State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1045

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Roland Lee Anderson,
Appellant.

Filed June 12, 2017
Affirmed
Cleary, Chief Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-9339

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Lydia Maria Villalva Lijó,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Connolly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CLEARY, Chief Judge
Appellant Roland Lee Anderson challenges the district court’s denial of his motion
to suppress the evidence due to an unlawful search and seizure, and challenges his
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conviction of ineligible possession of a fir earm in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713,
subd. 1(2) (2014). Because (1) appellant lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy relating
to the area searched and the seized firearm in order to challenge the search and seizure, and
(2) the evidence at trial was sufficient to prove appellant possessed the firearm, we affirm.
FACTS
In April 2015, the state charged appellant with one count of possession of a firearm
by an ineligible person, in violation of Minn . Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2). The charge
stemmed from an incident on the evening of January 26, 2015, at the Little Earth of United
Tribes housing complex in Minneapolis, when law enforcement stopped appellant as a
passenger in a vehicle and discovered a firearm in an infant car seat.
Appellant moved the district court to suppress the evidence of the firearm
contending that law enforcem ent lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to seize
appellant and lacked a warrant or warrant exce ption to justify the search of the vehicle
where the firearm was discovered. The district court held a contested omnibus hearing on
February 3, 2016, where three law-enforcement officers testified.
At the omnibus hearing, Officer Cam pbell testified that on the evening of
January 26, 2015, he was patrolling the area of the Little Ea rth housing complex with his
partner, Sergeant Hatle. Campbell and Hatle were working off-dut y security for the
housing complex. Campbell said that, as he and Hatle were drivin g past a parking lot
entrance to the complex, he observed two people entering an SUV-type vehicle. The SUV
was parked with its windshield facing away from the curb, as if it backed in. After passing
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the parking lot entrance by a few feet, Campbell stopped their squad, backed up, and then
entered the lot.
Campbell initially testified that the two people who entered the SUV were familiar
to him from past arrests and incidents, however, he was not clear when exactly he realized
their identities. Campbell next indicated that he did not initially id entify the men and he
stated that he backed up and entered the parking lot because he wanted to see who the men
were. The person who sat in the front passenger seat of the SUV was later identified as
appellant, and the person who entered the rear passenger side was identified as M.R. A
woman was in the driver’s seat, and two children and an infant were in the back seat.
After entering the parking lot, the officers shined their squad car’s spotlight on the
vehicle. Campbell testified that seeing ap pellant and M.R. in the area concerned him
because appellant was trespassed “numerous times” from the housing area, and Campbell
thought that M.R. had a prob able-cause pickup for a recent shooting and was trespassing
on the premises. Campbell said that he had no suspicion of criminal activity until he
identified M.R.
Campbell said that he and Hatle approached the vehicle, identified themselves, and
told the occupants of the vehicle to put their hands up. Campbell said that appellant “turned
to the left in the front seat,” and that he c ould not see appellant’s hands. M.R. was in the
backseat and he “kind of bent forward and turned to the left by the baby seat.” Appellant
and M.R. eventually complied with raising their hands and the officers removed them from
the SUV.
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Campbell detained M.R. because of the probable-cause pickup and trespass. Once
M.R. was taken out of the SUV and detained , Campbell realized he was mistaken about
the probable-cause pickup, but M.R. had been issued a trespass notice the previous October
and the notice was still active. Campbell placed M.R. in hi s squad and began processing
paperwork for the trespass. While M.R. was in the back of Campbell’s squad car, police
discovered a firearm in the SUV. M.R. told Campbell that appellant had handed him the
firearm to hide it.
Campbell testified that appellant was detained because he thought that appellant was
also trespassing. Campbell said that he eventually realized appellant was not on a trespass
notice, but Campbell could not remember if this realization came before or after the search
of the SUV.
Sergeant Hatle also testified at the omnibus hearing. Hatle said that as he and
Campbell were passing the park ing lot entrance, Campbell said to Hatle that he just
observed someone duck when the person noticed their squa d car and the person looked
shocked. He said the SUV wa s 20 to 25 yards away at this point. Hatle confirmed the
officers entered the parking lot and shined a spotlight on the SUV. He said that he noticed
two males inside the SUV. He said the front passenger, appellant, caught his attention right
away by the “shocked” look on his face. Ha tle recognized appellant and thought he was
on a trespass notice at the time. Hatle said that he observed appellant make a “movement
real quick to the back seat like he was placin g something . . . and then [M.R.] in the back
seat was moving around.”
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Hatle said that his decision to draw his firearm and approach the vehicle was based
on appellant and M.R.’s “furtive” movements a nd the surprised looks on their faces, and
because he thought they were hiding either na rcotics or a weapon. He also said that the
area was dangerous.
Hatle radioed for backup, and other officer s arrived moments after. He removed
M.R. and appellant from the vehicle. The two were cuffed, pat-frisked, and handed off to
other officers. No weapons were found on their persons. Hatle saw that there were children
still in the SUV and the mother was outside the car. He testified that he ordered a
responding officer, Officer Young, to search behind the drive r’s seat for weapons. Hatle
said that he discovered that there was not a tr espass notice in effect for appellant after the
SUV was searched. Hatle testified that he di d not view drugs or weapons in plain view,
there was no “medical emergency” to justif y a search, he had not received consent to
search, and the vehicle was not being impounded.
Officer Young, then an on-duty officer with the Minneapolis Police Department,
testified at the hearing that she responded to Hatle’s call for assistance. When she arrived,
appellant and M.R. were outside the SUV, and two older child ren and an infant in a car
seat were still in the SUV. Young said that Hatle instructed her to assist with removing the
children in the car. Young drew her attention to the infant in the car seat behind the driver’s
seat. Before Young lifted the infant out of the car seat, she observed what appeared to be
a handgun. She could see the grip of the firearm sticking out from between the infant’s
legs. Young removed the infant and officers seized the firearm.
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On March 3, 2016, the distri ct court denied appellant’s suppression motion. In its
order, the district court confused the identitie s of appellant and M.R ., and concluded that
the police had a reasonable suspicion to stop appellant because they believed that they had
probable cause to arrest appellant for a recent shooting.
A court trial was held in March 2016. The only issue at trial was whether appellant
possessed the firearm. Testimony from law enfo rcement was substantially similar at trial
to the testimony at the omnibus hearing. Appellant testified at trial and denied possessing
the firearm. Appellant said that, when M.R. entered the back seat, appellant turned around
to shake M.R.’s hand. Appellant testified that he was not aware M.R. had a gun. However,
in a prior police statement, appellant said th at M.R. had tried to hand him something,
presumably the firearm, when police approached the SUV, but that he shrugged M.R. off.
The district court found appellant guilty on April 1, 2016. Appellant challenges the
district court’s order denying his motion to suppress and appeals his conviction.
D E C I S I O N
I. Motion to Su ppress the Firearm
Appellate courts review de novo a distri ct court’s determination of reasonable
suspicion as it relates to an investigatory stop. In re G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Minn.
1997). Appellate courts independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law,
whether the district court erred in supp ressing or not suppre ssing the evidence. State v.
Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). A district court’s findings of fact will not be set
aside unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Gauster , 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn.
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2008). Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if this court is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake occurred. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 853-54 (Minn. 2011).
Appellant argues that (1) the district court’s order denying suppression was tainted
by clearly erroneous factual findings that influe nced the district court’s decision, (2) law
enforcement lacked the requisite reasonabl e suspicion to seize him, and (3) law
enforcement unlawfully expanded the scope of the stop in se arching the SUV where they
discovered the firearm.
We agree with appellant that the distri ct court’s order denying suppression was
tainted by clearly erroneous factual findings. Law enforcement did not have probable
cause to believe that appellant was involved in a recent shooting. We also have doubts that
law enforcement’s mistakes of fact regarding whether a ppellant was trespassing were
reasonable, and that without those facts they possessed a reasonable suspicion that
appellant was engaged in criminal activity. Nevertheless, appellant cannot challenge the
search of the SUV where la w enforcement discovered the firearm because he had no
expectation of privacy in the vehicle or the item seized.
In general, a passenger stopped in a vehicle may challenge the stop. State v. Ritchie,
379 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Minn. App. 1985), review denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1986). But in
order to contest a search of property, “a defendant must establish a legitimate expectation
of privacy relating to the area searched or the item[s] seized.” State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d
243, 249 (Minn. 2003) (alteration in original) (q uotation omitted); see In re Welfare of
B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Minn. 2003) (determining that a defendant must show that
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he or she personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his
expectation is reasonable). “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some
other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.” Rakas v. Illinois , 439 U.S.
128, 133-34, 99 S. Ct. 421, 425 (1978) (quotation omitted).
Here, appellant has not contended he ha d a subjective, personal expectation of
privacy in the SUV. The r ecord shows appellant was only a passenger in the SUV, and
appellant does not contend he had any possessory interest in the vehicle. Appellant denies
that he possessed the item seized . Even if appellant asserted a subjective expectation of
privacy in the back seat of a vehicle in which he was a pa ssenger, this expectation would
not be reasonable because there is no eviden ce that appellant was more than a brief
passenger in the vehicle. Appellant did not s it in the back seat of the SUV, and was not
inside the SUV when the back seat area was searched. Because appellant lacked a
legitimate expectation of priv acy in the area searched an d the item seized, he has no
standing to challenge the SUV search, or the admissibility of the firearm.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant next challenges his conviction, arguing the state failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt at his court trial that he possessed the firearm.
In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case, appellate courts are
limited to ascertaining whether, given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences
that can be drawn from those facts, a fact -finder could reasonably conclude that the
defendant was guilty of the offense charged. Bernhardt v. State , 684 N.W.2d 465, 476
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(Minn. 2004). The evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id. at
477. This court assumes the fact-finder believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any
evidence to the contrary. State v. Porter, 674 N.W.2d 424, 427 (Minn. App. 2004).
It is a crime for a person to possess a fire arm when the person has previously been
convicted of a crime of violence. Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2). Appellant stipulated
at his trial that he was convicted of a crime of violence, so the only issue was whether he
possessed the firearm found in the SUV. To prove possession, the state must show beyond
a reasonable doubt that appellant either had actual or constructive possession of the firearm.
Porter, 674 N.W.2d at 427. “Actual possession, also referred to as physical possession,
involves direct physical control.” State v. Barker, 888 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Minn. App. 2016)
(quotation omitted).
Constructive possession may be established either (1) by proof
that the item was in a place u nder the defendant’s exclusive
control to which other people did not normally have access or
(2) by proof of a strong probability that the defendant was at
the time consciously exercising do minion and control over it,
even if the item was in a place to which others had access.

Id. at 353-54 (quotations omitted).
Here, the district court concluded that appellant had constructive possession over
the firearm. The court found that appella nt “knowingly possesse d the gun when police
approached,” and that he “knowingly exercise d dominion and control over the firearm.”
The district court did not find appellant’s testimony that M.R. attempted to give him the
firearm believable. The district court credit ed M.R.’s statement to police that appellant
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gave M.R. the firearm. In its conclusions of law after the be nch trial, the district court
determined:
Officer Campbell, Sgt. Hatle, a nd Defendant all testified that
defendant moved toward the back seat, toward [M.R.]. Sgt.
Hatle saw that Defendant appear ed to have something in his
hand. Although the officer could not see at the time what was
in Defendant’s hand, it is reas onable to infer, and this Court
expressly finds, that the obj ect was the firearm. After
Defendant handed the gun to [M.R.], [M.R.] made a quick
movement to his left, so he could place the gun in that area.
Neither individual complied wi th officer commands to put
their hands up. Such behavior is consistent with hiding a
handgun from police. . . . [M.R .] told police that Defendant
gave him the gun to hide. Defendant told police that he knew
the gun was in the car. Las tly, Defendant’s DNA was likely
on the handgun, consistent with Defendant having handled the
gun.

Appellant argues that his conviction was based on circumstantial evidence,
warranting a heightened standard of review. However, the direct evidence presented at
trial was sufficient to prove appellant’s guilt.
1 M.R. told police that appellant gave him the
firearm, and the district court found this cred ible. “Because the weight and believability
of witness testimony is an issue for the district court,” this court gives deference to a district
court’s credibility determinations. State v. Miller , 659 N.W.2d 275, 279 (Minn. App.
2003), review denied (Minn. July 15, 2003). Further, the officers testified about their direct

1 “‘Direct evidence’ is ‘[e]vidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and
that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.’” Bernhardt, 684 N.W.2d at
477 n.11 (alteration in original) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 596 (8th ed. 2004).
“‘Circumstantial evidence’ is defined as ‘[e]vidence based on inference and not on personal
knowledge or observation’ and ‘[a]ll evidence that is not given by eyewitness testimony.’”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 595 (8th ed. 2004).
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observations of appellant and M.R.’s furtiv e movements, which were consistent with
appellant possessing a gun and handing it to M.R. to hide in the back seat. In giving
deference to the district court’s acceptance of M.R.’s statement to police, there is sufficient
direct evidence that appellant possessed the weapon.
We agree with the state that, even under the heightened circumstantial-evidence test,
the evidence is sufficient. If a conviction is based on ci rcumstantial evidence, “[t]he
circumstances proved must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and
inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Bernhardt, 684 N.W.2d at
477 (quotation omitted). Appl ying the circumstantial-eviden ce standard is a two-step
process. State v. Silvernail , 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 20 13). “The first step is to
identify the circumstances proved.” In identifying the circum stances proved, we defer to
the fact-finder’s acceptance of the proof of th ese circumstances and rejection of evidence
in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the state. Id. at 598-99. As
with direct evidence, conflictin g evidence is construed in the light most favorable to the
verdict. Id. at 599. The second step is to independently examine the reasonableness of all
inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved, including inferences
consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt. State v. Andersen , 784 N.W.2d 320, 329
(Minn. 2010). In the second stage of the analysis, we give no deference to the fact-finder’s
choice between reasonable inferences. Id. at 329-30.
The circumstances proved at trial are the following findings by the district court:
(1) when police shined a spo tlight on the SUV, appellant immediately moved his entire
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upper torso to his left; (2) appellant appeared to have something in his hand, and he moved
his right arm over his left shoulder toward M.R.; (3) seconds later, M.R. made movements
to his left near the infant car seat; (4) after being commanded to put their hands up,
appellant and M.R. failed to comply; (5) M.R. told law enforcement that appellant gave
him the gun; (6) appellant’s statement to poli ce suggested that he knew a firearm was in
the vehicle; and (7) appellant’s DNA was among the 4.5% of the general population that
cannot be excluded as a DNA contributor to the firearm.
Appellant contends that there is an equa lly reasonable inference that M.R. solely
possessed the weapon and placed it in the car seat, which was closest to M.R. However,
because this court defers to the fact-finder’s acceptance of the circumstances proved, this
hypothesis is not reasonable as it does not offer an explanation of the object in appellant’s
hand and appellant’s furtive movements reaching back to M.R.
In sum, under both the direct- and circ umstantial-evidence standards of review, the
evidence in this case was su fficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant
possessed the firearm.
Affirmed.