In re the Arbitration of: Katie Altenburg o/b/o Ian Altenburg, claimant, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1092

In re the Arbitration of:
Katie Altenburg o/b/o Ian Altenburg, claimant,
Respondent,

vs.

AAA Insurance Company,
Appellant.

Filed April 10, 2017
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-15-5793

James S. Ballentine, Alicia N. Sieben, Schwebel Goetz & Sieben, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Michael W. Lowden, Shari L. Lowden, The Lowden Law Firm, LLC, Minnetonka,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant insurer challenges the district court’s order confirming a no -fault
arbitration award in favor of respondent, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded her authority

2
and displayed evident partiality by awarding outstanding medical expenses. Appellant also
asserts that the district court erred by awarding respondent attorney fees. And a ppellant
contends that the statutory requirement for mandatory and binding arbitration of claims for
$10,000 or less, pursuant to the Minnesota No -Fault Automobile Insurance Act (no-fault
act), is unconstitutional because it deprives a party of its right to a jury trial, divests the
district court of its original jurisdiction, and violates procedural due process. We affirm.
FACTS
In December 2014, respondent Ian Altenburg suffered injuries in a motor vehicle
accident. Following the accident , he sought chiropractic treatment for his injuries.
Appellant AAA Insurance Company paid no-fault benefits to Altenburg or on his behalf
for approximately four months. Based on the results of an independent medical
examination conducted in March 2015, AAA no tified Altenburg by letter of its intent to
terminate and deny any future benefits. The letter further advised him of his right to
arbitrate, stating “[i]f you disagree with our decision, you have our permission to arbitrate
if the amount in dispute as of the time of filing is $10,000.00 or less, if over $10,000.00,
we do not agree to arbitrate.” The letter was consistent with the terms of Altenburg’s
insurance policy, which provided “[i]f you and we do not agree on your right to receive
Benefits involving an amount of $10,000 or less, the dispute will be settled by arbitration
according to the Rules of Procedure for Arbitration of No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act
Claims.”
While Altenburg continued treatment, he filed a petition for no -fault arbitration to
the American Arbitration Association, seeking recovery of medical expenses in the amount

3
of $3,358.33. The American Arbitration Asso ciation provided the parties with a list of
possible arbitrators , which led to an arbitrator being appointed . Prior to a scheduled
hearing, the arbitrator disclosed that she had prior and current clients who had claims
against AAA. Neither party object ed to the arbitrator’s appointment. The arbitrator
conducted a hearing and ultimately awarded $3,438.24 in medical ex penses, interest, and
fees to Altenburg.
AAA moved the district court to vacate the arbitrator’s award on the grounds that
the arbitrator acted with evident partiali ty and exceeded her authority. AAA also sought
declaratory relief asserting that the no-fault act’s requirement of mandatory and binding
arbitration, under Minn. Stat. § 65B.525, subd. 1 (2016), is unconstitutional because it
violates a party’s right to a jury trial and procedural due process and divests the district
court of its original jurisdiction.
The district court denied AAA’s motion, determining that the record did not set forth
any facts demonstrating that the arbitr ator either exhibited evident partiality or exceeded
her authority. The district court also concluded that AAA failed to meet its burden to prove
that the no-fault act is unconstitutional on any of the three challenged grounds. And the
district court con firmed the arbitration award, entered judgment, and awarded Altenburg
attorney fees. AAA appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I.
AAA contends that the arbitration award should be vacated because the arbitrator
acted with evident partiality and exceeded her authority in making the award. A court may

4
vacate an arbitration award upon proof of one of the grounds enumerated in Minn. Stat.
§ 572B.23 (2016). See AFSCME Council 96 v. Arrowhead Reg’l Corr. Bd. , 356 N.W.2d
295, 299 (Minn. 1984). Two possible ground s for vacating an award occur when the
neutral arbitrator’s conduct demonstrates evident partiality or when the arbitrator exceeds
his or her powers. Minn. Stat. § 572B.23(a)(2), (4). The scope of our review of a no-fault
arbitration award is extremely narrow, and we must exercise every reasonable presumption
favoring the award’s finality and validity. State, Office of State Auditor v. Minn. Ass’n of
Prof’l Emps., 504 N.W.2d 751, 754 -55 (Minn. 1993). When we review an arbitration
award, we review legal questions de novo. Garlyn, Inc. v. Auto -Owners Ins. Co. , 814
N.W.2d 709, 712 (Minn. App. 2012). But the arbitrator’s findings of fact are conclusive.
Id.
A. Evident Partiality
AAA argues that the arbitrator showed evident partiality in her decision to award
medical expenses relating to Altenburg’s treatment for an elbow injury. A party
challenging an arbitration award on the basis of evident partiality must establish facts that
create a reasonable impression of partiality. Pirsig v. Pleasant Mound Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
512 N.W.2d 342, 343 (Minn. App. 1994). Whether the arbitrator’s conduct amounts to
evident partiality is a question of law that we review de novo. Aaron v. Ill. Farmers Ins.
Grp., 590 N.W.2d 667, 669 (Minn. App. 1999). Evident partiality is broader than actual
bias in that it is not enough to confirm an award if the arbitrator is unbiased; the arbitrator
must also appear to be unbiased. Pirsig, 512 N.W.2d at 344. Therefore, evident partiality

5
generally occurs if the arbitrator has contacts with a party that create at least an impression
of possible bias. Aaron, 590 N.W.2d at 669.
This record does not present any indication that the arbitrator acted with evident
partiality in making the award decision. The parties engaged in a selection process in which
they were able to strike and rank potential arbitrators from a list. After an arbitrator was
selected and accepted the appointment, the American Arbitration Association informed the
parties of their ability to object to the appointment. Neither party objected. Prior to the
arbitration hearing, the arbitrator notified the parties that she would act in good faith and
be fair to both sides. She also stated at the hearing that, although she was familiar with the
parties’ counsel, her role in the arbitration process was to remain neutral and that she would
listen to each party’s arguments. The arbitrator disclose d to the parties that she had prior
and current clients who had claims against AAA. But the fact that an arbitrator or the
arbitrator’s firm represents automobile claimants against an insurer, including the insurer
that is a party to the action, does not itself create a presumption of bias. Minn. R. No-Fault
Arb. 10(b).
Without pointing to any specific examples that would demonstrate the arbitrator’s
appearance of bias, AAA broadly asserts that bias is “a systemic problem for all no -fault
arbitrations.” AAA further alleges that the evidence in the record relating to Altenbur g’s
elbow treatment compels us to conclude that the arbitrator ignored relevant evidence and
“simply rubber-stamped the claim.” But this amounts to a challenge of the arbitrator’s
findings and conclusions rather than an argument regarding evident partiality. While AAA
may disagree with the arbitrator’s award, disapproval does not equate to proof of partiality.

6
Based on the evidence in this record, we conclude that AAA has failed to provide any facts
that demonstrate that the arbitrator’s conduct created an impression of partiality.
B. Exceeding Authority
AAA asserts that the arbitrator exceeded her authority by awarding medical
expenses for massage therapy and related to the diagnosis of a concussion. Although AAA
framed the award of medical expenses related to Altenburg’s elbow injury as
demonstrating evident partiality, its argument appears to also contest the award as
exceeding the arbitrator’s authority. We therefore assess the arbitrator’s authority to award
expenses relating to the massage therapy, the concussion diagnosis, and the elbow injury
in turn. A no -fault arbitrator is “limited to deciding questions of fact, leaving the
interpretation of law to the courts.” Weaver v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 609 N.W.2d 878, 882
(Minn. 2000). Accordingly, an arbitrator has the authority to make factual findings and
evaluate the sufficiency of proof in a no -fault claim. Garlyn, Inc., 814 N.W.2d at 712.
“Absent a clear showing that the arbitrators were unfaithful to their obligations, the courts
assume that the arbitrators did not exceed their authority.” Id. at 712 -13 (quotation
omitted).
First, AAA argues that massage therapy performed independently of chiropractic
treatment is not covered as a medical expense under the no-fault act. A no-fault arbitrator
exceeds her authority if she interprets, rather than applies, the no-fault act . Id. at 712.
Interpretation of statutes and whether a particular expense is covered present questions of
law for the courts. Id. The no-fault act provides that all reasonable medical -expense
benefits shall be reimbursed to an insured person for necessary medical services, including

7
chiropractic services. Minn. Stat. § 65B.44, subd. 2(a)(1) (2016). Minn. Stat. § 148.01
(2016) defines the dif ferent types of chiropractic services. “ Therapeutic services” are
defined as rehabilitative therapy that is “performed within a practice where the primary
focus is the provision of chiropractic services, to prepare the patient for chiropractic
services, or to complement the provision of chiropractic services.” Minn. Stat. § 148.01(6).
“Rehabilitative therapy” is intended to restore an injured patient to maximum functional
improvement and encompasses “massage and the use of forces associated with low voltage
myostimulation.” Minn. R. 2500.0100, subp. 11 (2015).
AAA’s argument with respect to the massages that Altenburg received is based on
the fact that Altenburg’s chiropractor, whose clinic did not provide therapeutic massage
treatment, referred Altenbur g to another chiropractic practice for massage. We do not
agree with AAA’s assertion that such a referral is inconsistent with the plain language of
Minn. Stat. § 148.01(6). The referred clinic’s chart notes illustrate that the clinic was aware
of Altenburg’s accident and that the massage therapy focused particularly on areas of his
body that were injured in the accident. Because the massage therapy is a chiropractic
practice and related to Altenburg’s injuries, we conclude that the arbitrator properly applied
the relevant statutes and rules by incorporating the massage therapy expenses as part of the
award.
Second, AAA asserts that the arbitrator exceeded her authority by awarding medical
expenses based on a chiropractor’s concussion diagnosis in January 2015. This argument
is based on (1) a chiropractor’s report in June 2015, in which the chiropractor does not
diagnose a concussion and (2) a medical doctor’s opinion that “[t]here were no symptoms

8
at the time of [Altenburg’s] injury to suggest that there was [a] concussive element.” But
as previously stated, this court may not review whether the record supports an arbitrator’s
factual findings. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sankey, 605 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Minn. App. 2000),
review denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 2000). The arbitrator’s findings are final. We conclude that
the arbitrator was within her authority in making these findings.
Finally, AAA asserts that the arbitrator disregarded evidence in her decision to
award medical expenses related to Altenburg’s elbow injury. AAA argues that because
Altenburg did not report any issue with his elbow until five months after the accident and
after he resumed playing competitive tennis, the elbow injury must be related to the sport,
not the accident. AAA also claims that the arbitrator ignored expert opinion because the
June 2015 report from Altenburg’s primary chiropractor did not mention the elbow injury
or that it was related to the accident. Again, AAA’s argument amounts to a request that
we determine whether t he arbitrator’s factual findings are consistent with the evidence in
the record. Whether the record supports an arbitrator’s findings is not an issue that we
review. See Sankey, 605 N.W.2d at 413. For these reasons, we conclude that the district
court did not err in confirming the award because the arbitrator did not exceed her authority.
II.
The district court determined that under the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), it
could award attorney fees and other reasonable exp enses incurred during the contested
proceeding to the prevailing party upon the prevailing party’s request . See Minn. Stat.
§ 572B.25(c) (2016). The district court awarded attorney fees in the amount of $1,600 to
Altenburg. AAA claims that the district court lacked a statutory or procedural ground for

9
an attorney-fees award because the no-fault act and Minnesota No-Fault Arbitration Rules
do not provide for such an award. Specifically, AAA asserts that it filed its application to
vacate the award pursuant to Minnesota No-Fault Arbitration Rule 38, which provided that
“[t]he provisions of Minn. Stat. § 572.10 through 572.26 shall apply to the confirmation,
vacation, modification or correction of award issued hereunder.” Altenburg responds that
Minn. Stat. § 572B.25(c), which allows for the award of attorney fees, is the governing
statute because it was in effect at all relevant times.
In 2010, the legislature repealed Minn. Stat. §§ 572.08 -.30 (2010) and enacted the
current version of the UAA. 2010 Mi nn. Laws ch. 264, art. 1, § 32 , at 511. At the time
AAA moved to vacate the arbitration award, rule 38 had not yet been amended to update
the citation to Minn. Stat. § 572B.01-.31 (2016). By the time of the award of attorney fees,
rule 38 had been amended to cite chapter 572B. Because the prior version of rule 38 was
in effect at the time AAA moved to vacate, AAA argues that the prior version of arbitration
statutes (Minn. Stat. §§ 572.10-.26) were preserved and continued to be applicable in this
case. This argument relies on Minn. Stat. § 645.37 (2016), which provides that “[w]hen a
law is repealed and its provisions are at the same time reenacted in the same or substantially
the same terms by the repealing law, the earlier law shall be construed as con tinued in
active operation.” Minn. Stat. §§ 572B.01-.31 has significantly different terms and
provisions than Minn. Stat. §§ 572.08 -.30 and therefore AAA’s reliance on Minn. Stat.
§ 645.37 is misplaced. See 2010 Minn. Laws ch. 264, art. 1, § 1-31, at 499-50.
The UAA clearly provides that all of its provisions, including the allowance of
attorney fees and litigation expenses, govern agreements to arbitrate entered into after

10
August 1, 2011. Minn. Stat. § 572B.03(a)(1). Here, the insurance policy was effective as
of July 2014, nearly three years after the attorney-fees provision became effective. We
therefore conclude that the district court properly applied the effective statute and was
permitted to award attorney fees to Altenburg.
III.
AAA challenges the no-fault-act requirement of mandatory and binding arbitration
for claims of $10,000 or less on the grounds that it is unconstitutional because it violates
its right to a jury trial and procedural due process . AAA also maintains that this no-fault-
act requirement unconstitutionally divests the district court of its original jurisdiction. The
applicable provision of the no-fault act provides:
The Supreme Court and the several courts of general trial
jurisdiction of this state shall by rules of court or other
constitutionally allowable device, provide for the mandatory
submission to binding arbitration of all cases at issue where the
claim at th e commencement of arbitration is in an amount of
$10,000 or less against any insured’s reparation obligor for no-
fault benefits or comprehensive or collision damage coverage.

Minn. Stat. § 65B.525, subd. 1.
Because we recognize a presumption in favor of a statute’s constitutionality, a party
that challenges a statute has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute
is unconstitutional. Neal v. State Farm Ins. Co., 509 N.W.2d 173, 178 (Minn. App. 1993),
rev’d on other grounds, 529 N.W.2d 330 (Minn. 1995). “Great caution must be exercised
before declaring a statute unconstitutional.” Id.
The Minnesota Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial for all cases at law
and provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty , or property without due

11
process of law. Minn. Const. art. I, §§ 4, 7. The constitution also provides that the district
court has original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases. Minn. Const. art. IV, § 3.
AAA contends that mandatory and binding arbitration under Minn. Stat. § 65B.525, subd.
1, which results in the district court having limited review of no -fault arbitration awards,
violates these constitutional provisions. Altenburg counters that because the arbitrator in
this case determined only the amount of loss, not whether AAA is liable, the district court
properly decided that the mandatory and binding arbitration requirement did not deprive
either party of their constitutional rights.
In Neal, we held that mandatory arbitration for no -fault insurance claims does not
violate the constitutional right to a jury trial. 509 N.W.2d at 179. We explained that no-
fault arbitrators decide only issues of fact and that consideration of legal issues remains
with the courts. Id. at 175 (citing Johnson v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 426 N.W.2d 419,
421 (Minn. 1988)). We further stated that because a no -fault arbitrator only decides the
amount of loss (a fact issue) and does not determine the insurance company’s liability (a
legal issue left to the co urts), the statute’s requirement for mandatory arbitration did not
violate the Minnesota Constitution. Id. at 178-79.
Here, the arbitrator’s award determined only the amount of loss and reached no
conclusions as to whether AAA is liable under the insurance policy. Because this case fits
squarely within our analysis in Neal, we conclude that AAA has not fulfilled its burden to
prove that Minn. Stat. § 65B.525, subd. 1, is unconstitutional.
Affirmed.