State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1119

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Chad Timothy Anderson,
Appellant

Filed May 22, 2017
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-15-411

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, G. Paul Beaumaster , Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Worke,
Judge.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant argues that he is entitled to be resentenced under changes to controlled-
substance statutes and the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines that went into effect after he
was sentenced. We affirm.
FACTS
In January 2015, police arranged a controlled buy through a confidential informant.
During the controlled buy, appellant Chad Timothy Anderson sold 27.68 grams of
methamphetamine.
Anderson was charged with first-degree sale of a controlled substance, in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1) (2014) (ten grams or more of methamphetamine) and
first-degree possession of a controlled substanc e, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021,
subd. 2(a)(1) (2014) (25 grams or more of methamphetamine). After a court trial, the
district court found Anderson guilty of both offenses.
Before sentencing, Anderson moved for a downward durational departure, based in
part on proposed amendments to the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines that , if enacted ,
would reduce presumptive sentences for first-degree controlled-substance crimes. In April
2016, the district court denied Anderson’s motion. The district court sentenced Anderson
to 138 months in prison on the possession count. The sentence w as at the bottom of t he
guidelines presumptive range of 138 to 192 months.
After Anderson was sentenced, the legislature enacted the 2016 Minnesota drug
sentencing reform act. See 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, §§ 1-22, at 576-92. The act amended
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Minn. Stat. § 152.021 by, inter alia, raising the threshold weight for first -degree sale of a
controlled substance from 10 grams to 17 grams of methamphetamine and the threshold
weight for first-degree possession of a controlled substance from 25 grams to 50 grams o f
methamphetamine. Id., § 3, at 577 -578. The act rejected some of the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission’s proposed amendments and directed the commission
to modify the presumptive sentences for certain controlled -substance crimes. Id., § 18, at
590-91. The act and subsequent amendments to the sentencing guidelines reduce
presumptive sentences for first-degree controlled-substance crimes and other drug-related
offenses. Compare Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.C (2016) with Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4. A
(2014). This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Anderson argues that he is entitled to be resentenced under the act, claiming that he
is entitled to the benefits of the act because his conviction was not final when the act took
effect.
If applied to Anderson, the act’s changes to threshold weights would reduce his first-
degree possession of a controlled -substance conviction to second -degree possession of a
controlled substance, resulting in a presumptive sentencing range of 95 to 132 months. See
Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1) (2016) (first -degree possession now 50 grams or
more); Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 2(a)(1) (2016) (second -degree possession now 25
grams or more); Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.2.c, 4.C (2016) (sentencing guidelines drug-
offender grid and desc ription of custody -status point). Even if the act does n ot apply to
reduce his conviction, Anderson claims that reduced presumptive sentences for first-degree
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controlled-substance crimes must be applied . This would re sult in a presumptive
sentencing range of 110 to 153 months. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.2.c, 4.C.
As a general rule, “[n]o law shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and
manifestly so intended by the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.21 (2016). When a law is
amended, “the new provisions shall be construed as effective only from the date when the
amendment became effective.” Minn. Stat. § 645.31 (2016). Accordingly, for a statute to
be applied to conduct committed before its effective date, the legislature must provide clear
evidence that it intended that application, “such as mention of the word ‘retroactive.’”
State v. Traczyk , 421 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Minn. 1988) (quotation omitted). “The
retroactivity of a statute is a matter of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.”
State v. Basal, 763 N.W.2d 328, 335 (Minn. App. 2009). Interpretation of the sentencing
guidelines is also s ubject to de novo review . State v. Campbell, 814 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn.
2012).
Anderson’s argument centers on State v. Coolidge, which outlines an exception to
the general rule stated above. 282 N.W.2d 511, 514-15 (Minn. 1979). Coolidge states that
when a “ criminal law in effect is repealed, absent a savings clause, all prosecutions are
barred where not re duced to a final judgment.” Id. at 514. It also states that “a statute
mitigating punishment is applied to acts committed before its effective date, as long as no
final judgment has been reached.” Id. The rationale for this rule is that “the legislature has
manifested its belief that the prior punishment is too severe and a lighter sentence is
sufficient.” Id.
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Coolidge was convicted of sodomy. Id. at 513. After he was convicted but before
his conviction became final, 1 the legislature repealed the sodomy statute and reduced the
maximum punishment for Coolidge’s conduct from ten years to one year.2 Id. at 512, 514-
15. The supreme court determined that Coolidge “should have been sentenced under the
present law.” Id. at 515. As Coolidge had served over two years in prison, the supr eme
court reduced his sentence to time served. Id.
Coolidge was narrowed by State v. Edstrom. 326 N.W.2d 10, 10 (Minn. 1982). In
Edstrom, the supreme court explained that Coolidge’s common-law rule applies only
“absent a contrary statement of intent by the legislature.” Id. Because “the legislature
ha[d] clearly indicated its intent” that the new statute “have no effect on crimes committed
before the effective date of the act,” the supreme court refused to apply a statute enacted
after Edstrom’s crime that would have reduced his sentence. Id. Edstrom committed the
crime in March 1975, and the effective date of the act was August 1, 1975. Id. The new
statute provided, “crimes committed prior to the effective date of this act are not affected
by its provisions.” 1975 Minn. Laws ch. 374, § 12, at 1251.
We have addressed Coolidge and Edstrom in two published opinions. In State v.
McDonnell, we determined that Coolidge’s common-law rule did not apply because the
legislature clearly indicated its intent that a statutory amendment not apply to crimes
committed before the amendment’s effective date. 686 N.W.2d 841, 846 (Minn. App.

1 A conviction becomes final when direct appeals are exhausted or the time for filing a
direct appeal has expired. State v. Losh, 721 N.W.2d 886, 893-94 (Minn. 2006).
2 The legislature provided that the act reducing the maximum sentence for Coolidge’s crime
was “effective the day after final enactment.” 1977 Minn. Laws ch. 131, § 11, at 223.
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2004), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2004). The legislature provided that the amendment
“is effective August 1, 2003, and applies to violations committed on or after that date.” Id.
(quoting 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. c h. 2, art. 9, § 1, at 1446). In Basal, we again
determined that Coolidge did not apply. 763 N.W.2d at 336. The legislature expressly
provided that the relevant amen dment “would become effective January 1, 2008.” Id.
(citing 2007 Minn. Laws ch. 147, art. 2, § 64, at 1901). We concluded that “[b]ecause the
legislature provided for a specific effec tive date . . . , the legislature did not intend for the
amendment to apply to conduct occurring before the effective date.” Id.
Amendments to first- and second-degree controlled-substance-crime statutes
Anderson first argues that he is entitled to have his conviction reduced and to be
resentenced for second-degree possession of a controlled substance because his conduct no
longer fits the definition of first -degree possession of a contro lled substance. But, in
amending the fi rst-degree controlled -substance-crime statute, the legislature clearly
indicated that it did no t intend to apply the amendments to conduct occurring before the
effective date. See Edstrom, 326 N.W.2d at 10. The act states, “This section is effecti ve
August 1, 2016, and applies to crimes committed on or after that date.” 2016 Minn. Laws
ch. 160, § 3, at 579. In amending the second-degree controlled-substance-crime statute,
the legislature used identical effective-date language. Id., § 4, at 581. Because Anderson
committed his offense in January 2015, he is not entitled to application of the amendments.
Anderson claims that because the amendments not only mitigate punishment but
also increase punishment for certain conduct, the effective-date language is meant only to
prevent ex post facto application of increased punishments. See Jones v. State, 883 N.W.2d
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596, 600 (Minn. 2016) (explaining that the legislature is prohibited from passing a
retroactive law that disadvantages an o ffender). But the effective-date language clearly
states that amendments to the first- and second-degree controlled-substance-crime statutes
apply only to crimes committed on or after August 1, 2016. This court may not “read into
a statute a requirement that the [l]egis lature by its plain language has left out.” State v.
Vue, 797 N.W.2d 5, 17 (Minn. 2011). Had the legislature intended to apply increased
punishments prospectively and mitigated punishments prospectively and to crimes
committed before the effective date, it would have said so.
Anderson also argues that in order to prevent the mitigating aspects of the
amendments from being applied to non-final cases, the legislature needed to use the same
language used in the statute at issue in Edstrom. But Edstrom does not require specific
language. 326 N.W.2d at 10. In the statute analyzed in Edstrom, the legislature provided
that “crimes committed prior to the effective date of this act are not affected by its
provisions.” 1975 Minn. Laws ch. 374, § 12, at 1251 . The effective-date provisions at
issue here use different language to accomplish the same result. Moreover, the language
of the effective -date provisions at issue here is virtu ally identical to the effective -date
provision at issue in McDonnell. Compare 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, § § 3, at 579; 4, at
581 with 686 N.W.2d at 846 (quoting 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 2, art. 9, § 1, at
1446). The language is also more specific and clearer than the effective -date provision
involved in Basal, which said only that the act would be effective on a specific date. See
763 N.W.2d at 336 (citing 2007 Minn. Laws ch. 147, art. 2, § 64, at 1901). In both
8
McDonnell and Basal, we determined that the amendments applied only to crimes
committed on or after the effective date. Id.; McDonnell, 686 N.W.2d at 846.
The legislature clearly indicated its intent to apply the amendments to the first- and
second-degree controlled -substance-crime statutes only to crimes committed on or after
August 1, 2016. Anderson committed his crime well before that date and is not entitled to
have his conviction reduced from first - to second -degree possession of a controlled
substance.
Amendments to sentencing guidelines
Anderson claims that even if the amendments to the statutes do not apply to him,
the modifications to the sentencing gui delines do. The effective -date provision of the
portion of the act dealing with the sentencing guidelines provid es that it is effective “the
day following final enactment.” 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, § 18, at 591. This is virtually
identical to the effective-date provision at issue in Coolidge. Compare id. with 1977 Minn.
Laws ch. 131, § 11, at 223. Nevertheless, for several reasons outlined below, the Coolidge
rule does not make the changes to the sentencing guidelines apply to non-final cases.
First, it is not clear that Coolidge even applies to the sentencing guidelines.
Coolidge addressed a change to the st atutory maximum sentence, not a change to the
guidelines. 282 N.W.2d at 5 13-14. In 1979 when Coolidge was decided, the guidelines
did not yet exist. See State v. Shattuck , 704 N.W.2d 131, 138 (Minn. 2005) (stating that
the first edition of the sentencing guidelines was not effective until May 1, 1980).
Second, the legislature and the commission have clearly indicated that changes to
the guidelines do not apply to conduct committed prior to the modification’s effective date.
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The guidelines explicitly provide that modifications “apply to offenders whose date of
offense is on or after the specified modification effective date.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines
3.G.1 (2016). In adopting the act’s changes to the guidelines, the commission specified an
effective date of August 1, 2016. Minn. Sent. Guidelines Comm., Adopted Modifications
to the Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary Effective Date: August 1, 2016 (Aug. 2016),
http://mn.gov/msgc-stat/documents/2016%20Guidelines/August%202016%20Adopted%
20Modifications.pdf. The first page of the 2016 guidelines also s tates that the guidelines
are “effective August 1, 2016, and determine the presumptive sentence for felony offenses
committed on or after the effective date.”
The effective date of the portion of the act addressing the sentencing guidelines does
not dictate the effective date of the actual modifications to the guidelines. Pursuant to
statute, the commission must submit proposed modifications of the guidelines to the
legislature by January 15. Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 11 (2014). The proposed
modifications are effective August 1 of the year they are submitted, “unless the legislature
by law provides otherwise”. Id. All other modifications take effect according to the rules
of the commission. Id. The rules of the commission provide that “amendments to the
sentencing guidelines that do not have to be submitted to the legislature are eff ective on
the date ordered by the commission.” Minn. R. 3000.0600, subp. 3 (2015). The act itself
does not modify the guidelines; it rejects certain amendments proposed by the commission
and orders the commission to make other modifications. 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, § 18,
at 590-91. The act was passed and signed by the governor on May 22, 2016. Id., at 592.
The portion of the act dealing with the guidelines was likely made effective “the day
10
following final enactment” to allow the commission time to modify the guidelines before
August 1, 2016. Id., § 18, at 5 91. Under section 244.09, subdivision 11, any proposed
modifications that the legislature did not reject took effect on August 1, 2016. The
modifications that were mandated by the legislature or related to a crime created or
amended by the legislatur e in the act did not need to be submitted to the legislature and
thus took effect on the date ordered by the commission, August 1, 2016. See Minn. Stat. §
244.09, subd. 11; Minn. R. 3000.0600, subp. 3. Accordingly, the effective date of the
changes to the guidelines is not governed by the act but by the commission and Minn. Stat.
§ 244.09, subd. 11. Both the commission and the statute indicate that the modifications
took effect on August 1, 2016, and the guidelines themselves provide that the modifications
do not apply to crimes committed before that date.
At one time, pursuant to statute, any modification to the guidelines that reduced the
presumptive sentence duration was retroactive. Minn. Sta t. § 244.09, subd. 11 (Supp.
1983). Later, that statute was amended to allow an offender serving a sentence to petition
for a retroactive reduction of his sentence only when there was a “modification of the
numbers in the cells of the guidelines grid. ” 1984 Minn. Laws ch. 590, § 5, at 12 37. In
1997, this portion of the statute was repealed. 1997 Minn. Laws ch. 239, art. 3, § 25, at
2786. The repeal of this subdivision further indicates that the legislature generally does
not intend modifications to the guidelines to apply to conduct committed prior to the
effective date of the modification.
Finally, the act is a comprehensive piece of legislation that creates new crimes, such
as aggravated-controlled-substance crime in the first degree, and makes numerous changes
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that affect the definitions of various other controlled-substance crimes. 2016 Minn. Laws
ch. 160, at 576-92. The legislature specifically provided that these offense changes were
“effective August 1, 2016, and appl[y] to crimes committed o n or after that date.” Id., §§
2-9, at 576-85. The sentencing guidelines were amended to correspond to these changes
and thus should also apply only to crimes committed on or after August 1, 2016. See Minn.
Sent. Guidelines 4.C.
The commission and th e legislature clearly indicated that the 2016 changes to the
guidelines do not apply to crimes committed before August 1, 2016. Accordingly,
Anderson is not entitled to be resentenced under the new guidelines.
Affirmed.