State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1182

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Joseph Lee Bellanger,
Appellant.

Filed September 11, 2017
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Becker County District Court
File No. 03-CR-15-1258

Lori Swanson, Attorney Gene ral, Edwin W. Stockmeyer, A ssistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Tammy L. Merkins, Becker County Attorney, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Joseph Lee Bellanger appeals hi s conviction of two counts of criminal
sexual conduct, arguing that (1) the district c ourt abused its discretion in ruling that the

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state could impeach him with tw o prior felony convictions and (2) he is entitled to a new
trial because some jurors expressed bias duri ng voir dire. Because the evidentiary ruling
was not an abuse of discretion and Bellanger waived his juror-bias challenges, we affirm.
FACTS
On May 29, 2015, 16-year-old T.J. went to an emergency room seeking treatment
after a sexual assault. White Earth Police officers were dispatched to the emergency room.
T.J. reported to the officers that Bellanger ha d sexually assaulted her early that morning,
causing physical injuries. Bellanger was charged with two counts of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct.
The county moved to imp each Bellanger with two prior felony convictions—motor-
vehicle theft in March 2006 and domestic assa ult in May 2015—if he testified. At the
pretrial hearing, the district court performed the required analysis and ruled that the state
would be allowed to impeach Bellanger by asking him if he was convicted of motor-vehicle
theft in March 2006 and of an unspecified felony in May 2015. Bellanger chose not to
testify, so the jury did not receive evidence of the prior convictions.
The jury found Bellanger guilty on both counts.
Bellanger appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the state could
impeach Bellanger with two prior felony convictions.
Bellanger argues that the district court erre d in ruling that the state could impeach
him with evidence of his March 2006 motor- vehicle-theft conviction and an unspecified

3
felony conviction in May 2015. We will affirm a district court’s ruling on the admissibility
of prior convictions for impeachment absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Swanson,
707 N.W.2d 645, 654 (Minn. 2006).
A prior conviction of a felony not involving dishonesty is admissible to impeach a
witness if the probative value of admitting it outweighs the pr ejudicial effect. Minn. R.
Evid. 609(a)(1). When applying this balancing test, the district court must consider the
following factors outlined in State v. Jones:
(1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the date of
the conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history, (3) the
similarity of the past crime with the charged crime (the greater
the similarity, the greater the reason for not pe rmitting use of
the prior crime to impeach), (4) the importance of defendant’s
testimony, and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue.
271 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Minn. 1978).1 The district court must demonstrate on the record
that it has considered and weighed the Jones factors. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 655. It is
not necessarily an abuse of discretion to admit a prior conviction if any one of the Jones
factors weighs against admission. See id. at 656; State v. Bettin , 295 N.W.2d 542, 546
(Minn. 1980).
The district court analyzed the Jones factors on the record be fore ruling that both
convictions would be admissible for impeachm ent if Bellanger chose to testify. With
respect to the first factor, the district court found that both convictions have some
impeachment value because th ey help show the jury Bellanger’s “whole person.”

1 Jones was decided before the adoption of Minn. R. Evid. 609(a) but has been reaffirmed
as the applicable test when the state seeks to impeach a defendant with a prior conviction
under rule 609(a)(1). State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 586 (Minn. 1998).

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Bellanger argues that the probative value was “minimal” and that the convictions were not
needed because there wa s other evidence that would allo w the jury to see “what kind of
person” he is. However, Minnesota cases hold that any prior felony conviction has some
impeachment value because it al lows the jury to see “the whole person” a nd thus better
judge the trustworthiness of the witness’s testimony. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d at 586 (quotation
omitted).
Bellanger argues that the second Jones factor should have weighed against
admitting the 2006 motor-vehicle-theft conviction because it is not recent. See Jones, 271
N.W.2d at 538. The district court acknowled ged that the conviction was nearly ten years
old, but decided to admit it after noting that Bellanger was convicted of another felony in
between the 2006 conviction and the current charge. This reasoning comports with State
v. Zornes, in which the supreme court noted that, “i f a witness is convicted again or sent
back to prison,” the later event “enhances an otherwise stale conviction’s probative value.”
831 N.W.2d 609, 627 (M inn. 2013) (quotation omitted). Thus, it was within the district
court’s discretion to conclude that the 2006 motor-vehicle-theft conviction is still probative
of Bellanger’s truthfulness.
Bellanger argues that the third Jones factor should have weighed against admitting
his 2015 domestic-assault conv iction because domestic assault is similar to the current
crime. See Jones, 271 N.W.2d at 538. The district court recognized the similarity and
decided to mitigate the prejudicial effect by ruling that the st ate could ask Bellanger if he
was convicted of a felony on the relevant da te but could not refer to the nature of the
offense. The supreme court has upheld this practice of admitting unspecified or “sanitized”

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felony convictions as a permissible way to avoid unduly prejudicing a defendant when
impeaching with a conviction of a similar offense. State v. Hill, 801 N.W.2d 646, 650 n.1,
652-53 (Minn. 2011).
Finally, Bellanger argues that the fourth Jones factor should have outweighed the
fifth factor in favor of excluding bot h prior convictions. Under the fourth Jones factor, a
district court may exclude a prior conviction if it determines that the admission of the
conviction for impeachment will cause the defendant not to testify and it is more important
that the jury hear the defend ant’s version of the case. Bettin, 295 N.W.2d at 546. Under
the fifth factor, if the defendan t’s credibility is “the central i ssue in the case,” i.e., “if the
issue for the jury narrows to a choice between defendant’s credibility and that of one other
person[,] then a greater case can be made for admitting the impe achment evidence.” Id.
Here, the district court cons idered the fourth and fifth Jones factors together and
determined that, because the major evidence against Bellanger is T.J.’s testimony, if
Bellanger decided to testify to a different version of what happened, his credibility would
be “key.” It was within the district court’s discretion to conclude that the need to evaluate
Bellanger’s credibility if he testified outweighed the countervailing factors. See id. (noting
that it was fair to impeach defendant w ith prior convictions where defendant and
complainant were the only witnesses to alleged criminal sexual conduct and complainant’s
credibility had been questioned).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the Jones
factors, concluding that the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect of admitting
the convictions, and ruling that the state c ould impeach Bellanger with the 20 06 motor-

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vehicle-theft conviction and the sanitized 2015 conviction if he testified. See Swanson,
707 N.W.2d at 654.
II. Bellanger waived his juror-bias challenges.
In his pro se supplemental brief, Bellanger a sserts that he is entitled to a new trial
because some jurors expressed bias during voir dire. We do not cons ider this argument,
however, because it is waived. After questioning potential jurors, Bellanger’s trial counsel
expressly “pass[ed] for cause” without cha llenging the jurors Bellanger now seeks to
challenge. By stating, “I pass for cause,” during voir dire, a party affirmatively waives the
right to challenge prospective jurors for ca use and relieves the district court of any
obligation to dismiss any juror for cause. State v. Geleneau, 873 N.W.2d 373, 381 (Minn.
App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 2016). We will not consider on appeal whether
the district court erred by not dismissing jurors sua sponte after the appellant affirmatively
waived the right to assert such a challenge. Id. at 381-82.
Affirmed.