State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1143

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Pierre Lamont Flowers,
Appellant

Filed June 19, 2017
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-14-17643

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda K. Jenny, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Caroline Durham, Durham Law Office, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Schellhas, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of possessing a firearm when ineligible, arguing
that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his request to give a necessity-

2
defense jury instruction at trial. Because the evidence did not warrant the instruction , we
affirm.
FACTS
On June 18, 2014, appellant Pierre Lamont Flowers went searching for his teenage
niece. The teenager was not at home when Flowers’s sister returned from school ; she left
no information on her where abouts and was not answering her cell phone , which caused
concern. After contacting the police, Flowers, his sister, and others drove to various homes
searching for the girl. They arrived at the ho me of one of the girl’s friends. Numerous
people were gathered outside.
According to Flowers, his sister got out of the vehicle and spoke with a woman
outside the house, and then Flowers exited the vehic le to observe the discussion because
“they were talking for too long.” Flowers’s sister grew suspicious because the woman with
whom she was speaking “seemed nonchalant . . . like she knew more th an what she was
talking about.” Flowers and his sister “just walked into the [residence]” to look for the
girl. Inside, Flowers’s sister was crying and questioning the occupants about t he
whereabouts of her daughter, which caused the occupants to become upset. Heated
conversations ensued, and the occupants denied taking the girl.
Flowers searched the basement, but did not find his niece . He walked upstairs and
into the kitchen , where he observed that the situation had escalat ed and people w ere
screaming. Flowers walked up behind his sister, who was crying, and saw her pull out a
gun, which she held “off to her side.” She did not point the gun at anyone . There were
three or four men “circling” Flowers’s sister; one “was in her face,” and a nother was

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“talking kind of aggressive.” Flowers did not know what would occur next, and he “did
something [he] just thought was safe”; he grabbed the gun from his sister, “told everybody
to back up,” and left the residence with his sister, handing her back the gun before exiting.
He did not point the gun at anyone. Flowers did not want anyone “to accidentally get shot.”
Flowers’s sister largely echoed Flowers’s version of events, stating that she owned
the gun and brandished it that day, but did not p oint it at a nyone. She also testified that
nobody in the house threatened to do her harm , though people were “bum rushing” her
prior to her brandishing the gun . However, individuals at the house provided a diffe rent
account of what occurred. One occupant testified that Flowers entered the residence with
the gun and pointed it at everyone in the house. Another testified that she was awoken by
the commotion, exited her bedroom , and saw Flowers coming out of the kitchen with the
gun, which he pointed in her face.1
After Flowers and his sister exited the house, an officer on routine patrol spotted
them crossing the street and observed several people yelling that Flowers had a gun.
Flowers and his sister got into their vehicle and started driving a way. The officer stopped
their vehicle, and a loaded revolver was discovered under the dashboard. Flowers’s sister
indicated that the gun was hers.
Flowers was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm. The matter proceeded
to trial. Flowers stipulated that he was ineligible to possess a firearm. Prior to trial,

1 DNA testing was performed on the gun; Flowers could not be excluded a s a possible
contributor to the DNA recovered; roughly 90% of the general population could be
excluded; Flowers’s sister was excluded as a contributor to the DNA.

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Flowers moved for a necessity-defense jury instruction, and at the close of trial, that request
was denied. The district court concluded that the evidence did not support a necessity
defense. Flowers was convicted and received a 60-month sentence. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
This court reviews a district court’s refusal to give a requested jury instructi on for
an abuse of discretion. State v. Cole , 5 42 N.W.2d 43, 50 (Minn. 1996). An abuse of
discretion occurs if the evidence warrants a requested jury instruction that was not given.
Turnage v. State , 708 N.W.2d 535, 546 (Minn. 2006). A defendant seeking a necessity
defense instruction has the burden of making a pri ma facie showing of necessity. State v.
Brodie, 532 N.W.2d 557, 557 (Minn. 1995). In reviewing whether a necessity instruction
should have been given, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party that
sought the instruction. Turnage, 708 N.W.2d at 545-46; State v. Shane, 883 N.W.2d 606,
612 (Minn. App. 2016).
A criminal charge is defeated by a necessity defense “if the harm that would have
resulted from compliance with the law would have significantly exceeded the harm actually
resulting from the defendant’s breach of the law.” State v. Rein , 477 N.W.2d 716, 717
(Minn. App. 1991) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Jan. 30, 1992). For a
necessity defense to apply, a defendant must show that: (1) he had no legal alternative to
violating the law, (2) the harm to be prevented was imminent, and (3) there was a direct,
causal connection between violating the law and preventing the harm. Id.
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give a necessity -
defense instruction because the evidence did not warrant the instruction. First, there were

5
legal alternatives to Flowers’s act of taking the gun from his sister. He could have told his
sister to put the gu n away or leave the residence. Or, Flowers and his sist er could have
contacted the police for assistance rather than barging into the home. See State v. Johnson, 289 Minn. 196, 199, 183 N.W.2d 541, 543 (1971) (stating that the defense of necessity is
unavailable “if the choice of action is necessitated by recklessness or negligence”).
Second, there w as no imminent threat of harm. See Rein, 477 N.W.2d at 717.
Flowers’s sister never pointed the gun at any one. She also testified that nobody in the
house threatened to do her harm. Flowers testified that, after his sister pulled out the gun,
he did not “know what could have possibly went down,” which implies that no particular
act or threat was perceived as imminent.
Lastly, because there was no particular imminent harm to be prevented, it follows
that Flowers’s act of taking the gun cannot be directly connected to preventing harm. In
sum, even when the e vidence is viewed in a light most favorable to Flowers, it does not
constitute a prima facie showing of necessity. See Turnage, 708 N.W.2d at 545-46 (stating
that evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the party that sought the instruction );
Brodie, 532 N.W.2d at 557 (stating that defendant seeking a necessity instruction has the
burden of making a prima facie showing ). As such, the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied Flowers’s request for a necessity-defense jury instruction.
Affirmed.