State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0901

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ryan Daniel Yollen,
Appellant.

Filed March 20, 2017
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Carlton County District Court
File No. 09-CR-15-888

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Thomas Pertler, Carlton County Attorney, Nico le L. Ketola, Assist ant County Attorney,
Carlton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Pr esiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Toussaint, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant challenges his misdemeanor domestic assault conviction, arguing that the
district court abused its discretion by admitting as relationship evidence an unredacted 911
call containing allegations of a prior domestic-conduct incident. He argues that the danger
of issue confusion substantially outweighe d the evidence’s probative value and had a
substantial effect on the verdict. We affirm.
FACTS
On April 29, 2015, appellant Ryan Daniel Yollen struck his wife, C.Y., during an
argument. C.Y. called 911 to report the assau lt. She told th e 911 operator that appellant
had punched her in the back of the head and threatened to kill her. She said that this was
the second time in three days that appellant ha d attacked her and that the earlier assault
involved appellant strangling her while she screamed for help.
Officers responded to the call, and C.Y. repo rted to the officers that appellant had
struck her in the back of the neck with a closed fist and pushed her on the couch when she
tried to call 911. C.Y. again reported that appellant had strangled her a few days earlier.
Appellant was arrested and charged with misdemeanor domestic assault and gross
misdemeanor interference with an emergency call.
Before trial, appellant challenged the admissibility of portions of the recorded 911
call because it contained evidence of other bad acts. The district court inquired into the
substance of the recording, and appellant’s counsel explained that the recording contained
C.Y.’s statements that appellant had strangle d her two days earlier. Although appellant

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argued to the district court that the recording contained Spreigl evidence, the district court
analyzed the recording under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2014) as relationship evidence. It
admitted the challenged portion of the recording on this basis.
Before the unredacted recording was played to the jury during the trial testimony of
the first witness, the 911 supervisor, the distri ct court gave a cautionary instruction. It
informed the jury that the state would introduce evid ence of appellant’s conduct from an
incident that took place on a date other than Ap ril 29, 2015. The jury was instructed that
the evidence was being admitte d for the limited purpose of demonstrating the nature and
extent of the relationship betw een appellant and C.Y., in order to assist the jury in
determining whether appellant committed the crime with which he was charged. The jury
was further instructed that it was not to convict appellant on the basis of the other incident,
because to do so would be unjust.
C.Y., who by the time of trial wanted the charges against appellant dismissed, was
subpoenaed by the state. She testified that she had argued with appellant on April 29, 2015,
but that she did not remember much about it. She testified that appellant hit her on April 29,
but she did not know if it was with a closed fist or an open hand. The officer who took
C.Y.’s statement testified about C.Y.’s April 29 statements concerning the assault and the
prior incident. The district court gave an additional cautionary instruction after the
officer’s testimony about the prior incident. A third cautionary instruction about the prior
conduct was included with the final jury instructions.

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Shortly after deliberations began, the ju ry requested to again listen to the 911
recording. The recording was replayed for the jury. The jury found appellant guilty of the
domestic-assault charge and not guilty of interfering with an emergency call.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
“Evidence of domestic condu ct by the accused against the victim of domestic
conduct . . . is admissible un less the probative value is s ubstantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury . . . .” Minn. Stat.
§ 634.20. Section 634.20 was adopted by th e Minnesota Supreme Court as a rule of
evidence governing the admission of domestic conduct against the alleged victim of
domestic abuse. State v. McCoy , 682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004); see also State v.
Fraga, 864 N.W.2d 615, 627 (Minn. 2015) (expressly extending the application of section
634.20 as a rule of evidence to domestic conduct against fam ily or household members).
We review a district court’s decision to admit relationship evidence for abuse of discretion.
State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 553 (Minn. 2010).
Appellant argues that there must be so me proof that the prior conduct actually
occurred before it is admitted and that we should use this occasion to define the degree of
proof that must be met by the proponent of prior domestic conduct before the evidence is
admitted under section 634.20. Unlike evidence admitted under rule 404(b) of the
Minnesota Rules of Evidence, section 634.20 does not require that evidence of prior
domestic conduct be proved by clear and convincing evidence before it may be admitted.
McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 161. The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that domestic

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conduct in domestic abuse trials “is relevant and admissible unless it should be excluded”
for failing to meet the balancing test contained within section 634.20. Id. at 159. The
balancing test is the standard for admitting evidence of domestic co nduct. Evidence of
domestic conduct is admissible “unless the prob ative value is substa ntially outweighed.”
Minn. Stat. § 634.20. The degree of proof of the conduct in question is that level of
probative value. It is not for us to adopt a different standard for admissibility. See Tereault
v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn. App. 1987) (“[T]he task of extending existing law
falls to the supreme court or the legislat ure, but it does not fall to this court.”), review
denied (Minn. Dec. 18, 1987).
Appellant also argues that the evidence had minimal probative value because it did
not illuminate the ten-year history of the re lationship between appellant and C.Y., and at
most gave context to a difficult three-day pe riod. He argues that the minimal probative
value of the evidence was subs tantially outweighed by the danger of confusing the issue
because of the close tempor al relationship between the charged crime and the prior
incident. We disagree.
Evidence of prior domestic violence committed by the same defendant against the
same victim has an inherent probative value. State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn.
2006). “Evidence that helps to establish the relationship between the victim and the
defendant or which places th e event in context bolsters its probative value.” State v.
Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn. Ap p. 2008) (quotation omitted), review denied
(Minn. Oct. 29, 2008); see also McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 161 (holding that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in allowing “evidence that, if believed by the jury, could have

6
assisted the jury by providing a context with which it could better judge the credibility of
the principals in the relationship”). Section 634.20 contains no “temporal restriction.”
Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d at 756 (permitting evidence of conduct that occurred after the charged
offense).
The evidence that appellant had assaulted C.Y. several days before the charged
offense, and that they argued about the prior assault, puts the charged offense into context
and was probative of the recen t relationship history. The unredacted 911 call had
significant probative value because it permitte d the jury an opport unity to judge the
credibility of C.Y. and weigh he r trial testimony, which contra dicted both her statements
to the 911 operator and to th e responding office r. Any danger of issue confusion was
mitigated by the district court’s three cautionary instructions concerning the purpose of the
prior incident evidence. “We presume that jurors follow a judge’s instructions.” State v.
Miller, 573 N.W.2d 661, 675 (Minn. 1998). The district c ourt acted within its discretion
in admitting the evidence of the prior incident of domestic conduct because the probative
value of the evidence was not substantially out weighed by the danger of confusion of the
issue.
Affirmed.