State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0831

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Bradley James Trousil,
Appellant.

Filed April 10, 2017
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Douglas County District Court
File No. 21-CR-14-1883

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Chad Larson, Douglas County Attorney, Miche lle L. Clark, Assist ant County Attorney,
Alexandria, Minnesota (for respondent)

Daniel J. Koewler, Charles A. Ramsay, Ja y S. Adkins, Ramsay Law Firm, P.L.L.C.
Roseville, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Pr esiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Bradley James Trousil appeals his second-degree driving-while-impaired
(DWI) conviction. Trousil argues that the distri ct court erred in concluding that exigent

2
circumstances absolved the need for the arres ting officers to obtain a warrant for a blood
draw for an alcohol-concentration test. Be cause we agree with the district court’s
conclusion that the exigent-circumstances exception applies in this case, we affirm.
FACTS
At approximately 12:49 a.m. on Septembe r 27, 2014, Deputy Wacker and Deputy
Stern of the Douglas County Sh eriff’s Office were dispatched to an all-terrain vehicle
(ATV) accident. At some point, Sergeant Wind hurst joined the depu ties on the scene.
They found the ATV tipped over on its side and the driver, Trousil, injured and lying in a
ditch. Trousil had difficulty remaining conscious and smelled of alcohol. An ambulance
arrived.
The three officers discussed whether a warrant was necessary to obtain a blood draw
for an alcohol-concentration test. Sergeant Windhurst contacted th e county attorney’s
office, who advised the officers to get a warr ant if Trousil would stay at Douglas County
Hospital, but to have blood dr awn if Trousil was going to be flown to another hospital
within a short period of time.
The ambulance left to take Trousil to D ouglas County Hospital. The two deputies
left the scene at 1:35 a.m. and went to Trousil’s parents’ house to inform his parents of the
accident. Sergeant Windhurst re mained on the scene to wait for a tow truck. Deputy
Wacker went to Douglas Coun ty Hospital, arriving at appr oximately 1:55 a.m. Deputy
Stern returned to the office to seek a warrant for the blood draw.
In the meantime, Deputy Wacker asked a nurse at Douglas County Hospital if
Trousil was going to be flown to a different hos pital. The nurse told Deputy Wacker that

3
they intended to fly Trousil to St. Cloud Hospital, and the flight crew said that they intended
to leave in 15 to 20 minutes. Deputy Wacker believed that Trousil might not remain at
St. Cloud Hospital due to the severity of his injuries and decided that there was insufficient
time to obtain a warrant. Deputy Wacker reque sted that Douglas C ounty Hospital staff
perform a blood draw. The hospital did so at 2:20 a.m. Deputy Wacker notified Deputy
Stern that Douglas County Ho spital was transferring Trousil to St. Cloud Hospital, and
thus Deputy Stern did not complete the warrant application.
The alcohol-concentration test showed that Trousil had an alcohol concentration of
0.214. Trousil was charged with second-degree and third-degree DWI.
Before trial, Trousil moved to suppress the results of the alcohol-concentration test
obtained from the warrantless blood draw. The district court denied the motion, concluding
that exigent circumstances ab solved the officers of the warrant requirement. Trousil
stipulated to the prosecution’s case in order to obtain review of the pretrial suppression-
motion ruling. A bench trial took place on November 12, 2015, at which Deputy Wacker
and Deputy Stern testified. The district court found Trousil guilty on both counts.
Trousil appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Trousil argues that the warrantless bloo d draw was unconstitutional because the
officers had sufficient time to obtain a telephoni c warrant and, therefore, no exception to
the warrant requirement applies to this case. The district court concluded that the exigent-
circumstances exception applies because the officers did not have sufficient time to seek a
warrant.

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In reviewing a motion to su ppress evidence, this court re views the district court’s
legal determinations de novo and its factual findings for clear error. In re Welfare of G.M.,
560 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Minn. 1997).
The Fourth Amendment protects indi viduals from unreasona ble searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Absent an exception, searches
conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable. State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218,
222 (Minn. 1992). An exception to the warrant requirement exists if the state can show
that “the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that
the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2414 (1978) (q uotation omitted). Exigent
circumstances may exist when “there is a co mpelling need for official action and no time
to secure a warrant.” Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 1949 (1978).
In determining whether exigent circumstances exist, this court obje ctively examines the
totality of the circumstances. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559 (2013); Kentucky
v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 464, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1859 (2011).
In Schmerber v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the warrantless blood
draw of a driver who was taken to the hospital and appeared intoxicated. 384 U.S. 757, 86
S. Ct. 1826 (1966). The Court noted in Schmerber that exigent circumstances existed
because “time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene
of the accident.” Id. at 770-71, 86 S. Ct. at 1836.
In McNeely, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Schmerber analysis “fits
comfortably within our case law applying th e exigent circumstan ces exception,” but

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refined the application of the exigent-circumst ances exception. 133 S. Ct. at 1560. In
particular, the Court concluded that natural metabolization of alcohol does not constitute a
per se exigency justifying a warrantless blood draw. Id. at 1556. The Court held that the
Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement to obtain a warra nt before a blood draw if
reasonable to do so under the circumstances. Id. at 1563. While the Court noted that
telephonic warrants make it easier for law enforcement to obtain warrants in time-sensitive
cases, “time-consuming forma lities designed to create an adequate record, such as
preparing a duplicate warrant,” may make it unr easonable for officers to obtain a warrant
in some cases. Id. at 1562. The Court concluded that “relevant factors in determining
whether a warrantless search is reasonable, including the practical problems of obtaining a
warrant within a timeframe that still preserves the opportunity to obtain reliable evidence,
will no doubt vary depending upon the circumstances in the case.” Id. at 1568.
After the Supreme Court decided McNeely, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a
warrantless blood draw under the exigent-circumstances exception in State v. Stavish, 868
N.W.2d 670 (Minn. 2015). The Minneso ta Supreme Court found the following
circumstances relevant: (1) law enforcement had reason to believe that the accused was
intoxicated at the time of the accident; (2) the accused sustained serious injuries that
necessitated emergency treatment; (3) the need for medical tr eatment rendered the future
availability of a blood draw uncertain; (4) the officer did not know how long the accused
would remain at the same hospital or whet her further medical care would preclude
obtaining a sample; (5) the accused might be tr ansported to a different hospital; and (6) it
was important to draw the accused’s blood within the statutory two-hour period. Id. at

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677-79. The court also noted that one “relevant consideration is whether the time necessary
to bring the accused to the hospital, or for the officer to travel to the hospital, impacted the
officer’s ability to obtain a warrant befo re the blood draw without significantly
undermining the efficacy of the search.” Id. at 680.
This case presents similar facts to Stavish. Deputy Wacker be lieved that Trousil
was intoxicated at the time of the accident becau se he could smell alcohol on his person.
Trousil was having trouble remaining consci ous, was badly injured by the accident, and
needed emergency care. It took additional time for an ambulance to bring Trousil to
Douglas County Hospital and fo r the deputies to notify Trousil’s parents of the accident.
Sergeant Windhurst remained at the scene waiting for a tow truck. Thus, none of the three
officers were available to begin the warrant process until 1:55 a.m. At that point, Deputy
Stern returned to the office to seek a warrant. Around that same time, hospital staff notified
Deputy Wacker that Trousil would be airlifted to St. Cloud Ho spital in 15 to 20 minutes.
Deputy Wacker also believed that Trousil mi ght be taken to a different hospital after
St. Cloud because of the severity of his injuries. Notice of the airlift gave the officers only
15 to 20 minutes to seek a warrant. Additionally, over an hour and a half passed between
the time of the accident and the administering of the blood draw. To satisfy Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.20, subd. 1(5) (2014), the blood draw had to be administered within two hours of
driving.
In light of these exigent circumstances, Deputy Wacker reasonably concluded that
15 to 20 minutes was insufficient time to obtain a telephonic warrant. A law enforcement
officer requesting a telephonic warrant “must prepare a duplicate original warrant and must

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read the duplicate original warrant, verbatim , to the judge.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 36.03
(2014). The judge “must prepare an original warrant by recording, verbatim, what has been
read by the applicant.” Id. These procedural requirements are the sort of procedural delays
described by the U.S. Supreme Court in McNeely as potentially excusing the warrant
requirement in cases of exigent circumstance s. 133 S. Ct. at 1562. Therefore, exigent
circumstances excused the need for the officers to obtain a telephonic warrant.
Because exigent circumstance s absolved the officers of the warrant requirement in
this case, the district court did not err in denying Trousil’s motion to suppress the results
of the alcohol-concentration test obtained from a warrantless blood draw.
Affirmed.