Pamela Sue Platz, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1181

Pamela Sue Platz,
Appellant,

vs.

Progressive Direct Insurance,
Respondent.

Filed April 17, 2017
Reversed
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-16-1500

James S. Ballentine, Alicia N. Sieben, Schwebel, Goetz & Sieben, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Jamie A. Sonsteby, Fox Law Office, New Brighton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Bjorkman, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
Pamela Sue Platz was injured in an automobile accident. She received income-loss
benefits under her no -fault auto insurance policy for approximately five months. Her
insurer lim ited her income -loss benefits to $250 per week, which was the statutory
maximum at the time of the accident. In no-fault arbitration, Platz sought income -loss
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benefits of $500 per week , which is the statutory maximum that became effective eight
days after the accident. Both an arbitrator and the district court rejected her argument. We
conclude that Platz was entitled to the increased amount of income-loss benefit as of the
effective date of the amendment and, therefore, reverse.
FACTS
On December 24, 2014, Pamela Sue Platz was injured in an automobile accident.
She was insured by Progressive Direct Insurance . Her auto insurance policy had been
issued on August 19, 2014, and was effective for six months. The policy was renewed on
February 19, 2015. Because of her injuries, she was unable to work from the date of the
accident until May 27, 2015. After the accident, Progressive provided Platz with income-
loss benefits in the amount of $250 per week until May 23, 2015.
In June 2015, Platz petitioned for no -fault arbitration. The parties agreed that the
arbitrator should decide questions of law, subject to de novo review by the district court.
Platz argued to the arbitrator that she was entitled to income-loss benefits of $500 per week
as of January 1, 2015, the effective date of an amendment to the no-fault act that increased
the maximum weekly income -loss benefit from $250 to $500 . The arbitrator rejected
Platz’s argument on the grounds that her entitlement to income-loss benefits is governed
by the insurance policy in force at the time of the accident, that the insurance policy is
governed by the law in effect when the policy was issued, and that the amendment to the
no-fault act does not apply to claims arising from accidents that occurred before January 1,
2015. But the arbitrator found that Platz was entitled to $241 of income-loss benefits for
additional working days because she unable to work until May 27, 2015.
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In February 2016, Platz commenced an action in district court and moved to
partially vacate or to modify the arbitrator’s award . See Minn. Stat. § 572B.23(a)(4)
(2016). Platz argued to the district court that the arbitrator erroneously interpreted the no-
fault act by ruling that she was not entitled to $500 per week in income-loss benefits after
January 1, 2015. She argued in the alternative that she was entitled to $500 per week in
income-loss benefits after her insurance policy was renewed in February 2015. The district
court, conducting a de novo review, agreed with the arbitrator that Platz was entitled to
only $250 in weekly income -loss benefits throughout the period during which she was
unable to work. The district court also rejected Platz’s alternative argument on the ground
that Platz did not preserve it by presenting it to the arbitrator. Accordingly, the district
court denied Platz’s motion. Platz appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Platz argues that the district court erred by denying her motion to partially vacate or
to modify the arbitration award. Specifically, she argues that the arbitrator and the district
court erred by ruling that she was entitled to only $250 per week, not $500 per week , in
income-loss benefits after January 1, 2015.
One of the purposes of the Minnesota No -Fault Automobile Insurance Act is to
“relieve the severe economic distress of uncompensated victims.” Minn. Stat. § 65B.42(1)
(2016). To accomplish this purpose, the no-fault act requires owners of vehicles to carry
insurance policies that provide certain first -party benefits, including economic -loss
benefits. Minn. Stat. §§ 65B.48, subd. 1, 65B.49, subd. 2 (2016). Basic economic -loss
benefits, including income -loss benefits, are available to reimburse persons injured in
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automobile accidents for “all loss suffered through injury arising out of the maintenance or
use of a motor vehicle.” Minn. Stat. § 65B.44, subd. 1(a) (2016). Income-loss benefits
“shall provide compensation for 85 percent of the injured p erson’s loss of present and
future gross income from inability to work,” subject to a maximum weekly amount. Minn.
Stat. § 65B.44, subd. 3(a) (2016). In 2014, the legislature amended the no -fault act to
increase the maximum weekly amount of income -loss benefits from $250 to $500 . 2014
Minn. Laws ch. 310, § 3, at 2061 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 65B.44, subd. 3 (a) (2014)).
The increase in the weekly maximum became effective on January 1, 2015. Id.
Platz’s argument raises an issue of statutory interpretat ion. Both parties rely
principally on no-fault caselaw to inform their arguments about the proper interpretation
of the statute.
In both her initial brief and her reply brief, Platz relies primarily on Hoben v. City
of Minneapolis, 324 N.W.2d 161 (Minn. 1982). The question in Hoben was whether an
amendment to the no-fault act applied to an injured person’s claim for economic -loss
benefits based on an accident that occurred before the effective date of the amendment. Id.
at 161-62. The supreme court analyzed the issue by referring to a provision of the no-fault
act that provided as follows: “‘Basic economic loss benefits are payable monthly as loss
accrues. Loss accrues not when injury occurs, but as income loss . . . is incurred. ’” Id. at
163 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 65B.54, subd. 1 (1980)). The supreme court reasoned, “Because
of the clear language of § 65B.54, subd. 1, we hold that it was the intent of the legislature
to deal prospectively with future payments of all basic economic loss benefits, reg ardless
of when the accident or incident giving rise to the claim occurred.” Id. Accordingly, the
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supreme court reasoned that “economic loss benefits are payable as the loss occurs, not
when the injury occurs.” Id. The supreme court concluded , “The los ses which [Hob en]
suffered after [the effective date] are therefore governed by the law in effect from and after
that date.” Id.
In its responsive brief, Progressive does not dwell on the Hoben opinion but
mentions that it was issued before another supreme court opinion, thereby hinting that
Hoben has been overruled. The subsequent supreme court opinion on which Progressive
relies is AMCO Insurance Company v. Lang, 420 N.W.2d 895 (Minn. 1988). Progressive
cites Lang for the proposition that “benefits are based upon the policy in effect at the time
of the accident .” The question in Lang was whether a n amendment to the no -fault act
concerning the interaction between no-fault benefits and worker s’ compensation benefits
applied to a claim for underinsured-motorist benefits based on an accident that occurred
after the effective date of the amendment. Id. at 896-98. In that case, t he session law
specifically provided that the amendment would be “effective October 1, 1985, and apply
to all insurance policies . . . that are executed, issued, issued for delivery, delivered,
continued, or renewed . . . after September 30, 1985.” Id. at 898. The supreme court
reasoned that, given the particular language of the session law concerning the prospective
application of the amendment, the claim for underinsured-motorist benefits was “governed
by the law in effect at the time the policy [was] issued” and that the amendment to the no-
fault act would apply only to insurance policies issued or renewed after the effective date.
Id. Because the insurance policy in force at the time of the accident had been issued before
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the effective date of the amendment, the supreme court concluded that the amendment to
the no-fault act did not apply. Id. at 898-900.
We do not read Lang to have overruled Hoben. The Lang opinion does not expressly
overrule Hoben. See 420 N.W.2d 895. The Lang opinion does not even discuss, let alone
cite, Hoben. See id. Furthermore, there is no basis for interpreting Lang to have overruled
Hoben by implication. The two opinions concern different issues. Of the two opinions,
Hoben is more similar to the issue in this case. Both Hoben and this case concern income-
loss benefits. Th e statute that was central to the analysis in Hoben still is in force, with
identical language. See Minn. Stat. § 65B.54, subd. 1 (2016 ). Indeed, the supreme court
has applied the plain language of section 65B.54, subdivision 1, in a manner similar to
Hoben on at least three occasions in the intervening years. See Stand Up Multipositional
Advantage MRI, P.A., v. American Family Ins. Co. , 889 N.W.2d 543, 550 (Minn. 2017);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lennartson, 872 N.W.2d 524, 530-31 (Minn. 2015); Stout
v. AMCO Ins. Co. , 645 N.W.2d 108, 112 -13 (Minn. 2002). For these reasons, Hoben
applies, and Lang does not apply.
Progressive also cites American Family Insurance Company v. Metropolitan Transit
Commission, 424 N.W.2d 825 (Minn. App. 1988) (MTC), in support of its argument. The
issue in MTC was whether one insurer was entitled to reimbursement from another insurer
for no-fault benefits paid to a person injured while a passenger on a public-transit bus. Id.
at 826 -27 The parties’ dispute centered o n an amendment to the no -fault act that was
intended to shift the indemnification duty from the public-transit authority’s insurer to the
passenger’s no-fault insurer. Id. at 826-28 (citing 1986 Minn. Laws ch. 455, § 50, at 867).
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After the amendment’s effective date, the passenger made a claim for no -fault economic-
loss benefits for an injury that occurred before the effective date . Id. at 826. This court
resolved the issue by following the analysis in Lang, reasoning that the amendment did not
apply because amendments to the no-fault act generally are “prospective in nature, fixing
the date of loss and the rights and obligations of the parties as of the date of accident or
injury.” Id. at 828. This court discussed Hoben but stated that the two cases are “quite
different” from each other. Id.
The MTC opinion does not apply to this case. As we recognized in MTC, that case
is dissimilar to Hoben. See id. Accordingly, MTC is dissimilar to this case for some of the
same reasons. In addition, the MTC opinion is concerned with which insurer is responsible
for all types of no-fault benefits, while Hoben is focused on an insured’s entitlement to
income-loss benefits in particular. Compare Hoben, 324 N.W.2d at 161 -63, with MTC,
424 N.W.2d at 826 -28. Those benefits are governed by section 65B.54, subdivision 1,
which was the focus of the analysis in Hoben. 324 N.W.2d at 161-63. Furthermore, to the
extent that this court’s opinion in MTC discussed section 65B.54, subdivision 1, the
discussion may be i n tension with subsequent supreme court opinions, which have
reiterated that income-loss benefits are “payable monthly as loss accrues” and that “[l]oss
accrues . . . as income loss . . . is incurred.” See Minn. Stat. § 65B.54, subd. 1; see also
Stand Up, 889 N.W.2d at 550 ; Lennartson, 872 N.W.2d at 5 30-31; Stout, 645 N.W.2d at
112-13.
Applying the Hoben analysis in this case leads to the conclusion that “[t]he losses
which [Platz] suffered after [the effective date] are . . . governed by the law in effect from
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and after that date.” See Hoben, 324 N.W.2d at 163. Thus, the district court erred by ruling
that Platz was not entitled to income-loss benefits of as much as $500 per week as of
January 1, 2015, and thereafter. In light of that conclusion, we need not consider Platz’s
alternative argument.
In sum, the district court erred by denying Platz’s motion to partially vacate or to
modify the arbitrator’s award.
Reversed.