The holding in the court’s own words
Because we conclude that appellant’s rights were not violated, we affirm.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- A11-0852 not in our corpus
- A13-1067 not in our corpus
- Case v. Pung 413 N.W.2d 261
- Thiele v. Stich 425 N.W.2d 580
- Aziz v. Fabian 791 N.W.2d 567
- Johnson v. Fabian 735 N.W.2d 295
- Roth v. Commissioner of Corrections 759 N.W.2d 224
- Ricky James Bedell v. Tom Roy, Commissioner of Corrections 853 N.W.2d 827
- Carrillo v. Fabian 701 N.W.2d 763
- Jacquet Deon Munn v. State of Minnesota A15-1222
Opinion text
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1225
Jacquet Deon Munn, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
Tom Roy, et al.,
Respondents.
Filed March 13, 2017
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge
Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-16-1739
Jacquet Deon Munn, Bayport, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Kelly S. Kemp, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondents)
Considered and decided by T. Smith, Pres iding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order denying his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus and dismissing his claims without a hearing. He argues that the
Department of Corrections (DOC) violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
when it imposed extended incarceration as a disciplinary penalty for appellant’s refusal to
2
participate in sex-offender treatment. Because we conclude that appellant’s rights were
not violated, we affirm.
FACTS
In December 2010, appellant Jacquet Munn pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal
sexual conduct and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. Appellant filed a
direct appeal of his sentence to this court, and we reversed and remanded for
resentencing. State v. Munn, No. A11-852, 2012 WL 2077264, at *1 (Minn. App. June
11, 2012). On remand, appellant sought to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court
denied appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and resentenced him, and appellant
challenged that decision. State v. Munn, No. A13-1067, 2014 WL 1516480, at *2 (Minn.
App. Apr. 21, 2014), review denied (Minn. July 15, 2014). On his second appeal, this
court affirmed the denial of appellant’s guilty-plea-withdrawal motion. Id. at *1.
Appellant was committed to the custody of the commissioner of corrections and
placed at the Minnesota Correctional Facility in Stillwater. In May 2013, DOC staff
determined that appellant should complete sex-offender treatment. DOC staff
interviewed appellant on June 24, 2015, to assess his willingness to participate in
treatment. Appellant refused sex-offender treatment, claiming that he was awaiting the
outcome of an active appeal. The next day, DOC staff issued appellant a notice of
violation of a discipline rule for his refusal. A disciplinary hearing was held on June 30,
2015, after which appellant received 360 days of extended incarceration. The hearing
officer noted that appellant did not have a direct appeal pending at the time that DOC
staff interviewed him.
3
Appellant exhausted the DOC’s disciplin e-appeal process, with the warden
affirming the decision to deny the administrative appeal because appellant did not have
an active direct appeal at the time of the interview. Appellant then filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the DOC violated his Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights when it imposed extended incarceration. The district court dismissed
appellant’s petition with prejudice. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the district court erred in denying his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus because the DOC violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
when it extended his incarceration as a result of his disciplinary violation.1 We disagree.
The state constitution guarantees the privilege of filing a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. The legislature codified this privilege, extending
the right to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to individuals who are “imprisoned
or otherwise restrained of liberty.” Minn. Stat. § 589.01 (2014). The petitioner bears the
burden of showing the illegality of his detention. Case v. Pung, 413 N.W.2d 261, 262
(Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Nov. 24, 1987). “The district court’s findings
1 Appellant also argues, for the first time on appeal, that the DOC violated Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), because it withheld evidence relating to a
transfer block that prevented appellant from transferring to a medium-security
correctional facility for MSOP. This was not appellant’s reason for refusing to
participate in sex-offender treatment. In addition, Brady may not apply because appellant
no longer has the same Fourth Amendment privileges as a preconviction defendant.
Boles v. Chavis, 454 U.S. 907, 909-10 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Moreover,
appellant did not make this argument to the district court; thus, we need not consider it.
Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988).
4
in support of a denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus are entitled to great weight
and will be upheld if reasonably supported by the evidence.” Aziz v. Fabian, 791 N.W.2d
567, 569 (Minn. App. 2010). This court, nonetheless, reviews questions of law de novo.
Id.
I. Appellant’s Fifth Amendment right was not violated.
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V; see also Minn. Const. art. I,
§ 7. “In order for the privilege to apply, two distinct elements must be present—
compulsion and incrimination.” Johnson v. Fabian, 735 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Minn. 2007).
In Minnesota, imposing an extension of an inmate’s incarceration for his refusal to
participate in a sex-offender-treatment program is compulsion under the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 309. Thus, compulsion was
present when appellant refused sex-offender treatment.
The incrimination element is present when a convicted individual has a direct
appeal of that conviction pending or when “the time for direct appeal of that conviction
has not expired.” Id. at 310. “[O]nce a direct appeal has concluded and the risk of a
perjury prosecution is absent or has expired, an offender no longer enjoys the Fifth
Amendment privilege to refuse to participate in sex-offender treatment.” Roth v. Comm’r
of Corrections, 759 N.W.2d 224, 229 (Minn. App. 2008).
When DOC staff interviewed appellant for entry into MSOP on June 24, 2015, he
did not have a direct appeal pending. This court affirmed the district court’s denial of
appellant’s guilty-plea-withdrawal motion on April 21, 2014. The Minnesota Supreme
5
Court denied review on July 15, 2014, and appellant did not file a petition for a writ of
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court within 90 days.
Further, at the time of the interview, appellant did not face a risk of perjury
prosecution for two reasons. First, appellant pleaded guilty to his crimes in December
2010. Bedell v. Roy, 853 N.W.2d 827, 830 (Minn. App. 2014) (“Once the appeal is
exhausted, the privilege applies only if the inmate testified at trial and denied that a crime
occurred because the inmate would have a ‘real’ fear of a perjury prosecution.”) (citing
Johnson, 735 N.W.2d at 311)). Second, DOC staff interviewed appellant for MSOP in
June 2015, which is almost five years after he pleaded guilty, well past the three-year
statute of limitations for perjury. Minn. Stat. § 628.26(k) (2014). Therefore, appellant
cannot establish that the DOC violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination because he cannot establish the incrimination element.
II. Appellant’s Fourteenth Amendment right was not violated.
Under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, an inmate “has a
protected liberty interest in his supervised release date that triggers a right to procedural
due process before that date can be extended.” Carrillo v. Fabian, 701 N.W.2d 763, 773
(Minn. 2005). The United State Supreme Court has held that due process requires that an
inmate be afforded: (1) “[a]t least a brief period of time after the notice, no less than 24
hours, . . . to prepare for the appearance,” (2) “a written statement by the factfinders as to
the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action,” and (3) the ability “to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so
6
will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564, 566, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2979 (1974) (quotation omitted).
Here, the DOC served appellant with the no tice of violation five days prior to the
disciplinary hearing. A hearing officer presided over the hearing and provided a written
statement of his findings and reasoning for the disciplinary action, including that
appellant did not prevail in his direct appeal and that the postconviction court denied his
postconviction petition.2 The DOC also provided appellant with the opportunity to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence. Appellant was afforded all the process due
to him.
Affirmed.
2 In January 2015, appellant petitioned for postconviction relief and argued, in an amended
petition, “that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas on due-process grounds.” Munn
v. State, No. A15-1222, 2016 WL 1396963, at *1-2 (Minn. App. Apr. 11, 2016), review
denied (Minn. June 29, 2016). The postconvic tion court denied hi s request without a
hearing on June 18, 2015. Id. at *2. Appellant filed a notice of appeal of the postconviction
court’s decision on July 24, 2015. This court affirmed the postconviction court’s decision,
and the supreme court denied ap pellant’s petition for review. Munn v. State , 2016 WL
1396963.