State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0926

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Matthew Howard Isensee,
Appellant.

Filed May 8, 2017
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Koochiching County District Court
File No. 36-CR-15-448

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Karen B. McGillic, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Jeffrey Naglosky, Koochiching County Attorney, International Falls, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
On appeal from his second-degree assault conviction, appellant argues that the state
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not acting in self-defense. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Matthew Isensee stabbed D.A. ou tside of a bar on July 1, 2015, and was
charged with second-degree assault.1 At trial, the state presented evidence that appellant
and D.A. had not known each other before that night. The two socialized and consumed
alcohol together, along with other friends, for several hours. When D.A. attempted to leave
for the night, appellant stopped him in the park ing lot. D.A. testifie d that appellant told
him he “wasn’t going anywhere” and then appellant shoved him a few times. D.A. shoved
appellant back, and they began rolling on the ground and punching each other. Witnesses
saw D.A. put appellant into a chokehold, and appellant then “tapped out.” D.A. released
appellant and began walking away.
Witnesses testified that 30 or 40 seconds later, D.A. and appellant began fighting
again after appellant indicated that he could win a fight against D.A. with only two punches.
D.A. responded, “Let me see you do it.” Witnesses saw appellant produce a knife during
the break in the fighting and then saw appellant charge D.A. D.A. testified that he rolled
appellant onto his side and began hitting appellant hard; he then felt something piercing his

1 The state also charged appellant with terrori stic threats for commen ts made to a police
officer following appellant’s arrest. The terroristic-threats charge was tried separately and
is not involved in this appeal.

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arm. A witness saw appellant stab D.A. and attempt to place the knife near D.A.’s throat.
Upon seeing appellant with a knife, D.A.’s fri end kicked appellant and held appellant’s
wrist down because appellant wa s still holding the knife. O fficers arrived and disarmed
appellant, striking him repeated ly because he would not rel ease the knife. D.A. was
transported to the hospital for treatment of two stab wounds.
Appellant presented evidence tending to show that D.A. initiated the fight.
Appellant testified that D.A. charged him after he accidentally knocked off D.A.’s hat. He
testified that he only produced the knife afte r D.A. had him in a chokehold. Appellant
testified that he warned D.A. that he woul d stab him if he did not release him from the
chokehold. He testified that D.A. did not let go and bega n squeezing harder. Appellant
produced the knife and cut D.A. while trying to remove D.A.’s hold on his neck. Appellant
testified that he had begun to lose consciousness, either from loss of oxygen or from being
kicked in the face.
Two other witnesses testifie d on appellant’s behalf. M. W. testified that she saw
appellant on the ground, with D.A. “choking him out,” a nd D.A.’s friend punching and
kicking appellant. She did not s ee the start of the fight or appellant with a knife. G.H.
testified that he witnessed part of the fight from his bedroom window. G.H. testified that
he saw a man, who he believed to be appellant, backing away with his hands up before he
was tackled to the ground. He testified that he did not see the knife or who had it, but that
a man in a white shirt cut himself when he tried to intervene in the fight. G.H. testified that
the man who got cut then began kicking appellant in the head.

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The district court instructed the jury on self-defense, in cluding that the state was
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did not act in self-defense. The
jury found appellant guilty.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Our review of the sufficien cy of the evidence after a criminal conviction is limited
to a thorough review of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdic t, is sufficient to support it. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d
426, 430 (Minn. 1989). We assume that the jury believed evidence that supports the verdict
and disbelieved conflicting evidence. State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989).
Additionally, “[a]ssessing witness credibility and the weight given to witness testimony is
exclusively the provin ce of the jury.” State v. Pendleton , 759 N.W.2d 900, 909 (Minn.
2009). “We will not disturb a verdict if the jury could re asonably conclude, given the
presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Id.
Minnesota’s self-defense statute permits the use of reasonable force against a
person, without that person’s consent, when “resisting or aiding another to resist an offense
against the person.” Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(3) (2014). To prevail on a self-defense
claim, the defendant must produce evidence supporting the four self-defense elements:
(1) the absence of aggression or provocation on the part of the
defendant; (2) the defendant’s actual and honest belief that he
or she was in imminent danger of . . . bodily harm; (3) the
existence of reasonable grounds for that belief; and (4) the

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absence of a reasonable possibi lity of retreat to avoid the
danger.

State v. Devens , 852 N.W.2d 255, 258 (Minn. 2014) (alteration in original) (quotation
omitted). Self-defense also re quires that the degree of for ce used “must not exceed that
which appears to be necessary to a reasonable person under similar circumstances.” State
v. Basting, 572 N.W.2d 281, 286. Th e state has the burden of di sproving one or more of
the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Devens, 852 N.W.2d at 258.
The first element of self-defense require s there to have b een an absence of
provocation or aggression on the part of appellant. State v. Radke, 821 N.W.2d 316, 324
(Minn. 2012). The state presented evidence that appellant was the aggressor during the
fight, both initially, as D.A. te stified that appellant would not let him leave and began to
shove him, and in reengaging in the fight after D.A. released appellant. Appellant
presented evidence that he was not the aggre ssor. Identifying whether appellant was the
first or primary aggressor, and whether his fear of imminent danger was honest and
reasonable, depends on which version of even ts the jury believed. When faced with
varying versions of events, we assume that the jury believed the state’s evidence and
disbelieved evidence to the contrary; in this case, there was sufficient evidence from which
the jury could reasonably conclude that appellant was the aggressor in the fight. Because
the state disproved one element of appellant ’s self-defense claim beyond a reasonable
doubt, the self-defense claim fails. See id. at 325 (concluding that the state disproved the
first element of a self-defense claim, and ther efore any evidence with respect to the other
elements would not have changed the outcome).

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Even if more were needed, the record here is adequate to support the jury’s rejection
of appellant’s self-defense cl aim for another obvious reason. In conformity with Minn.
Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(3), the district court instructed the jury that appellant “is not guilty
of a crime . . . if [he] used reasonable force against [D.A.] to resist an offense against the
person, and such an offense was being committed or [appellant] reasonab[ly] believed that
it was.”2 The state presented evidence that there was a 30 to 40 second break between the
end of the first tussle, when D.A. was walking away, and the beginning of the second fight,
when appellant pulled a knife and charged at D.A. The record evidence supports a
conclusion by a jury that appellant was not resisting an offense against the person when he
charged at and stabbed D.A. Although appella nt argues that the state did not meet its
burden of proof, appe llant’s claim of self-defense requ ired the jury to make credibility
determinations concerning the testimony of a ll of the witnesses. It did so, and found
appellant guilty. As evidence d by the conviction, the jury did not believe appellant’s
version of events. The record supports the jury’s conclusion.
Affirmed.

2 The state argues that it suffi ciently disproved all elements of appellant’s self-defense
claim. We note that the jury was not instructed on the duty to retreat in this case. This lack
of instruction seemingly inured to the benefit of appellant because the record suggests there
was an opportunity to retreat after appellant was released from the chokehold. But because
the state sufficiently disproved other elements of self-defense, we need not consider
whether the jury was properly instructed concerning this element.