State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1120

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Bradley Charles Slagle,
Appellant.

Filed October 30, 2017
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-14-9762

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
In this appeal from final judgment, a ppellant challenges the district court’s denial
of his motion to dismiss the charge of violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd . 2a(2)

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(2012), electronic communication with a child describing sexual conduct , based on the
defense of entrapment. Because we conclude that the district court properly concluded that
appellant was not entrapped, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Bradley Slagle posted an advertisement on Craigslist entitled
“Daughter/Mother Fantasy,” indicating that he was looking to make his fantasy of having
sex with a mother and daughter at the sam e time a reality. Officer Ryan Peterson, who at
the time was working to target the solicitation of children on the internet, responded to
Slagle’s adver tisement, representing himself as a fictitious 35-year-old mother named
Michelle with a fictitious 13-year-old daughter named Amanda.
The district court made the following factual findings with respect to the initial
exchange of emails between Slagle and Michelle:
Officer (1031 hours): Hey...saw your ad...im curious...my
daughters 13. Never done this before. Im 35 and like to have
fun. [Slagle] did not immediately respond and 24 minutes later
the Officer sent another email with a photo of “Amanda”.

[Slagle] (1231 hours): Daughter is very cute, how bout a photo
of yourself? She is only 13?? You are on with her getting
f--cked? I would want to make sure as she isn’t 18... This email
contained two nude photos of a penis. Several emails were
immediately exchanged and [Slagle] expressed concerns about
not wanting to get in trouble.

Officer (1257 hours): I’ve talked with my daughter b4 about
this...I’d like her to chat with you so she feels comfortable. The
Officer then provides [Slagle] with Amanda’s email address.

[Slagle] (1505 hours): (after a series of questions by [Slagle])
I am alitte concerned about her age to be honest. I want to
make sure you aren’t in law enforcement and that she is

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completely ok as she is under 18 and not “legal” if you know
what I mean. The Officer goes on to explain to [Slagle] that
she has discussed this with her daughter and believes it would
be a good experience for her. The Officer then again sends
[Slagle] Amanda’s email address. [Slagle] did not contact
Amanda on May 28, 2014.

Slagle subsequently began exchanging emails with Amanda on May 29 after
Michelle gave him Amanda’s email address and encouraged him to contact her. Initially
the messages between Slagle and Amanda were nonsexual in nature . But Slagle soon
began inquiring about her sexual experience, describing the sexual acts he would like to
perform with her and expressing arousal at the thought of meeting Amanda and her mother.
Slagle also repeatedly asked Amanda for pictures of he rself. After Amanda told him that
she did not know what he looked like, he sent her two nude photographs of himself.
Slagle was arrested and charged with electronic solicitation of a child under Minn.
Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(2). Slagle asserted an entrapment defense. He agreed to waive
his right to a jury trial on the issue and submit the defense of entrapment to the district
court under Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.02, subd. 1(6). Following an omnibus hearing, the district
court rejected Slagle’s entrapment defense . Slagle proceeded under Minn . R. Crim.
P. 26.01, subd. 4, seeking appellate review of the entrapment issue.1 The district court
found Slagle guilty of electronic solicitation of a child. This appeal on the entrapment issue
follows.

1 Slagle refers to this as a Lothenbach proceeding. But Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4,
replaced Lothenbach in 2007 as the way to preserve a dispositive pretrial issue for appellate
review in criminal cases. See State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn. 2016).

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D E C I S I O N
Standard of Review
Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, states in relevant part:
(b) The defendant must maintain [a] plea of not guilty.

(c) The defendant and the prosecutor must acknowledge
that the pretrial issue is dispositive . . . .

. . . .

(e) The defendant must stipulate to the prosecution’s
evidence in a trial to the court, and acknowledge that the court
will consider the prosecution’s evidence, and that the court
may enter a finding of guilt based on that evidence.

(f) The defendant must also acknowledge that appellate
review will be of the pretrial issue, but not of the defendant’s
guilt, or of other issues that could arise at a contested trial.

This court reviews a district court’s findings of fact for clear error. State v.
Wiernasz, 584 N.W.2d 1, 3 (M inn. 1998) (discussing mixed questions of law and fact).
Whether those facts constitute entrapment is a legal question that we review de novo. See
id. Because Slagle does not challenge any of the district court’s findings of fact, we review
de novo the legal question of whether those facts constitute entrapment.
Entrapment
The supreme court articulated Minnesota’s entrapment doctrine in State v. Grilli ,
304 Minn. 80, 88-96, 230 N.W.2d 445, 451-56 (1975). The Grilli analysis utilizes a two-
pronged test. 304 Minn. at 96, 230 N.W.2d at 45 6. For the first prong, the burden is on
the defendant to “raise by a fair preponderance of the evidence the issue of entrapment for
consideration by the court or jury, as he elects.” Id. To succeed under this prong, t he

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defendant must show “that the state did something more than merely solicit the commission
of a crime.” State v. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d 89, 107 (Minn. 1980). This prong can be satisfied
by showing “persuasion, badgering, or pressure by the state.” Id.
If the defendant is successful on the first prong, the burden shifts to “the state to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was predisposed to commit the crime
charged.” Grilli, 304 Minn. at 96, 230 N.W.2d at 456. This predisposition can be shown
by evidence of: “(a) Defendant’s active solicitation to commit the crime, (b) prior criminal
convictions, or (c) prior criminal activity not resulting in conviction, or (d) defendant’s
criminal reputation, or by any other adequate means.” Id. at 89, 230 N.W.2d at 452. “Any
other adequate means,” id., can be proved “by evidence that the accused readily responded
to the solicitation of the commission of a crime by the state.” Olkon, 299 N.W.2d at 108.
But “the state must prove the defendant was predis posed ‘prior to first being approached
by government agents.’” State v. Johnson , 511 N.W.2d 753, 755 (Minn. App 1994)
(quoting Jacobson v. United States , 503 U. S. 540, 549, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1540 (1992)) ,
review denied (Minn. Apr. 19, 1994).
Officer Peterson undeniably gave Slagle the opportunity to commit this crime. But
as the supreme court made clear in Olkon, the first prong of Grilli does not ask whether the
state merely solicited the crime ; it asks whether the state did something more through
persuasion, badgering, or pressure. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d at 107.
Slagle asserts that the district court, in its order denying his motion to dismiss, stated
that law enforcement did not engage in “threats, intimidation or excessive pressure.” Slagle
characterizes this language as constituting a higher burden than a showing of persuasion or

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pressure and therefore argues that the district court applied an incorrect standard . But in
the next sentence of its order, the district court states that law enforcement “did nothing to
pressure or persuade him to engage in sexual-conduct communication.” We conclude that
the district court applied the correct standard in its analysis.
Slagle also argues that his situation is comparable to Johnson, in which this court
concluded that the state had entrapped the defendant. 511 N.W.2d at 756. We disagree.
In Johnson, the defendant was approached in a sting operation and asked if he wanted to
buy marijuana. Id. at 754. The defendant initially refused before eventually agreeing to
“act[] as a conduit” and buy marijuana for someone else. Id. We determined that “not only
did the government solicit the encounter by initiating the ‘reverse sting,’ it also continued
to press its of fer even after Johnson initially refused to buy any marijuana.” Id. at 755.
Slagle claims that his situation is comparable because Slagle contends that Officer Peterson
brought up the idea of sexual communications with Amanda and that he “rejected the crime
initially but [was] eventually overcome by the officer’s persuasion.”
While Officer Peterson initiated the sting, as in Johnson, he did not continue to press
the offer after a refusal. Slagle expressed some concerns about Amanda’s age, but a t no
point did he say “no” only to have Officer Peterson continue to press until he relented and
agreed. To the contrary, upon seeing a picture of Amanda and learning that she was 13 -
years-old, Slagle responded to Michelle, “Daughter is very cute…She is only 13?? You are
on with her getting f --ked? I would want to make sure as she isn’t 18…” and sent two
pictures of his erect pe nis. After Michelle confirmed her approval, Slagle said that he
would love to help Michelle teach Amanda how to have intercourse and perform fellatio.

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Slagle also argues that he was excessively pressured by law enforcement because,
after Michelle first contacted him , she sent him a second email 24 minutes later that
included Amanda’s photo. We are not persuaded. Officer Peterson testified that he sent
Slagle two relatively quick, consecutive emails because he had forgotten to include all of
the information in the first email that was responsive to Slagle’s Craigslist ad.
Finally, Slagle argues that he was pressured bec ause Officer Peterson was the one
who brought up the idea of sex with a minor and gave him Amanda’s email address. But
Slagle was not forced to act on those offers. In fact, Officer Peterson gave Slagle several
“outs.” Despite these outs, Slagle continued communicating with Amanda, even going so
far as to send her nude pictures and engage her in graphic sexual conversation.
Because Slagle was not persuaded, badgered, or pressured by law enforcement into
committing this crime, Slagle does not satisfy the first prong of Grilli. We therefore do
not address the second prong in the Grilli analysis. We conclude that Slagle was not
entrapped.
Affirmed.