State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0810

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Sirvontes Demico Bills,
Appellant.

Filed October 2, 2017
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Peterson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-14-2810

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda K. Jenny, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
PETERSON, Judge
In this appeal from his conviction of and sentence for second-degree controlled-
substance crime, appellant argues that (1) a confidential informant’s tip did not provide

2
probable cause to support a warrantless stop and search that resulted in the discovery of
drug evidence and (2) he is entitled to be resentenced under the Drug Sentencing Reform
Act of 2016 because his conviction was not yet final when the act became effective. We
affirm appellant’s conviction but reverse his sentence and remand to the district court for
resentencing in accordance with State v. Kirby, 899 N.W.2d 485 (Minn. 2017).
FACTS
On January 29, 2014, Officer Jeffrey Werner , who works primarily in narcotics
investigations for the Minneapolis Police Department , received information from a
confidential reliable informant (CRI) that a man nicknamed “Insane” would be going to an
apartment building at 2100 Bloomington Avenue South in Minneapolis to sell crack
cocaine. The CRI did not give Werner a physical description of the man, but Werner was
acquainted with “Insane” from previous interactions, and he knew that his real name was
Sirvontes Bills, the appellant here. Werner showed the CRI appellant’s picture, and the
CRI confirmed that appellant was the man he was talking about. The CRI said that
appellant would arrive at 2100 Bloomington Avenue within an hour in a teal-green minivan
with the license-plate number 594BDH.
Werner and other officers set up surveillance at the apartment building . After
several minutes, Werner saw a teal-green minivan drive up and a black male passenger get
out of the van and go up to the apartment door. Werner observed “a very brief conversation
which followed a hand to hand transaction” between appellant and an unidentified woman
at the apartment building’s back door. Werner was familiar with hand-to-hand transactions
in narcotics cases and described them as “an interaction between two parties where both

3
hands are extended and it appears that an object is exchanged.” Werner acknowledged that
he did not see an actual object exchanged and he did not interview the woman he observed.
Officers stopped the minivan and confirmed that the passenger who had engaged in
the hand -to-hand transaction was appellant. Police found about seven grams of crack
cocaine on appellant’s person. Both appellant and the driver of the minivan were arrested.
Appellant was charged with second-degree controlled-substance offense (possession).
Appellant moved to suppress the drug evidence, arguing that the warrantless stop
and search were not based on probable cause and, therefore, were unconstitutional. Werner
testified at the hearing on the motion. He did not e xplain why he believed the CRI was
reliable, but when asked what a CRI is, he said, “A confidential reliable informant is . . . a
person that has worked for the Police Department for a certain amount of time that has
been proven to be reliable, has provided information usually that has led to the arrest of
parties, recovery of narcotics or firearms.” He agreed that th is CRI’s information had led
to convictions or prosecutions in the past. Werner said t hat if an informant does not have
a track record, he refers to them as a “confidential informant,” omitting the reference to
reliability. The district court denied appellant’s motion.
Appellant stipulated to the prosecution’s case in order to obtain review of the district
court’s pretrial ruling , and the district court found appellant guilty of second -degree
controlled-substance crime. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. The district court
sentenced appellant to 75 months, a downward departure from the presumptive sentencing
range of 92 to 129 months given appellant’s criminal -history score of seven. See Minn.
Sent. Guidelines 4.A (Supp. 2013).

4
Appellant filed a notice of appeal on May 17, 2016, and moved for a stay in order
to pursue a postconviction remedy. By postconviction petition, appellant asked the district
court to apply the provisions of the Drug Sentencing Reform Act (DSRA), and the district
court ruled that the act did not apply retroactively to crimes committed before the effective
date of August 1, 2016. This court reinstated appellant’s appeal.
D E C I S I O N
I.
Appellant argues that the drug evidence found following the warrantless stop and
search must be suppressed because the pol ice acted in reliance on an informant’s tip but
the reliability of the informant was not established. A warrantless search or seizure is per
se unreasonable under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions , subject to a few
exceptions. U.S. Const. ame nd. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10 ; see State v. Othoudt , 482
N.W.2d 218, 221 -22 (Minn. 1992) . Under one of th ose exceptions, p olice may arrest a
felony suspect without a warrant in a public place based on probable cause. State v. Walker,
584 N.W.2d 763, 766 (Minn. 1998). If the warrantless arrest is valid, police may conduct
a warrantless search incident to arrest. State v. Cook, 610 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Minn. App.
2000), review denied (Minn. July 25, 2000). We review the district court’s findings of fact
for clear error . State v. Dickey , 827 N.W.2d 792, 796 (Minn. App. 2013). The district
court’s determination whether a police officer had probable cause to make a warrantless
search or seizure is a question of law, which we review de novo. Id.
Probable cause for an arrest exists if the facts would lead a reasonable person to
have an honest and strong suspicion that the suspect is guilty of a crime. Cook, 610 N.W.2d

5
at 667. “The lawfulness of an arrest is determined by an objective standard that takes into
account the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
Probable cause can be established through information provided by a CRI. State v.
Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999). “Where a probable cause determination is
based on an informant’s tip, the informant’s veracity and the basis of his or her knowledge
are considerations under the totality [of the circumstances] test.” State v. Ward , 580
N.W.2d 67, 71 (Minn. App. 1998). A CRI’s reliability can be established based on
previous accurate information given to the police or “by sufficient police corroboration of
the information supplied, and corroboration of even minor details can lend credence to the
informant’s information where the police know the identity of the informant. ” Id.
(quotation omitted).
Werner testified that his informant was a CRI and explained that the CRI
designation meant that this individual had provided accurate information in the past that
led to arrests and prosecutions. The CRI told Werner that “Insane” would arrive at a
specific address within a short period of time , he would be driving a teal-green minivan
with a specifi c license-plate number, and he would sell crack cocaine. Werner, who
recognized the street name “Insane,” showed the CRI a photo of appellant , and the CRI
confirmed that this was the person he knew as “Insane.” Werner immediately began
surveillance of the address; within minutes, a teal-green minivan with the specified license-
plate number arrived; a man matching appellant’s appearance got out of the passenger side
of the minivan; and this man engaged in a short conversation with a woman who appeared

6
at the back door of the apa rtment building. When officers stopped the minivan, Werner
confirmed that the passenger was appellant.
Werner did not testify to the source of the informant’s information, which is a
consideration in assessing an informant’s credibility. See Cook, 610 N.W.2d at 668. But,
unlike the informant in Cook, this CRI provided predictive information, stating that the
teal-green minivan would arrive at 2100 Bloomington within one hour. See id. at 668-69
(affirming suppression of evidence when source of CRI’s inf ormation was not known,
defendant’s car was parked at a certain building, and no predictive information was given).
A teal-green minivan with the specified license -plate number arrived as the CRI said it
would, which corroborated the CRI’s information. T he CRI also said that the man in the
picture that Werner showed him was the man that he knew as “Insane,” and Werner knew
before he showed the picture that appellant’s street name was “Insane.” Finally, Werner
observed what he described as a “hand to hand transaction,” which he said was typical of
a narcotics exchange. The district court acknowledged that Werner did not see an item
exchanged, but he “observed both parties reach their hand out to interact with the other,
they then pulled their hands back a nd immediately parted ways in different directions.”
The total interaction lasted 10 to 15 seconds.
Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the CRI’s information,
the corroboration of details of that information, and the predictive quality of the
information are sufficient to establish probable cause. The district court did not err by
refusing to suppress the evidence.

7
II.
Appellant argues that provisions of the DSRA should apply to mitigate his sentence.
The DSRA changed the threshold weights of drugs required to commit various controlled-
substance crime s. See Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 2(a)(1) (2016); 2016 Minn. Laws
ch. 160, § 4, at 579-80. The DSRA also changed the presumptive sentencing ranges under
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines for various categories of crimes. 2016 Minn. Laws
ch. 160, § 18, at 590-91.
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s recently issued opinion in Kirby holds that the
amelioration doctrine requires that a person whose conviction was not yet final on the
effective date of section 18 of the DSRA must be sentenced in accordance with the DSRA-
amended provisions of the sentencing guidelines. Kirby, 899 N.W.2d at 496. We,
therefore, reverse appellant’s sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing in
accordance with the DSRA-amended provisions of the sentencing guidelines. When
resentencing, the district court cannot impose a sentence greater than the sentence the
district court originally imposed. See State v. Prudhomme , 303 Minn. 376, 380, 228
N.W.2d 243, 246 (1975) (stating that after a sentence has been set aside, district court must
not resentence defendant to a longer sentence).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.