State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1017

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Michael Vincent Leith,
Appellant.

Filed June 12, 2017
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CR-14-1513

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathleen A. Heaney, Sherburne County Attorney, Tim Sime, Assistant County Attorney,
Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant challenges both his conviction of first-degree sale of a controlled
substance and his 114-month sentence, arguing that he is entitled to be resentenced in
2
accordance with the ameliorative amendments to controlled-substance-offense levels and
the modifications to the sentencing guidelines following the 2016 Drug Sentencing
Reform Act (DSRA). We affirm.
FACTS
On April 29, 2014, appellant Michael Vincent Leith sold 13.589 grams of
methamphetamine to a confidential informant. Shortly after the transaction, police
stopped the vehicle appellant was driving for an equipment violation and identified
appellant.
Respondent State of Minnesota later charge d appellant with first-degree sale of a
controlled substance in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1) (2012). After a
trial, the jury found appellant guilty of the charged offense. Then, in March 2016, district
court sentenced appellant to 114 months in prison. The presumptive sentencing range
was 114 to 160 months based on the severity of the conviction offense and appellant’s
criminal-history score of four. At the sentencing hearing, appellant noted that the
Sentencing Guidelines Commission (the commission) had proposed reducing the
presumptive sentence for first-degree controlled-substance crimes.
On May 22, 2016, the governor signed into law the DSRA. 2016 Minn. Laws ch.
160, § 22, at 592. Among other things, the DSRA increased the threshold amount of
drugs necessary for first- and second-degree controlled-substance crimes and reduced the
presumptive guideline sentences for those crimes. After the DSRA’s amendments went
into effect, the presumptive sentence for first-degree sale of a controlled substance based
on a criminal-history score of four is now 105 months with a discretionary range of 90 to
3
126 months. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.C (2016). In addition, the sale of 13.589 grams of
methamphetamine is now a second-degree controlled-substance crime for which the
presumptive sentence is 88 months with a range of 75 to 105 months. Minn. Stat.
§ 152.022, subd. 1(1) (2016). The DSRA provision that increased the threshold amount
of drugs necessary for first- and second-degree controlled-substance crimes became
“effective August 1, 2016, and applies to crimes committed on or after that date.” 2016
Minn. Laws ch. 160, §§ 3-4, at 579, 581. The provision of the DSRA directing the
commission to modify the new drug offender grid became “effective the day following
final enactment.” Id. § 18, at 591.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that his conviction level is improper and that he is entitled to be
resentenced in accordance with the ameliorative sentencing provisions of the DSRA
because his case was not final when the act took effect. We disagree.
The interpretation of a sentencing statute is a question of law that this court
reviews de novo. State v. Noggle, 881 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn. 2016); State v. Leathers,
799 N.W.2d 606, 608 (Minn. 2011). “The object of all interpretation and construction of
laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16
(2016). When the legislature’s intent is clear from the unambiguous statutory language,
we apply the statute’s plain meaning. Id.; State v. Hayes, 826 N.W.2d 799, 804 (Minn.
2013). A conviction becomes final when direct appeals are exhausted or the time for
4
filing a direct appeal has expired. State v. Losh, 721 N.W.2d 886, 893-94 (Minn. 2006).
The parties agree that appellant’s case is not final.
I. The DSRA’s amendments to controlled-substance offense levels do not apply
to offenses committed before the effective date to reduce appellant’s
conviction level.
Appellant first asserts that the DSRA provision that increased the threshold
amount of controlled substance necessary for first- and second-degree controlled-
substance offenses should apply to reduce his conviction from first degree to second
degree. We are not persuaded.
“No law shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so
intended by the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.21 (2016); see also State v. Traczyk, 421
N.W.2d 299, 300 (Minn. 1988), as amended (Minn. Mar. 4, 1988). “When a section or
part of a law is amended . . . the new provisions shall be construed as effective only from
the date when the amendment became effective.” Minn. Stat. § 645.31, subd. 1 (2016).
However, appellant relies on the common-law principle first announced in State v.
Coolidge that “a statute mitigating punishment is applied to acts committed before its
effective date, as long as no final judgment has been reached.” 282 N.W.2d 511, 514
(Minn. 1979) (citing People v. Rossi, 555 P.2d 1313, 1314 (Cal. 1976)).
In Coolidge, the supreme court held that the 1977 repeal of the law under which
the defendant was convicted applied to reduce the defendant’s sentence. Id. at 514-15.
Subsequently, the supreme court applied the Coolidge principle to resentence an
appellant where the statute under which the appellant was sentenced was repealed and
replaced with a new statute providing for a lower maximum punishment in State v.
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Hamilton, 289 N.W.2d 470, 474-75 (Minn. 1979), and Ani v. State, 288 N.W.2d 719, 720
(Minn. 1980). However, in State v. Edstrom, the supreme court limited the application of
the Coolidge principle and held that it did not apply because “[i]n this case the legislature
ha[d] clearly indicated its intent that the criminal sexual conduct statutes have no effect
on crimes committed before the effective date of the act, August 1, 1975,” and the
petitioner committed the underlying crime in March 1975. 326 N.W.2d 10, 10 (Minn.
1982). Together, Coolidge and Edstrom stand for the proposition that the legislature
intends for newly enacted laws that mitigate punishment for a criminal offense to apply to
all cases that are not final when the law takes effect, unless the legislature clearly
indicates otherwise. See id.; see also Coolidge, 282 N.W.2d at 514-15.
Here, like in Edstrom, the legislature clearly indicated that the amended
controlled-substance-crime statute “is effective August 1, 2016,” and “applies to crimes
committed on or after that date.” Appellant asserts that Edstrom should be read to require
more to effectuate the legislature’s intent that the DSRA does not apply to non-final
cases. Appellant contends that Edstrom requires, for example, “a specific provision
stating that the new law does not apply to ‘past and present’ prosecutions for crimes
committed before the changes took effect.” But, Edstrom contains no requirement for
such specific language.
Further, appellant’s argument ignores this court’s decisions in State v. McDonnell,
686 N.W.2d 841 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2004), and State v.
Basal, 763 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. App. 2009). In McDonnell, this court held that the
Coolidge principle did not apply because the 2003 amendment to the statute under which
6
the appellants were charged included an effective-date provision that stated that the
amendment “is effective August 1, 2003, and applies to violations committed on or after
that date.” 686 N.W.2d at 846 (quoting 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 2, art. 9,
§ 1, at 1446).1 Similarly, in Basal, this court declined to apply a 2007 amendment to
crimes committed before the effective date where “the legislature expressly provided that
the [amendment] would become effective January 1, 2008.” 763 N.W.2d at 336 (citing
2007 Minn. Laws ch. 147, art. 2, § 64, at 1901).
Here, the legislature clearly indicated that it did not intend for the amendments
contained in the DSRA to apply to crimes committed before the effective date when it
included language stating that the amendments would become effective August 1, 2016,
and would apply to crimes committed on or after that date. Accordingly, appellant is not
entitled to have his conviction level reduced because he committed his offense prior to
the effective date of the relevant DSRA provisions.
II. The DSRA’s modifications to the sentencing guidelines do not apply to
offenses committed before the effective date to reduce appellant’s sentence.
Appellant next contends that even if the amendments to the offense levels do not
apply to him, the DSRA’s modifications to the sentencing guidelines do apply because
the DSRA provision that reduced the grid sentences for first-degree controlled-substance
crimes did not contain the same effective-date language as the amendments to the offense
levels. We disagree.

1 The McDonnell court also cited to section 645.21 in concluding that the legislature did
not clearly and manifestly intend for the 2003 amendment to apply to violations
committed before the amendment’s effective date. 686 N.W.2d 845-46.
7
Section 18 of the DSRA rejected certain proposed changes to the guidelines and
directed the commission to make modifications to the new drug-offender sentencing grid.
2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, § 18, at 591. This section became “effective the day following
final enactment” of the DSRA, which occurred on May 22, 2016, when the governor
signed the act. Id. § 18, 22, at 591-92. Contrary to appellant’s argument, this provision
does not provide the effective date for the changes that the commission subsequently
made to the guidelines.
The guidelines explicitly dictate that “the presumptive sentence for any offender
convicted of a felony . . . is determined by the Sentencing Guidelines in effect on the date
of the conviction offense.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2 (2016). The first page of the
guidelines also states that “[t]he Sentencing Guidelines are effective August 1, 2016, and
determine the presumptive sentence for felony offenses committed on or after the
effective date.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines (2016). In addition, when the commission
amended the guidelines after the DSRA, it stated that the amendments were effective
August 1, 2016. Minn. Sent. Guidelines Comm., Adopted Modifications to the
Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary (Aug. 1, 2016), http://mn.gov/msgc-
stat/documents/2016%20Guidelines/August%202016%20Adopted%20Modifications.pdf.
And, given that the commission clearly stated the effective-date language, appellant’s
reliance on Coolidge for application of the DSRA’s modifications to the sentencing
guidelines is misguided.
Appellant acknowledges that Minn. Sent. Guidelines 3.G.1 (2016) includes
effective-date language that applies the modifications prospectively, but he asserts that
8
this provision applies only to “policy” changes. Appellant’s contention conflicts with the
plain language of guideline 3.G.1, which states that “[m]odifications to the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines and associated commentary apply to offenders whose date of
offense is on or after the specified modification effective date.” Therefore, the
modifications to the sentencing guidelines made after the DSRA do not apply to crimes
committed before August 1, 2016. The presumptive sentence that applies to appellant is
determined by the guidelines in effect in April 2014. Thus, appellant is not entitled to be
resentenced under the new drug-offender sentencing grid.
Affirmed.