State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1055

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Shannon Michael Benson,
Appellant.

Filed May 30, 2017
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Meeker County District Court
File No. 47-CR-15-488

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Karen B. McGillic, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Ap pellate Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Pres iding Judge; Larkin , Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his felony domestic assault (harm) conviction on the ground
that the district court plainly erred by ad mitting evidence of a prior domestic conduct
incident under Minnesota Statutes section 634.20 (2014) because th e evidence contained

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reference to appellant’s assault of an individual who was not a family or household member
under Minnesota Statutes section 518B.01, subdivision 2(b) (2014). Assuming without
deciding that there was an erro r and that the error was plain, we conclude that appellant
has not established that his substantial rights were affected under the three-pronged plain-
error test and we therefore affirm.
D E C I S I O N
This appeal arises out of appellant Shannon Michael Benson’s conviction of felony
domestic assault (harm) against his wife, K.B. At appellant’s jury trial, the state presented
evidence that during the course of an argument in their apartment, appellant chased K.B.
into the bathroom, pushed her to the floor, th reatened to kill her, bi t her, and choked her
until she had difficulty breathing. During trial, the district court permitted the state to
introduce section 634.20 relationship eviden ce of two prior convictions of qualified
domestic violence-related offenses, without obj ection or redaction. The jury convicted
appellant of domestic assault (harm), and the district court imposed a sentence of 28 months
in prison.
The state’s relationship evidence included a complaint and a guilty-plea petition to
prove appellant’s May 2010 conviction of vi olating a domestic abuse no-contact order
(DANCO) against his then-wife, B.J.L.F. The complaint alleges that appellant confronted
B.J.L.F. while she was walking with a male friend, W.L.S. The complaint also alleges that
appellant got into a “verbal argument” with W.L.S., during which appellant “told W.L.S.
that he was going to get a knife and stab him.” The complaint includes charges of a
DANCO violation as to K.B. and fifth-degree assault as to W.L.S. The plea petition shows

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appellant’s plea of guilty to the DANCO viola tion, and to fifth-degree assault against
W.L.S.
Appellant argues that the district court erred in admitting the complaint and the plea
petition as evidence of the DANCO violation because the documents referenced appellant’s
assault of W.L.S., who was neither a family nor a household memb er, as required for
purposes of admitting section 634.20 relationship evidence. See Minn. Stat. §§ 518B.01,
subd. 2(b) (defining “[f]amily or household members”), 634.20 (providing that “[e]vidence
of domestic conduct by the accused against the victim of domestic conduct, or against other
family or household members,” may be admissibl e). Because appellant did not raise this
objection at trial, we review the matter for plain error. See State v. Griller , 583 N.W.2d
736, 740 (Minn. 1998) (explaining that appellate courts have the discretion to consider an
unobjected-to error on appeal if it is a plain error affecting substantial rights). Under the
plain-error test, appellant must show (1) an e rror, (2) that was plain, and (3) that affected
appellant’s “substantial rights.” State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 805 (Minn. 2012). If all
three prongs of plain-error review are satisfi ed, a reviewing court may decide whether to
address the error to ensure “fairness and th e integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
If we determine upon review that any one of the three prongs of the plain-error test
is not satisfied, we need not ad dress the remaining elements. Montanaro v. State , 802
N.W.2d 726, 732 (Minn. 2011). Here, we conclude that appe llant failed to establish that
the alleged error affected his substantial rights. “[A]n error affects a defendant’s
substantial rights if there is a reasonable likelihood that the error had a ‘significant effect’

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on the verdict.” State v. Finch , 865 N.W.2d 696, 703 (Minn. 2015) (quoting State v.
Sontoya, 788 N.W.2d 868, 873 (Mi nn. 2010)). Appellant bear s a “heavy burden” of
proving prejudice. State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Minn. 2015), cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 595 (2015) (quotation omitted).
Appellant cannot satisfy this burden. K.B. testified that appellant chased her into
the apartment bathroom, pushe d her to the ground, bit he r, choked her until she had
difficulty breathing, and threatened to kill her. The apartment manager and his girlfriend,
who lived in the apartment below appellant and K.B., heard K.B. yell for help and scream
that appellant was trying to kill her. The ap artment manager called 911 and then entered
appellant and K.B.’s apartment. Upon en tering the apartment, the apartment manager
found appellant crouched over K.B. with his hands around her neck. The responding police
officers found K.B. sitting on the bathroom floor, unclothed and “distraught,” with bruises
and bite marks on her neck that were consiste nt with the report that appellant choked and
bit K.B. The jury found the testimony of these witnesses cr edible, and we defer to the
jury’s credibility determinations. See State v. Buckingham , 772 N.W.2d 64, 71 (Minn.
2009) (“[D]etermining the credibility or reliability of a witness lies with the jury alone.”).
The district court further minimized any potential prejudice to appellant by
providing a cautionary in struction to the jury prior to the state’ s elicitation of the
relationship evidence, and again before deliber ations. A limiting instruction to the jury
mitigates the potential for unfair prejudice, see State v. Kennedy , 585 N.W.2d 385, 392
(Minn. 1998), and we assume that jurors follow the district court’s instructions, State v.
Ferguson, 581 N.W.2d 824, 833 (Min n. 1998). During its case-in-chief, the state

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introduced evidence of appellant’s prior qua lified domestic violence-related offenses,
including the DANCO violation through a police officer. Prior to the officer’s testimony
on this point, the district court instructed the jury:
This evidence is being offere d for the limited purpose of
demonstrating the nature and extent of the relationship
between the defendant and other household members in order
to assist you in determining whether the defendant committed
those acts with which the defendant is charged in the
complaint.

The defendant is not being tried for and may not be
convicted of any behavior othe r than the charged offenses.
You are not to convict the defendant on the basis of conduct on
[the dates of appellant’s prior qualified domestic violence-
related offenses]. To do so might result in unjust double
punishment.

Following the close of eviden ce and prior to deliberations , the district court again
cautioned the jury:
As I told you . . . at the time th[e relationship] evidence was
offered, it was admitted fo r the limited purpose of
demonstrating the nature and extent of the relationship
between the defendant and other household members in order
to assist you in determining . . . whether the defendant
committed these acts with which the defendant is charged in
the complaint.

The defendant is not being tried for . . . and may not be
convicted of any behavior other than the charged offense. You
are not to convict the defendant on the basis of similar conduct
[because] [t]o do so might result in unjust double punishment.

The district court’s cautionary instructions “lessened the probability of undue weight being
given by the jury to the evidence.” State v. Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d 752, 757 (Minn. App.
2008) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2008).

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Given the strength of the state’s evidence as a whole and the presumption that the
district court’s cautionary jury instructions reduced any potential prejudice, we conclude
that the error, if any, did not affect appellant’s substantial rights. See, e.g., State v. Mosley,
853 N.W.2d 789, 801 (Minn. 2014) (deter mining that no relief was warranted where
defendant’s substantial rights were not affected, even upon an assumption of plain error);
State v. Spann , 574 N.W.2d 47, 53 (Min n. 1998) (concluding that district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial ab sent a showing that there was a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would be different ab sent a discovery violation).
Because appellant’s substantial rights were not affected, we need not consider whether to
address the matter to ensure the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings. See State
v. Morton, 701 N.W.2d 225, 234 (Minn. 2005) (“On ly if the three prongs of [the plain-
error test] are satisfied will we assess whether we should address the error to ensure fairness
and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.”).
In sum, we conclude that appellant faile d to satisfy the three-pronged plain-error
test and the district court did not commit reversible error.
Affirmed.