State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1047

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Derrell Ja Cori Cole,
Appellant.

Filed April 3, 2017
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-28032

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Stauber, Pres iding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Rodenberg,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Derrell Ja Cori Cole challenges his conviction of aiding and abetting first-
degree aggravated robbery. He argues that the district court abused its discretion when it

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ruled that two unspecified fe lony convictions could be used to impeach his testimony.
Appellant raises additional pro se arguments. We affirm.
FACTS
On July 3, 2015, appellant drove two ac complices to a residential neighborhood as
part of a plan rob D.M. Appellant, who had met D.M. that morning, had told D.M. that he
wished to purchase designer belts from him. When appellant arrived, his accomplice, D.B.,
got out of the car and pointed a gun at D.M., who was near his car. Another accomplice,
R.H., got out of the car to collect D.M.’s property. Upon seeing D.M. on the ground being
robbed, D.M.’s girlfriend confronted the two accomplices, whom she recognized from
Facebook, and called out their names. After being confronted, D.B fired multiple shots,
striking D.M.’s girlfriend in the foot. Appellant drove the two accomplices from the scene.
Appellant was arrested and charged with aiding and abetting first-degree aggravated
robbery. Appellant notified th e district court and counsel that he intended to present an
alibi defense, and that he may call three alibi witnesses. Before trial, the state moved to
admit appellant’s prior convictions, as unspecified felony convictions, if appellant testified.
Appellant had been convicted of two counts of first-degree aggravated robbery in 2013 and
of terroristic threats in 2014 . The district court analy zed the admissibility of the
convictions under the Jones factors and ruled that the state could admit two of the
convictions, without identifying the aggravated robbery convictions by name, to impeach
appellant’s testimony.
At trial, D.M. and his girlfriend testified about the robbery, and D.B. testified against
appellant as part of a plea agreement with the state. D.B. testified that it was appellant’s

3
idea to rob D.M., that appellant supplied the guns, and that ap pellant drove the vehicle.
Appellant did not testif y and rested without calling any w itnesses. The ju ry returned a
guilty verdict.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
I.
Appellant argues that he is entitled to a ne w trial because he was unable to present
his alibi defense because of the district court’s ruling that he could be impeached with two
prior convictions.
The state may impeach a defendant with evidence of a prior felony conviction if no
more than ten years have elapsed since the da te of conviction (or since he was released
from confinement for that conviction), and if the district court determines that the probative
value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(1),
(b); State v. Zornes, 831 N.W.2d 609, 626-27 (Minn. 2013). We review a district court’s
ruling on the admissibility of prior convictions under a clear abuse of discretion standard.
State v. Hill, 801 N.W.2d 646, 651 (Minn. 2011).
Five factors guide the exercise of a district court’s discretion in determining whether
the balancing test of rule 609(a) is met:
‘(1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the date of
the conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history, (3) the
similarity of the past crime with the charged crime . . . , (4) the
importance of the defendant’s testimony, and (5) the centrality
of the credibility issue.’

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Id. at 653 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Jones , 271 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Minn.
1978)).
Appellant challenges the distri ct court’s analysis of the Jones factors, specifically
concerning factors three and four, and the dist rict court’s conclusion that the probative
value of admitting the convictions outweighed th e prejudicial effect. He argues that the
district court’s erroneous ruling hindered his ability to present a defense.
Impeachment value
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that “it is the general lack of respect for the
law, rather than the specific nature of the co nviction, that informs the fact-finder about a
witness’s credibility.” Hill, 801 N.W.2d at 652. “In other words, any felony conviction is
probative of a witness’s credib ility, and the mere fact that a witness is a convicted felon
holds impeachment value.” Id. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that this
factor weighs in favor of admission of appellant’s prior convictions.
Date of prior conviction
Convictions occurring within ten years of trial are presumptively not stale. State v.
Gassler, 505 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Minn. 1993); see also State v. Williams , 757 N.W.2d 504,
509 (Minn. App. 2008) (stating that, because the convictions occurred within the past ten
years, the second Jones factor “weigh[ed] in favor of admission”), aff’d, 771 N.W.2d 514
(Minn. 2009). Appellant’s three prior felony convictions occurred within the last ten years.
We agree with the district court’s conclusion that this factor weighs in favor of admission.

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Similarity of prior conviction with charged crime
“The more similar the alleged offense a nd the crime underlying a past conviction,
the more likely it is that the conviction is more prejudicial than probative.” State v.
Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 655 (Minn. 2006). “The danger when the past crime is similar
to the charged crime is that the likelihood is increased that the jury will use the evidence
substantively rather than merely for impeachment purposes.” State v. Bettin, 295 N.W.2d
542, 546 (Minn. 1980).
The district court found that this factor weighed against admissibility with regard to
the two robbery convictions, but that the pr ejudicial effect would be mitigated by not
specifying the nature of the crimes. It concluded that, if the convictions were unspecified,
the third factor would weigh in favor of admi ssion. Appellant argues that this factor
weighed in favor of excluding the convictions, and that the district court erred when it
considered the conviction as unspecified before first determining whether the convictions
passed the Jones-factor analysis.
In State v. Hill , the Minnesota Supreme Court discussed the ad missibility of
unspecified felonies under rule 609(a)(1): “If a court finds that the prejudicial effect of
disclosing the nature of a felony conviction outweighs its probative value, then it may still
allow a party to impeach a witness with an un specified felony conviction if the use of the
unspecified conviction satisfies the balancing test of rule 609(a)(1).” 801 N.W.2d at 652-
53. The application of the Jones factors aids a district court’s consideration of the probative
value and prejudicial effect of admitting th e convictions, a require d consideration under
rule 609(a)(1). Whether to ad mit an unspecified felony, because specifying the nature of

6
the conviction would be overly prejudicial, is within the district court’s discretion and part
of its rule 609(a)(1) and Jones analysis. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
implicitly concluding that the admission of the nature of the robbery convictions would be
too prejudicial to appellant, but that the balancing test of rule 609(a)(1) would be satisfied
if the convictions were admitted without specifying their nature.
Importance of appellant’s testimony and credibility (fourth and fifth factors)
The district court found that, because appellant had other witnesses through whom
he could present his alibi defense, the importa nce of appellant’s testimony in that regard
was not significant, and therefore the fourth factor favored admission of the convictions.
The district court found that the fifth facto r, the centrality of the credibility issues, was a
neutral factor.
“A defendant has a constitutional right to pres ent his version of events to a jury.”
Zornes, 831 N.W.2d at 628. The district cour t may exclude evidence of a prior felony
conviction if admission of such evidence would “cause [the] defendant not to testify and if
it is more important in the case to have the jury hear the defendant’s version” of what
happened. Bettin, 295 N.W.2d at 546.
Appellant argues that the district court’s ruling concerning the admissibility of his
prior convictions hindered his ability to present his alibi. However, at the time the district
court considered this factor, appellant had given notice of an intention to call three
witnesses supporting his alibi defense. Moreover, appellant’s accomplice ultimately
testified that appellant was present at the sc ene of the robbery. Appellant’s subsequent
testimony in his defense that he was not present at the scene of the robbery would have had

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mixed persuasive value, and would pu t appellant’s credibility at issue. See Zornes, 831
N.W.2d at 628 (noting that if the defendant had testified that he was with someone else at
the time of the crime, when th at alibi witness testified to the contrary, the defendant’s
testimony would have “mixed persuasive value”).
When a criminal defendant intends to present an alibi defense for which his
testimony is the only evidence, credibility is a central issue.1 Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 655-
56. If appellant had testified that he was not present at the scene of the robbery, while three
other witnesses testified that he had been pres ent, appellant’s version of the facts and his
credibility would have been important issues to be decided by the jury. “If credibility is a
central issue in the case, the fourth and fifth Jones factors weigh in favor of admission of
the prior convictions.” Id. at 655. We agree with the district court’s analysis of the fourth
and fifth factors.
After considering the Jones factors and weighing the probative value of the
unspecified convictions against their prejudicial effect, the district court acted within its
discretion in concluding that the probative va lue predominated. The district court acted
within its discretion to carefully limit the im peachment evidence so as to avoid unfair
prejudice to appellant, requiring that they be identified only as unspecified felonies.

1 Appellant did not testify at tr ial and called no other witnesses. At the time the district
court ruled on the admissibility of appellant’s prior felony convictions, appellant was
intending to testify. After the district court ruled that the unspecified convictions would be
admissible, appellant opted not to testify.

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II.
In his pro se brief, appellant additionally asserts that his speedy-trial rights were
violated and that the prosecut or should not have been perm itted to prepare witnesses in
advance of trial. Appellant does not provide argument or citation to legal authority to
support his claims, and we therefore decline to consider them unless “prejudicial error is
obvious on mere inspection.” State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 22 (Minn. 2015) (quotation
omitted); State v. Krosch , 642 N.W.2d 713, 719-20 (Minn. 2002). We have examined
appellant’s pro se assertions and do not find, on mere inspec tion, prejudicial error caused
by either trial delay, or in the state’s preparation of its witnesses.
Affirmed.