State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0956

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

James Richard Jerome Cochran,
Appellant.

Filed May 15, 2017
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Winona County District Court
File No. 85-CR-15-10

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Karin L. Sonneman, Winona County Attorney, Christin a Marie Davenport, Rebecca
Church, Assistant County Attorneys, Winona, Minnesota (for respondent)

Jed J. Hammell, Hammell & Murphy, P.L.L.P., Caledonia, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of three counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct, arguing that (1) the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for
a continuance; (2) the court erred by allowing a medical doctor to testify on the
2
prosecution’s behalf as an expert; (3) the court violated appellant’s right to a fair trial by
allowing an expert witness to vouch for the complainant; (4) the court erred by denying
his motion for a mistrial; (5) the court abused its discretion by admitting the
complainant’s forensic interview into evidence; (6) the court erred by preventing
appellant from attacking the credibility of complainant’s mother; (7) insufficient evidence
supports the convictions; (8) appellant’s trial counsel was ineffective; and (9) the
cumulative effect of these errors deprived appellant of his right to a fair trial. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant James Richard Jerome Cochran is J.P.’s biological father. During the
time period in question, J.P. lived with his biological mother J.K. and his step-father T.K.
He would spend approximately every other weekend at appellant’s residence in Winona,
Minnesota. In December 2014, around the time of J.P.’s sixth birthday, J.P. returned
from a weekend with appellant and made comments to J.K. and T.K. regarding “special
time” with appellant. Following these comments, J.K. and T.K. grew suspicious that
appellant was sexually abusing J.P.
Based on their suspicions, J.K. and T.K. took J.P. to CornerHouse, a child-abuse
evaluation center, where a trained social worker conducted a forensic interview of J.P. A
multidisciplinary team observed the social worker conduct her first forensic interview.
The interview was conducted in a child-friendly room using age-appropriate language
and questioning methods recommended by the National Child Protection Training Center
(NCPTC).
3
During the interview, J.P. used the words and terms familiar to a six-year-old to
describe appellant’s acts of sexual abuse. J.P. stated that these acts occurred at
appellant’s residence, where appellant lived with his then-girlfriend, when he was four
and five years old. When asked about “special time,” J.P. described being subjected to
acts of sexual touching, oral sex, and penetration by appellant that involved ejaculation
and the use of mint-flavored sexual aids. J.P. further described at least one instance
where appellant sexually abused J.P. while the two played video games. Two subsequent
medical examinations of J.P. did not reveal any physical signs of sexual abuse.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged ap pellant with three counts of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct: (1) penetration of a victim under the age of 13; (2) penetration
of a person under the age of 16 where there is a significant relationship; and (3) multiple
acts of penetration over time of a victim under the age of 16 where there is a significant
relationship. See Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a), (g), (h)(iii) (2014). Appellant
pleaded not guilty to all charges and a jury trial was held from February 29, 2016, until
March 4, 2016. The prosecution’s trial witnesses included J.P.; the CornerHouse social
worker; the three medical professionals who examined J.P., including Dr. Ann Budzak;
T.K.; J.K.; investigating officers; and Victor Vieth, a senior director and founder of the
NCPTC. The defense also called a number of witnesses, including appellant who denied
sexually abusing J.P. The jury found appellant guilty of all three counts of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct. The district court sentenced appellant to 172 months in prison.
This appeal follows.

4
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s request
for a continuance.

Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request
for a continuance on the day trial was scheduled to begin based upon the absence of one
of his attorneys. We are not persuaded.
The United States and the Minnesota Cons titutions guarantee a criminal defendant
the right to the assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6.
“This right includes a fair opportunity to secure counsel of [the defendant’s] choice.”
State v. Vance, 254 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn. 1977). While a defendant may request a
continuance for substitution of counsel, such a request will only be granted if, based on
all the surrounding facts and circumstances, exceptional circumstances exist and the
demand is timely and reasonable. Id. The question is whether the defendant has been
prejudiced in preparing his defense so as to materially affect the outcome of the trial.
State v. Huber, 275 Minn. 475, 481, 148 N.W.2d 137, 142 (1967). This court will not
reverse the decision to deny a motion to continue a trial unless the denial shows a clear
abuse of discretion. State v. Rainer, 411 N.W.2d 490, 495 (Minn. 1987).
On the first day of trial, appellant’s tr ial counsel, A.S., requested a continuance
because C.D., an attorney admitted pro hac vice to represent appellant, was absent due to
a family medical emergency. A.S. explained to appellant that she prepared the case for
trial and was ready to try it, but appellant insisted that C.D. be present for trial.
5
The district court denied appellant’s motion for a continuance, noting that C.D.
had not previously appeared in court on appellant’s behalf and that A.S. “is extremely
experienced and capable [and] has made all the appearances and prepared this case for
trial.” In denying appellant’s request, the district court also cited concerns regarding
rescheduling for the parties’ numerous witnesses and avoiding a scenario where J.P.
would need to re-prepare to testify for a delayed trial date. In addition, the district court
postponed jury selection until the following morning to allow C.D. an opportunity to
make necessary arrangements before trial began.
Appellant argues that the denial of his continuance request denied him the
opportunity to be represented by the attorney of his choosing. However, appellant does
not articulate how C.D.’s absence prejudiced him in preparing his defense so as to
materially affect the outcome of his trial. See Huber, 275 Minn. at 481, 148 N.W.2d at
142. Instead, the record establishes that A.S. was experienced and capable of
representing appellant at trial. This determination is bolstered by the fact that she had
appeared alone at each of appellant’s pretrial hearings from the time her firm was
retained. Moreover, in an effort to accommodate C.D., the district court postponed jury
selection to provide him an opportunity to make necessary arrangements. Therefore, we
conclude that the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s
motion for a continuance.

6
II. The district court’s admission of Dr . Budzak’s expert testimony was harmless
error.

Appellant argues that the district court erred by allowing Dr. Budzak, a medical
doctor who examined J.P. on January 5, 2015, to testify as an expert because the
prosecution did not comply with the expert-disclosure requirements established in Minn.
R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1(4)(c). While we agree that allowing Dr. Budzak to testify as an
expert was erroneous, we conclude that the error was harmless.
“Whether a discovery violation occurred is an issue of law which this court
reviews de novo.” State v. Palubicki, 700 N.W.2d 476, 489 (Minn. 2005). A district
court’s erroneous admission or exclusion of expert testimony is subject to harmless-error
analysis. See State v. Bird, 734 N.W.2d 664, 672 (Minn. 2007).
Prior to trial, and at the defense’s request, the prosecution is required to make a
series of disclosures to a criminal defendant. Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1. Such
disclosures include the name of “[a] person who will testify as an expert but who created
no results or reports in connection with the case” and “a written summary of the subject
matter of the expert’s testimony, along with any findings, opinions, or conclusions the
expert will give, the basis for them, and the expert’s qualifications.” Id., subd. 1(4)(c).
While Dr. Budzak testified at trial that she did not discover any physical signs of
sexual abuse during her examination of J.P., she stated that “it is exceedingly rare that [a
child will] disclose an acute sexual assault immediately. It is often a delayed disclosure
of weeks, months, even years until they tell someone what’s happened to them.” She
further explained, “And so when we are seeing children for sexual abuse at least 95% of
7
those that we know for certain that have been sexually abused will have an absolutely
normal physical exam with no findings of trauma whatsoever.” The defense objected to
Dr. Budzak testifying as an expert beyond the scope of her examination findings because
the prosecution had not previously disclosed her as an expert witness for purposes of
testimony regarding common behaviors exhibited by abuse victims. The district court
overruled the objection.
On appeal, the parties agree that Dr. Budzak’s testimony was limited to her expert
opinions concerning sexual assault. The record indicates, and the prosecution
acknowledged, that Dr. Budzak was not identified as an expert witness, with respect to
common behaviors, prior to trial. Moreover, there is no indication that the prosecution’s
“witness summary” document, which is not in the record before this court, addressed Dr.
Budzak’s expert conclusions or the basis for such conclusions. Rather, based on the
parties’ descriptions to the district court, this document merely outlined Dr. Budzak’s
experience and the findings derived from her examination of J.P. Accordingly, the state
did not comply with its discovery obligations under Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1(4)(c),
and the district court erred in allowing Dr. Budzak to offer her expert opinions.
Appellant argues that the erroneous admission of Dr. Budzak’s expert testimony
was prejudicial and entitles him to a new trial. “Prejudice warrants a new trial only if a
reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the trial would have been different if the
evidence” had not been admitted. State v. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d 470, 479 (Minn. 2009)
(quotation omitted). Here, Dr. Budzak’s erroneously admitted expert opinions are ones
that are commonly included in a medical doctor’s testimony in a sexual-assault case.
8
When considered within the broader context of the prosecution’s voluminous case against
appellant, Dr. Budzak’s expert testimony was very limited. Appellant also had the
opportunity to challenge Dr. Budzak’s credibility regarding her expert opinions through
cross-examination. Given these considerations, appellant has failed to establish a
reasonable probability that the jury would not have reached its verdict without taking into
account Dr. Budzak’s expert opinions. Therefore, because we conclude that there is no
danger that Dr. Budzak’s expert opinions affected the jury’s verdict, the district court’s
erroneous admission of Dr. Budzak’s expert testimony was harmless.
III. The invited-error doctrine preclud es appellant’s fair-trial argument.

Appellant argues that his right to a fair trial was violated by improper vouching
testimony. We disagree.
During cross-examination, Dr. Budzak answered, “I believe [J.P.] was telling the
truth” when appellant’s trial counsel asked whether she knew that J.P.’s report of sexual
abuse was truthful. The defense did not object to Dr. Budzak’s reply until the next day of
trial, which the district court denied as untimely and without merit.
Because the testimony was elicited through appellant’s cross-examination of Dr.
Budzak, we must determine whether the invited-error doctrine precludes appellant’s
argument. “Under the invited error doctrine, a party cannot assert on appeal an error that
he invited or that could have been prevented at the district court.” State v. Carridine, 812
N.W.2d 130, 142 (Minn. 2012). However, the invited-error doctrine does not apply if an
error satisfies the plain-error test. Id. “The plain error test gives us discretion to review
. . . errors if: (1) there is error, (2) the error is plain, and (3) the error affects substantial
9
rights.” Id. “If the defendant establishes all three factors, we consider a fourth: ‘whether
the error should be addressed to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial
proceedings.’” Id. (quoting State v. Goelz, 743 N.W.2d 249, 258 (Minn. 2007)). When
assessing the third factor, this court must determine whether the defendant has met the
heavy burden of showing that the error was prejudicial and affected the trial’s outcome.
Id. at 142-43.
Vouching testimony is generally inadmissible. See State v. Ferguson, 581 N.W.2d
824, 835 (Minn. 1998). However, as the Minnesota Supreme Court has noted, this
general rule is not without exceptions: “Expert testimony concerning the credibility of a
witness should be received only in unusual cases. An example of such an unusual case is
a sexual assault case where the alleged victim is a child . . . .” State v. Saldana, 324
N.W.2d 227, 231 (Minn. 1982).
Moreover, the line of questioning immediately leading up to the testimony-at-issue
calls into question whether Dr. Budzak’s statement even constituted vouching. The
preceding questions addressed Dr. Budzak’s past experiences regarding the truthfulness
of reports from child victims of sexual assault. This context implies that the question and
testimony at issue were not intended to elicit testimony regarding the veracity of J.P.’s
allegations; rather, the line of questioning suggests that appellant’s trial counsel was
attempting to emphasize Dr. Budzak’s bias as a medical professional specializing in
sexual abuse.
Therefore, based on the exception recognized in Saldana and the context
surrounding the testimony at issue, which strongly suggests Dr. Budzak’s answer was not
10
impermissible vouching testimony, we conclude that appellant has failed to demonstrate
any error. Accordingly, the invited-error doctrine applies and precludes appellant’s fair-
trial argument.1
IV. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by admitting J.P.’s forensic
interview into evidence.

Appellant argues that the district court erred by admitting the forensic interview
under the prior-consistent-statement and residual exceptions to the hearsay rule as well as
the statutory exception for a child victim’s out-of-court statements. See Minn. Stat.
§ 595.02, subd. 3 (2014); Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B), 807. We disagree.
A prior consistent statement is not hearsay and is admissible as substantive
evidence where the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement, and the statement is consistent with the declarant’s testimony
and helpful to the trier of fact in evaluating the declarant’s credibility. Minn. R. Evid.
801(d)(1)(B). Prior to admission “‘the witness’[s] credibility must have been challenged,
and the statement must bolster the witness’[s] credibility with respect to that aspect of the
witness’[s] credibility that was challenged.’” In re Welfare of K.A.S., 585 N.W.2d 71, 75
(Minn. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Nunn, 561 N.W.2d 902, 909 (Minn. 1997)). The
prior statement need not be identical to the trial testimony but rather “reasonably
consistent” to be admissible. State v. Zulu, 706 N.W.2d 919, 924 (Minn. App. 2005)

1 At the time she objected to Dr. Budzak’s testimony, appellant’s trial counsel also moved
for a mistrial, which the district court denied. A district court’s denial of a motion for a
mistrial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Manthey, 711 N.W.2d 498, 506
(Minn. 2006). For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion for a mistrial.
11
(citing State v. Bakken, 604 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn.
Feb. 24, 2000); K.A.S., 585 N.W.2d at 76). Evidentiary rulings are generally reviewed
for an abuse of discretion, but construction of the rules of evidence is a question of law
subject to de novo review. State v. McCurry, 770 N.W.2d 553, 559 (Minn. App. 2009),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 2009).
Relying on State v. Bakken, appellant argues that inconsistencies exist in J.P.’s
forensic interview and testimony, rendering Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) inapplicable.
There, the complainant’s interview reported that Bakken’s act of criminal sexual conduct
involved him ripping off the complainant’s clothes, using a butcher knife to threaten and
cut the complainant, and threatening death if the complainant told anyone about the
incident. 604 N.W.2d at 108. At trial, the complainant testified that Bakken told him to
undress and that he was afraid of Bakken and complied. Id. On appeal, this court stated
that these discrepancies were significant because, “if the jury believed the inconsistent
videotaped statements, the criminal conduct would legally escalate from third-degree to
first-degree. Thus, where inconsistencies directly affect the elements of the criminal
charge, the Rule 801(d)(1)(B) requirement of consistency is not satisfied.” Id. at 110.
In this case, J.P.’s trial testimony incl uded the following: J.P. would stay at
appellant’s residence in Winona; appellant did bad stuff with his privates; appellant was
the only one to touch J.P. with his privates; it hurt the “inside” of J.P.’s butt; and J.P. was
four or five when this occurred. J.P.’s testimony also included details regarding the
videogames J.P. played while being sexually assaulted and the layout of appellant’s
residence. In comparison, during the forensic interview, J.P. described in greater detail
12
being subjected to acts of sexual touching, oral sex, and penetration with appellant, which
occurred at appellant’s residence when J.P. was four or five years old. After reviewing
the forensic interview and J.P.’s testimony, the district court determined that J.P.’s
statements in these two instances were reasonably consistent. The district court
acknowledged that J.P. provided more detail in the forensic interview, which was
conducted more than one year before the trial. The district court further described J.P.’s
hesitancy to discuss “the really bad information” in the courtroom setting.
Unlike Bakken, any differences between J.P.’s statements in these two instances
do not directly affect the elements of the criminal charges of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a), (g), (h)(iii). Moreover, this court has
previously rejected similar arguments regarding the admission of a child-victim’s prior
statement where the prior statement was much more detailed than the child’s trial
testimony. See K.A.S., 585 N.W.2d at 75. Accordingly, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the forensic interview under rule
801(d)(1)(B), and need not address the additional arguments relating to admissibility
under rule 807 and Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 3.
V. The district court did not violat e appellant’s confrontation rights.

Appellant argues that the district court violated his confrontation rights by
precluding his attorney from attacking J.K.’s credibility on cross-examination “by asking
[J.K.] questions about her father’s criminal sexual conduct and how that affected the
child custody dispute between [J.K.’s] mother and father.” We are not persuaded.

13
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides a defendant the
right to confront witnesses who testify against him and limits the district court’s authority
to control the scope of cross-examination. State v. Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d 635, 640
(Minn. 1995). But the right to cross-examine witnesses may be limited “so long as the
jury is presented with sufficient information from which to draw inferences as to the
witness’s reliability.” State v. Yang, 774 N.W.2d 539, 552 (Minn. 2009) (quotation
omitted). “The scope of cross-examination is left largely to the district court’s discretion
and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Parker, 585 N.W.2d
398, 406 (Minn. 1998).
Here, the defense asked questions rega rding discrepancies surrounding how J.P.
reported special time to J.K. and whether J.K. knew about appellant’s sexual preferences
and use of sexual aids. The defense further engaged in extensive questioning relating to
J.K.’s relationship and interactions with appellant before and after the birth of J.P. These
questions were relevant to the theory that J.K. was motivated by her desire to obtain sole
custody of J.P.
In addition, the defense sought to further question J.K. on matters related to J.K.’s
parents’ divorce, an ensuing custody dispute between J.K.’s parents, and how J.K.’s
father’s conviction of criminal sexual conduct impacted that custody dispute. Following
the prosecution’s objection and a bench conference, the district court reaffirmed its prior
determination that information regarding J.K.’s father’s criminal-sexual-conduct
conviction was inadmissible, but allowed the defense to ask J.K. questions “about her
parents getting divorced, the date of the divorce, and the fact that there was a custody
14
issue assuming in fact she was old enough to even understand or appreciate there was
even a custody issue because she may not have even known about it.”
The defense was afforded ample opport unity to question J.K. on a number of
subjects that implicated its theory. Therefore, we conclude that the district court’s
limitations on the scope of cross-examination did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
VI. Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s guilty verdict.

Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he committed criminal sexual conduct crimes against J.P. We disagree.
Our review of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge is “limited to a painstaking
analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most
favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which
they did.” State v. DeRosier, 695 N.W.2d 97, 108 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted). “A
defendant bears a heavy burden to overturn a jury verdict.” State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d
676, 690 (Minn. 2001). A reviewing court must assume that “the jury believed the state’s
witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d
373, 384 (Minn. 2011). “[W]eighing the credibility of witnesses is the exclusive function
of the jury.” State v. Pieschke, 295 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 1980). The verdict will not
be disturbed “if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the
defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100
(Minn. 2012).
15
To support appellant’s conviction of three counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct, the prosecution had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant engaged
in sexual penetration or sexual contact with J.P. and that the following circumstances
existed:
(a) [T]he complainant is under 13 years of age and the actor is
more than 36 months older th an the complain ant. Neither
mistake as to the co mplainant’s age nor consent to the act by
the complainant is a defense;
. . . .
(g) [T]he actor has a significant relationship to the
complainant and the complainan t was under 16 years of age
at the time of the sexual penetration. . . .
(h) [T]he actor has a significant relationship with the
complainant, the comp lainant was under 16 years of age at
the time of the sexual penetration, and . . . the sexual abuse
involved multiple acts committed over an extended period of
time.

Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a), (g), (h)(iii). In a prosecution for a first-degree
criminal-sexual-conduct crime, “the testimony of a victim need not be corroborated.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1 (2014).
The record establishes that J.P. was four and five years old during the relevant
time frame. Appellant is J.P.’s biological father, which constitutes a significant
relationship. See Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 15(1) (2014). The record further
establishes that appellant used sexual aids and subjected J.P. to acts of sexual contact and
sexual penetration over an extended period of time when J.P. would visit appellant’s
residence in Winona. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury could reasonably
conclude that appellant was guilty of the charged crimes.
16
Appellant argues that: (1) J.P. did not sufficiently identify appellant as the
potential sexual abuser; (2) no testimony established any dates that appellant sexually
abused J.P.; (3) appellant’s expert testified that, in his expert opinion, the forensic
interview was flawed in all respects; and (4) J.P. may have based his allegations on
previous instances unrelated to sexual abuse where J.P. had encountered appellant’s
sexual aids and witnessed appellant and his then-girlfriend, as well as J.K. and T.K.,
having sexual intercourse. Contrary to appellant’s first and second arguments, J.P.’s
forensic interview and trial testimony included statements identifying appellant as the one
who sexually abused J.P. when J.P. was four or five years old. As to the third and fourth
arguments, despite hearing evidence from several defense witnesses, including appellant
and appellant’s expert, the jury chose to credit J.P.’s statements and the prosecution’s
other witnesses. See Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d at 384.
Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that appellant was
guilty of the charged crimes. See State v. Franks, 765 N.W.2d 68, 73 (Minn. 2009) (“Our
precedent does not permit us to re-weigh the evidence.”). Appellant’s arguments to the
contrary do not meet the heavy burden required to overturn a jury verdict. Vick, 632
N.W.2d at 690. Accordingly, we conclude that appellant’s conviction of three counts of
first-degree criminal sexual conduct is supported by sufficient evidence.
VII. Appellant did not receive ineffe ctive assistance of trial counsel.

Appellant argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We
disagree.
17
To prevail on a claim of ineffective a ssistance of counsel, a defendant must
demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that (1) counsel’s performance was
deficient, such that counsel “made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as
the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment” and (2) the defendant
was prejudiced by counsel’s performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,
104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Gates v. State, 398 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn. 1987). An
insufficient showing on one of these requirements defeats a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Gates, 398 N.W.2d at 561. An attorney provides reasonable
assistance upon exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent
attorney would exercise under the circumstances. Dukes v. State, 621 N.W.2d 246, 252
(Minn. 2001). There is a strong presumption that an attorney acts competently. Id. As a
general rule, matters of trial strategy do not provide a basis for an ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim. State v. Doppler, 590 N.W.2d 627, 633 (Minn. 1999).
First, appellant argues that his tria l counsel failed to properly utilize her
peremptory challenges during the jury selection process, which resulted in four
“unfavorable jurors” sitting on the final jury. In addition, appellant asserts that trial
counsel’s mistake in filling out the jury selection sheet, which was remedied by the
district court “whit[ing] out” the mistake, and subsequent failure to raise an objection
constituted ineffective assistance. However, “Minnesota courts have recognized that
‘[a]ttorneys must make tactical decisions during jury selection, and a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel cannot be established by merely complaining about counsel’s
failure to challenge certain jurors or his failure to make proper objections.’” Jama v.
18
State, 756 N.W.2d 107, 113-14 (Minn. App. 2008) (quoting Tsipouras v. State, 567
N.W.2d 271, 276 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 1997)).
Second, appellant argues that his trial c ounsel provided ineffective assistance after
failing to object to the district court conducting a competency hearing of J.P. in front of
the jury. Appellant further asserts that the district court’s comments regarding J.P.’s
competency amounted to vouching for J.P.’s credibility. Minn. R. Evid. 601 provides
that “the competency of a witness to give testimony shall be determined in accordance
with law.” Under Minnesota law, “[w]hen a person is produced as a witness, the court
may examine the person to ascertain capacity, and whether the person understands the
nature and obligations of an oath.” Minn. Stat. § 595.06 (2014). While it is atypical for a
district court to conduct a competency hearing in the presence of the jury, appellant cites
no rule or law indicating that proceeding as such is improper. Moreover, the district
court’s comment’s only concerned J.P.’s competency to testify and that he understood the
difference between the truth and a lie. The district court made no comment as to whether
J.P. would tell the truth.
Third, appellant argues that his trial couns el was ineffective in failing to object to
leading questions during the prosecution’s direct examination of J.P. The record directly
contradicts this argument as appellant’s trial counsel raised eight objections during J.P.’s
direct examination. In addition, appellant’s trial counsel raised a concern that the
prosecution was asking leading questions that referenced facts outside the scope of J.P.’s
prior testimony.
19
Finally, appellant argues that his tria l counsel provided ineffective assistance
through her cross-examination of Dr. Budzak. As noted above in section II, a careful
review of the record supports the conclusion that appellant’s trial counsel intended to
shed light on Dr. Budzak’s bias as a medical professional specializing in sexual abuse.
When viewed in this light, the decision to ask such a question constitutes a matter of trial
strategy, which does not provide the basis for an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
See Doppler, 590 N.W.2d at 633.
Accordingly, because appellant is unabl e to demonstrate by a preponderance of
evidence that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient, we conclude that appellant is
not entitled to relief under his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, and we need not
consider the second Strickland prong.
VIII. Appellant’s cumulative-effect argument is without merit.

Appellant argues that the cumulative effect of the errors discussed above deprived
him of his right to a fair trial. “[I]n rare cases, . . . the cumulative effect of trial errors can
deprive a defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial. State v. Davis, 820 N.W.2d
525, 538 (Minn. 2012). “The test is whether the effect of the errors considered together
denied appellant a fair trial.” State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 642 (Minn. App.
2010). Despite appellant’s numerous arguments on appeal, he has only sufficiently
demonstrated one error, the admission of Dr. Budzak’s expert testimony, which we have
determined was harmless. Accordingly, we conclude that appellant was not denied his
right to a fair trial.
Affirmed.