State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0752

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Javaris Martin,
Appellant.

Filed April 3, 2017
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-16940

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges his second-degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction,
arguing that the evidence is insu fficient to support his convic tion because he had an alibi
defense that the district court improperly discounted. We affirm.
FACTS
On May 2, 2015, N.H., then age 11, told her cousin, L.W., that her uncle, appellant
Javaris Martin, touched her vagina with his hand the previous summer. 1 That same day,
N.H. also told L.W.’s older sister that Martin had touched her. L.W.’s older sister relayed
the information to her mother, and eventually N.H.’s mother reported the incident to the
police. N.H. was interviewed at CornerHouse on May 18 and said that Martin touched her
when she was at her paternal grandfather’s house. N.H. explained that while she was lying
on a couch watching TV and her aunt was asleep on the floor in the same room, Martin
entered the house and asked N.H. to braid his hair. After N.H. braide d Martin’s hair and
returned to the couch, Martin sat beside N.H., reached inside her pajama pants, and touched
her vagina with his finger.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Martin with second-degree criminal sexual
conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.34 3, subd. 1(a) (2012), for engaging in sexual
contact with N.H., who was under the age of 13 and more than 36 months younger than he,
on or about June 6, 20 14. Martin asserted the affirmativ e defense of alibi and waived his

1 The record reflects that N.H. was born on February 2, 2004.

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right to a jury trial. The district court conducted a court trial on November 4−6, 23, 2015,
and heard testimony from 11 witnesses, including Martin and N.H. The court found Martin
guilty as charged. Before announcing its finding of guilt, the court noted which witnesses
were credible and which were not and explained the reasons for its credibility
determinations. The court subsequently issued a written order with extensive findings of
fact, and the court sentenced Martin to 30 months’ imprisonment, a downward durational
departure from the presumptive 60-month se ntence. The court justified the downward
durational departure on the basis that the of fense was “on the less serious spectrum” of
crimes involving second-degree criminal sexual conduct and because “[t]he touching was
very fleeting.”
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Martin argues that the eviden ce was insufficient for the di strict court to find him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because his alibi-witness testimony demonstrates that he
was not in Minneapolis at the time of the alleged offense and the district court improperly
discounted the alibi-witness testimony. We “will not disturb the verdict if the factfinder,
acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, could have reasonably concluded that the defendant was guilty
of the charged offense.” State v. Dorn , 887 N.W.2d 826, 830 (Minn. 2016). Appellate
courts “view the evidence in th e light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the
factfinder disbelieved any testimony conflicting with that verdict.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Assuming that the fact-finder “believed the stat e’s witnesses is particularly appropriate

4
when resolution of the case depends on conflic ting testimony, as it is the function of the
[fact-finder] to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.” State v. Pippitt, 645 N.W.2d 87,
92 (Minn. 2002). “This standard applies to both bench trials and jury trials.” Dorn, 887
N.W.2d at 830. “Inconsistencies or conflic ts between one witness and another do not
necessarily constitute false testimony or serve as a basis for reversal.” State v. Mems, 708
N.W.2d 526, 531 (Minn. 2006). “[I]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence [this court]
do[es] not try the facts anew.” Id. (quotation omitted). “The [fact-finder] is free to accept
part and reject part of a witness’s testimony.” Id. “In a prosecution under sections 609.342
to 609.3451 . . . the testimony of a victim need not be corroborated.” Minn. Stat. § 609.347,
subd. 1 (2012). This court does not make findings of fact, and defers to the district court’s
credibility determinations. See Mems, 708 N.W.2d at 531 (“Assessing the credibility of a
witness and the weight to be given a witness’s testimony is exclusively the province of the
[fact-finder].”).
“Under [appellate court] decisions, the defendant need not prove an alibi beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Currie , 267 Minn. 294, 306, 126 N.W.2d 389, 398 (1964)
(footnote omitted). “[T]he burden rests on the state of proving the essential elements of the
crime, including the presence of the defendant at the place where it was committed, in spite
of a claim of alibi.” Id. at 306–07, 126 N.W.2d at 398; see also State v. Brechon , 352
N.W.2d 745, 750 (Minn. 1984) (noting that “[c] ourts have held that the presence of the
accused at the scene of the crime is an essential element of an offense” and that defendant
therefore need not prove an alibi beyond a reasonable doubt).

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Martin first argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the timeframe of the offense—that the offense occurred between June and July
2014—and that Martin was in Minneapolis at that time, i.e ., present at the scene of the
crime. Martin points to N.H.’s uncertainty ab out the specific date of the sexual contact,
L.W.’s recollection of what N. H. told her, and testimony about N.H.’s age at the time of
the offense. We are not persuaded.
As to the timeframe of the o ffense, N.H. testified that she was out of school at the
time and that Martin committed the offense in the summer of 2014. She provided details
about other things that happened in her family that summer, and N.H.’s mother confirmed
the timeframe based on the date on which N.H.’s school ended for the summer and the date
on which she last saw Martin in Minneapolis during the summer of 2014.
The district court heard conflicting testimon y about N.H.’s age at the time of the
offense. L.W. testified that N.H. told her that Martin sexually touched her when she was
eight or nine years old. N.H.’s mother initially testified that N.H. was nine years old when
the sexual contact occurred and later testified that N.H. would have been nine or ten years
old. But each witness who testif ied about N.H.’s reports of th e offense testified that N.H.
said that Martin touched her during the summ er of 2014. The determination of when the
offense was committed depended entirely on the district court’s credibility determinations.
The district court found that N.H. was credible.
Martin also argues that even if N.H. ha d testified with certainty that the crime
occurred in June 2014, the evidence would still be insufficient to convict him because of
the conflicted testimony about Martin’s whereab outs during the timeframe of the crime,

6
i.e., whether he was in Minneapolis or In dianapolis. But the fact-finder must resolve
conflicting testimony by weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations, and
we defer to the fact-finder’s credibility determinations. See Mems , 708 N.W.2d at 531
(stating that “[t]he [fact-finder] is free to ac cept part and reject part of a witness’s
testimony”). Here, the evidence that supports Martin’s alibi defense—that he was not in
Minneapolis during the summer of 2014—consists of testimony by Martin, A.L., and F.G.
The district court had to assess that testimony in light of all other witnesses’ contradictory
testimony. The evidence contradicting Martin’s alibi defense consists of testimony by
N.H., N.H.’s aunt, N.H.’s mother, and Martin’s sister.
The record before us reflects that the district court, as fact-finder, carefully reviewed
the evidence and considered the credibility of the witnesses in finding Martin guilty. See,
e.g., State v. Scruggs , 822 N.W.2d 631, 645 (M inn. 2012) (stating that, “It was properly
left to the jury [as fact-finder] to assess [the witness’s] credibility and determine the weight
it believed her testimony deserved ”). Considering all the evidence, nothing suggests that
the court improperly credited the state’s witne sses in determining that the witnesses who
testified that Martin was in Indianapolis during the entire summer of 2014 were not
credible. Significantly, the cour t found that “N.H.’s testimony that [Martin] . . . digitally
penetrated her on or around June 6, 2014, was credible, consistent in and out of court and
largely unimpeached.” And the cour t noted that “the presence of Mr. Martin at the same
location as N.H. in June of 2014 was corr oborated by” more than one person. Moreover,
the court discredited Martin’s alibi testimony because when he was interviewed by police
in 2015, although police repeatedly asked him where he was living in June 2014, he never

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mentioned that he was living in Indiana and working long hours for A.L. Although A.L.
testified that Martin worked long hours at A.L.’s restaurant in Indiana from April 2014 to
July 2014, and that Martin ne ver took a vacation, the court did not believe his testimony
because “the description of his record keep ing of his employees’ work and hours just
wasn’t credible.” The court found that F.G .’s testimony was biased because she was still
in love with Martin. In sum, the court found that “Martin’s alibi defense was fabricated.”
Martin also argues that the district court improperly shifted the burden of proof to
him when “it erroneously found that his alib i was unsupported because he has failed to
submit dated documentation of his time in Indian apolis.” Martin states in his brief that,
“During the hearing, as well as in its written findings, the court specifically noted that part
of the reason for its verdict was that Martin had failed to prove hi s alibi.” But Martin’s
argument seems to rest on an erroneous interpretation of the reason for the court’s finding
of guilt. The record reveals that the court never said that Ma rtin “had failed to prove his
alibi.” The court did state that Martin “did not pr ovide any evidence, any dated evidence
of [his] presence in Indianapolis in June of 2014.” But the context of this statement is
important to understanding the court’s rationa le for rejecting Martin’s alibi defense—the
court found that neither Martin nor A.L. was credible. The court stated:
I do find, based on your interview with the police in . . .
2015—that your failure to mention your alibi defense seriously
undermined your credibility. That you were . . . living in
Indianapolis the entire time dur ing June of 2014. While I do
find that [A.L.] — I couldn’t figure out any reason why he
would provide false testimony re garding your whereabouts in
June of 2014, I simply didn’t believe his testimony. . . .
[B]asically because the description of his record keeping of his
employees’ work and hours just wasn’t credible.

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And finally, I note that you did not provide any
evidence, any dated evidence of your presence in Indianapolis
in June of 2014. There were no bank statements, any cancelled
paychecks, any receipts, ther e was no documentation that
showed that you were present in Indianapolis during the entire
month of June, 2014.

We agree that Martin had no burden of proof, but he had the burden of going forward
with evidence to s upport his defense. See Currie, 267 Minn. at 307, 126 N.W.2d at 398
(stating, with regard to alibi defense, that defendant does not have burden of proving
essential elements of crime, including presence at place where crime was committed, but
defendant does have the “burden of going forward with the evidence” of the alibi defense
(quotation omitted)). In this case, the state overcame Ma rtin’s alibi-defense evidence at
least in part because the district court did not find his alibi-defense witnesses credible. The
record does not reflect that the court impr operly shifted the state’s burden of proof to
Martin.
Although N.H. could not provide a speci fic date on which the criminal sexual
conduct occurred, viewing the ev idence in the light most fa vorable to the verdict, we
conclude that the evidence is sufficient to supp ort the district court’s finding that Martin
digitally penetrated N.H. on or about June 6, 2014. The evidence is sufficient to support
Martin’s conviction of second-degree crimin al sexual conduct. Martin therefore is not
entitled to have his conviction reversed.
Affirmed.