Bethany Good, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1085

Bethany Good,
Appellant,

vs.

John Doe,
Defendant,

Paul Christy,
Respondent.

Filed March 6, 2017
Affirmed
Cleary, Chief Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-15-12027

Katie J. Christiansen, Michael J. Brose, Doar, Drill & Skow, S.C., New Richmond,
Wisconsin (for appellant)

Tania K. Lex, Godfrey & Fox, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CLEARY, Chief Judge
Appellant Bethany Good appeals from th e entry of judgment, arguing that the
district court erred by (1) refusing to consid er Michael Christy’s statement in reaching its
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summary-judgment decision, (2) granting summary judgment in favor of respondent Paul
Christy, and (3) refusing to permit her to file a motion to reconsider. Because we conclude
that the district court did not err, we affirm.
FACTS
On November 22, 2008, Good drove her vehicle near the Mall of America in
Bloomington. She slowed for traffic and was rear-ended by a vehicle. On November 21,
2014, Good provided a summons and complaint to the Hennepin County Sheriff for service
on Paul Christy. In her complaint, Good alleged that John Doe, a person then unknown to
her, drove negligently and rear-ended her vehicl e in 2008. She also alleged that Paul
Christy was vicariously liable for John Doe’ s negligence, because he owned the vehicle
involved in the collision and permitted John Doe to drive it.
Paul Christy has consistently denied that he owned the vehicle involved in the 2008
collision at the time the accident occurred. In the answer to Good’s complaint, Paul Christy
denied that he owned the vehi cle involved in the collision. In his response to Good’s
interrogatories, Paul Christy stated that, to the best of his knowledge, he did not own any
vehicle involved in the collision and believed that his son, Michael Christy, may have been
the driver and owner of the vehicle allegedly involved in the accident.
On January 22, 2016, Paul Christy m oved for summary judgment and filed a
memorandum supporting his motion. In his me morandum, Paul Christy asserted that, to
the best of his knowledge, Michael Christy wa s potentially involved in the accident and
was driving a vehicle that he owned exclusivel y. Paul Christy argued that Good failed to
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to an essential element of her vicarious liability
3
claim, because she did not pro duce sufficient evidence to sh ow that Paul Christy owned
the vehicle involved in the 2008 collision. In support of his motion, Paul Christy attached
a number of exhibits. Among them was a doc ument listing Michael Christy as the owner
of a particular white 1993 “Cadi.” However, the document failed to show the date on which
Michael Christy gained title to the vehicle.
In February 2016, Paul Christy was depose d and testified as follows. He believed
that a white 1993 Cadillac DeVille was involved in the 2008 collision. He owned a green
1994 Cadillac Concours and transferred the 1993 Cadillac to his son, Michael Christy. To
the best of his recollection, the 1993 Cadilla c was transferred to Michael Christy before
November 22, 2008, but he “can’t say for sure .” The 1993 Cadilla c was junked shortly
after the incident.
On February 16, 2016, Good filed a memorandum in op position to Paul Christy’s
summary-judgment motion, arguing that there remained material fact questions as to which
vehicle was involved in the co llision and who owned the vehicl e. She argued that Paul
Christy’s assertion that the white 1993 Ca dillac was involved in the collision conflicted
with evidence showing that the green 1994 Cadillac was involved. Good attached several
exhibits to her memorandum, including a stat ement that Michael Ch risty gave to Paul
Christy’s insurance company in September 2010 and an InstaVIN report. In his September
2010 statement, Michael Christy stated th at a 1994 Cadillac owned by his father was
involved in the 2008 accident. The InstaVIN report disclaimed InstaVIN’s responsibility
for errors in the report and explained that InstaVIN’s reports rely on third-party data
suppliers and other sources. The report showed that a 1993 Cadillac with a VIN matching
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that of the Cadillac that Michael Christy purportedly owned was junked on July 10, 2008.
Good argued that even if Michael Christy owned the 1993 Cadillac on November 22, 2008,
this could not have been the vehicle involved in the collision, because it had earlier been
destroyed and was incapable of being driven. Good asserted that summary judgment was
inappropriate because disputed issues of material fact rema ined as to whether the 1994
Cadillac owned by Paul Christy was involved in the accident. Good additionally argued
that, even if the 1993 Cadillac was involved in the collision, there remained disputed issues
of material fact as to whether Paul Christ y owned the 1993 Cadillac at the time of the
accident.
On May 9, 2016, the district court gran ted summary judgment in favor of Paul
Christy. Good now argues that the district court erred by refusing to consider Michael
Christy’s statement in reaching its summary-judgment decision, by granting Paul Christy’s
motion for summary judgment, and by refusing to allow her to file a motion to reconsider.
D E C I S I O N
I. Admissibility of Statement
The district court concluded that Good could not rely on Michael Christy’s unsworn
statement to avoid summary judgment becaus e it is inadmissible hearsay. Good argues
that the statement is admissible and that the district court erred by refusing to consider it.
Paul Christy argues that the district court pr operly excluded the st atement as hearsay not
subject to any exception. He also asserts that the statement is inadmissible because it was
unsworn and lacked foundation to establish its reliability.
5
Appellate courts review evidentiary rulings on hearsay statements for clear abuse of
discretion. State v. Burrell, 772 N.W.2d 459, 469 (Minn. 2009); Citizens for a Safe Grant
v. Loan Oak Sportsmen’s Club, Inc., 624 N.W.2d 796, 808 (Minn. App. 2001). “Appellant
bears the burden of demonstrating that an improper evidentiary ruling caused prejudicial
error.” Citizens for a Safe Grant, 624 N.W.2d at 808. An ev identiary error is prejudicial
if it might reasonably have changed the result of the trial. Id.
The rules of evidence provide that the co urt shall determine preliminary questions
concerning the admissibility of evidence. Minn. R. Evid . 104(a). In making its
determination, the court “is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect
to privileges.” Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held “that the preponderance of the
evidence standard applies to preliminary questions concerning the admissibility of
evidence.” In re Source Code Evidentiary Hearings, 816 N.W.2d 525, 539 (Minn. 2012).
This standard requires a court to determine that it is more probable that a fact exists than
that the contrary exists, and thereby ensures that a court will have found it more likely than
not that the technical issues and policy concer ns addressed by the rules of evidence have
been afforded due consideration before evidence is admitted. Id. at 538-39.
A. Statement by a Party-opponent
Good argues that Michael Christy’s statem ent is admissible as a statement by a
party-opponent under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 801(d). Under this rule,
A statement is not hearsay if . . . [it] is offered against a party
and is . . . (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party
to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement
by the party’s agent or servant c oncerning a matter within the
scope of agency or employment, made during the existence of
6
the relationship, or (E) a statem ent by a coconspirator of the
party.

Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Good notes that rule 801(d) excludes from hearsay a statement
offered against a party if the statement is by the party’s coconspirator or a person authorized
to make a statement concerning the subject. However, Good presented little argument or
evidence to show that Michael Christy was Paul Christy’s coconspirator or was authorized
by Paul Christy to make a statement concerning the 2008 collision. The district court did
not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit Michael Christy’s statement as a statement by
a coconspirator or authorized person of a party-opponent.
Good additionally asserts that Michael Ch risty’s statement is admissible, because
Michael Christy was Paul Christy’s agent. Michael Christy’s statement is admissible as a
statement by a party-opponent’ s agent only if: (1) Michael Christy was Paul Christy’s
agent; (2) Michael Christy’s stat ement concerns a matter with in the scope of his agency;
and (3) Michael Christy’s statement was ma de during the existence of the agency
relationship. Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). Good argues that Michael Christy was Paul
Christy’s agent under Minn. Stat. § 169.09, subd. 5a (2016), which provides that any person
other than the owner of a vehicle will be deemed an agent of the owner in the case of an
accident if such person operates the vehicle with the consent of the owner.
Good concedes that “if Paul Christy did not own the vehicle at the time of the
accident, the statement may not be admissib le against Paul as a party admission.”
However, she argues that the district court should have considered Michael Christy’s
statement, because it was required to resolve the fact dispute as to ownership in her favor
7
at the summary-judgment stage. Good fails to differentiate between the district court’s
ruling on the admissibility of evidence and its ruling on the summary-judgment motion.
A district court is required to construe th e evidence in the light most favorable to
the party opposing summary judgment when determining whether there is a genuine issue
of material fact. J.E.B. v. Danks, 785 N.W.2d 741, 747 (Minn. 2010). However, a district
court applies a preponderance of the evidence standard when determining preliminary
questions regarding evidence admissibility. In re Source Code , 816 N.W.2d at 539. To
determine whether Michael Christy’s statement was admissible as a statement made by the
agent of a party-opponent, the district court was required to determine whether Paul Christy
owned the car involved in the 2008 collision at th e time of the accident. In doing so, the
court was permitted to consider Michael Christy’s statement. See Minn. R. Evid. 104(a)
(providing that a court is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to
privileges when determining preliminary questions concerning evidence admissibility).
When the district court was considering the summary-judgment motion, the record
contained the following evidence related to the ownership of the vehicle involved in the
collision: (1) Paul Christy’s response to interrogatories, stating that Michael Christy may
have been the driver and owner of the vehicle allegedly involved in the collision; (2) Paul
Christy’s deposition testimony, stating that, to the best of his recollection, the 1993
Cadillac was transferred to Michael Christy before November 22, 2008, but he “can’t say
for sure”; (3) a driver and vehicle services record indicating that the 1993 Cadillac was
owned by Michael Christy at some point; (4 ) Michael Christy’s 2010 unsworn statement,
in which he stated that the vehicle involve d was a 1994 Cadillac owne d by Paul Christy;
8
and (5) an InstaVIN report, stating that the 1993 Cadillac was junked on July 10, 2008, but
not identifying the owner.
After reviewing the evidence, we cannot sa y that the district court abused its
discretion by concluding that Good failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
Paul Christy owned the vehicle involved in the collision when the accident occurred. For
this reason, the district cour t did not commit an abuse of di scretion by refusing to admit
Michael Christy’s statement as a statement by an agent of a party-opponent.
B. Recorded Recollection
Good next argues that Michael Christy’s statement is admissible as a recorded
recollection. The recorded-recollection exception provides that a record may be read into
evidence if it: (1) concerns a matter about which a witness once had knowledge but now
has insufficient recollection to testify fully and accurately; (2) was shown to have been
made or adopted by the witness when the ma tter was fresh in the witness’s memory; and
(3) was shown to reflect that knowledge correctly. Minn. R. Evid. 803(5). Good admits
that “a recorded recollection would not be admissible without first obtaining the testimony
of Michael Christy,” but argues that Michael Christy’s deposition testimony authenticates
his 2010 statement as a recorded recollectio n. However, Michael Christy’s deposition
testimony was obtained after the summary-judgm ent hearing and only three days before
the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
Even if we consider Michael Christy’s deposition testimony, we cannot say that the
district court abused its discretion by refu sing to admit his statement as a recorded
recollection. Because the statement was made in September 2010, nearly two years after
9
the collision occurred, the matter discussed was not then fresh in Michael Christy’s mind.
It is also unclear whether Michael Christy would be unable to testify from his present
recollection. Michael Christy testified in his deposition that he could “remember that day
of the incident with her clear as day” and that his memory was just as good at his deposition
as when he made his 2010 statement. For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by refusing to admit Michael Christy’s statement as a recorded recollection.
C. Record of a Regularly Conducted Business Activity
Good also argues that Michael Christy’s st atement is admissible as a record of a
regularly conducted business activity. A record is not hearsay if: (1) the record is made at
or near the time by a person w ith knowledge or from information transmitted by a person
with knowledge; (2) the record is kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity; and (3) it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the record.
Minn. R. Evid. 803(6). Beca use Michael Christy’s statement was made nearly two years
after the collision, it was not made at or near the time of the event. For this reason, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit the statement as a record of
a regularly conducted business activity.
D. Prior Inconsistent Statement
Finally, Good argues that Michael Christy’s statement would have been admissible
at trial as a prior inconsistent statement. An appellate court need not address issues omitted
from an appellant’s principal brief. Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860,
887 (Minn. 2010). Because Good failed to ar gue that Michael Christy’s statement was
admissible as a prior inconsistent statement in her principal brief, we are not compelled to
10
address the issue. Even if we were to deci de this issue on the merits, we would reject
Good’s argument. “A statement not given under oath is not admissible substantively, but
may be admitted under Rule 607 for impeachment purposes.” State v. Thames, 599 N.W.2d
122, 125 (Minn. 1999); see Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) (requi ring the prior inconsistent
statement of a witness to be made under oa th to be excluded from the hearsay rule).
Because Michael Christy’s statement was unsworn, it is clearl y inadmissible for
substantive purposes.
Good argues that the statement would nonetheless have been admissible at trial. She
asserts that Michael Christy would have been called to testify at trial and would have either
testified consistently or inconsistently with his 2010 statement. If he testified consistently
with his 2010 statement, that testimony would constitute admissible evidence that a 1994
Cadillac owned by his father was involved in th e accident. If he testified inconsistently
with his 2010 statement, the statement would be admi ssible for the purpose of
impeachment. Using this logic, any unsworn statement by a witness would necessarily be
admissible, because the witness could be called at trial and would either testify consistently
or inconsistently with his or her prior statement. Becaus e such a result does not accord
with our evidentiary rules, we are unpersuaded by Good’s argument.
E. Conclusion
The district court did not abuse its disc retion by holding that Michael Christy’s
statement was inadmissible hearsay. “When deciding any summary-judgment motion, the
district court must disregard hearsay eviden ce that would be inadmissible at trial.” In re
Trusts A & B of Divine, 672 N.W.2d 912, 921 (Minn. App. 2004). The court properly held
11
that Good could not rely on Michael Christy’s statement to avoid summary judgment.
Because we conclude that the statement was inadmissible hearsay, we do not r each Paul
Christy’s arguments that the statement is inadmissible because it was unsworn and because
it lacked foundation to establish its reliability.
II. Summary Judgment
Appellate courts review a district cour t’s summary-judgment decision de novo.
Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010).
In our review, we must “determine (1) if there are genuine issues of material fact and (2) if
the district court erred in its application of the law.” Osborne v. Twin Town Bowl, Inc. ,
749 N.W.2d 367, 371 (Minn. 20 08). In this review, we “mus t view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted.” Fabio v. Bellomo,
504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993).
A. Genuine Issue of Material Fact
To avoid summary judgment, a party must show more than “some metaphysical
doubt as to a factual issue.” Bob Useldinger & Sons, Inc. v. Hangsleben, 505 N.W.2d 323,
328 (Minn. 1993). Where a “movant has supp orted the [summary-judgment] motion, . . .
the opponent must show that a material is sue of fact remains in dispute by presenting
specific admissible facts giving rise to a factual question.” Bixler by Bixler v. J.C. Penney
Co., 376 N.W.2d 209, 215 (Minn. 1985) (emphasis added). The opponent may not rely on
general statements contained in the pleadings or upon surmise or speculation as to what
could be produced at trial. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.05; Bixler, 376 N.W.2d at 215. Rather, the
opponent must point to specifi c facts from which the factfinde r might return a verdict in
12
that party’s favor. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.05; Sackett v. Storm, 480 N.W.2d 377, 379 (Minn.
App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Mar. 26, 1992).
The district court determined that Good would ultimately be required to prove that
Paul Christy owned the vehicle involved in th e 2008 accident as an element of her claim
and concluded that Good failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Paul Christy owned the vehicle. As a result, the court granted summary judgment in favor
of Paul Christy. Good asserts that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous, because
there were genuine issues of material fact as to which vehicle was involved in the accident
and who owned the vehicle.
“A defendant is entitled to summary judgmen t as a matter of law when the record
reflects a complete lack of proof on an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim.” Lubbers
v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. 1995). Go od alleged that Paul Christy, as the
owner of the vehicle involved in the 2008 collision, was vicariously liable for the negligent
conduct of the person who dr ove that vehicle. In her memorandum opposing summary
judgment, Good supported her claim of vica rious liability by citing Minn. Stat. § 169.09,
subd. 5a. This subdivision provides that “[w]henever any motor vehicle shall be operated
within this state, by any person other than the owner, with the consent of the owner, express
or implied, the operator thereof shall in case of accident, be deemed the agent of the owner
of such motor vehicle in opera tion thereof.” Minn. Stat. § 16 9.09, subd. 5a. The district
court correctly determined that Good was required to prove that Paul Christy owned the
vehicle involved in the collis ion at the time the accident occurred and that summary
13
judgment was appropriate if the record reflected a complete lack of proof that Paul Christy
owned the vehicle at the time of the accident.
The district court properly held that Good could not rely on Michael Christy’s
statement to defeat the summary-judgment motion. Good argues that even without Michael
Christy’s statement, issues of material fact were raised by Paul Christy’s answers to
interrogatories and deposition.
By interrogatory, Good asked Paul Christy to state whether there were any insurance
policies that might afford coverage to him with respect to her cause of action. Paul Christy
provided a policy numb er issued by Illinois Farmers In surance Company. Good argues
that this insurance policy covered the green 1994 Cadillac and that Paul Christy impliedly
disclosed that the 1994 Cadillac was involved in the 2008 collision. Good’s interrogatories
did not identify the relevant vehicle, but rather referred to it as “the vehicle involved in the
incident.” Because it is unclear from the record whether this policy provides coverage for
the 1994 Cadillac, Paul Christ y’s answers to Good’s interroga tories do not show that the
1994 Cadillac was involved in the collision or that Paul Christy owned the vehicle involved
in the collision.
Good next argues that Paul Christy conceded in his deposition that he could not be
sure if he still owned the 1993 Cadillac when the 2008 collision occurred. Good correctly
notes that Paul Christy could not recall the exact date on which he transferred title of the
1993 Cadillac to Michael Christy. However, Paul Christy testified that, to the best of his
recollection, the title was transferred before November 22, 2008, the date of the collision.
14
Paul Christy’s deposition testimony does not s how that Paul Christy owned the vehicle
involved in the collision at the time of the accident.
From this record,1 we conclude that Paul Christy was entitled to summary judgment.
Good merely raised a metaphysical doubt as to whether Paul Christy owned the vehicle
involved in the collision at the time of the accident. Because a party must show more than
some metaphysical doubt as to a factual issue to avoid summary judgment, the district court
properly held that Good failed to raise an issue of material fact as to whether Paul Christy
owned the vehicle.
B. Application of Law
In its order granting summary judgment, the district court stated that “[n]either side
has presented uncontroverted evidence of who owned the car at the time of the accident.”
Good argues that this statement shows that the district court applied an erroneous standard.
To avoid summary judgment, Good was not re quired to present uncontroverted evidence
that Paul Christy owned the ve hicle involved in the collision at the time of the accident.
Rather, she was required to pr esent sufficient admissible evid ence to raise an issue of
material fact as to whether Paul Christy owned the vehicle. See Bixler, 376 N.W.2d at 215
(explaining that a party opposing summary judgment must presen t admissible evidence
showing that a material factual dispute remain s). Considered in th e context of the entire

1 The record also included an InstaVIN report that purpor tedly showed that the 1993
Cadillac was junked on July 10, 2008. The district court determined that this report, by its
own warning, was questionabl e and concluded that it was inadmissible. Because Good
does not challenge the exclusion of the Inst aVIN report, we do not consider it in our
summary-judgment analysis. See Bixler, 376 N.W.2d at 215 (p roviding that a party
opposing summary judgment must present admissible facts giving rise to a fact question).
15
order, the district court’s statement means onl y that neither Good nor Paul Christy could
conclusively show who owned the vehicle at the relevant time. While the statement might
be confusing when taken out of context, the di strict court’s order, as a whole, shows that
the district court properly applied the law. The district cour t determined that Good could
not establish Paul Christy’s liability if sh e could not show that he owned the vehicle
involved in the collision at th e time of the accident. The co urt correctly stated that the
question to be determined was whether there was a genuine issue of material fact related
to whether Paul Christy owned the vehicle. We conclude that the district court did not err
in its application of the law.
C. Premature Ruling
Good argues that she was forced to respond to the summary-judgment motion
without a complete record and that the district court erred by granting summary judgment
when outstanding factual issues remained. We construe this argument as an assertion that
the district court awarded summary judgment prematurely because Good should have been
permitted to conduct additional discovery. We apply an abus e-of-discretion standard to
this issue. Molde v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 781 N.W.2d 36, 45 (Minn. App. 2010).
A party against whom a claim is asserted “may, at any time, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party’s favor.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.02.
A party opposing summary judgment may file an affidavit requesting that the district court
deny or continue the motion on the grounds that the non-moving party should be permitted
to conduct additional discovery. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.06; Molde, 781 N.W.2d. at 45. “An
affidavit filed pursuant to rule 56.06 must be specific about the evidence expected, the
16
source of the discovery necessary to obtain the evidence, and the reasons for the failure to
complete discovery to date.” Molde, 781 N.W.2d at 45 (quotation omitted). “[F]ailure to
submit such an affidavit, by itself, justifies the district court’s decision to rule on the motion
without granting relief under 56.06.” Id. At the summary-judgment hearing, Good’s
counsel argued that the motion was prematur e, because Good had not yet taken Michael
Christy’s deposition. However, Good failed to comply with rule 56.06 by filing an affidavit
describing how additional discovery would allow her to submit additional evidence to the
district court. For this reason, the district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling on
Paul Christy’s summary-judgment motion.
D. Conclusion
Here, Good failed to raise a genuine issue as to the ownership of the vehicle, and
the district court properly applied the law. For these reasons, the district court did not err
by granting summary judgment in favor of Paul Christy.
III. Motion for Reconsideration
Finally, Good argues that the district court erred by refusing to grant her request to
file a motion to reconsider. “Motions to reconsider are prohibited except by express
permission of the court, which will be gr anted only upon a showing of compelling
circumstances.” Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 115.11. Good argues that this court, in an
unpublished opinion, upheld a district court’s grant of a mo tion to reconsider where the
requesting party subm itted additional documen ts and where reconsideration caused no
prejudice to the other party. See Finn v. Walworth State Bank , No. A11-2334, 2013 WL
6389521, at *8-9 (Minn. App. Dec. 9, 2013), review denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 2014).
17
Unpublished opinions are not precedential, but may be persuasive. Minn. Stat. § 480A.08,
subd. 3(c) (2016); Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch , 502 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn. App. 1993).
Because Good fails to recogn ize the difference between challenging a district court’s
decision on a request to file a motion to re consider and challenging a district court’s
ultimate decision on such a motion, her c itation to our unpublished opinion is not
persuasive.
In Baker v. Amtrak Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. , this court held that the denial of a
request to make a motion to reconsider is not appealable. 588 N.W.2d 749, 755-56 (Minn.
App. 1999). We explained that “Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03 permits appeals only from
specified judgments and orders” 2 and determined that the only provision in this rule that
was not explicitly inapplicable to the denial of a request “is clause (e), which permits an
appeal ‘from an order which, in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment from
which an appeal might be taken.’” Id. at 755 (quoting Minn. R. Ci v. App. P. 103.03(e)).
Because the district court’s denial of the re quest to bring a motion to reconsider neither
determined Baker’s action nor prevented a judgment from which Baker could appeal, we
concluded that Baker could not appeal the denial of the request. Id.
The district court’s denial of Good’s reques t to file a motion to reconsider is not
appealable. Clause (e) is th e only provision in Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03 that is
potentially applicable to the denial of Good’ s request. Here, the denial of the request
neither determined the action nor prevented a judgment from which an appeal might be

2 In Baker, we declined to deny review simply because the district court responded to the
request by letter rather than by order. 588 N.W.2d at 755.
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taken. Good made the request after the action had been determined and judgment had been
entered. No further action by the district court was needed to pe rmit Good to take an
appeal. Because no provision of Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103. 03 applies to the denial of
Good’s request, the denial is not appealable.
Affirmed.