State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1028

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Matthew Starnes,
Appellant.

Filed July 17, 2017
Affirmed; motion granted
Reyes, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-15-6336

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Anthony Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant County Attorney,
Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pu blic Defender, Renée Bergeron, Special
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Pr esiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction of second-degree assault with a dangerous
weapon, arguing that he was denied his due-process right to a fair trial because the district
2
court committed multiple errors, exhibited im proper personal bias ag ainst appellant, and
relied on information gained outs ide of trial. Appellant also argues that the evidence at
trial was legally insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Matthew Starnes and victim R.G. were roommates at a homeless shelter
located on the Anoka Metro Regional Treatment Center (AMRTC) campus. On the day of
the incident, R.G. was working in the kitchen when appellant entered to prepare a meal for
the following morning. Unaware that appellant had permission to be in the kitchen, R.G.
confronted appellant, telling appellant that he could not be there. An argument ensued and
R.G. struck appellant in the face. Appellant reported the incident to the executive director
of the shelter, who spoke with both individuals.
A short while later, R.G. left the shelter and walked to a nearby park. While R.G.
was at the park, C.G., an AMRTC employee, was driving and noticed him. C.G. stopped
at an intersection as a black SUV approached the intersection. The male driver of the SUV
told C.G. to “just go.” C.G. continued driving, looked in her rearview mirror, and saw R.G.
running away from three men who had exited the SUV. 1 R.G. saw a tall, skinny man get
out of the driver’s seat with a tire iron and appellant exit the rear passenger seat with a
metal object in his hand.
The driver caught up with R.G. and struck him with the tire iron in the back of the
head. R.G. fell on the ground while the assailants continued assaulting him. R.G. testified

1 C.G. testified that she saw three men assaulting R.G. However, R.G. testified that while
he saw three men in the SUV only two men assaulted him.
3
that appellant kicked him in the face, stabbe d him near his eye, and stabbed him multiple
times around his kidneys. C.G. testified that one of the individuals, whom she described
as tall, skinny, and wearing a white shirt, was making a stabbing motion. Frightened, C.G.
drove away and called her boss, who notified th e police. Eventually, the men went back
into the SUV and drove away, leaving R.G. on the ground.
R.G. was taken to Mercy Hospital wher e he was treated for his many injuries,
including multiple stab wounds on his torso, a fractured rib, and a laceration to the back of
his head. While at the hospital, R.G. was interviewed by a police officer and identified
appellant as one of the attackers.
Appellant’s girlfriend picked appellant up from the shelter, saw a cut on his hand,
and drove him to Unity Hospital. From the hospital, appellant called 911 and reported that
he had been assaulted. When the police officer who interviewed R.G. learned about
appellant’s report, he took a statement from appellant, and after a brief investigation,
arrested appellant at Unity Hospital.
In an amended complaint, Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with
one count of second-degree assa ult in violation of Minn. Stat . § 609.222, subd. 2 (2104)
(substantial bodily harm) and one count of second-degree assault in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.222, subd. 1 (2014) (dangerous weapon ). Appellant’s jury trial began on January
11, 2016.
After six of the state’s witnesses had testifie d, the district court learned that one of
the jurors had been discussing the trial and he r concern for her personal safety with other
jurors. Appellant’s counsel requested a mistri al, which the district court granted. The
4
district court was going to adjourn the case for jury selection, but appellant did not want to
wait until the adjournment date. Appellant then requested to waive his right to a jury trial
and proceed with the case as a bench trial. The district court gave appellant time to consider
his decision and discuss it further with his attorney and adjourned the case for the following
day. The next day, appellant waived his right to a jury trial on the record and requested to
proceed with the rest of the trial as a bench trial, which the district court granted.
Appellant claimed self-defense and testifie d on his own behalf. At the end of the
bench trial, the district cour t found appellant guilty on both counts. Instead of making
written findings of fact and attaching them to the verdict sheet, the district court made oral
findings of fact on the record and attached the transcript of the findings to the verdict sheet.
Neither party objected. In its findings, the district court credited C.G.’s and R.G.’s
testimony and discredited appellant’s testimony. The distri ct court determined that the
state met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did not act in self-
defense.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court adjudicated appellant guilty only of
count one, second-d egree assault (substantial bodily harm-dangerous weapon), and
sentenced him to 71 months in prison.2 This appeal follows.

2 We note, however, that the warrant of commitment indicates that appellant was convicted
and sentenced on count two, Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (dangerous weapon), and that
count one was dismissed. “[A]n orally pr onounced sentence contro ls over a [written]
judgment and commitment orde r when the two conflict.” State v. Staloch , 643 N.W.2d
329, 331 (Minn. App. 2002) (quotation omitted). Additionally , if there is a discrepancy
between the oral and written sentences that is attributable to clerical error, the district court
may correct it at any time. Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 10.
5
D E C I S I O N
I. Any alleged errors by the district court did not violate appellant’s due-
process right to a fair trial.

Under both the Minnesota and United Stat es Constitutions, due process of law
requires that a defendant receive a fair trial. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV § 1; Minn. Const.
art. I, § 7. This guarantee “doe s not require a perfect trial, but rather one that is fair and
does not prejudice the substantial rights of the accused.” State v. Marchbanks, 632 N.W.2d
725, 729 (Minn. App. 2001). Additionally, a defendant, while entitled to a jury trial, may
waive his jury-trial rights, “but the waiver must be knowing, inte lligent, and voluntary.”
State v. Little, 851 N.W.2d 878, 882 (Minn. 2014). Here, appellant does not challenge the
validity of his jury-trial waiver.
Appellant argues that the district court co mmitted several errors that violated his
due-process right to a fair trial, including: (1) depriving him of a fact-finder for part of his
trial; (2) making erroneous findings of fact; and (3) issuing its essential findings of fact in
violation of Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 2(b). We address each issue in turn.
A. The invited-error doctrine bars appellant from arguing that the district
court deprived him of a fact-finder fo r any part of his trial because he
fails to meet the plain-error test.
The invited-error doctrine prov ides that “a party cannot assert on appeal an error
that he invited or that could have been prevented at the district court.” State v. Benton, 858
N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). This rule stems from the principle that
defendants should not be perm itted “to court error in order to preserve a basis for appeal
and thus force the state into the cumb ersome necessity of a new trial.” State v. Kortness,
6
284 Minn. 555, 558, 170 N.W. 2d 210, 213 (1969) (quotation omitted). The invited-error
doctrine applies unless a party meets the plain-error test. State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d
130, 142 (Minn. 2012). And while the plain-error test has not been applied in this type of
case, the test has been applied to other u nobjected-to procedural trial errors under
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure 26.01. See e.g., State v. Little, 851 N.W.2d 878,
883-85 (Minn. 2014) (applying pl ain-error analysis to district court’s error in failing to
obtain from defendant new jury-trial waiver after state filed amended complaint adding
new criminal charge); State v. Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d 844, 852-53 (Minn. 2011) (applying
plain-error analysis to unobjected-to error in failing to obtain valid jury-trial waiver from
defendant).
“The plain error test gives us discretion to review unobjected-to errors if: (1) there
is error, (2) the error is plain, and (3) the error affects substa ntial rights. If the defendant
establishes all three factors, we consider a fourth: whether the error should be addressed to
ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Carridine, 812 N.W.2d at
142 (citation and quotation omitted). An error is plain if it violates or contradicts caselaw,
a rule, or an applicable standard of conduct. State v. Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 789, 801 (Minn.
2014).
Here, even assuming that the district court’s grant of appellant’s request to continue
the trial as a bench trial instead of adjourning the case for a jury-trial date was error, it was
not plain error. Appellant does not cite to any statute, rule, or caselaw that requires a court
to restart a trial from the beginning, specifically in a situation where the defendant, after a
mistrial, waives his rights to a jury trial and elects to proceed as a bench trial. Furthermore,
7
appellant does not cite to any law that prohibits the district court, in assuming the role of
factfinder, from considering the testimony that was presented prior to the mistrial in
reaching its conclusions an d finding appellant guilty. See State v. Dorsey , 701 N.W.2d
238, 249-50 (Minn. 2005) (“An impartial trial requires that conclusions reached by the trier
of fact be based upon the facts in evidence and prohibits the trier of fact from reaching
conclusions based on evidence sought or obtained beyond that adduced in court.” (citation
omitted)).
Furthermore, appellant’s due-process argument fails to demonstrate that any alleged
error affected his substantial rights or “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of the judi cial proceedings.” Benton, 858 N.W.2d at 540. The witnesses that
testified prior to the mistrial would likely have testified similarly the second time around.
Moreover, these witnesses’ testimony was under oath, meaning that if they did not testify
similarly, the state would have been able to bring in their prior testimony as non-hearsay.
Minn. R. Evid. 801 (d)(1)(A). Because appellant fails to satisfy a ny prong of the plain-
error test, the invited-error te st applies and bars his claim that he was deprived of a
factfinder for part of his trial.
B. Any alleged errors in the district court’s factual findings did not deprive
appellant of a fair trial.
Appellant argues that the district court’s erroneous oral findings of fact demonstrate
that he did not get a fair trial. We disagree.
“A [district] court’s findings of fact are given great deference, and shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous only if the reviewing
8
court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” State v.
Gomez, 721 N.W.2d 871, 883 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).
Here, appellant points to a number of findings by the district court that he believes
to be unsupported by the record and demonstrate that he did not receive a fair trial: (1) R.G.
was stabbed near the eye; (2) most of the blood tested belonged to R.G.; (3) R.G.’s wounds
were six inches deep; (4) the scratch on appellant’s neck was minor and there was no sign
of bleeding; and (5) C.G.’s description of the shirt worn by the individual who was making
the stabbing motion was consistent with the shirt appellant was wearing when he arrived
at the hospital.
Contrary to appellant’s suggestion, there is support in the record that R.G. was
stabbed near his right eye and that appellant’s neck scratch was minor. R.G. testified that
he was stabbed near his right eye, and the ph otographs in the record demonstrate that he
suffered an injury near that eye. With respect to the blood tested, the testimony of one of
the state’s experts established that R.G.’s blood was found on appellant’s shoe. The district
court’s remark that most of the blood tested belonged to R.G., even if incorrect, does not
prove that appellant received an unfair trial. With respect to the district court’s remarks
regarding the depth of R.G.’s wounds, the di strict court understood and found, based on
the evidence presented, that R.G. suffered substantial bodily harm. 3 Finally, the district
court’s remark about the shirt appellant wore was inconsistent with C.G.’s testimony. Any

3 The district court stated, “I think [appellant] acknowledged [that the weapon used] was a
box cutter. I don’t know the length of the bl ade of that box cutter. The doctor that
testified . . . had said that some of the stab wounds were as deep as [six] inches.”
9
error here is immaterial because, as appella nt’s testimony makes cl ear, there is no doubt
that appellant was involved in the attack and, in fact, appellant admitted to stabbing R.G.
Even with this inconsistency, there is sufficient evidence to support the district court’s
finding that C.G.’s testimony was credible. In sum, none of the facts highlighted by
appellant demonstrate that he received an unfair trial.
C. The district court made essential fi ndings of fact and did not deprive
appellant of a fair trial.
Appellant next argues that the district c ourt erred when it failed to make essential
findings of fact within seven days of making its general finding, in violation of Minn. R.
Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 2(b). We disagree.
In bench-trial proceedings, the district court must make a general finding of guilty
or not guilty and provide writte n findings of essential facts seven days after its general
finding. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 2(a)-(b). “An opinion or memorandum of decision
filed by the court satisfies the requirement to fi nd the essential facts if they appear in the
opinion or memorandum.” Id., subd. 2(d). “If th e court omits a finding on any issue of
fact essential to sustain the general finding , it must be deemed to have made a finding
consistent with the general finding.” Id., subd. 2(e). The purp ose of requiring written
findings is to aid the appellate court in its review. State v. Scarver, 458 N.W.2d 167, 168
(Minn. App. 1990). And the appropriate remedy for a rule 26.01, subdivision 2(b),
violation is to remand for further findings. See State v. Taylor , 427 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn.
App. 1988), review denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 1988).
10
Here, the district court made detailed esse ntial findings of fact on the record. The
district court also noted, without objection fr om appellant, that it intended to use these
detailed oral findings as written findings by attaching them to its order.
Appellant cites to State v. Taylor to support his position. But appellant’s reliance
on Taylor is misguided for several reasons. In Taylor, this court remanded the case back
to the district court because the district court failed to make written findings of fact to allow
for appropriate appellate review. Id. In the instant case, the di strict court’s oral findings
on the record explained the reasons for the general finding of guilt and addressed each
element of the crime and the f acts pertaining to each element in detail. Therefore, unlike
in Taylor, the district court provided a sufficient written record to allow appellate review.
Furthermore, Minnesota caselaw supports the conclusion that the district court
complied with Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 2(b). See, e.g., id. (suggesting, in dicta, that
had the district court put its oral findings in writing, it would have satisfied Minn. R. Crim.
P. 26.01, subd. 2(b)); Scarver, 458 N.W.2d at 168 (findings may be “gleaned from
comments from the bench” so long as the comments “afford a basis for intelligent appellate
review” (quotation omitted)). Therefore, the district court’s extensive oral findings
attached to its order in transcribed form are sufficient for us to review its findings with
respect to appellant’s guilt. Accordingly, there is no need for us to remand for further
findings.

11
II. Appellant has failed to demonstrate that he received an unfair trial due to bias
by the district court.

Appellant next argues that he did not rece ive a fair trial because the district court
demonstrated bias toward him at the sentencing hearing. We disagree.
“Due process requires that a judge have no actual bias agains t a defendant or an
interest in a case’s outcome.” State v. Sailee, 792 N.W.2d 90, 95 (Minn. App. 2010) (citing
Bracy v. Gramley , 520 U.S. 899, 904-05, 1 17 S. Ct. 1793, 1797 (1997)), review denied
(Mar. 15, 2011). The Sixth Amendment of the United Stat es Constitution establishes a
criminal defendant’s right to be tried by an impartial fact-finder. See also Minn. Const.
art. 1, § 6. This principle has long been recognized as applying to bench trials. See, e.g.,
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 3105 (1986); see also Greer v. State ,
673 N.W.2d 151, 155 (Minn. 2004) (“[I]mpartiality is the very foundation of the American
judicial system.”). We review claims of judicial bias de novo. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 249.
“There is the presumption that a judge ha s discharged his or her judicial duties
properly.” State v. Mems, 708 N.W.2d 526, 533 (Minn. 2006). “[A]dverse rulings by a
judge, without more, do not constitute judicial bias.” Id. The party alleging bias has the
burden to present evidence sufficient to overcome this presumption. See McKenzie v. State,
583 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1998).
Appellant argues that “[t]he district court’s comments at sentencing fell far short of
the applicable canons of judicial conduct and demonstrated bias, negative stereotyping, and
suggested connections between race and crime.” At the sentencing hearing, while arguing
for a downward departure, appellant noted that he had a tough life growing up in Chicago
12
and that he was involved in criminal activ ity from a very young ag e. The presentence
investigation (PSI) report also established appellant’s difficulties growing up in foster care
and when he was later adopted by his grandmother. The district court stated that appellant
had, “grown up on the streets of Chicago where it’s the tough guys who stay alive and the
weak ones that get killed.” C ontrary to appellant’s suggesti on, the district court did not
make its comments as a result of bias or ster eotype against appellant but in response to
appellant’s remark and the PSI.
Appellant next contends that the district court used information outside of the record
because it mentioned not seeing anyone who coul d be appellant’s brot her during trial to
support him and referenced the possibility of one of appellant’s brothers being involved in
the assault. “An impartial tria l requires that conclusions reached by the trier of fact be
based upon the facts in evidence . . . and pr ohibits the trier of fact from reaching
conclusions based on evidence sought or obtained beyond that adduced in court.” Dorsey,
701 N.W.2d at 249-50. “[A] reviewing cour t should place great c onfidence in a judge’s
ability to follow the law and should not assume that evid ence was considered for an
improper purpose without a clear showing.” State v. Burrell, 772 N.W.2d 459, 467 (Minn.
2009) (quotation omitted).
Here, the record demonstrates that the district court relied on the evidence in finding
appellant guilty. Appellant has failed to overco me the presumption that the district court
arrived at its finding of guilt or sentencing improperly because the record supports the
district court’s finding of guilt . Accordingly, we conclude that the district court’s
13
comments about appellant’s history and his br other do not support appellant’s contention
that the district court demonstrated bias toward him.
III. The evidence at trial was legally suffici ent to sustain appellant’s conviction and
disprove his self-defense claim.
Appellant next argues that the evidence presented was insufficient to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that he was not acting in self-defense. We disagree.
“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence leading to a conviction, we view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the factfinder
disbelieved any testimony conflicting with that verdict.” State v. Hayes, 831 N.W.2d 546,
552 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). This court “will not disturb the verdict if the [fact-
finder], acting with due regard for the presum ption of innocence” and the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty
of the charged offenses. Bernhardt v. State , 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004)
(quotation omitted).
To support appellant’s conviction, the state must disprove appellant’s claim of self-
defense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Spaulding , 296 N.W.2d 870, 875 (Minn.
1980). The four elements of self-defense are:
(1) the absence of aggression or provocation on the part of the
defendant; (2) the defendant’s actual and honest belief that he
or she was in imminent danger of . . . great bodily harm; (3) the
existence of reasonable grounds for that belief; and (4) the
absence of a reasonable possibi lity of retreat to avoid the
danger.
State v. Basting , 572 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Minn. 1997) (citing Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd.
1(3) (1996)). Additionally, even if a defendant meets the above elements, his self-defense
14
claim fails if he used unreasonably exce ssive force under the circumstances. Id. at 286;
see also State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392, 399 (Minn. 2001) (“To find that a defendant
acted in self-defense, a jury must . . . find that the defendant reasonably believed that force
was necessary.”). The factfinder makes the reasonableness determination. Glowacki, 630
N.W.2d at 403. On appeal, th e record must demonstrate that the state disproved at least
one of the elements of self-defense. Basting, 572 N.W.2d at 286.
Appellant testified that R.G. attacked hi m right outside of the shelter and began
choking him while appellant was on the ground. Appellant further testified that he stabbed
R.G. because appellant was afraid he was goin g to lose consciousness and was afraid for
his life. None of the witnesses who testified on appellant’s behalf personally observed the
incident. The district court found that appellant’s use of force was not reasonable and that
appellant’s use of a weapon against R.G. was unwarranted. Additionally, the district court
found that appellant acknowledged that he had a duty to retreat, but did not do so. We
conclude that the district court, as the fact-finder, did not clearly err in finding that the state
proved that appellant’s use of force was not reasonable and that appellant failed to fulfill
his duty to retreat. Accordingly, sufficien t evidence exists to uphold appellant’s
conviction.
IV. Appellant’s other arguments do not entitle him to relief.
Appellant raises a number of arguments in his pro se supplemental brief. Appellant
challenges the conviction, alleging improper bias against him and insufficient evidence,
both of which are addressed above.
15
Appellant next argues that the district c ourt abused its discre tion when it failed to
order the state to return his cell phone. We note that appellant does not cite any authority
to support his argument in his principal brief, supplemental brief, or reply brief.
Minnesota law provides that “[a]fter the trial for which the property was being held
as potential evidence, and the expiration date for all associated appeals, the property or
thing shall, unless otherwise subject to lawful detention, be returned to its owner or any
other person entitled to possess it.” Minn. Stat. § 626.04 (b) (2014). Here, the district court
found that appellant is not en titled to the release of his ce ll phone until he has exhausted
his appeals process. Appellant has not yet e xhausted his appeals process. Therefore, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order return of his cell phone.
Finally, appellant’s principal brief included an attached document that was not part
of the district court record. Appellant’s pr incipal and pro se supplemental brief contain
references to this document. The record on appeal consists of “[t]he documents filed in the
trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if any.” Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 110.01; see also Fabio v. Bellomo, 489 N.W.2d 241, 246 (Minn. App. 1992) (“The court
will strike documents included in a party’s brief that are not part of the appellate record.”)
aff’d, 504 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1993). The state submitted a motion to strike, and we now
grant the state’s motion striking this document and any references to it. See AFSCME,
Council No. 14 v. Cty. of Scott , 530 N.W.2d 218, 222-23 (Min n. App. 1995) (noting that
court may disregard and strike po rtions of brief that improper ly refer to evidence outside
of record), review denied (Minn. May 16, June 14, 1995).
Affirmed, motion granted.