State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0898

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Chateram Prashad,
Appellant.

Filed April 10, 2017
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-6465

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appe llate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KIRK, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, arguing
that the district court erred by depriving him of his right to a unanimous verdict when it

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failed to issue a specific unanimity instruction to the jury. Because any error did not affect
appellant’s substantial rights, we affirm.
D E C I S I O N
“The jury’s verdict must be unanimous in all cases.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd.
1(5). “But a jury need not agree unanimously with respect to the alternative means or ways
in which a crime can be committed.” State v. Rucker, 752 N.W.2d 538, 547 (Minn. App.
2008), review denied (Minn. Sept. 23, 2008).
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Chateram Prashad with first -
degree criminal sexual conduct for his actions involving R.C., his great niece. At trial,
appellant did not request a specific unanimity instruction and he did not object to the jury
instructions. “A defendant’s failure to propose specific jury instructions or to object to
instructions before they are given to the jury generally constitutes a waiver of the right to
appeal.” State v. Cross, 577 N.W.2d 721, 726 (Minn. 1998). Despite appellant’s failure
to object, this court may review the jury instructions under the plain -error analysis. State
v. Griller , 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998). Under the plain -error test, this court
examines the jury instructions to see if there was (1) error, (2) that was plain, and (3) that
affected appellant’s substantial rights. State v. Gunderson, 812 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn.
App. 2012).
Relying on State v. Stempf, appellant argues that the district court erred in failing to
instruct the jury that they had to reach a unanimous verdict on one of the four alleged
incidents of sexual contact between himself and R.C. 627 N.W.2d 352 (Minn. App. 2001).
Appellant asserts that the prosecutor presented evidence of multiple, distinct acts that took

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place on different dates instead of evidence of alternate means of committing one act of
sexual conduct on one date. Appellant further asserts that the prosecutor ’s closing
argument highlighted four separate incidents of sexual contact between R.C. and appellant
and informed the jury that it could f ind appellant guilty based on any of the alleged
incidents. Appellant urges this court to reverse his conviction because this error was
prejudicial and affected the outcome of his case. We disagree.
After reviewing the record, we conclude that we do not need to decide whether the
district court erred by omitting a specific -unanimity instruction because the alleged error
did not affect appellant’s substantial rights. State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Minn.
2015). An error affects a defendant’s substantial rights “if the error was prejudicial and
affected the outcome of the case.” Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 741. An error is prejudicial “if
there is a reasonable likelihood that the giving of the instruction in question would have
had a significant effect on the verdict of the jury.” Id. (quotation omitted). The defendant
bears the “heavy burden” of proving an error affected his substantial rights. Id.
Here, the state’s evidence was strong because R.C. consistently testified under
cross-examination about the first incident of sexual contact between herself and appellant,
which was consistent with her CornerHouse interview. R.C. testified that the first incident
occurred in July 2012 when she was eight years old. She testified that she was in the
basement watching television at her great aunt’s residence wh en appellant sat down next
to her on the couch, pulled her shorts down, and “he put his finger inside me.” R.C. testified
that appellant then went back upstairs and she stayed in the basement because she was
scared. The jury heard and received a transcript of R.C.’s CornerHouse interview.

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The record also establishes that R.C. sought out and spoke with the school social
worker about multiple incidents of sexual contact with appellant , which prompted the
police investigation. The CornerHouse interviewer testified that it is not uncommon for
children who are R.C.’s young age to delay reporting sexual abuse. The CornerHouse
interviewer also testified that it is not uncommon for children to be unable to describe each
incident of sexual abuse in specific det ail because “the trauma can have an influence on
memory in a variety of ways.”
The state inappropriately informed the jury that if they had reasonable doubts about
the second or third incident of sexual contact between R.C. and appellant , it could rely on
R.C.’s consistent testimony regarding the first incident to convict appellant of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct. But the state’s instruction was limited to a portion of its closing
argument, and it did not excessively dwell on any particular incid ent of sexual abuse at
trial. Appellant did not present strong evidence that he had not committed the crimes, and
he did not object to the district court’s jury instructions or to the state’s closing argument.
On this record, “there is no reasonable like lihood that the absence of the misconduct in
question would have had a significant effect on the verdict.” State v. Hohenwald, 815
N.W.2d 823, 834 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
Finally, in his pro se brief, appellant asserts that there was insufficient evidence
presented at trial to support his conviction. Our review of a sufficiency -of-the-evidence
challenge is “limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the
evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit
the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” State v. DeRosier , 695 N.W.2d 97, 108

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(Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted). “A defendant bears a heavy burden to overturn a jury
verdict.” State v. Vick , 6 32 N.W.2d 676, 690 (Minn. 2001). As noted above, the
prosecution’s evidence was substantial in this case. Appellant’s assertion to the contrary,
which is not supported by any argument or authority, does not meet the heavy burden that
is required. Accord ingly, we conclude that appellant’s conviction is supported by
sufficient evidence.
Affirmed.