A16-1042 Precedential Reversed and remanded Processed

Lisa Jensen, Respondent,

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed April 10, 2017

The holding in the court’s own words

We conclude that the district court erred in applying the appellate standard of review to the CSM’s findings, conclusions of law, and order.

Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.

Authorities cited

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Opinion text

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1042

Lisa Jensen,
Respondent,

vs.

Robert Otto,
Appellant,

Ramsey County, intervenor,
Respondent.

Filed April 10, 2017
Reversed and remanded; motion denied
Kirk, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-F8-04-000840

Kelly M. McSweeney, Jenson, Mullen, McSweeney & Meyer, P.L.L.P., Bloomington,
Minnesota (for respondent Lisa Jensen)

Glenn P. Bruder, Mitchell, Bruder and Johnson, Edina, Minnesota (for appellant)

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Patrick M. Hest, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Ramsey County)

Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KIRK, Judge
On appeal from the district court’s affirmance of the Child Support Magistrate’s
(CSM’s) decision in this support dispute, appellant -father argues that the district court:
(1) failed to apply the de novo review of the CSM’s ruling required under Minn. R. Gen.
Pract. 377.09, subd. 2(b); (2) erred in allowing mother to move to establish child support;
and (3) failed to grant him a downward deviation in child support. Because the district
court did not engage in a de novo review of the CSM’s ruling, we reverse and remand. We
also deny mother’s motion for conduct-based attorney fees on appeal.
D E C I S I O N
When “a party moves for revie w of the CSM’s original decision, the reviewing
authority conducts an ‘independent review’ of that decision.” Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 673
N.W.2d 528
, 530 n.2 (Minn. App. 2004) (quoting Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 377.09, subd. 2(b)).
“[T]he requirement that t he district court make an independent review of findings and
provisions in the [CSM’s] decision means that the district court was to make its review free
from the influence, guidance, or control of the magistrate.” Blonigen v. Blonigen , 621
N.W.2d 276
, 28 0 (Minn. App. 20 01), review denied (Minn. Mar. 13, 2001). This court
examines the district court’ s decision on child-support matters for an abuse of discretion.
Kuronen v. Kuronen, 499 N.W.2d 51, 53 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied (Minn. June
22, 1993). This court will reverse the district court ’s decision for abuse of that discretion
only when the court ’s resolution of the issue is against logic and the facts on the record.
Id.

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Appellant-father Robert Otto argues that the district court applied the wrong
standard of review when it reviewed the CSM’s ruling. He asserts that the district court
should have applied a “de novo” standard of review under Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 377.09,
subd. 2, but instead it applied the appellate standard of review as enunciated in Putz v. Putz,
645 N.W.2d 343, 347 (Minn. 2002) (holding that the supreme court will reverse a district
court’s order regarding child support only if it is convinced that the district court abused
its direction by resolving the matter in a manner that is against logic and the facts o n the
record). Respondent-mother Lisa Jensen and intervenor-respondent Ramsey County argue
that the district court independently reviewed the record and the CSM’s ruling and that the
court reached its own decision on the merits.
The record establishes that the parties divorced in 2006, after six years of marriage,
and are the parents to Y.O., a minor child. According to the terms of a stipulation that was
incorporated into the dissolution judgment and decree, the parties shared joint legal
custody, and mother had “primary residency ” of Y.O ., subject to father’s reasonable
parenting time. The district court ordered father to pay child support, child-care costs, and
child-care expenses.
In 2008, mother moved to find father in constructive civil contempt of court for
failing to pay child support and child -care expenses. In 2009, the district court scheduled
an evidentiary hearing after it found that mother had met her burden of a prima facie case
for modifying custody and parenting time. Prior to and during the evidentiary hearing, the
parties engaged in settlement negotiations . Through letter and email, mother proposed to
forego any future child support and discontinue her legal motions if father agreed to give

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her sole legal and sole physical custody of Y.O. In March 2010, the parties reached a
settlement and read the terms of the stipulation into the record before the district court.
Based on the parties’ stipulation, the district court filed an order amending the terms of the
original judgment and decree. The district court’s amended judgment stated that mother
was awarded sole legal custody and that physical custody was to remain “as is.” Basic child
support was reserved, but father was ordered to pay all outstanding child-support arrearages
in full and to pay child-care costs.
In December 2015, mother moved to establish father’s basic child -support
obligation and to modify his medical -support obligation. On January 12 , 2016, a CSM
conducted an evidentiary hearing on mother’s motion. Both parties appeared at the hearing
with counsel. Father argued that mother was estopped from requesting child support under
McNattin v. McNattin , because she had made specific representations to father in 2010
whereby he agreed to give mother full legal custody and in exchange she would forego any
future child support. 450 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. App. 1990). Father also asked that if support
was awarded to mother, he be given a downward deviation in child support.
The CSM issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order establishing child
support and modifying medical support. The CSM concluded that the May 2010 amended
judgment reserved the issue of basic child support, and that there was nothing in the record
establishing that mother had waived child support in exchange for an award of full legal
custody. Based on father’s average monthly gross income, the CSM established father’s
basic child -support obligation at $758 per month and also modified father’s medical -

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support obligation. The CSM rejected father’s request for a downward deviation in child
support.
Father requested that the district court conduct an independent review of the CSM’s
findings, conclusions, and order under Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 376.01 and 376.03. In an order
and memorandum, the district court denied father’s motion for review in its entirety. Citing
Putz, the district court reviewed the CSM’s decision for an abuse of discretion and whether
the CSM “came to a clearly erroneous decision in a manner that is against logic and the
facts of the record.”
We conclude that the district court erred in applying the appellate standard of
review to the CSM’s findings, conclusions of law, and order. According to Minn. R. Gen.
Pract. 377.09, subd. 2(b), the district court judge “shall make an independent review of any
findings or other provisions of the underlying decision and order for which specific changes
are requested in the motion. ” Caselaw affirms th at the CSM’s decision is subject to de
novo review by the district court. See Kilpatrick, 673 N.W.2d at 530 n.2; Davis v. Davis,
631 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Minn. App. 2001); Blonigen, 621 N.W.2d at 280. For this reason,
we remand the issue to the district court for an independent analysis of the CSM’s order
under Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 377.09, subd. 2(b).
Because we are reversing and remanding to the district court, we do not reach
father’s argument that the district court erred in failing to grant him a downward deviation
in child support. We also deny mother’s motion for $5,303.50 in conduct-based attorney
fees incurred in defending this appeal. Attorney fees on appeal may be allowed as a matter
of substantive law or as a sanction. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 139.06 (1998 advisory comm.

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note); see also Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2016) (stating that conduct-based fees “may”
be awarded against a party who unreasonably contributes to the length or expense of the
proceeding). Father did not unreasonably contribute to the length or expense of the appeal
by challenging the district court’s application of the wrong standard of review to the CSM’s
ruling. See Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1.
Reversed and remanded; motion denied.