (Minn.
1999). Given the circumstances surrounding the stop at issue here, including the details of
the 911 call, the location, the late hour, and th e fact that the officers had to proceed past
the white Cadillac to conduct a Terry stop of the women in the identified cars, the officers
acted reasonably by approaching the group with guns drawn and first securing Bass.

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C. The officers conducted a lawful search of the vehicle.

Under Terry, police may stop and search a suspect, even in the absence of probable
cause, when “(1) they have reasonable, artic ulable suspicion that a suspect might be
engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect might be
armed and dangerous.” State v. Dickerson , 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992). The
Minnesota Supreme Court has further clarified that an officer may conduct:
a protective search of the pa ssenger compartment of the
vehicle, limited to those area s in which a weapon may be
placed or hidden, if the offi cer has a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of
criminal activity and the officer possesses a reasonable belief,
based on specific and articulable facts, that the suspect is
dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon.

State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 251 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted). When evaluating
the reasonableness of a Terry stop, this court must determine whether the stop was justified
at its inception, and if the actions of the police were reasonably related to and justified by
the circumstances initially giving rise to the stop. Id. Here, the district court concluded
that the officers reasonably suspected illegal activity, and reasonably feared for their safety,
based on the vehicle’s proximity and gun report.
To be reasonable, the officers’ actions mu st not exceed the permissible scope of a
Terry search. Id. at 252. When officers have articulated a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity and that the suspect is armed and dangerous, the officers may conduct “a carefully
limited frisk for weapons.” Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 846. An officer’s protective search
may extend to the passenger compartment of th e vehicle, but it “must be appropriately

13
limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden.” Flowers, 734 N.W.2d
at 253 (quotation omitted).
After arriving at the scene, officers observed the occupant of the blue sedan
engaging with the occupants of the white Ca dillac and articulated a reasonable suspicion
that one of the occupants was armed and dangerous based on the woman’s unsolicited
statement that “if you are look ing for a gun, it’s in the wh ite Cadillac.” The officers
therefore handcuffed Bass, detained him in the back of a squad car, and conducted a brief
search of the front compartmen t of the white Cadillac. The scope of the officer’s search
was limited to the front seats of the passenge r compartment, and th e search uncovered a
gun wrapped in a sock in between the front driver’s seat and the center console. This was
a lawful Terry search under the Fourth Amendment.2
Affirmed.

2 The state also argues, for the first time on ap peal, that even if the seizure was unlawful,
the district court did not err by denying appellant’s suppression motion because discovery
of the firearm was inevitable. Because the search and seizure was lawful under Terry, we
decline to address this argument.