State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1054

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Michael Dean Grussing,
Appellant.

Filed June 26, 2017
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge

Chippewa County District Court
File No. 12-CR-15-575

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Edwin W. Stockmeyer, III, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Mark D. Nyvold, Special
Assistant Public Defender, Fridley, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and
Johnson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
PETERSON, Judge
In this appeal from a conviction of second -degree intentional murder, appellant
argues that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted his prior felony
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convictions as impeachment evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 609(1). Because any error in
admitting the prior convictions was not prejudicial, we affirm.
FACTS
C.A. and her friend, B.Z., were in C.A.’s front yard recording snapchat videos. K.R.
walked by and went into an apartment at 721 Sherman Avenue. When K.R. entered the
apartment, C.A. and B.Z. heard a loud argument. About five minutes later, K.R. came back
outside, holding his neck, bleeding, and screaming. K.R. was pursued by a man holding a
knife. C.A. and B.Z. went inside and called 911. Officers were dispatched at 5:46 p.m.
and arrived at the scene within about two minutes.
K.R. went to another apartment in the building at 721 Sherman and knocked on the
door, but no one answered. K.R. ran down the middle of Eighth Street, waving his arms
in the air, and a passing pick -up truck stopped. The driver, who knew K.R., brought him
to the hospital. K. R. had blood on his shirt and s aid that he had been stabbed. K.R. died
shortly after arriving at the hospital.
The medical examiner testified that K.R. had a 6.5 -inch horizontal incise d wound
on his neck with a 1.75-inch vertical gaping portion. K.R. had no other injuries to his body.
On the left side of his neck, the muscles were cut all the way through. Although the medical
examiner could not determine the amount of force used, she testified that the incision would
have required some force and effort.
Montevideo Police Officer Joshua Walker responded to the 911 call. As he
approached the intersection of Sherman Avenue and Seventh Street, he saw a man, later
identified as appellant Michael Dean Grussing, who took off running when he saw the
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squad car. Walker found Grussing hiding between a bush and a staircase. Walker drew
his Taser, ordered Grussing to come out of his hiding place, and handcuffed him.
Walker searched Grussing but did not find a knife. Walker instructed Officer
Charles Beery, who had come to assist, to search for a knife along the route that Grussing
followed when he fled. About then, Grussing said, “[H]e got his face stabbed; maybe he
did.” Walker said that he needed to find the knife because he did not want children to get
it, and Grussing said that he could take the officers right to it and that it was inside the
apartment. As they approached K.R.’s apartment, Grussing said: “I stabbed it into his
throat. . . . I stabbed it into his throat. . . . See all the blood? ” Grussing was referring to
blood on the staircase, which Walker described as a significant amount of blood. Inside
the apartment, Grussing directed Walker to a fillet knife with a black handle on the armrest
of a couch. K.B., who was in the apartment when the officers and Grussing arrived, asked
Grussing what had happened, and Grussing responded, “I stabbed [K.R.] . . . I stabbed him
in his throat.”
After repeatedly asking if K.R. was dead, Grussing said: “I hope he is. I slit . . . his
throat. I did. I slit his throat. That’s all I have to say about it, I slit his throat, . . . I hope
he dies.” At the jail, Grussing said: “I killed him! . . . You guys, I did it. My name’s
Mike, I did it.” He also asked, “Did I murder him?” Although Grussing was not injured,
blood was found on his clothing and shoes.
Grussing was charged with second -degree murder in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.19, subd. 1(1) (Supp. 2015). The case was tried to a jury. Over objection at trial,
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the district court admitted evidence of Grussing’s three prior felony convic tions as
impeachment evidence.
Two of Grussing’s fellow jail detainees testified about statements that Grussing
made while in custody awaiting trial. T.G. testified that Grussing said that he killed K.R.
by cutting his throat with a fillet knife. T.G. and Grussing talked about the murder “[w]ell
over ten different times.” Grussing did not show remorse and was us ually laughing when
he talked about the murder.
R.G. testified that Grussing said that he killed K.R. and that K.R. was dead at 5:30.
Grussing said that he used a knife to give K.R. “an extra smile.” When talking about the
murder, Grussing showed no remorse and “was just really happy go lucky.”
The jury found Grussing guilty as charged. This appeal followed sentencing.
D E C I S I O N
We need not decide whether the district court erred in admitting the prior
convictions because, to obtain a new tria l based on an erroneous evidentiary ruling, the
appellant must show both that the district court erred and that the error was prejudicial.
State v. Griffin, 846 N.W.2d 93, 103 (Minn. App. 2014) , review denied (Minn. Aug. 5,
2014). Even if the district co urt erred in admitting the prior convictions, Grussing has
failed to show that the error was prejudicial.
An error is prejudicial if a rea sonable possibility exists “that the evidence
significantly affected the verdict,” or , as otherwise stated, a reasonab le possibility exists
“that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant without the evidence.”
Id. “To determine whether the error warrants a new trial, we consider the manner in which
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the evidence was presented, whether it was highly per suasive, whether it was used in
closing argument, and whether the def ense effectively countered it.” Id. (quotation
omitted). Although the court cannot focus only on evidence of guilt, overwhelming
evidence of guilt is often a very important factor when determining whether the erroneous
admission of evidence was prejudicial. Townsend v. State, 646 N.W.2d 218, 224 (Minn.
2002) (applying harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard).
The only disputed issues in the case were intent and self -defense, and Grussing’s
numerous statements to police officers and others showed that he intentionally slit K.R.’s
throat and contradicted his claim of self-defense. Grussing repeatedly told the officers who
responded to the 911 call and K.B. that he stabbed K.R. in the throat and slit K.R.’s throat.
He then said that he hoped K.R. died. At the jail, Grussing asked if he murdered K.R. and
bragged about killing him. Grussing talked to one jail detainee about the murder more than
ten times, saying that he killed K.R. by cutting his throat with a fillet knife. Grussing told
another jail detainee that K.R. was dead at 5:30 and that he used a knife to give K.R. “an
extra smile.” With both detainees, Grussing showed no remorse and acted happy about the
murder.
Grussing’s actions after the stabbing are also contrary to his self -defense claim in
that he did not attempt to assist K.R. Although Grussing claimed that he tried to call 911
but the phone did not work, C.A. and B.Z. saw him holding a knife and pursuing K.R. See
State v. Roy , 408 N.W.2d 168, 171-72 (Minn. App. 1987) (concluding that defendant’s
actions after offense were relevant to state of mind), review denied (Minn. July 22, 1987).
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The jury’s verdict was also supported by forensic evidence. Grussing was not
injured, and K.R. had no defensive injuries. On the left side of K.R.’s neck, the muscles
were cut all the way through, which required some force and effort by Grussing.
In addition to the overwhelming evidence of guilt, other factors indicate that any
error in admitting the prior convictions was harmless. Admitting the prior convictions did
not prevent Grussing from testifying. See State v. Davis, 735 N.W.2d 674, 680-81 (Minn.
2007) (noting that admission of prior convictions did not prevent defendant from testifying,
thereby reducing potential prejudice). Grussing testified that he was convicted of felony
offenses in 2006 and 2008 and of failure to register as a predatory offender/providing false
information in 2005. Immediately after Grussing testified about the prior convictions, the
district court instructed the jury that the evidence could only be used in assessing
Grussing’s credibility and not as evidence of character or conduct. See Griffin, 846 N.W.2d
at 104-05 (concluding that any error i n admitting evidence of prior convictions was not
prejudicial when defense counsel did not draw attention to the fact that one felony was
unspecified and two were specified, the state did not specifically inquire about the prior
convictions during cross-examination or refer to them in closing argument, and the district
court gave a limiting instruction); see also State v. Ridley , 776 N.W.2d 419, 428 (Minn.
2009) (stating that a jury is presumed to follow a court’s cautionary instruction). Also, the
evidence of the prior convictions was not hig hlighted, the district court sustained an
objection to a cross -examination question about the county where the failure -to-
register/providing-false-information occurred, and the prosecutor briefly mentioned during
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closing argument that the jury could consider the prior convictions in deter mining
Grussing’s credibility.
We conclude that no reasonable possibility exists that the evidence of Grussing’s
prior felony convictions significantly affected the jury’s verdict.
Grussing argues that the more stringent harmless -beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard should be applied to evaluate prejudice. “When [an evidentiary] error implicates
a constitutional right, a new trial is required unless the State can show beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error was harmless.” State v. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d 883, 887 (Minn. 2009).
Grussing’s argument that the admission of the prior convictions violated his constitutional
due-process right to a fair trial is not persuasive. Cf. State v. Swinger , 800 N.W.2d 833,
838 (Minn. App. 2011) (applying reasonable -possibility standard to erroneous admission
of prior convictions).
Affirmed.