Sno-Barons Snowmobile Club, Inc., Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0862

Sno-Barons Snowmobile Club, Inc.,
Relator,

vs.

Chisago County Board of Commissioners,
Respondent.

Filed March 27, 2017
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Chisago County Board of Commissioners

Paula A. Callies, Callies Law, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for relator)

Paul D. Reuvers, Nathan C. Midolo, Iverson Reuvers Co ndon, Bloomington, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Pr esiding Judge; Reilly , Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Relator Sno-Barons Snowmobile Club (Sno- Barons) appeals by writ of certiorari
the Chisago County Board of Commissioners’ denial of its request for an amended
conditional-use permit (CUP), arguing that the board’s de cision was arbitrary and

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capricious. Because the denial of the CUP was supported by legally sufficient reasons
having a factual basis in the record, we affirm.
FACTS
Sno-Barons owns approximately 140 acres of land in Chisago County that is zoned
agricultural. In 2009, Sno-Barons was gran ted a CUP to hold an annual two-day festival
called “Hay Days” involving grass snowmobile races and other motorsport-related events.
In 2015, Sno-Barons began the process of applying for an amended CUP that would add a
third day to Hay Days, remove some condi tions from the current Hay Days CUP, and
permit Sno-Barons to hold additional “commerc ial recreation” and “rural retail tourism
business” events for 20 days each year. Both commercial recreation and rural retail tourism
business are conditional uses that may be permitted in agricultural zones under the Chisago
County Zoning Ordinance. Sno-Barons did not specifically define the proposed additional
events in its application, but it suggested they might include horse shows, car shows, fitness
competitions, holiday festivals, Boy Scout meetings, tractor pulls, drone exhibitions and
competitions, paintball events, snow cross, and BM X racing, among othe rs. After twice
asking Sno-Barons for additional information, the county received a complete application
on January 25, 2016.
On February 4, the Chisago County Planning Commission held a public hearing to
consider Sno-Barons’ request . The county received written and oral comments from
members of the public opposing and supporting the request. Public comments opposing
the request highlighted concerns that additional noise, light, and traffic from the proposed
activities would disrupt the rural character of the community. The planning commission

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voted to revisit the matter at its next meeting. On March 3, the planning commission voted
to recommend approval of the CUP request with revised conditions.
The Chisago County Board of Commissione rs met on March 16. There is no
recording or transcript of that meeting. The agenda and minutes from that meeting state
that there was an update on zoning activities, including the Sno-Baro ns application, but
that “[n]o action was taken” on that matter. However, according to the statements of
several board members during the board’s next meeting, the board voted at the March 16
meeting to deny Sno-Barons’ request and directed staff to draft findings supporting denial.
On March 17, the county notified Sno-Baro ns that it was extending the statutory
deadline to consider the request by 60 days pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 3 (2016),
to allow time to prepare “findings consistent with denial of the permit request.”
At its next meeting, on April 6, the board discussed reasons for denial, voted to deny
Sno-Barons’ request, and adopted written findings supporting denial.
Sno-Barons appeals.
D E C I S I O N
A county board’s decision regarding a CUP is quasi-judicial and reviewable by writ
of certiorari. Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs , 617 N.W.2d 566, 574
(Minn. 2000). “An appellate court will reve rse a governing body’s decision regarding a
conditional use permit application if the governing body acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or
capriciously.” Perschbacher v. Freeborn Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs , 883 N.W.2d 637, 643
(Minn. App. 2016) (quotation omitted). A decision is arbitrary or capricious if it represents

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the decision-maker’s will rather than its judgment, or if it is “based on whim or is devoid
of articulated reasons.” Id. at 643 (quotation omitted).
Sno-Barons alleges that both procedural and substantive issues demonstrate that the
board’s denial of its CUP request was arbitrary and capricious.
I. Procedural issues
Sno-Barons asserts that the board voted to deny the request on March 16 without
stating reasons for denial, making the denial “per se arbitrary and capricious.” Minn. Stat.
§ 15.99, subd. 2(c) (2016), governs the procedures for denying a CUP. That statute states:
If a multimember governing body denies a request, it must state
the reasons for denial on the r ecord and provide the applicant
in writing a statement of the re asons for the denial. If the
written statement is not adopted at the same time as the denial,
it must be adopted at the next meeting following the denial of
the request but before the expi ration of the time allowed for
making a decision under this se ction. The written statement
must be consistent with the reas ons stated in the record at the
time of the denial.
Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2(c).
Sno-Barons rightly does not argue that, because the board did not state reasons for
denial on the record on Marc h 16, the CUP must be automatic ally approved as a penalty.
As Sno-Barons recognizes, in a case addr essing what is now subdivision 2(a) of
section 15.99, the supreme court held that a statutory requirement that a state agency
provide a written statement of reasons for de nying a request is directory rather than
mandatory and that the automatic-approval penalty from subdivision 2(a)—which applies
when a decision is not made within 60 da ys—does not attach to the written-statement
requirement. Johnson v. Cook County, 786 N.W.2d 291, 296 (Minn. 2010); see also Minn.

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Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2(a) (2016). 1 Sno-Barons does not argue that the stating-reasons-on-
the-record requirement of subdivision 2(c) sh ould be treated differently from the written-
statement requirement in subdivision 2(a). Thus, even if the board voted to deny the CUP
application at the March 16 meeting withou t stating its reasons on the record, the CUP
would not automatically be approved.
Rather, Sno-Barons argues that even if no penalty attaches to the failure to comply
with subdivision 2(c), the fact that the board voted to deny the request without articulating
reasons at the time demonstrates that the decision was arbitrar y. But we have previously
upheld denials for which reasons were adopted only after the vote. See Perschbacher, 883
N.W.2d at 642-43 (holding that Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2(b) (2016), which contains
language similar to that in subdivision 2(c), permits the board to state reasons after the vote
but before the statutory deadline); see also Concept Props., LLP v. City of Minnetrista, 694
N.W.2d 804, 812 (Minn. App. 2005) (affirming denial of zoning request where the city
voted a second time after it fa iled to adopt written findings supporting previous vote to
deny same request), review denied (Minn. July 19, 2005). Thus, even if the board did vote
to deny the CUP on March 16, the failure to state its reasons at that time does not in itself
render the decision arbitrary and capricious.

1 “[A] statute may contain a requirement but provide no consequence for noncompliance,
in which case we regard the statut e as directory, not mandatory.” Hans Hagen Homes,
Inc. v. City of Minnetrista , 728 N.W.2d 536, 541 (Minn. 20 07). If a directory statute
“requires a governmental body to perform some act, it is reas onable to assume the
governmental body will do so or it could be compelled to do so by mandamus.” Id.

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Sno-Barons argues that the board’s acti on in extending the deadline for decision-
making was a subterfuge to gain time in order to fabricate reasons for denial. On March 17,
the board notified Sno-Barons that it was extending the statutory deadline for deciding the
request to allow time to prepare findings cons istent with denial. At the board’s next
meeting on April 6, it was acknowledged that th e staff had prepared findings for denial
pursuant to the board’s direction and had also prepared findings for partial approval and
partial denial should the board wish to co nsider them. These communications openly
acknowledged that, at the board’s direction, staff prepared reasons for denial; the
communications suggest transparency, not subte rfuge. The record demonstrates that the
board lawfully extended the deadline and, within the extended deadline, stated reasons for
denial on the record and adopted a written stat ement of reasons for de nial. We conclude
that the alleged procedural errors do not warrant reversal.
II. Substantive issues
Sno-Barons asserts that th e reasons adopted by the board at the April 6 meeting are
not legally sufficient to deny the CUP and are not factually supported in the record.
In determining whether a county acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously in
denying a CUP, an appellate court must examine whether the reasons given by the county
were “legally sufficient” an d determine whether the legally sufficient reasons “had a
factual basis in the record.” RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington , 861 N.W.2d 71, 75-76
(Minn. 2015). “A legally sufficient reason is one reasonably related to the promotion of
the public health, safety, morals and general welfare of the community.” BECA of
Alexandria, LLP v. Cty. of Douglas ex rel. Bd. of Comm’rs , 607 N.W.2d 459, 463 (Minn.

7
App. 2000) (quotation omitted). The applicant bear s the burden of pe rsuading the court
that the reasons for denial are legally insuffici ent or have no factual basis in the record.
Hubbard Broad., Inc. v. City of Afton, 323 N.W.2d 757, 763 (Minn. 1982).
A conditional use is one
that would not be appropriate generally but may be allowed
with appropriate restrictions as provided by official controls
upon a finding that (1) certain conditions as detailed in the
zoning ordinance exist, and (2) the use or development
conforms to the comprehensive land use plan of the county and
(3) is compatible with the existing neighborhood.

Minn. Stat. § 394.22, subd. 7 (2016). Th e reasonableness of a decision on a CUP
application “is measured by the standa rds set out in the local ordinance.” White Bear
Docking & Storage, Inc. v. City of White Bear Lake , 324 N.W.2d 174, 176 (Minn. 1982).
Not all of the reasons given must be legally sufficient and supported in the record in order
to affirm the decision. See Barton Contracting Co. v. City of Afton, 268 N.W.2d 712, 719
(Minn. 1978) (upholding city’s denial of a CUP even though one of five given reasons was
not legally sufficient to support denial). A denial is not arbitrary when at least one reason
given has a rational basis. Trisko v. City of Waite Park, 566 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Minn. App.
1997), review denied (Minn. Sept. 25, 1997). The applicant has the burden of showing that
the county’s denial was withou t any legally sufficient reasons with factual support in the
record. Hubbard, 323 N.W.2d at 765.

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A. Legally sufficient reasons
Sno-Barons argues that the county’s decision lacks a legally sufficient basis because
the county ordinances do not provide express standards or criteria that must be satisfied to
obtain a CUP. We disagree.
The county’s ordinances lay out specifi c standards for evaluation of proposed
conditional uses. The general CUP provision of the Chisag o County Zoning Ordinance
directs the planning commission to consider eight general factors before providing the
board with a recommendation on a CUP requ est. Chisago Coun ty, Minn, Zoning
Ordinance § 8.04(C) (Dec. 30, 2008). In this case, the board’s written findings cite seven
of the eight factors that were not satisfied and were the bases for denial:
1. [Possible effect of the CUP on] [t]he Comprehensive Plan
and development policies of the County;
. . .
3. The use shall be sufficiently compatible or separated by
distance or screening from adjacent development or land so
that existing development does not suffer undue negative
impact and there will be no significant deterrence to future
development;
4. The structure and site shall have an appearance that will not
have an adverse effect upon adjacent properties;
5. The use in the opinion of the County is reasonably related
to the overall land use goals of the County and to the
existing land use;
6. The use is consistent with the purposes of the Zoning
Ordinance and the purposes of the zoning district in which
the applicant intends to locate the proposed use;
7. The use shall not cause traffic hazard or congestion; and
8. Existing nearby properties shall not be adversely affected
by intrusion of noise, glare or general unsightliness.
See id.

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These factors apply to “commercial recrea tion areas” and “rural retail tourism
businesses,” both of which are recognized and defined by county ordinances as conditional
uses that may be permitted in the agricultural zone. Commercial recreation areas are
similar to public recreation areas including private
campgrounds, golf courses, swimming pools, resorts, and
crafting uses such as quiltin g and scrapbooking [and]
[r]estaurants and/or liquor es tablishments when clearly
incidental and associated with the primary commercial
recreation use.
Id., § 5.06(C)(5). Rural retail to urism businesses must have “a unique and demonstrable
relationship with Chisago County or its region, and its hist ory, culture, traditions, arts,
crafts, lore, natural resources, or other features and amenities,” and should be “small-scale”
and “low impact.” Id., § 4.15(B)-(C) (Nov. 16, 2011). The county’s findings address both
of these conditional-use ordina nces and find that Sno-Bar ons’ proposed use exceeds the
scale of commercial recreation areas and rural retail tourism businesses.
The county ordinances relied on by the boar d provide legally sufficient bases for
denying a CUP. The ordinances lay out multiple factors relating to “public health, safety,
and welfare.” RDNT, LLC, 861 N.W.2d at 76 (holding that a city ordinance providing that
use “not be injurious to the surrounding neighborhood or otherwise harm the public health,
safety and welfare” was legally sufficient). For example, preventing traffic hazards and
congestion are goals reasonably related to the promotion of public safety. C.R. Invs., Inc.
v. Village of Shoreview, 304 N.W.2d 320, 325 (Minn. 1981). In addition, incompatibility
between a proposed use and a comprehensive plan is a legally sufficient reason for denying
a CUP. Barton Contracting Co., 268 N.W.2d at 717-18.

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B. Reasonable factual basis
Having concluded that the county gave legally sufficient reasons, we turn to whether
those reasons are supported by a reasonable factual basis. We conclude that they are.
Sno-Barons argues that the county lacked a reasonable factual basis for finding that
the proposed CUP is not consistent with the county’s comprehensive plan and development
policies, that the proposed uses cannot be pr actically or strategically screened, that the
proposed uses would have an adverse effect on adjacent properties, that the proposed uses
are inconsistent with the county’s land use goals, that the proposed uses would cause traffic
hazards or congestion, and th at nearby properties would be adversely affected by noise,
glare, or general unsightliness. With respect to these factors, Sno-Barons relies primarily
on the argument that the proposed CUP would a dd only 21 additional days a year to the
two days of events already permitted for Hay Days, that any concerns are already well
managed for Hay Days, and that the proposed uses would not all be of the same large scale
as that event.
The county’s findings determine that the proposed uses, if extended to the limits of
Sno-Barons’ requested CUP, would be incompatible with comprehensive-plan goals such
as preventing incompatible uses in agricultural ar eas and encouraging growth in village
centers and in areas where urban services and adequate roads are already available. The
findings also express a concern that granting the request for 20 days per year of new crowd-
drawing events in addition to Hay Days, with no limitations on scale beyond the physical
limitations that the event be contained within Sno-Barons’ 140 acres and 8,600 parking
spots, would draw too much traffic and congestion to a rural area with limited road access.

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The findings observe that the traffic, noise, light, and glare already present for Hay Days
would be increased, adversely affecting neighboring properties. And the findings express
concern that the loosely defined events pr oposed by Sno-Barons would result in an
unknown number of days of pre- and post-e vent preparations, temporary structures, and
site changes that would result in a continual appearance of a commercial district in the rural
area.
The county’s findings have a factual basis in the record. The county received public
comments on Sno-Barons’ proposed CUP throughout the application process. A citizens’
organization expressed concern about the uncerta in nature and size of proposed uses and
the impacts on traffic, noise, and lighting. Area businesses expressed concern about the
impact of larger scale events like Hay Days on their rural bus inesses. Residents testified
to the noise, light, traffic congestion, and disruption they experienced during Hay Days and
expressed concern about increasing those negative effects throughout the year.
A staff report to the planning commission provides additional factual support for
the county’s findings. The st aff report found that the propos ed uses would bring traffic
congestion and possible traffic hazards to the area, as Hay Days has in the past. It found
that neighboring properties would be impacted visually by the requested addition of new
permanent lighting, outdoor li ghting during night events, and the presence of additional
cars and event attendees in the area. The staff report noted that there is insufficient
landscaped or natural buffering to insulate some of the nearby residential properties from
the visual impacts of Sno-Barons’ events. The staff report also found that even the smaller
proposed events might impact neighboring pr operties with noise from “cars arriving and

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departing, engines starting, car doors slamming, as well as normal crowd gathering sounds
such as conversation and laught er.” Further, it found that some events would generate
more significant auditory impa cts from amplified announcing and racing engines. The
staff report cited a 2010 study of Hay Days noise, which is included in the record and which
found measurable noise impacts from snowmobile racing, motorcycle and ATV events, a
PA system, generators, vehicles , and banner-pulling airplanes. According to the study,
Hay Days noise was audible at several nearby locations and exceeded state noise-level
standards at one of the neighboring residential locations during the 2010 Hay Days event.
The staff report also found that adding more days of events would have cumulative impacts
on the closest neighbors who are accustomed to the existing agricultural land uses.
Because the board provided reasons for denying the CUP that are legally sufficient
and have a factual basis in the record, we c onclude that the denial was not arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable and reversal is not warranted. See Barton Contracting Co. ,
268 N.W.2d at 719; Perschbacher, 883 N.W.2d at 643.
Affirmed.