A16-1612

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1015
A16-1612

Marjorie A. Gomes,
Appellant,

vs.

James D. Meyer,
Respondent,

County of Clay, intervenor,
Respondent.

Filed September 5, 2017
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Cleary, Chief Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-FA-12-913

Marjorie A. Gomes, Sabin, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

James D. Meyer, Layton, Utah (respondent)

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Je nny M. Samarzja, Chief Assistant County
Attorney, Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent County)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge;
and Toussaint, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CLEARY, Chief Judge
In these consolidated a ppeals involving a dispute over the modification of two
Minnesota child-support orders and enforcement of a Georgia spousal-maintenance order,
pro se appellant-mother, Marjorie A. Gomes, argues that the child support magistrate
(CSM) erred by: (1) modifying the child-support orders because respondent-father, James
D. Meyer, failed to show that the new supp ort orders would result in a child-support
calculation at least 20% and at least $75 different from the existing orders; (2) finding that
mother was “voluntarily underemployed” ; (3) failing to apply Georgia law when
calculating the parties’ gross incomes for the purposes of determining the amount of child
support; (4) failing to apply Georgia law on the accrual of interest to spousal-maintenance
arrears when enforcing the order; (5) includ ing the full amount of spousal maintenance
ordered in the calculation of the parties’ gro ss incomes, instead of the amount of spousal
maintenance actually paid by fa ther and received by mother ; (6) reducing father’s child-
support obligation through a parenting-expense adjustment; (7) failing to include father’s
bonus in his gross-income calculation; and (8 ) determining that a child was emancipated
for child-support purposes.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
After 21 years of marriage, mother and father divorced in October 2009 in Georgia.
In the Georgia divorce settlement, father agr eed to pay mother $2,500 per month in child
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support for seven joint children, and $2,500 per month in spousal maintenance from 2010
until 2030.
Mother and the joint children now reside in Minnesota, and father resides in Utah.
In March 2012, the Georgia divo rce decree was registered in Minnesota. On a motion to
modify father’s child-support obligation in 2012, the CSM concluded there was a
substantial change in circumstances rendering the existing child-support order unfair and
unreasonable. The CSM modified the Georgia child-support order, and required father to
pay $1,600 per month in child support beginning July 1, 2012, for five joint children.
As a basis for the 2012 modification or der, the CSM found that (1) two children
were emancipated, (2) mother was “voluntarily underemployed” and had the ability to earn
$866.00 per month, and (3) father’s monthly income from work decreased to $7,500 from
$9,583. Under the Georgia decr ee, father was still obligated to pay $2,500 per month in
spousal maintenance. That $2,500 was subt racted from father’s income, resulting in a
monthly gross income of $5,000, as calculated pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 518A.29 (2012).
The CSM added the $2,500 in ordered monthly spousal maintenance to mother’s income,
resulting in a gross-income calculation of $3,366. The CSM also awarded father 10%-45%
of total parenting time for ch ild-support purposes, resulting in a 12% parenting-expense
adjustment, reducing father’s child-support ob ligation to $1,414. Because father did not
fully use his parenting time, the CSM ordered an upward deviation, increasing father’s
child-support obligation to $1,600.
4
In September 2012, mother moved the CS M for review of the 2012 modification
order, arguing that the CSM erred by including the full $2,500 in spousal maintenance in
her gross-income calculation for child-sup port purposes because she never regularly
received the full amount from father. The CS M denied mother’s motion, ruling that
because mother has a right to spousal-main tenance arrearages, a nd father has a legal
obligation to pay, money not received one month will be received eventually. Mother did
not appeal the 2012 order.
In November 2015, the county moved for child-support modification, requesting a
reduced child-support obligation for father. At the February 2016 modification hearing,
mother moved: (1) to dismi ss the county’s motion because it failed to prove under the
modification statute that application of the child-support guidelines to the parties’ current
circumstances would result in a new obligation at least 20% and at least $75 per month
different than the existing order; (2) to in clude father’s bonus in his gross-income
calculation; and (3) to calculate her gross income using only the amount of spousal
maintenance that she actually received.
The CSM denied all of mother’s motions . Mother’s gross-income calculation
remained $3,366, an amount that included the full $2,500 ordered for spousal maintenance.
In his March 1, 2016 order, the CSM again concluded that the full $2,500 in ordered
spousal maintenance, not the actual amount paid and received, should be accounted for in
the parties’ gross-income calculations for th e purpose of calculating child support. The
CSM reasoned that the amount of spousal maintenance actually paid was a “moving target”
5
month to month, and that any amount not paid by father was still owed to mother. The
CSM acknowledged that the 20%/$75 differen ce threshold was not met to create a
presumption that the existing order was unrea sonable or unfair, but that the emancipation
of one child caused a substantial change in circumstances that rendered the existing child-
support order unreasonable and unfair. The CSM again found that mother was voluntarily
underemployed and imputed potential income to her. The CSM did not include father’s
2015 bonus in the calculation of father’s gross-income. The CSM again awarded father a
12% parenting-expense adjustment, but deviated upward and ordered father to pay a total
of $1,500 per month for child support.
In late March 2016, mother filed a motion fo r review in district court of the March 1
modification order. In her motion for revi ew, mother objected to the 12% parenting-
expense adjustment, asserting that the adjust ment was unfair because father rarely had
overnights with the children. Mother demons trated that father owed her significant
spousal-maintenance arrears and often failed to pay her the full spousal-maintenance
obligation of $2,500 per month. By February 2016, father owed mother $70,948 in
spousal-maintenance arrears that had accumulated since 2009. Mother submitted records
showing that since 2010 she has consistently received less than th e full $2,500 due in
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monthly spousal maintenance.1 In April 2016, the district court affirmed the CSM’s March
order.
In June 2016, the co unty moved to modify father’s child-support obligation because
of the emancipation of the child E.J.M. At the modification hearing, mother argued that
E.J.M., who was then 19 years old and had graduated from high school, should not be
considered emancipated because of his special needs and disabilities.
On August 8, 2016, the CSM modified the child-sup port order. The CSM found
that mother presented insufficient evidence to show E.J.M. was incapable of self-support,
concluding that E.J.M was no longer a “child” for child-support purposes. The new child-
support-obligation calcula tion, based on one less child, did not result in a
20%/$75 difference, but the CSM concluded that there was a substantial change in
circumstances rendering the existing child-support order unreasonable and unfair because
E.J.M. was emancipated. The calculation of mother’s gross income remained the same.
Father was ordered to pay $1,293.00 per month in child support beginning July 1, 2016.

1 In 2011, mother received a to tal of $3,992.39 for spousal ma intenance, with an average
monthly payment of $332.69. In the years following, mother received spousal maintenance
in varying amounts:
2012—$12,118.81 (monthly average of $1,009.90)
2013—$23,311.86 (monthly average of $1,942.65)
2014—$21,766.43 (monthly average of $1,813.86)
2015—$23,905.81 (monthly average of $1,992.15)
2016 (Jan. and Feb. only)—$2,804. 43 (monthly average of $1,402.21)

7
Mother now appeals the district court’ s April 2016 order and the CSM’s August
2016 order.
D E C I S I O N
I. Threshold to Mo dify an Existing Child-Support Order
Mother argues that the CSM erred in both of the 2016 orders by modifying child
support because the new child-su pport calculations did not re sult in at least a 20%/$75
difference from the existing orders.
Appellate courts review orders modifying child support for an abuse of discretion.
Haefele v. Haefele, 837 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2013). When a district court affirms a
CSM’s decision, the CSM’s decision becomes th e decision of the district court and we
review that decision by the district court. See Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick , 673 N.W.2d 528,
530 n.2 (Minn. App. 2004) (explaining appellate review of decisions made in the expedited
child-support process). While a district court enjoys broad discretion in ordering
modifications, it abuses its di scretion when it acts outside the statutory limits set by the
legislature, or when it reaches a “clearly erroneous conclusion that is against logic and the
facts on record.” Haefele, 837 N.W.2d. at 708 (quotation omitted).2

2 Here, the district court affirmed the CSM’ s March 1, 2016 order after mother filed a
motion for review. The CSM’s August 8, 2016 order was not reviewed by the district court
because mother did not move for district-court review. Pursuant to Kilpatrick, 673 N.W.2d
at 530 n.2, we review the CSM’ s March 1, 2016 decision as if it was the district court’s
decision, and we review the CSM’s August 8, 2016 decision on its own. For simplicity,
we will refer to the decision-maker in both cases as the CSM.
8
A district court may modify an existing award for child support if the moving party
shows both a substantial change in circum stances and that the changed circumstances
render the existing child-support order unreas onable and unfair. Minn. Stat. § 518A.39,
subd. 2(a) (2016); Bormann v. Bormann, 644 N.W.2d 478, 480-81 (Minn. App. 2002). The
party seeking modification of a child-support order has the bu rden to prove a substantial
change in circumstances. Gorz v. Gorz, 552 N.W.2d 566, 569 (Minn. App. 1996).
The terms of a child-support order may be modified upon the emancipation of the
child, when the emancipation makes the term s of the current order “unreasonable and
unfair.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a)(8 ). If the application of the child-support
guidelines to the current circumstances of the parties would result in a calculated obligation
that is at least 20%/$75 diffe rent from the existing order, a rebuttable presumption exists
that the existing support obligation is un reasonable and unfair, and an irrebuttable
presumption exists that there has been a substantial change in circumstances. Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.39, subd. 2(b)(1); Rose v. Rose, 765 N.W.2d 142, 145 (Minn. App. 2009).
Mother argues that a movi ng party’s failure to show that current circumstances
would generate a support obligation at least 20%/$75 different than the existing obligation
precludes modification of the existing support obligation. But because satisfaction of the
20%/$75 threshold creates only presumptions (an irrebuttable presumption of substantially
changed circumstances and a rebuttable presumption that the existing support obligation is
unreasonable and unfair), the lack of those presumptions do es not preclude a decision-
maker, on a proper record, from ruling that th ere is, in fact, a substantial change in
9
circumstances that renders the existing sup port obligation unreasonable and unfair. We
reject mother’s argument.
Here, the CSM based his Ma rch 1 and August 8 orders to modify child support on
the fact that, in both instances, a child had been emancipated. Although mother challenges
the emancipation determination in the August 2016 order, moth er does not challenge this
reason as being legally insufficient to justify modification. Appellate courts decline to
reach an issue in the absence of adequate briefing. State, Dep’t of Labor & Industry v.
Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997). Because the issue was not
adequately briefed, we do not address whether the emancipation of a child, on its own, is a
legally sufficient reason to modify a child-support order.
In sum, the CSM did not abuse his discretion in modifying the child-support orders
despite the fact that the moving party did not demonstrate a 20%/$75 difference.
II. Imputing “Potential Income” to Mother
Next, mother challenges the CSM’s finding that she was voluntarily
underemployed, resulting in potential inco me being imputed to her for purposes of
calculating gross income under Minn. Stat. § 518A.29 (2016). See Minn. Stat. § 518A.32
(2016) (providing methods of determining “p otential income”). Whether a parent is
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed is a finding of fact, which we review for clear
error. Welsh v. Welsh, 775 N.W.2d at 364, 370 (Minn. App. 2009).
“If a parent is voluntarily unemployed, u nderemployed, or employed on a less than
full-time basis, or there is no direct eviden ce of any income, child support must be
10
calculated based on a determination of potential income.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.32, subd. 1.
Potential income is determined by considering
(1) the parent’s probable earnings level based on
employment potential, recent work history, and occupational
qualifications in light of pr evailing job opportunities and
earnings levels in the community; . . . or
(3) the amount of income a parent could earn working
30 hours per week at 100 percent of the current federal or state
minimum wage, whichever is higher.

Id., subd. 2(1), (3). However, a parent is not considered voluntarily unemployed,
underemployed, or employed on a less than fu ll-time basis if the status is temporary and
will ultimately lead to an increase in income, or if the parent has made a bona fide career
change that outweighs the adverse effect of that parent’s diminished income on the child.
Id., subd. 3(1)-(2).
After considering the fact that mother ca res for children with special needs, the CSM
determined in its modification orders that mother had the ability to work 20 hours per week
at $10 an hour, and that her potential income was $866 per month. Mother argues that she
submitted evidence and testimony that she made a bona fide career change as a paralegal,
and that her lower wages during her internship “will be more than offset w ith increased
future earnings.” Mother testified at the February and July 2016 hearings about her
experience working at her attorney’s law office and her development of paralegal skills.
The CSM briefly touched on the issue by finding that although mother asserted she
received “non-cash income” for her internship, “no income is here assigned to [mother’s]
‘internship’ with the [law office]. The evidence presented is insufficient to determine any
11
value to the internship.” These findings and conclusions, though, do not address the
relevant statutory factors under Minn. Stat § 518A.32, subd. 3, of whether mother’s
internship would “ultimately lead to an increase in income,” or whether the internship
represented a “bona fide career change” that outweighs the adverse effect of mother’s
diminished income on the children. Id., subd. 3(1)-(2).
Accordingly, we remand for the CSM to make findings on the statutory factors and
readdress whether mother is voluntarily u nderemployed under Minn. Stat. § 518A.32,
subd. 3.
III. Application of Minnesota’s Substant ive Law to Modification of an Issuing
State’s Child-Support Order Under the Uniform Interstate Family Support
Act (UIFSA)

Mother next challenges the CSM ruling that Minnesota substantive law dictates the
child-support calculation in the 2016 modification orders.
Both Minnesota and Georgia have adopted the UIFSA, which governs inter-state
child-support matters. Minn. St at. §§ 518C.101-.905 (2016); Ga. Code. Ann. 19-11-100
to -191 (West 2016). Whether Minnesota or Georgia substantive law applies to the child-
support calculation is a choice-of-law questi on, which this court reviews de novo.
Danielson v. Nat’l Supply Co., 670 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn.
Dec. 16, 2003). The i ssue raised by mother —whether Minn. Stat. §§ 518C.604, .611(c)
require a Minnesota court to apply Georgia law to calculate child support when modifying
a Georgia child-support order—requires us to construe the meaning of various provisions
12
of the UIFSA. We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. In re Welfare of
S.R.S., 756 N.W.2d 123, 126 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Dec. 16, 2008).
The goal of all statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the
legislature. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2016); Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 536-37
(Minn. 2013). Our supreme court noted in Christianson:
[T]he first step in statutory interpretation is to determine
whether the statute’s language, on its face, is ambiguous. In
determining whether a statute is ambiguous, we will construe
the statute’s words and phrases according to their plain and
ordinary meaning. A statute is only ambiguous if its language
is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Multiple
parts of a statute may be read together so as to ascertain
whether the statute is ambiguous . When we conclude that a
statute is unambiguous, our role is to enforce the language of
the statute and not explore the spirit or purpose of the law.
Alternatively, if we conclude th at the language in a statute is
ambiguous, then we may consider the factors set forth by the
Legislature [under Minn. Stat. § 645.16(1)-(8)] for interpreting
a statute.

Id. (quotations and cita tions omitted). Further, uniform laws “shall be interpreted and
construed to effect their general purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which
enact them.” Minn. Stat. § 645.22 (2016). “A ccordingly, we give great weight to other
states’ interpretations of a uniform law.” Johnson v. Murray, 648 N.W.2d 664, 670 (Minn.
2002).
Under UIFSA parlance, Minnesota is th e “responding state” and Georgia is the
“issuing state,” because Minnesota courts were asked to modify a support order filed by a
Georgia court. See Minn. Stat. § 518C.101(m), (w) (def ining both terms). Georgia lost
13
“continuing, exclusive jurisdiction” over its support order in 2012, when the Georgia order
was registered in Minnesota, no party reside d in Georgia, and the parties did not consent
to continuing jurisdiction before a Georgia court. See Ga. Code Ann. § 19-11-114(a) (West
2016) (explaining when Georgia loses continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under the UIFSA).
Minnesota’s version of the UIFSA under chapter 518C has multiple provisions
addressing choice of law. Mi nn. Stat. § 518C.303 provides th at a responding tribunal in
Minnesota must (1) “apply the procedural a nd substantive law gene rally applicable to
similar proceedings originating in this state” and (2) “deter mine the duty of support and
the amount payable in accordance with the law and support guid elines of this state.” In
contrast, Minn. Stat. § 518C.604, which is titled as “Choice of Law,” provides that the law
of the issuing state or foreign country governs “(1) the nature, extent, amount, and duration
of current payments under a registered s upport order; [and] (2) the computation and
payment of arrearages and accrual of interest on the arrear ages under the support order.”
Finally, under section 518C.611( c), which governs modification of a child-support order
of another state, “[a] tribunal of this stat e may not modify any aspect of a child-support
order that may not be modified under the law of the issuing state.”
Collectively, these statutes are subject to multiple reasonable interpretations. For
example, mother’s reading of Minn. Stat. § 518C.604 to require Minnesota, as the
responding state, to apply the law of the issuing state in calculating a child-support
obligation, is reasonable because the statute st ates that the issuing state’s law governs the
“nature, extent, amount, and duration of current payments.” (Emphasis added.) But
14
because Minn. Stat. § 518C.604 requires that the issuing state’s law governs the amount of
“current payments,” this suggests that it only applies to the enforcement of a support order
currently in effect. Further, Minn. Stat. § 518C.303 provides that “the duty of support and
the amount payable” must be determined in accordance with the law and child-support
guidelines of Minnesota. Because the UIFSA statutes addressing choice of law are subject
to more than one reasonable interpretation, they are ambiguous.
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Groseth v. Groseth, 600 N.W.2d 159, 164 (Neb.
1999), also determined that the same choice-of-law provisions in its version of the UIFSA,
which are nearly identical to Minnesota’ s UIFSA statutes, were ambiguous, and it
examined the intent of its legislature. In Groseth, the parties divorced in Massachusetts,
wife subsequently moved with the children to Nebraska, and husband moved to Texas. Id.
at 163. Modification of the Massachusetts support order was sought in Nebraska. Id.
Applying Nebraska’s UIFSA statute, a Nebraska district court applied the substantive law
of the “issuing state,” Massachusetts, in calculating child support. Id. at 166.
The Nebraska Supreme Court, however, he ld that Nebraska’s statute—mirroring
Minn. Stat. § 518C.604 and governing “the nature, extent, amount, and duration of current
payments under a registered support order”—applied only to enforcement of the currently
registered out-of-state support order, not to modification. Id. This is because the Nebraska
statute uses the phrase “current payments” to reference the order curre ntly in effect and
being enforced. Id.
15
We find the Groseth court’s reading of this UIFSA section persuasive. Minnesota’s
statute also states that the issuing state’s la w applies to “the nature, extent, amount, and
duration of current payments under a registered support order .” Minn. Stat. § 518C.604
(emphasis added). Appellate courts interpret stat utes to give effect to all of the statute’s
provisions so that no word, phrase, or sent ence should be deemed superfluous, void, or
insignificant. Allan v. R.D. Offutt Co. , 869 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Minn. 2015). The phrase
“current payments under a registered support order” evinces an intent for the provision to
apply only to orders then in effect, not future orders th at may result from a petition for
modification. The phrase limits the languag e of section 518C.604 to enforcement of
current orders.
Further, section 518C.604 is placed und er the heading “Registration and
Enforcement of Support Order.” While a statut e’s heading or caption is not part of the
statute, Minn. Stat. § 645.49 (2016), the he adings are relevant to legislative intent .
Minnesota Exp., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co. , 333 N.W.2d 871, 873 (Minn. 1983). The
heading demonstrates an inte nt that the choice-of-law provisions in section § 518C.604
apply to the enforcement of existing orders, not modification.
Finally, as the court in Groseth noted, the comments to the UIFSA’s model version
of Minn. Stat. § 518C.604 bolster this interpretation. 600 N.W.2d at 167. The comments
state:
A basic principle of UIFSA is that throughout the process the
controlling order remains the order of the tribunal of the
issuing state or foreign country until a valid modification. The
16
responding tribunal only assist s in the enforcement of that
order. Absent a loss of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction by
the issuing tribunal and a subsequent modification of the order,
the order never becomes an order of a responding tribunal.

UIFSA 2008 § 604 cmt. (emphasis added). In sum, the language of section 518C.604,
directing courts to apply the law of the issu ing state, applies to enforcement of support
orders under the UIFSA, not to modification.
Minn. Stat. § 518C.611(c) is also not controlling on the choice-of-law question here.
In Groseth, Nebraska’s version of section 518C. 611(c) also precluded a Nebraska court
from modifying “any aspect of a child support order that may not be modified under the
law of the issuing state,” and the court furthe r determined that the issuing state certainly
could have modified the amount of the obligor’s child-support obligation. 600 N.W.2d at
169. Likewise, here, because Georgia law allows the amount of a child-support award to
be modified based on a substantial change of circumstances, Ga. Code. Ann. § 19-6-15(k)
(West 2016), Minnesota has authority to modify the registered Georgia order on this basis.
Cf. Hennepin County v. Hill , 777 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn. App. 2010) (concluding that
district court did not err when it determined it could not modify duration of child-support
award pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 518C.611 beca use issuing state’s law did not allow that
aspect of order to be modified).
While Minn. Stat. § 518C.611(c) preven ts a court in a responding state from
modifying any aspect of a support order that cannot be modified under the issuing state’s
law, the statute does not dictate which state’s substantive law applies when an aspect of an
17
order can be modified. Furthermore, in ascer taining the legislature’s intent, we presume
that the legislature does not intend an absurd , impossible, or unreasonable result. Minn.
Stat. § 645.17 (2016). Mother’s reading of Minn. Stat. §§ 518C.604, .611 would result in
Minnesota district courts i ssuing vastly disparate orders by applying the child-support
guidelines of 49 other states and foreign countries. Similarly situated parties in Minnesota
could end up with very different results, depending on which st ate’s child-support
guidelines were applied.
Other UIFSA states have followed Groseth’s interpretation. See, e.g., Crosby v.
Grooms, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146, 151 -52 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (“[W]hen California assumes
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order for purposes of modification
of that order, it must apply California law to determine the amou nt of child support
owed.”); Batterman v. Bender, 809 N.E.2d 410, 413 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (statute allowing
application of issuing state’s law applies to enforcement, not modification); Cook v. Cook,
758 N.E.2d 1158, 1160 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (“Because Georgia law allows the
modification of a child support order, the trial court had the authority to modify the child
support pursuant to Ohio law, if appropriate.”).
Because Minn. Stat. § 518C.604(a) applie s to the enforcement of an out-of-state
order, and Minn. Stat. § 518C.611(c) does not address which state’s substantive law
applies, the more general choice-of-law provisions under Minn. Stat. § 518C.303 apply to
the modification order. We conclude that the language of Minn. Stat. § 518C.303,
providing that a responding court of this state shall “determine the duty of support and the
18
amount payable in accordance with the law a nd support guidelines of this state,” means
that when a Minnesota court modifies an issuing state’s child-support order pursuant to the
UIFSA, the court applies Minnesota substa ntive law in calculating a child-support
obligation. The CSM appropriately applied Minnesota law.
IV. Application of Georgia Law on the Interest on Arrears
Mother also contends that Georgia la w should dictate the amount of interest
accruing on the spousal-maintenance arrears. Minn. Stat. § 518C.604 specifically
addresses which state’s law appl ies when determining the accrua l of interest on arrears.
The CSM denied mother’s motion, stating that the court had no au thority to address a
spousal-maintenance issue in an expedited child-support hearing.
Whether the CSM had the statutory author ity to address the enforcement of the
spousal-maintenance order during an e xpedited child-support hearing involves
interpretation of statutes and court rules, questions that we review de novo. Nelson v.
Nelson, 866 N.W.2d 901, 903 (Minn. 2015); Lennartson v. Anoka-Hennepin Ind. Sch. Dist.
No. 11, 662 N.W.2d 125, 129 (Minn. 2003).
Minn. Stat. § 484.702, subd. 1 (2016), pr ovides that the Minnesota Supreme Court
“shall create an expedited child support heari ng process to establish, modify, and enforce
child support; and enforce main tenance.” Minn. Stat. § 484.702, subd. 3 (2016), allows
the appointment of child supp ort magistrates to preside over expedited child-support
hearings. Minnesota’s General Rule of Practice for the District Courts 353.01,
subdivision 1, provides that proceedings to enforce spou sal maintenance, “shall, if
19
combined with a support issue, be conducted in the expedited process if the case is a IV-D
case,3 except as provided in subdivision 2 and Rule 353.02.” Subdivision 2 of Rule 353.02
applies when a proceeding is commenced in di strict court, and the district court refers
support issues to a magistrate with a “clear statement of the issues referred.”
Here, mother’s case is a IV-D case, and there is no evidence th at a district court
referred certain specific issues for the CSM to address. The CSM had the authority under
rule 353.01 to address both child-support and spousal-maintenance issues at the hearings
because mother moved for a specific type of enforcement of her sp ousal maintenance.
Further, the issue of spousal-maintenance enfo rcement was discussed at the hearings and
considered by the CSM when determining how to calculate the parties’ gross income to
determine child support. Finally, Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 373.01 provides that when a party
is seeking a statutory remedy, the proceeding “shall be heard in the expedited process.”
The CSM erred in determin ing that spousal-maintenance enforcement issues could
not be addressed at the expe dited hearing. We remand so that the CSM can determine
whether Georgia law regarding interest accr ual to spousal-maintenance arrears applies
when enforcing the spousal-maintenance order in Minnesota pursuant to the UIFSA.

3 “A IV-D case is any proceeding where a party has either assigned to the state the right to
receive support because of the receipt of public assistance or has applied for child support
services under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 654(4).” Kilpatrick, 673
N.W.2d at 531 n.3.
20
V. Gross-Income Calculation
Mother next argues that the CSM erred in the calculation of the parties’ gross
incomes for child-support purp oses by including the full $2,500 of spousal maintenance
ordered, rather than the actual amount of maintenance that father paid and mother received.
Mother’s argument requires us to examine the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a),
(g), which explains what is included in a party’s “gross income” for the purposes of
calculating a child-support obligation. We review issues of statutory interpretation de
novo. S.R.S., 756 N.W.2d at 126.
We start with the statute’s plain meaning. Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a) provides that
“gross income includes any form of periodic payment to an individual, including, . . .
spousal maintenance received under a previous order or the current proceeding.” Further,
Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(g) provides that “spousal maintenance payments . . . ordered payable
to the other party as part of the current proceeding are deducted from other periodic
payments received by a party for purposes of determining gross income.” A literal reading
of section 518A.29(a) leads to a conclusion that spousal maintenance actually received by
the obligee, as opposed to th e maintenance ordered, is included in a gross-income
calculation for child suppo rt. In contrast, the plain lang uage of “payments . . . ordered
payable” under section 518A.29(g) leads to a conclusion that spousal-maintenance
payments ordered, not payments actually ma de, are deducted from the obligor’s gross
income.
21
Appellate courts look beyond the statutory language to ot her indicia of legislative
intent when the literal meaning of the words of a statute woul d produce an absurd result.
Olson v. Ford Motor Co. , 558 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn. 1997); Wegener v. Comm’r of
Revenue, 505 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 1993). In Wegener, the supreme court recognized
appellate courts’ obligation to follow the plain meaning of the words of a statute when its
words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the pu rpose of the legislation, but
noted there is an equal obligation to reject a construction that leads to absurd or
unreasonable results that “utterly depart from the purpose of the statute.” Id.
Despite, the legislature’s use of the wording “spousal maintenance received” under
section 518A.29(a), the application of a literal reading of the statute would produce absurd
and unreasonable results for several reasons. First, if spousal maintenance actually
received, as opposed to maintenance ordered, was included in a gross-income calculation,
the obligee could be entitled to a modification of a child-support award each time a monthly
spousal-maintenance payment was missed by the obligor. We agree with the CSM that the
amount the obligor actually pays is a “moving target” month to month. Disregarding this
reality would result in an inconsistent a nd topsy-turvy child-sup port system, where a
modification motion could be granted one m onth for a lack of payment and another
modification motion could be granted the next month when an obligor payed in full.
Second, under a literal interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a), it is unclear how
a court, when entering a judgment of dissolu tion, would initially calculate child-support
and spousal-maintenance obligations as required by Minn. Stat. § 518A.27 (2016), because
22
at the time of the initial ch ild-support award, the obligor would not have made any
payments of spousal maintenance yet in orde r for a court to accurately calculate gross
income. If spousal maintenance ordered is not included in the initial gross-income
calculation before a dissolution judgment is en tered, the obligor could immediately seek
modification once a first payment of maintenance was made.
Third, unlike other sources of income, which can end due to job loss or other
circumstances, spousal-maintenance arrearages from a court order will not go away. The
obligee of unpaid spousal maintenance has several remedies to secure payment, including
initiating contempt proceedings. See Minn. Stat. §§ 518A.64-.75 (2016).
Mother relies on Haefele, 837 N.W.2d at 710, and Lee v. Lee, 775 N.W.2d 631, 638
(Minn. 2009), for the propositio n that payments must be “received” to be included in a
parties “gross income.” In Haefele, the supreme court noted that “the Legislature’s use of
the term ‘payment’ in [section 518A.29] genera lly means that a benef it must be actually
received by the parent, as opposed to merely vested or owed, in order to constitute income.”
837 N.W.2d at 710. In Haefele, however, the supreme court held that in order to properly
calculate a party’s gross income under Minn. St at § 518A.29, when the source of income
is distributed earnings from a corporation, c ourts must use the calculation method under
Minn. Stat. § 518A.30 (2016). Id. at 710-11. Haefele’s holding is inapposite, as it deals
with a different statute from the one at issue here. In Lee, the supreme court held that
pension benefits are properly considered income and are included in a gross-income
calculation at the time the benefits are received, not vested or earned. 775 N.W.2d at 638.
23
But the type of income here distinguishes this case from Lee and Haefele. Unlike the
pension income in Lee, or the distributed earnings in Haefele, mother’s right to spousal-
maintenance income stems fr om a court order that also awarded child support.
Accordingly, mother’s remedy to correct fath er’s under- or nonpayment is through the
enforcement mechanisms listed under Minn. Stat. §§ 518A.64-.75, and not through a
recalculation of her income each time there is under- or nonpayment.
Finally, our reading of Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a), (g) is in accord with the principle
that gross income is only the starting point for a child-support analysis and “the obligation
calculated by applying gross income to the child support guidelines is merely a rebuttable
presumption.” Haefele, 837 N.W.2d at 714. Minn. Stat. § 518A.43 (2016) allows a court
to deviate from the presumptive child-support ob ligation after considering, inter alia, “all
earnings, income, circumstances, and resour ces of each parent,” as well as any
extraordinary financial needs of the children. The statute’s exp licit intent is to “prevent
either parent or the joint children from living in poverty.” Id., subd. 1. Accordingly, where
an obligor is not paying or underpaying spousal maintenance, resulting in increased support
needs, the child-support statute allows a court to account for this and deviate upward.
In sum, the CSM properly included spousal maintenance ordered, instead of spousal
maintenance actually received, in mother’s gross-income calcula tion, and properly
deducted spousal maintenance ordered from father’s gross-income calculation.

24
VI. Father’s Parenting-E xpense Adjustment
Mother contends that the CSM erred in awarding father a 12% parenting-expense
adjustment. The CSM has broad discretion when deciding child-support modification
issues. Hesse v. Hesse, 778 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Minn. App. 2009).
The parenting-expense adjustment statute provides that “[e]very child support order
shall specify the percentage of parenting time granted to or presumed for each parent,” and
that “[f]or purposes of this section, the percentage of parenting time means the percentage
of time a child is scheduled to spend with the parent during a calendar year according to a
court order.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.36, subd. 1( a) (2016). If the percentage range of
parenting time scheduled is le ss than 10%, there is no adjustment of the obligor’s basic
child-support obligation. Id., subd. 2 (2014). 4 If the percentage range of parenting time
scheduled is 10% to 45%, then the obligor is awarded a 12% deduction of the obligor’s
basic child-support obligation. Id.
Here, under the divorce decree, father has the “right to visit with the minor children
at all times mutually agreed upon by the parties,” and was awarded “less than 180 days per
year” in parenting time. The Georgia decree did not specify the exact amount of parenting
time awarded to father. The CSM reasoned that because father’s parenting time is less than
50%, and because there is a rebuttable presum ption under Minnesota law that a parent is

4 The 2016 version of Minn. St at. § 518A.36, subd. 2, has a di fferent calculation, but it
does not go into effect until Augu st 1, 2018. 2016 Minn. Laws , ch. 189, art. 15, § 20, at
1120-21.
25
entitled to receive at least 25% of the paren ting time, Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(g)
(2016), the Georgia decree is deemed to have awarded father between 10% and 45%
parenting time. Per statute, this finding resulted in a 12% parenting-expense adjustment.
Mother contends that the CSM erred becaus e father exercises less than 1% of his
parenting time. However, a parent is due a parenting-expense adjustment for parenting
time scheduled, even if a parent does not exercise that parenting time. Hesse, 778 N.W.2d
at 103. The CSM’s findings and conclusions are not against logic and the facts in the
record, and the court did not abuse its discretion.
VII. Father’s Bonus
Mother argues that the CSM erred in not including father’s bonus in the calculation
of his gross income. Under the gross-income calculation statute, Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a),
the relevant inquiry in determining whether money is gross income is whether it is a
“periodic payment to an individual.” Haefele, 837 N.W.2d at 710. The record shows that
father received one bonus in 2015 after being hired at his current employer in 2012. Father
said that he had not been promised a bonus going forward. Mother did not bring forth any
evidence showing that fa ther expected or received year ly bonuses that may have been
considered periodic payments under the gro ss-income calculation statute. The CSM did
not err in not including father’s one-time bonus in his gross-income calculation.
VIII. Emancipation Determination
Finally, mother contends that (1) th e CSM lacked jurisdiction to declare a
developmentally disabled child emancipated, and (2) even if the CSM had jurisdiction, he
26
erred as a matter of law in determining that E.J.M. was no longer a child for child-support
purposes. While mother uses the word “jurisdiction” in her brief, she does not identify
whether she is referring to personal jurisdic tion, subject matter jurisdiction, in rem
jurisdiction or something else, but her argument centers on the CSM’s authority under rules
and statutes. Accordingly, we construe mother’s argument as a challenge to the CSM’s
statutory authority to declare a child emancipated.
A. Authority to Declare a Child Emancipated
This question requires interpretation of st atutes and court rules, questions of law
that we review de novo. Nelson, 866 N.W.2d at 903; Lennartson, 662 N.W.2d at 129.
“Child support magistrates shall have the powers and authority necessary to perform
their duties in the expedited process pursuant to statute and rule.” Minn. R. Gen. Pract.
367.03. In order to compute a child-sup port obligation, a CSM must determine the
“combined basic support obligation by application of the guide lines in section 518A.35.”
Minn. Stat. § 518A.34(b)(4) (2016). That secti on, in turn, provides that the basic child-
support obligation “shall be determined by re ferencing the guideline for the appropriate
number of joint children.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.35, subd. 1(b) (2016). The number of joint
children affects the amount of basic support ordered. Id., subd. 2. Further, the statute
defines a “child,” for the purposes of a child-support order, as an individual under 18 years
of age, an individual under 20 who is still attending second ary school, or an individual
who, by reason of physical or mental condition, is incapable of self-support. Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.26 (2016). The CSM had the authority to determine the number of joint children
27
at the time of the modification order to dete rmine the basic child-s upport obligation.
Because mother alleged E.J.M. was incapable of self-support, the CSM had the statutory
authority to determine whether E.J.M. was a child or emancipate d for child-support
purposes.
B. E.J.M.’s Status
Mother contends the district court erred in finding that E.J.M. is not a “child” for
child-support purposes due to his disabilities. Whether a person is a “child” or emancipated
for child-support purposes is a factual determin ation, which we review for clear error.
Streitz v. Streitz, 363 N.W.2d 135, 137 (Minn. App. 1985).
An individual incapable of self-support continues to be a “child” for purposes of
child-support and maintenance. Minn. Stat. 518A.26, subd. 5; Maki v. Hansen , 694
N.W.2d 78, 83 (Minn. App. 2005).
In support of his conclusion that E.J.M. is not a child for child-support purposes, the
CSM found that E.J.M. (1) had a job coach to assist him in finding appropriate
employment, (2) had expressed the goal of living independently and finding a job, (3) has
had limited employment in the past, (4) has be en over 18 for almost one year with no
guardian or conservator in place, (5) has not applied for SSI, and (6) “has many recognized
strengths including his intelligence and ability to read.”
Mother presented evidence that E.J. M. is diagnosed with autism, ADHD,
Asberger’s syndrome, major depressive s yndrome, and mood dysregularity. The county
social worker determined that, because of his diagnoses, E.J.M requires significantly more
28
assistance with activities of daily living as compared to his pe ers. A member of E.J.M.’s
individual education plan team wrote in a lette r that E.J.M. was defi cient in the area of
executive functioning “which impact[s] his ab ility to plan, initia te, problem solve,
organize, and carry out goal dir ected activities,” and that E.J. M.’s needs adversely affect
his capacity for independent living, requiring “significant adult support.”
While many of the facts support mother’s contention that E.J.M. is incapable of self-
support, the CSM’s factual findings are not cl early erroneous, and his conclusion that
E.J.M. is able to support himself with the help of a jobs program has factual support in the
record. Based on the facts that the CSM re lied on, the CSM did not err in determining
E.J.M. is no longer a child for child-support purposes.
In conclusion, we affirm in part for th e following reasons. The CSM did not err in
modifying the child-support orders despite the fact that the newly calculated child-support
obligations were not at least 20% and at leas t $75 different than the existing orders. The
CSM did not err in applying Mi nnesota’s substantive law in calculating a child-support
obligation when modifying an issuing state’s child-support or der under the UIFSA. The
CSM did not err in calculating the parties’ gross incomes. The CSM did not abuse his
discretion in reducing father’s child-suppor t obligation through a parenting-expense
adjustment. The CSM correctly determined that father’s one-time bonus was not part of
his gross income as defined by statute. The CSM’s finding that E.J.M. is no longer a
“child” for child-support purposes is not clearly erroneous.
29
We reverse in part for the following reason s. The CSM’s finding that mother was
“voluntarily underemployed” was premature and erroneous because the court did not
consider the relevant statutory factors. Th e CSM had the statutory authority to rule on
mother’s motion to apply Georgia law on the accrual of interest to spousal-maintenance
arrears.
On remand, the CSM must (1 ) consider the relevant st atutory factors regarding
whether mother was engaged in a bona fide career change or whether her internship would
ultimately lead to an increase in income in the future, and (2) determine whether Georgia
law on accrual of interest to spousal maintenance applies to the enforcement of the Georgia
spousal-maintenance order in Minnesota.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.