State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1151

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Landis Sherel Tate,
Appellant.

Filed May 22, 2017
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-14-27731

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda K. Jenny, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Susan Andrews, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant challenges her conviction for second-degree assault with a dangerous
weapon, arguing that the state’s circumstantial evidence did not establish that she had the
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intent to cause another fear of immediate bodily harm or death. Because the evidence
sufficiently supports appellant’s conviction, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Landis Tate was charged with second-degree assault in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2014) for pointing a loaded gun at a police officer. The testimony
at Tate’s two-day jury trial established the following. According to Tate, her then-husband
was a drug-dealer. Their relationship was rocky, and she often stayed at her mother’s home,
going to their apartment only when her husband was not there.
“Several scary things happened” on September 17, 2014, while Tate was alone at
the apartment. First, in the early afternoon, a man tried to break into the apartment through
the balcony door. Tate was watching television in the bedroom, heard noises, saw the
stranger, and retrieved and loaded a gun from the hall closet. Tate testified that a friend had
given her the gun for protection and she kept it at the apartment. Tate did not call for help
because she had no phone. Eventually, the man left.
“A few hours” later, Tate heard a knock on the apartment door. Tate grabbed her
gun and answered the door. “Shot Baby,” who was her then-husband’s best friend, was at
the door along with two other men . Tate testified that she is afraid of Shot Baby because
he is “into drugs and other sorts of stuff that’s scary.” Tate shut the door quickly and
returned to the bedroom to watch television.
Around 5:00 p.m. or 6:00 p.m., Tate started drinking. Sometime after 6:00 p.m.,
Tate heard another knock on the apartment door. Tate again took her gun with her, opened
the door, and saw Shot Baby with another male. Tate was scared because she “had no clue
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what his intentions were,” so she shut the door. Tate returned to the bedroom and watched
more television. By 10 :00 p.m., Tate had consumed a “smaller bottle” of Crown Royal .
Sometime later, Tate went outside and fired two rounds from her gun. When asked, Tate
testified she did this because “[the gun] was new and I was intoxicated.”
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on September 18, 2014, C.P., an apartment resident,
heard loud noises and went to Tate’s apartment to ask her to quiet down . When C.P.
knocked on Tate’s door, Tate answered, holding the gun. C.P. immediately returned to his
apartment and called 911.
Sergeant Stanger and Officers Johnson, Blaine, and Blanchard responded to
investigate. As the officers approached Tat e’s apartment, t hey drew their g uns, pointing
them at the floor. After knocking and yelling “Police,” the officers heard noises from inside
the apartment, specifically, the sound of a gun being racked. 1 The officers said, “Police.
Police officers. Drop the gun. Come to the door.” Officer Johnson testified that she heard
a female voice say, “The door’s open.” Office Johnson also testified that she thought Tate
was “going to cause us harm.”
Tate opened the door, lifted her gun and brought it “across her body” so it was
pointing “directly at” at Officer Johnson, who “jumped to the side,” screamed at Tate to
“put the gun down,” and pointed her weapon at Tate’s chest.
Tate closed the apartment door , then opened the door and handed her gun to the
officers, handle -first. Officer Johnson took the gun and Tate was arrested . Tate’s gun

1 “Racking” places a round from the magazine into the chamber so the gun can be fired.
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contained a fully-loaded magazine with one round in the chamber. Tate testified that when
she answered the door, she intended “to see who was there and make sure I was safe.”
Officer Blaine testified that Tate appeared to be intoxicated because he could smell
alcohol “on her breath and her body” and she was slurring some of her speech. Sergeant
Stanger also testified that Tate had a “blank, blank look on her face.”
After hearing testimony, the jury was instructed on voluntary intoxication. The
judge stated that the jury “should consider whether the defendant was intoxicated and . . .
whether the defendant was capable of forming the required intent.” After deliberations, the
jury acquitted Tate of first -degree assault (attempted use of deadly force) and found Tate
guilty of second -degree assault with a dangerous weapon under Minn. Stat. § 609.222,
subd. 1 (2014). The district court denied Tate’s motion for a downward dispositional
departure, and committed Tate to the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections for 36
months. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Tate argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction because,
due to the amount of alcohol she consumed that night, “no rational fact-finder could have
found that . . . she was capable of forming the requisite criminal intent to support a
conviction for second-degree assault.”
When the sufficiency of evidence is challenged, this court thoroughly reviews the
record “to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the
conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” State v.
Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016) (quoting State v. We bb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430
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(Minn. 1989)). When the jury has acted with due regard for the presumption of innocence
and the necessity to overcome that presumption by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the
verdict will not be disturbed. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476 (Minn. 2004). This
court assumes that the jury “believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any contrary
evidence.” Gulbertson v. State, 843 N.W.2d 240, 245 (Minn. 2014) (quoting State v. Welch,
675 N.W.2d 615, 619 (Minn. 2004)). Credibility determinations are the “exclusive function
of the jury,” and this court gives deference to a jury’s credibility determinations. State v.
Pendleton, 706 N.W.2d 500, 512 (Minn. 2005); State v. Hagdu, 681 N.W.2d 30, 34 (Minn.
App. 2004) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2004).
Tate was con victed of second -degree assault. “Whoever assaults another with a
dangerous weapon” is guilty of second -degree assault. Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 .
Second-degree assault is “an act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate
bodily harm or death.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10(1) (2014). A dangerous weapon is
“any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded.” Id. subd. 6 (2014).
“[A]ssault-fear . . . is a specific intent crime,” which re quires “that the actor either
has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act, if
successful, will cause that result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2014); State v. Fleck,
810 N.W.2d 303, 312 (Minn. 2012). “The inte nt inquiry is made under an objective
standard.” State v. Collins , 580 N.W.2d 36, 44 (Minn. App. 1998) (quotation omitted) ,
review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998). Voluntary intoxication is a defense to specific-intent
crimes. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 312; see Minn. Stat. § 609.075 (2014).
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Generally, intent is proven by circumstantial evidence. State v. Davis, 656 N.W.2d
900, 905 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. May 20, 2003). This court applies
heightened scrutiny when reviewing the sufficiency of circumst antial evidence, using a
two-step analysis. State v. Al -Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 –74 (Minn. 2010). First, the
court identifies the circumstances proved by the state, deferring to the jury’s acceptance of
the state’s proof and rejection of contrary eviden ce. Id. at 473. Second, the court
“determine[s] whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent”
with any other reasonable hypothesis. State v. Silvernail , 831 N.W.2d 5 94, 599 (Minn.
2013) (quotation omitted). A jury “is in the best position to evaluate cir cumstantial
evidence” and its “verdict is entitled to due deference.” Webb, 440 N.W.2d at 430.
We begin our analysis of the circumstances proved with deference to the jury’s
acceptance of evidence consistent with its verdict. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 473. The
evidence proves the following circumstances. On September 17, 2014, Tate was alone at
an apartment she shared with her then-spouse, whom she described as a drug dealer. During
the daytime hours before her encounter with police, Tate retrieved her gun from a closet,
loaded it, kept it at her side while watching an intruder try to enter the apartment, and later
she answered the door holding a loaded gun two times. Tate kept this gun at the apartment
for her own protection.
Starting about 5 :00 p.m., Tate began consuming a significant quantity of alcohol.
Around 10:00 p.m., Tate went outside the apartment building and fired two rounds from
her gun. At about 3:00 a.m. on September 18, 2014, C.P. knocked on Tate’s apartment door
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to ask her to quiet down; Tate answered the door , again holding her loaded gun, and C.P.
fled. Responding to C.P.’s 911 call, the police knocked on Tate’s apartment door.
Standing inside the closed door, Tate racked her gun. Officers then announced their
presence saying, “Police,” and instructed Tate to put down the gun and open the door. Tate
opened the door, holding the gun at her side, then brought up the gun and pointed it at
Officer Johnson . Tate closed the door, then opened it, a nd handed her gun to Officer
Johnson. Tate smelled like alcohol and slurred some of her speech.
Tate argues that her testimony “had the ring of truth to it” when she stated she did
not know law enforcement was at the door and that she had her gun because she was afraid.
But the jury, relying on the evidence, their perceptions, experiences, and common sense
rejected Tate’s claim. See Collins, 580 N.W.2d at 44 (discussing how jurors may consider
a defendant’s conduct in determining whether the defendant formed specific intent).
Evidence that a defendant was intoxicated does not compel a conclusion that the defendant
could not form specific intent. State v. Olson , 298 Minn. 551, 552 –53, 214 N.W.2d 777,
778 (1974) (affirming conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon over defendant’s
contention that he was too intoxicated to form the requisite intent). Tate’s ability to lucidly
describe her actions and her reasons for holding the gun while answering the door belie her
claim that she was too intoxicated to form intent. See State v. Torres, 632 N.W.2d 609, 617
(Minn. 2001) (holding district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s
request for a voluntary -intoxication jury instruction when appellant could “describe[] the
actions of all participants lucidly and precisely, without any reference to his own
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intoxication”). Further, credibility determinations lie solely with the jury and this court will
not reweigh the evidence. Pendleton, 706 N.W.2d at 511–12.
Tate suggests that another reasonable inference would be that she was suicidal at
the time. But Tate’s actions througho ut the day contradict that contention. Tate testified
that she purposely answered the door with a loaded gun after someone tried breaking into
the apartment and af ter Shot Baby came to the apartment. While Tate did not recall
answering the door when C.P. knocked, evidence established that Tate again opened the
door holding a loaded gun. She did the same thing when police knocked on her door, even
though they identified themselves as police.
We conclude that a reasonable jury may only infer that Tate, who , in a single day,
evening, and night, answered the door four times holding a loaded gun, intended to frighten
whoever was on the other side. Thus, reviewing the reasonableness of all inferences that
might be drawn from the circumstances proved, we conclude that there is no reasonable
hypothesis other than Tate’s intent to cause fear in another and the evidence credited by
the jury could only rational ly lead to an inference of specific intent. The circumstantial
evidence is therefore sufficient to sustain Tate’s conviction for second-degree assault.
Affirmed.