State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1013

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Tony Dejuan Jackson,
Appellant.

Filed March 20, 2017
Affirmed; motion denied
Rodenberg, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-K0-97-001881

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Melvin R. Welch, Welch Law Firm, LLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cleary, Ch ief Judge; Ross, Judge; and Rodenberg,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Tony Dejuan Jackson challenges the district court’s denial of his motion
to correct a sentence under Minn . R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, arguing that the Ramsey
County District Court’s life sentence was not authorized by law. We affirm.

2
FACTS
In May 1997, appellant sexually assaulted three people in Ramsey, Washington, and
Dakota counties. He was convicted of crimes in all three counties.
In Washington County, appella nt was convicted of first-degree burglary and first-
degree criminal sexual conduct. The Wash ington County District Court sentenced
appellant to 182 months in prison, based on both aggravati ng factors and a finding that
appellant was a patterned sex offender under Minn. Stat. § 609.1352 (1996).
Appellant was subsequently convicted in Ramsey County of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i) (1996). Because the Washington
County District Court had prev iously found appellant to be a patterned sex offender, the
Ramsey County District Court imposed a mandatory life sentence under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.346, subd. 2a(a) (1996).
Appellant has frequently appealed both of these convictions and sentences. In this
appeal, appellant challenges th e Ramsey County District Cour t’s denial of his motion to
correct the life sentence under Minn. R. Crim . P. 27.03, subd. 9, and argues that the
sentence was not authorized by law. The dist rict court denied appellant’s motion, both
because it concluded that his sentence was au thorized by law, and because it considered
his action to be a postconviction petition that is time barred under Minn. Stat. § 590.01,
subd. 4(a)(2) (2016), and procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 243
N.W.2d 737 (1976).
This appeal followed.

3
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that his life sentence was unauthorized by law because it was based
on the earlier Washington County sentence under section 609.1352, which appellant argues
was not supported by sufficient findings.1
A district court “may at a ny time correct a sentence not au thorized by law.” Minn.
R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. “[F]or a sentence to be unauthorized, it must be contrary to law
or applicable statutes.” Reynolds v. State, 888 N.W.2d 125, 129 (Minn. 2016) (quotation
omitted). Whether a sentence is authorized by law is a legal questi on that we review de
novo. Vazquez v. State, 822 N.W.2d 313, 315 (Minn. App. 2012).
Appellant was sentenced in Ramsey County under Minn . Stat. § 609.346, subd.
2a(a)(1), (2)(i), which requires a sentencing court to impose a life sentence if the person is
convicted under section 609.342 and that person was previous ly sentenced as a patterned
sex offender under section 609.1352. The Rams ey County District Court correctly found
that both of these factors were met. Appellant had been previously convicted under section
609.342, and he had earlier been sentenced as a patterned sex offender by the Washington
County District Court under section 609.1352. As such, the Ramsey County sentence is
authorized by law.

1 Respondent moved that we dismiss this appeal under our “inherent authority,” or,
alternatively, that we disa llow oral argument. By Orde r dated October 25, 2016, we
deferred the motion to dismiss to the merits panel and set the case for oral argument.
Respondent waived oral argument, and we consider this appeal based solely on appellant’s
arguments. We now deny respondent’s motion to dismiss the appeal, and we address the
appeal on the merits.

4
Appellant fails to identify error by the Rams ey County District Court. Instead, he
argues that the Washington County District Court’s sentence under section 609.1352 was
not supported by sufficient findings. 2 It is not the proper role of the sentencing court in
Ramsey County to review th e Washington County District Court’s earlier sentencing
orders for error.3 State ex rel. Minn. Nat’l Bank of Duluth v. Dist. Court, 195 Minn. 169,
173-74, 262 N.W. 155, 157 (1935) (“Our district courts have concurrent jurisdiction. In
spite of the theory th at they constitute but one court, they yet function as independent
tribunals. . . . [w]hen one acquires jurisdicti on over the subject matter and parties to an
ordinary lawsuit that jurisd iction is exclusive.” (citation omitted)). The Ramsey County
District Court correctly found that appellant had previously been sentenced under section
609.1352, and it therefore properly declined to further review th e Washington County
District Court’s earlier sentencing order. The district did not err in denying appellant’s
motion under rule 27.03, subdivision 9.

2 While it is not dispositive in this appeal, we note that the Washingt on County District
Court’s sentence was based on an evaluator’s conclusion that appellant was “a serious risk
to public safety if not incarcer ated. . . . He is likely to re main a severe threat to the
community and even with trea tment retains a high potential for reoffense . . . .” The
evaluator did not use the word s “patterned sex offender,” but his conclusion was that
appellant fit the definition of a patterned sex offender. See Minn. Stat. § 609.1352, subd.
1(a)(3) (defining a “patterned sex offender” as “one whose criminal sexual behavior is so
engrained that the risk of reoffending is great without intensiv e psychotherapeutic
intervention or other long-term controls”). But the Washington Coun ty sentence is not
before us for review.
3 Appellant previously asked us to review the Washington County District Court’s
sentence, which we affirmed, although we did not reach the issue of whether the district
court correctly found him to be a “patterned sex offender.” Jackson v. State, No. CX-01-
36, 2001 WL 800039 , at *2 (Minn. App. July 17, 2001), review denied (Minn. Sept. 11,
2001).

5
Appellant makes additional arguments by way of a separate pro se brief. These
arguments mostly restate counsel’s argumen ts concerning whether appellant’s sentence
was legally authorized. Appellant’s additiona l pro se arguments pr ovide no discernable
basis for appellate relief.
Because the district court correctly deni ed the motion on subs tantive grounds, we
need not address whether appellant’s motion was time barred or procedurally barred.
Affirmed; motion denied.