State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1104

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Shane Douglas Lynch,
Respondent.

Filed March 20, 2017
Reversed and remanded
Schellhas, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-15-1975

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota Co unty Attorney, G. Paul Be aumaster, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for appellant)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appe llate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges the district cour t’s grant of a downward dispositional
sentencing departure, arguing that the district court erred by failing to impose a statutorily
mandated two-year minimum sentence. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
In June 2015, police executed a search warrant at A.R.’s home in Apple Valley,
where respondent Shane Lynch was living. Po lice officers discovered 1,020.61 grams of
methamphetamine in A.R.’s bedroom and 6.85 grams of methamphetamine in the garage.
In the home’s master be droom, police found an ad ditional 8.93 grams of
methamphetamine. Lynch’s personal belongings were found in the master bedroom along
with drug paraphernalia and other controlle d substances. A.R. told police that the
methamphetamine found in his bedroom and the garage was his, but he stated that he had
previously given Lynch nine grams of methamphetamine.
The state charged Lynch with second-degree controlled substance crime in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 2(a)(1) (2 014) (possession). In November 2015, Lynch
pleaded guilty to an amended charge of third-degree controlled substance crime in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 2(a)(1) (2014) (possession).
At Lynch’s sentencing hearing, the state requested the district court sentence him to
the presumptive guidelines se ntence of 57 months in prison. Because Lynch had a prior
controlled-substance conviction, he was re quired by statute to be “committed to the
commissioner of corrections for not less than two years.” Minn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 3(b)

3
(2014). Despite the statutory minimum, Lynch’ s counsel moved the district court for a
downward dispositional depart ure. Finding that L ynch is particularly amenable to
probation, the district court sentenced him to a presumptive dura tional 66-month prison
sentence and stayed execution for ten years.
The state now appeals.
D E C I S I O N
The state argues that the district cour t erred by staying execution of Lynch’s
sentence under section 152.023, subdivision 3(b). Whether a statute “requires a mandatory
minimum term of incarceration is a question of statutory construction which [appellate
courts] review[] de novo.” State v. Bluhm, 676 N.W.2d 649, 651 (Minn. 2004). “The object
of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of
the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2016). When a statute is una mbiguous, we must
apply its plain meaning. State v. Hayes, 826 N.W.2d 799, 804 (Minn. 2013).
At the time Lynch was sentenced, section 152.023, subdivision 3(b), stated: “If the
conviction is a subsequent controlled substance convicti on, a person convicted under
subdivision 1 or 2 shall be committed to the commissioner of corrections for not less than
two years nor more than 30 years.” And sec tion 152.026 provided that “[a] defendant
convicted and sentenced to a mandatory senten ce under [section 152.0 23] is not eligible
for probation, parole, discharge or supervised release until that person has served the full
term of imprisonment as provided by law.” Minn. Stat. § 152.0 26 (2014). We have
previously held that a district court lacks discretion to stay exec ution of the mandatory
minimum sentence for repeat offenders unde r section 152.023, subdivision 3(b), and

4
section 152.026. State v. Turck, 728 N.W.2d 544, 54 8 (Minn. App. 2007), review denied
(Minn. May 30, 2007); see also Bluhm, 676 N.W.2d at 654 (holding that the penalty
provision for fifth-degree controlled substance crime in Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 3(b)
(2002), required a mandatory minimum six-month jail term be imposed and served for
repeat offenders); State v. Adams, 791 N.W.2d 757, 759 (Minn. App. 2010) (holding that
the district court may not stay execution of the mandatory minimum sentence under Minn.
Stat. § 152.022, subd. 3(b) (2006), for re peat offenders who commit second-degree
controlled substance crime), review denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2011).
Lynch concedes on appeal that the distri ct court did not have discretion to stay
execution of his sentence under the 2014 version of the third-degree controlled substance
statute. But he argues that he is entitled to the benefit of the 2016 Minnesota drug
sentencing reform act, which am ended section 152.023, subdi vision 3, to eliminate the
mandatory two-year minimum sentence. See 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, § 5, at 582; see
also 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, § 8, at 585 (amending Minn. Stat. § 152.026). Lynch cites
State v. Coolidge in support of his argument. 282 N.W.2d 511 (Minn. 1979). In Coolidge,
a defendant appealed his conviction and ten-year sentence for sodomy. Id. at 512. Because
the legislature had repealed the statute und er which the defendant was convicted and
changed the maximum punishment for his act to one year in prison, the supreme court held
that he was entitled to the benefit of the more recent statute, noting that “a statute mitigating
punishment is applied to acts committed befo re its effective date, as long as no final
judgment has b een reached.” Id. at 514. The supreme court revisited the principle
articulated in Coolidge in Edstrom v. State, in which a petitioner serving a 30-year sentence

5
for aggravated rape sought postconviction relief on the grou nds that he was entitled to
resentencing under an amended statute that provided for a maximum sentence of 20 years.
326 N.W.2d 10, 10 (Minn. 1982). In affirming the denial of his postconviction petition, the
supreme court clarified that the Coolidge principle does not apply when it is contrary to
the legislature’s intent:
In Coolidge, we ruled that a statute mitigating punishment is to
be applied to acts committed befo re its effective date, as long
as no final judgment has been reached, at least absent a
contrary statement of intent by the legislature. In this case the
legislature has clearly indicated its intent that the criminal
sexual conduct statutes have no effect on crimes committed
before the effective date of the act, August 1, 1975. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.351 (1980).
Id.
Lynch maintains that this case is more like Coolidge than Edstrom because the
Minnesota drug sentencing reform act “does not expressly prohibit retroactive application
of the statute, as did the statute in Edstrom.” Lynch’s argument is unconvincing because it
ignores the explicit language of the act, wh ich provides that the amendment eliminating
the mandatory minimum sentence in sectio n 152.023, subdivision 3(b), “is effective
August 1, 2016, and applies to crimes committed on or after that date.” 2016 Minn. Laws
ch. 160, § 5, at 582; see also 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, § 8, at 585 (using the same language
with respect to the effective date for the amendmen t to section 152.026). We have
previously found similar language sufficient to indicate that the legislature did not intend
an amendment to apply retroactively. In State v. McDonnell , we held that the 2003
amendment to Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 21 , did not apply to an offense that occurred

6
before August 1, 2003, because the statute’s effective-date provision explicitly stated that
the amendment “is effective Au gust 1, 2003, and applies to violations committed on or
after that date.” 686 N.W.2d 841, 845–46 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn.
Nov. 16, 2004). This language directly mirrors the effective-date provision at issue in this
case. Similarly, in State v. Basal , we held that the 2007 amendment to Minn. Stat.
§ 256J.20, subd. 3(1), did not apply retroac tively because the legislature stated it was
“effective January 1, 2008.” 763 N.W.2d 328, 336 (Minn. App. 2009) (citing 2007 Minn.
Laws ch. 147, art. 2, § 64, at 1901).
Against the weight of this authority, Lynch suggests that we should apply the
effective-date provision found in 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, § 14, at 588, which concerns
the act’s establishment of a co mmunity justice reinvestment account and “is effective the
day following final enactment.” But that effective date, by its very terms, is limited to that
particular section. See 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, § 14, at 588 (“ This section is effective
the day following final enactment.” (emphasis added)). The relevant effective dates for the
purpose of this case are those relating to the amendments to the penalty provision for third-
degree controlled substance crime (section 152.023, subdivision 3) and mandatory
sentences (section 152.026). And those amendments both explicitly provide that they are
“effective August 1, 2016, an d appl[y] to crimes committed on or after that date.” 2016
Minn. Laws ch. 160, §§ 5, 8, at 582, 585.
Because the legislature has clearly indicat ed its intent that the amendments to
sections 152.023, subdivision 3, and 152.026 do not apply retroactively, and because Lynch
committed his offense over a year before August 1, 2016, he is not entitled to the benefit

7
of the revised statutes. The district court therefore erred by not imposing the mandatory
two-year minimum sentence.
Reversed and remanded.