State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0974

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ardis Leann Copeman,
Appellant.

Filed April 24, 2017
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Fillmore County District Court
File No. 23-CR-16-83

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Lee Michael Novotny, Spring Valley City Attorney, Novotny Law Office, Ltd., Chatfield,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Veronica May Surges, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges her conviction of failure to stop for a school bus with its stop-
signal arm lowered pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169.444, subd. 1 (2014), arguing the state

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failed to provide suffici ent evidence that the bus was marked as required by Minn. Stat.
§ 169.441 (2014). We affirm.
FACTS
On January 28, 2016, M.J. was driving a school bus southbound on Pleasant Avenue
in Spring Valley. M.J. stopped at a bus stop just south of a gas station. M.J. noticed a car
that was driven by appellant Ardis Leann Copeman traveling northbound on Pleasant
Avenue, approaching the school bus. M.J. opened the door to the school bus, which also
extended the stop -signal arm and activated the flashing red lights. While the school bus
was stopped, Copeman drove past it without stopping and turned into the gas station
parking lot . M.J. subsequently drove into the gas station parking lot and recorded
Copeman’s license-plate number.
At a bench trial, M.J. testified that this incident occurred while he was driving a big
yellow school bus with school bus markings on it. T he district court determined that the
bus “had the appropriate markings as a school bus” and found Copeman guilty. This appeal
follows.
D E C I S I O N
Copeman contends that the district court erred when it determined that the state
provided sufficient ev idence that the school bus was properly marked. Although
respondent failed to file a brief, we review the case on the merits. Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 142.03; see Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.01, subd. 2 (stating that the rules of civil appellate
procedure govern criminal appeals unless stated otherwise).

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“[Appellate courts] use the same standard of review in bench trials and in jury trials
in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Palmer , 803 N.W.2d 727, 733
(Minn. 2011). In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, our review is limited to a
“painstaking analysis” of the record to determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to allow the jurors to reach the verdict that
they did. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). The reviewing court must
assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the
contrary.” State v. Moore , 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). We will not disturb the
verdict if the fact-finder, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the
defendant was guilty of the charged offense. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77
(Minn. 2004).
The district court convicted Copeman of failure to stop for a school bus under Minn.
Stat. § 169.444, subd. 1, which provides:
When a school bus is stopped on a street or highway . . . and is
displaying an extended stop-signal arm and flashing red lights,
the driver of a vehicle approaching the bus shall stop the
vehicle at least 20 feet away from the bus. The vehicle driver
shall not allow the vehicle to move until the school bus stop -
signal arm is retracted and the red lights are no longer flashing.

This statute applies “if the school bus bears on its front and rear a plainly visible sign
containing the words ‘school bus’ in letters at least eight inches in height.” Minn. Stat.
§ 169.441, subd. 3(a).

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At trial, the following exchange occurred between the district court and M.J. with
respect to the markings on the school bus:
THE COURT: And is this a typical school bus?
M.J.: Yes.
THE COURT: It has markings on it?
M.J.: Has what?
THE COURT: It has school bus markings on it?
M.J.: Yes. Oh, yes. A big yellow school bus.

Copeman contends that this evidence is circumstantial, which would require us to
apply a heightened scrutiny in determining whether or not it was sufficient to support a
conviction. See State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010). We disagree.
“Circumstantial evidence” is defined as “[e]vidence based on inference and not on
personal knowledge or observation ” and “[a]ll evidence that is not given by eyewitness
testimony.” Black’s Law Dictionary 674 (10th ed. 2014). “Direct evidence” is “[e]vidence
that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without
inference or presumption.” Id. at 675. In testifying that the bus was “[a] big yellow school
bus” and “ha[d] school bus markings on it,” M.J. testified based on his personal knowledge
and observations. M.J.’s testimony is therefore direct evidence of the markings on the bus.
“In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case, we are limited to
ascertaining whether, given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be
drawn from those facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was gu ilty of
the offense charged.” Bernhardt, 684 N.W.2d at 476 (quotation omitted). M.J.’s testimony
that he was driving “[a] big yellow school bus” with “school bus markings on it” was clear.

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This evidence is sufficient for a fact-finder to reasonably conclude that the bus was marked
as the statute requires.
Affirmed.