State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0762

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Tramaine Smith, a/k/a Darryl Green,
Appellant.

Filed June 19, 2017
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-13-34512

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth R. Johnston, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his petition for postconviction relief in this
controlled-substance case, arguing that he is entitled to be resentenced in accordance with
the 2016 Minnesota Drug Sentencing Reform Act (the DSRA). We affirm.
FACTS
A jury found appellant Tramaine Smith a/k/a Darryl Green1 guilty of second-degree
controlled-substance crime and fifth-degree controlled-substance crime in connection with
an incident that occurred on October 13, 2013. On February 10, 2016, t he district court
sentenced Green to 92 months in prison on the second-degree controlled-substance offense.
Green appealed. Th is court subsequently stayed the appeal to allow Green to pursue
postconviction relief.
In his postconviction petition, Green argued that he is entitled to be resentenced
under the DSRA because his conviction was not final when the DSRA went into effect.
The district court denied the peti tion after concluding that the DSRA does not apply to
crimes committed prior to August 1, 2016, the date the DSRA went into effect. This court
then dissolved the stay of Green’s appeal.
D E C I S I O N
Green was convicted of second-degree controlled-crime based on his possession of
7.3 grams of cocaine. On the date of the offense, possession of more than six grams of

1 During the district court proceedings, appellant indicated Darryl Green is his true name.

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cocaine constituted second -degree controlled -substance crime. Minn. Stat. § 152.022,
subd. 2(a)(1) (2012). The legislature subsequently enacted the DSRA. See 2016 Minn.
Laws ch. 160, §§ 1-22, at 576-92. Under the mitigated provisions of the DSRA, possession
of 7.3 grams of cocaine is a fourth-degree controlled -substance crime. Minn. Sta t.
§ 152.024, subd. 2(2) (2016). Green contends that the DSRA applies retroactively because
his conviction was not final on the act’s effective date. We are not persuaded.
The retroactivity of a statute is a question of statutory interpretation, which we
review de novo. State v. Basal, 763 N.W.2d 328, 335 (Minn. App. 2009). As a general
rule, “[n]o law shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended
by the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.21 (2016). When a law is amende d, “the new
provisions shall be construed as effective only from the date when the amendment became
effective.” Minn. Stat. § 645.31 (2016).
In State v. Coolidge, the supreme court established an exception to this general rule,
holding that “a statute m itigating punishment is applied to acts committed before its
effective date, as long as no final judgment has been reached.” 282 N.W.2d 511, 514
(Minn. 1979). A judgment of conviction is final when direct appeals are exhausted or the
time for filing a direct appeal has expired. State v. Losh, 721 N.W.2d 886, 893-94 (Minn.
2006).
The Coolidge exception to the rule against retroactivity has since been narrowed.
In Edstrom v. State , the supreme court held that Coolidge does not apply to statutes
containing a contrary statement of intent from the legislature. 326 N.W.2d 10, 10 (Minn.
1982). This court has since addressed the application of Coolidge and Edstrom in two

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published opinions. In State v. McDonnell , we conclu ded that changes to an impaired -
driving statute did not apply retroactively because the legislature indicated that the
amendment would be “effective August 1, 2003, and appl[y] to violations committed on or
after that date.” 686 N.W.2d 841, 846 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16,
2004). In Basal, we determined that language indicating that a 2007 statutory amendment
“would become effective on January 1, 2008,” was equivalent to the language at issue in
Edstrom. 763 N.W.2d at 336. We concluded that the legislature had clearly expressed that
it “did not intend for the amendment to apply to conduct occurring before the effective
date.” Id.
As in McDonnell, the legislature clearly stated that it did not intend the DSRA to
apply retroactively. The DSRA provides that the amended Minn. Stat. § 152.024, subd.
2(2) “is effective August 1, 2016, and applies to crimes committed on or after that date.”
2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, § 6, at 583. Green acknowledges that this court found such
language to be sufficient to establish the legislature did not intend for an amendment to be
retroactive in McDonnell. But he argues that such language “merely restates the general
rule that new laws are not retroactive” and is insufficient to establish such an intent. In
essence, Green asks this court to overturn McDonnell. But we are bound by our published
opinions. State v. M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn.
Sept. 21, 2010). And our jurisprudence is consistent with Edstrom. Because the legislature
clearly stated that the DSRA does not apply retroactively, Green is not entitled to be
resentenced.
Affirmed.