State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1193

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Abel Ricardo Mendoza, III,
Appellant.

Filed June 12, 2017
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-CR-15-995

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Shane D. Baker, Kandiyohi County Attor ney, Stephen J. Wentzell, Assistant County
Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction for second -degree possession of a controlled
substance, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
methamphetamine found when police searched his purse. Appellant also argues that he is

2
entitled to be resentenced under changes to controlled -substance statutes that went into
effect after he was sentenced. We affirm.
FACTS
Law enforcement agents of the Drug and Gang Task Force (DGTF) , working with
a confidential informa nt (CI), arranged a controlled buy of methamphetamine at Emi lio
Ozornia’s home. Ozornia took the CI into his bedroom and locked the door. Although the
CI was ultimately unable to purch ase methamphetamine , the CI observed
methamphetamine and methamphetamine parapher nalia in the bedroom. Based on this
information, police obtained a search warrant for the home.
On November 4, 2015, before executing the warrant, police observed appellant Abel
Ricardo Mendoza III in a car outside of Ozornia’s home. Ozornia approached the car and
spoke with Mendoza. As Mendoza exited the car and entered the house with Ozornia, he
carried a silver and black purse.
Soon after Ozornia and Mendoza entered the home, police executed the warrant. A
DGTF agent went to Ozornia’s bedroom, announced his presence, and attempted to enter
the room. The door was locked. When no one unlocked the door, the agent kicked it open.
Ozornia and Mendoza were both in the room. The sil ver and black purse was on the bed
and Mendoza’s hands were on top of it. The agent ordered the men to put their hands up ,
and they complied.
Both men were handcuffed and pat searched for weapons. While pat searching
Mendoza, the agent felt what he believed to be a large amount of cash. He also felt what
he believed was a device for smoking marijuana and a pill bottle that he believed contained

3
a controlled substance. He retrieved the pill bottle; it contained synthetic marijuana. The
men were then taken outside and placed in the back of squad cars. DGTF Agent Robert
Braness recognized Mendoza from prior contacts and knew that Mendoza had multiple
drug convictions and was a suspected gang member.
After Mendoza and Ozor nia were secured in the squad cars, police searched the
silver and black purse and the bedroom. An agent found a baggie containing 8.478 grams
of methamphetamine inside the purse . The agent also found a baggie full of what he
believed to be a large amount of methamphetamine in plain v iew on the bedroom floor
only a few feet from where Mendoza and Ozornia had been standing. After these items
were found, Mendoza and Ozornia were arrested and taken to jail.
Mendoza was charged with second-degree sale of a controlled substanc e and
second-degree possession of a controlled substance . The charges rela ted to the
methamphetamine in the purse. Mendoza moved to suppress the methamphetamine as the
fruit of an illegal s earch. At an omnibus hearing , Agent Braness, who was the agent in
charge of executing the warrant, testified that even if the purse had not been searched,
Mendoza would have been arrested for possession of the methamphetamine found in plain
view on the bedroom floor. He also testified that, as Mendoza’s property, the purse would
have been brought with Mendoza to jail. He testified that the jail has a policy of searching
all inmates and their property. The search allows the property to be inventoried and stored
until the inmate is released.
The district court denied Men doza’s motion. The district court concluded that,
while the warrant to search Ozornia’s house could not justify the search of Mendoza’s

4
purse, the search was lawful as a search incident to Mendoza’s arrest for the
methamphetamine found on the bedroom floo r. The district court also determined that,
had the purse not been searched at the house, the methamphetamine in the purse would
inevitably have been discovered during an inventory search of the purse at the jail.
Mendoza agreed to stipulate to the state’s case to obtain review of the pretrial ruling.
See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. The state dismissed the sale count and the possession
count was submitted to the district court based on the testimony and exhibits received at
the omnibus hearing a s well as a Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) report on the
substances. T he distri ct court found Mendoza guilty of second -degree possession of a
controlled substance for the methamphetamine found inside the purse. The district court
sentenced Mendoza to 75 months in prison, which was at the bottom of the pr esumptive
sentencing range. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Suppression
Mendoza argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the
drugs found in his purse. When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress
evidence, this court reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error. State v.
Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Minn. 2011). But this court reviews de novo whether the
district court’s factual findings support its decision. Id. Mendoza claims that the district
court erred in its application of both the search -incident-to-arrest doctrine and the
inevitable-discovery doctrine. We first address the inevitable-discovery doctrine.

5
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 10; State v. Ture, 632
N.W.2d 621, 627 (Minn. 2001). Generally, warrantless searches are “per se unreasonable.”
Ture, 632 N.W.2d at 627. In this case, the district court determined, and the state concedes,
that the warrant to search Ozornia’s home did not entitle police to search Mendoza’s purse.
See State v. Wynne, 552 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Minn. 1996) (concluding that “a shoulder purse
is so closely associated with the person” that it does not fall within the ambit of a warrant
authorizing the search of a premises (quotation omitted)). Accordingly, “unless one of the
well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirem ent applies,” the search of Mendoza’s
purse was unconstitutional. Ture, 632 N.W.2d at 627 (quotation omitted). “The state bears
the burden of establishing an exception to the warrant requirement.” Id.
If “the fruits of a challenged search ‘ultimately or inevitably would have been
discovered by lawful means,’ then the seized evidence is admissible even if the search
violated the warrant requirement.” State v. Licari , 659 N.W.2d 243, 254 (Minn. 2003)
(quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2509 (1984)). The United
States Supreme Court adopted the inevitable -discovery doctrine as an exception to the
exclusionary rule to ensure that the “exclusion of evidence that would inevitably have been
discovered” does not “put the government i n a worse position, because the police would
have obtained that evidence if no misconduct had taken place.” Nix, 467 U.S. at 444, 104
S. Ct. at 2509. The state must establish the exception by a preponderance of the evidence.
Licari, 659 N.W.2d at 254. The state may not rely on speculation, but, rather, must base

6
the exception “on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or
impeachment.” Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5, 104 S. Ct. at 2509 n.5.
Minnesota caselaw recognizes that the inevita ble-discovery doctrine may be based
on the inevitability of an inventory search in cases in which a person is arrested and taken
to jail for booking. State v. Rodewald, 376 N.W.2d 416, 418, 422 (Minn. 1985); Geer v.
State, 406 N.W.2d 34, 36 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. July 15, 1987). Police
officers may conduct an inventory search “whenever an arrestee is to be jailed, . . . as part
of a standardized procedure,” and, in doing so, “may examine ‘all [] the items removed
from the arrestee’s person or possession.’” Rodewald, 376 N.W.2d at 420 (quoting Illinois
v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2609 (1983)).
The district court determined that if the purse had not been searched at the scene ,
Mendoza would have been arrested for possession of the methamphetamine found in plain
view on the bedroom floor. The purse would have been taken with him to jail and subjected
to a lawful inventory search. Because the methamphetamine in the purse would inevitably
have been found during this search, the district court concluded that the methamphetamine
in the purse was admissible. We agree.
When police executed the warrant, they found Mendoza and Ozornia in the bedroom
with the door locked, as it had been during the attempted controlled buy. Neither Ozornia
nor Mendoza opened the door when police announced their presence. The
methamphetamine on the floor was found in plain view only a few feet from where
Mendoza was standing. Multiple agents testified that it was very unusual for a large
amount of methamphetamine to be out in plain view. Mendoza also had a large amount of

7
cash on his person, and police knew that Mendoza had drug convictions and was a
suspected gang member. All of these facts pr ovided probable cause that Mendoza, either
exclusively or jointly with Ozornia, constructively possessed the methamphetamine found
on the floor. See In re Welfare of G.M. , 560 N.W.2d 687, 695 (Minn. 1997) (stating that
probable cause to arrest exists when the “ objective facts are such that under the
circumstances, a person of ordinary care and prudence would entertain an honest and strong
suspicion that a crime has been committed ”); State v. Florine , 303 Minn. 103, 105, 226
N.W.2d 609, 611 (1975) (outlin ing requ irements of constructive possession); State v.
Dickey, 827 N.W.2d 792, 796 (Minn. App. 2013) (“A person may constructively possess
contraband jointly with another person.” (quotation omitted)). In addition, Agent Braness
testified that if the purse had n ot been searched, Mendoza would have been arrested for
possession of the methamphetamine found on the floor.
The next question is whether the state established that the purse could have and
would have been taken with Mendoza to jail. Most caselaw dealin g with inventory
searches involves vehicles. In that context, the supreme court has recognized a “caretaking
authority to impound a vehicle to protect the defendant’s property from theft and police
from claims arising therefrom.” State v. Rohde , 852 N.W. 2d 260, 265 (Minn. 2014)
(quotations omitted). Courts give “deference ‘to police caretaking procedures designed to
secure and protect vehicles and their contents within police custody.’” State v. Holmes ,
569 N.W.2d 181, 186 -87 (Minn. 1997) (quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372,
107 S. Ct. 738, 741 (1987)). The key question is the “reasonableness” of the inventory
search, which is determined by asking “whether police carried out the search in accordance

8
with standard procedures in the local poli ce department.” Id. at 187. Moreover, even if
less intrusive means exist for protecting property, the Fourth Amendment does not require
such means. Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 647-48, 103 S. Ct. at 2610.
Police could have and would have taken the purse with Mendoza to jail pursuant to
their caretaking authority. Agent Braness testified that the purse would have been taken
with Mendoza to jail because , as a matter of course, “[p]roperty of individuals that are
arrested are brought to the jail.” Given the context of Mendoza’s presence in the house, it
also would have been reasonable for the agents to take the purse with Mendoza to jail in
order to protect it and make it available to Mendoza upon his release. Police saw Mendoza
carry the purse from the car into the home, and Mendoza had his hands on the purse when
police entered the bedroom. The purse belonged to Mendoza, and there is no indication
that Mendoza lived in the house or had any significant connection to the house. In addition,
the only person that Mendoza seemed to know in the house, Ozornia, was also arrested.
Finally, there is a policy that would have resulted in the purse being searched at the
jail. Agent Braness testifie d that the jail has a standard policy of searching and
inventorying all inmate property. His testimony is consistent with state law that requires
all jails to have a standardized procedure for processing arrestees, which must include “a
search of the inmate and the inmate’s possessions” and the “inventory and storage of the
inmate’s personal property.” Minn. R. 2911.2525, subp. 1(C), (D) (2015).
The state established by a preponderance of the evidence that the methamphetamine
in the purse inevitably would have been discovered during a lawful inventory search. The
district court did not err by denying Mendoza’s motion to suppress on this ground. Because

9
we conclude that the met hamphetamine is admissible under the inevitable -discovery
doctrine, we need not address Mendoza’s challenge to the district court’s application of the
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine.
Sentencing
When Mendoza committed his offense in November 2015 , possession of 8.478
grams of methamphetamine was a second -degree controlled substance crime carrying a
statutory maximum sentence of 40 years and, for a person with Mendoza’s criminal-history
score, a presumptive sentencing range of 7 5 to 105 months. Minn. Stat. § 152.022,
subds. 2(a)(1), 3(b) (2014); Minn. Sent. Guideline s 4.A (2014). In May 2016, the
legislature enacted and the governor signed the 2016 Minnesota drug sentencing reform
act. 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, §§ 1-22, at 576-92. Among other things, the act raised
threshold weights for first -, second-, and third -degree controlled subst ance crimes. Id.,
§§ 3-5, at 577 -82. As a result, if Mendoza committed his crime today, he would
presumably be convicted of fifth -degree possession of a controlled substance with a
statutory maximum sentence of five years and a presumptive stayed sentence of 17 months
in prison. See Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subds. 2(1), 4(b) (2016); Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.C
(2016). Mendoza argues that his conviction must be reduced to fifth-degree possession of
a controlled substance and that he must be resentenced under current law.
As a general rule, “[n]o law shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and
manifestly so intended by the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.21 (2016). When a law is
amended, “the new provisions shall be construed as effective only from the date whe n the
amendment became effective.” Minn. Stat. § 645.31 (2016). Accordingly, for a statute to

10
be applied to conduct committed before its effective date, the legislature must provide clear
evidence that it intended that application, “such as mention of th e word ‘retroactive.’”
State v. Traczyk , 421 N.W.2d 299, 300 (Minn. 1988) (quotation omitted). “The
retroactivity of a statute is a matter of statutory in terpretation, which we review de novo.”
State v. Basal, 763 N.W.2d 328, 335 (Minn. App. 2009).
Mendoza’s argument centers on State v. Coolidge , which outlines an exception to
the general rule stated above. 282 N.W.2d 511, 514-15 (Minn. 1979). Coolidge states that
when a “ criminal law in effect is repealed, absent a savings clause, all prosecutions are
barred where not reduced to a final judgment.” Id. at 514. It also states that “a statute
mitigating punishment is applied to acts committed before its effective date, as long as no
final judgment has been reached.” Id. The rationale for this rule is that “the legislature has
manifested its belief that the prior punishment is too severe and a lighter sentence is
sufficient.” Id. Coolidge was convicted of sodomy. Id. at 512. After he was convicted
but before his conviction became final, 1 the legislature repealed the sodomy statute and
reduced the maximum punishment for the criminal act Coolidge committed from ten years
to one year. Id. at 512, 514-15. The supreme court determined that Coolidge “should have
been sentenced under the present law.” Id. at 515. As Coolidge had already served over
two years in prison, the supreme court reduced his sentence to time served. Id.

1 A case is pending and not final “until such time as the availability of direct appeal has
been exhausted, the time for a petition for certiorari has elapsed or a petition for certiorari
with the United States Supreme Court has been filed and finally denied.” State v. Losh ,
721 N.W.2d 886, 893-94 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).

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Coolidge, however, was clarified by State v. Edstrom. 326 N.W.2d 10, 10 (Minn.
1982). In Edstrom, the supreme court explained that Coolidge’s common-law rule applies
only “absent a contrary statement of intent by the legislature.” Id. Because “the legislature
ha[d] clearly indicated its intent” that the new statute “have no effect on crimes committed
before the effective date of the act,” the supreme court refused to apply a statute enacted
after Edstrom’s crime that would have reduced his sentence. Id. The conduct underlying
Edstrom’s conviction occurred in March 1975, and the effective date of the act was August
1, 1975. Id. The new statute provided, “Except for section 8 of this act, crimes committed
prior to the effective date of this act are not affected by its provisions.” 1975 Minn. Laws
ch. 374, § 12, at 1251.
We have addressed Coolidge and Edstrom in two published opinions. In State v.
McDonnell, we determined that Coolidge’s common-law rule did not apply because the
legislature clearly indicated its intent that a statutory amendment not apply to crimes
committed before the amendment’s effective da te. 686 N.W.2d 841, 846 (Minn. App.
2004), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2004). The legislature provided that the amendment
“is effective August 1, 2003, and applies to violations committed on or after that date.” Id.
(quoting 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 2, art. 9, § 1, at 1446 ). In Basal, we also
determined that Coolidge did not apply. 763 N.W.2d at 336. The legislature expressly
provided that the relevant amendment “would become effective on January 1, 2008.” Id.
(citing 2007 Minn. Laws ch. 147, art. 2, § 64, at 1901). We concluded that “[b]ecause the
legislature provided for a specific effective date . . . , the legislature did not intend for the
amendment to apply to conduct occurring before the effective date.” Id.

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Mendoza claims tha t he is entitled to have his conviction reduced and to be
resentenced for fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance under Coolidge because
his conviction was not final at the time the act took effect. We disagree. In amending the
threshold weights in the second - and third-degree controlled-substance statutes to exceed
the 8.478 grams of methamphetamine Mendoza possessed, the legislature clearly indicated
that it did not intend to apply the amendments to conduct occurring before the effective
date. See Edstrom, 326 N.W.2d at 10. As to both statutes, the act provides, “This section
is effective August 1, 2016, and applies to crimes committed on or after that date.” 2016
Minn. Laws ch. 160, §§ 4-5, at 581 -83. The legislature used identical effecti ve-date
language in amending the first-, fourth-, and fifth-degree controlled-substance statutes. Id.,
§§ 3, 6-7, at 579, 584-85. Because Mendoza committed his offense in November 2015, he
is not entitled to application of the amendments.
Mendoza argues that to prevent the amendments from being applied to non -final
cases, the legislature needed to use more specific language, like that used in the statute at
issue in Edstrom. In the Edstrom statute, the legislature provided that “crimes committed
prior to the effective date of this act are not affected by its provisions.” 1975 Minn. Laws
ch. 374, § 12, at 1251. The effective-date provisions at issue here use different language
to accomplish the same result. Moreover, the language of the effective -date provisions at
issue here is virtu ally identical to the effective -date provision at issue in McDonnell.
Compare 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, §§ 4-5, at 581 -83 with 686 N.W.2d at 846 (quoting
2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. c h. 2, art. 9, § 1, at 1446 ). The language is also more
specific and clearer than the effective -date provision involved in Basal, which said only

13
that the act would be effective on a specific date. See 763 N.W.2d at 336 (citing 2007
Minn. Laws ch. 147, art. 2, § 64, at 1901). In both McDonnell and Basal, we determined
that the amendments applied only to crimes committed on or after the effective date. Id.;
McDonnell, 686 N.W.2d at 846.
The legislature clearly indicated its intent to apply the amendme nts to the
controlled-substance-crime statutes only to crimes committed on or after August 1, 2016.
Mendoza committed his crime well before that date and is not entitled to have his
conviction reduced from second- to fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance.
Affirmed.