Mansoor Akhtar, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1201

Mansoor Akhtar,
Appellant,

vs.

Anila Dairkee,
Respondent.

Filed April 3, 2017
Affirmed
Kalitowski, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-15-17681

Mansoor Akhtar, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Anila Dairkee, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Kalitowski,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KALITOWSKI, Judge
Mansoor Akhtar challenges the district court’s determination that he is not entitled
to damages for Anila Dairkee’s disposal of his personal property because he had abandoned
the property. We affirm.
FACTS
Akhtar lived rent free in the basement of Dairkee’s duplex from 2012 to 2013 . In
December 2013, Dairkee asked Akhtar to move out, but he refused. Dairkee warned
Akhtar that she was changing the locks and advised him to remov e his property from the
duplex. After she changed the locks, Dairkee called Akhtar on January 13, 2014, and left
him a message asking that he remove his property from the duplex. She repeated her
request at a January 2014 housing court hearing.1 Akhtar never removed his property.
In November 2014, unbeknownst to Dairkee, Dairkee’s father arranged to have the
duplex’s basement cleaned out , disposing of Akhtar’s property in the process. Akhtar
contacted Dairkee on March 8, 2015, and asked to retrieve his property. Dairkee informed
Akhtar that she was staying in New York and that he could not pick up his property until
she returned. When Dairkee returned, she learned that her father had disposed of Akhtar’s
property.

1 Akhtar’s housing court petition alleged that Dairkee unlawfully locked him out of the
duplex. The housing court denied Akhtar’s petition because he did not fit within the
statutory definition of “residential tenant.”

3
Akhtar sued Dairkee, alleging that she had wrongfully disposed of his property.
After a conciliation court hearing, Akhtar filed a demand for removal to district court. The
district court concluded that Akhtar had abandoned his property and therefore was not
entitled to damages.
D E C I S I O N
I. The statute does not require Dairkee to provide written notice.
Akhtar argues that the district court misapplied the law because Dairkee was
required to provide Akhtar with written notice before disposing of his personal property.
The district court found that Dairkee asked Akhtar to remove his property twice, providing
Akhtar with sufficient notice that his property had been abandoned.
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Lee v. Lee, 775 N.W.2d
631, 637 (Minn. 2009). We review a district court’s fact ual findings for clear error and
defer to its credibility determinations. Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co. , 832 N.W.2d
790, 797 (Minn. 2013); Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988).
Minn. Stat. § 345.75 (2016) governs the abandonment of tangible personal property
in this case. The statute requires the possessor of the abandoned property to provide notice
“personally” to the prior owner before taking ownership of the property . Minn. Stat.
§ 345.75. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “personal notice” as “[o]ral or written notice,
according to the circumstances, given directly to the affected person.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 1228 (10th ed. 201 4). Contrary to Akhtar’s assertion, the statute does not
explicitly require written notice; it only requires personal notice. The record supports the

4
district court’s finding that Dairkee asked Akhtar to collect his property twice: first by
phone and then in person at the housing court hearing. The district court therefore did not
err in finding that Dairkee had provided Akhtar with notice under Minn. Stat. § 345.75.
Akhtar also argues on appeal that the district court erred in finding that his bicycle
and television had been removed from the basement before the lockout. B ecause the
district court found that Akhtar had abandoned all of his property, we need not address this
issue.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dairkee’s phone bills
and documentation of Akhtar’s prior lawsuits.

Akhtar argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence
Dairkee’s phone bills and a document listing Akhtar’s prior lawsuits because Dairkee did
not follow the district c ourt’s instructions to send evidence to the district court before the
hearing.
We review a district court’s admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion.
Kroning v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 42, 45-46 (Minn. 1997). We disregard
harmless error. Minn. R. Civ. P. 61. The admission of evidenc e that is corroborated by
other competent evidence is harmless. George v. Estate of Baker, 724 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn.
2006). “A party failing to raise objection to the admission of evidence generally waives
later challenges to the evidence.” Town of Forest Lake v. Minn. Mun. Bd. , 497 N.W.2d
289, 290 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied (Minn. Apr. 29, 1993).
Because at trial Akhtar stated that he had no objection to the admission of the phone
bills, he has waived his right to challenge the ir admission on appea l. See id . Akhtar,

5
however, objected to admission of the documentation of his lawsuits as irrelevant. The
district court responded by excluding the p arts of the document not related to the present
case, admitting only the parts related to the housing court case, the conciliation court case,
and the district court case . Because Akhtar does not cite an evidentiary rule barring
admission of this evidence , the decision to admit the evidence was within the district
court’s discretion. See Kroning, 567 N.W.2d at 45-46. Moreover, even if the district court
abused its discretion in admitting evidence of Akhtar’s prior lawsuits , any error was
harmless because the testimony of Akhtar and Dairkee corroborates the three matters that
the district court did not exclude. See George, 724 N.W.2d at 9; Minn. R. Civ. P. 61.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting either
Dairkee’s phone bills or the documentation of Akhtar’s lawsuits.
III. Akhtar’s conciliation court arguments are not within our scope of review.

Akhtar argues that the conciliation court prevent ed him from presenting his case.
Our scope of review is limited to the order from which the appeal is taken. Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 103.04; see also Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp. , 766 N.W.2d 910, 917 -19 (Minn.
2009) (discussing the rea ch of Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04). An aggrieved party may
remove a case from conciliation court to district court for a trial de novo. Minn. R. Gen.
Pract. 521(a). When a district court tries a case de novo, it tries the case “as if it had not
been tried before.” Stronge & Lightner Co. v. Comm’r of Taxation , 228 Minn. 182, 195,
36 N.W.2d 800, 807 (1949). Here, because the district court conducted a trial de novo, the
conciliation court hearing did not affect the district court’s judgment, and any errors in the

6
conciliation court proceeding are not within our scope of review. See Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 103.04.
Affirmed.