State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1228

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Daniel Adam Oltz,
Appellant.

Filed May 30, 2017
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Benton County District Court
File No. 05-CR-15-2167

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Edwin W. Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Stauber,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
ROSS, Judge
Police arrested appellant Daniel Oltz for fifth-degree drug possession after an officer
pulled him over and saw methamphetamine and a pipe in his car. The district court allowed
the state to present Spreigl testimony that Oltz possessed a similar methamphetamine pipe
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previously. The jury found Oltz guilty, and on appeal he argues that the district court
improperly admitted the Spreigl testimony. We affirm because the district court did not
abuse its discretion and because, even if it did, there is no reasonable possibility that the
alleged error significantly affected the verdict.
FACTS
A Sauk Rapids police o fficer arrested Oltz after stopping Oltz’s car and seeing a
pipe and a substance the officer suspected was methamphetamine inside the car. The state
charged Oltz with a fifth-degree controlled substance crime in violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 152.025, subdivision 2(a)(1) (2 014). The prosecutor notified Oltz of the
state’s intent to produce Spreigl evidence that, in April 2014, a state trooper discovered a
methamphetamine pipe in Oltz’s backpack. The prosecutor said that the state would offer
the evidence “to aid the jury in determining whether the defendant knew the sub stance he
possessed on November 10, 2015, was methamphetamine.” The district court conducted a
jury trial in February 2016.
Testimony About the Fifth-Degree Controlled Substance Crime
Sauk Rapids police officer Matthew Bosma testified that he stopped Oltz’s Jeep for
running a stop sign and failing to signal a turn. Officer Bosma saw a “small baggy with
crystalline material and a glass pipe” on the floor below the driver’s seat. The o fficer
believed that the pipe was used for methamphetamine. He arrested Oltz and searched the
Jeep, finding a glass bong, a butane torch, other glass pipes, and marijuana. The crystalline
substance field-tested positive as methamphetamine.
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Amy Granlund, a forensic scientist with the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension, tested the substance and confirmed that it contained methamphetamine.
Cody Severtson, Oltz’s friend since childhood, testified in Oltz’s defense. Severtson
said that he used Oltz’s Jeep occasionally in November 2015. He claimed that in early
November, he was “heavily using methamphetamine” and “had a little bit of
methamphetamine . . . and a pipe” on his person. He asserted that he left “a little baggy of
methamphetamine” and his pipe in Oltz’s Jeep. He said he had attempted to contact Oltz,
but he was arrested before he could reach Oltz. On cross-examination, Severtson admitted
he had been convicted of first-degree burglary in November 2015 and was still serving his
prison sentence. And he admitted that he learned that Oltz had been arrested when he
encountered Oltz in jail. When the prosecutor challenged Severtson’s testimony by
emphasizing that his prison term could not be extended if he were sentenced for the drug
crime instead of Oltz, Severtson claimed to have been unaware of th at fact. Severtson’s
probation officer testified, confirming that if the state charged Severtson with the controlled
substance crime, he would face no additional time in prison.
Spreigl Testimony
The prosecutor reiterated that the state would offer the Spreigl testimony to prove
that Oltz knew the substance that he possess ed was methamphetamine. Oltz objected ,
arguing that “the presence of pipes without the presence of methamphetamine or
methamphetamine residue is not probative of whether he knew there was
methamphetamine in the vehicle in this case.” The district court ruled, “I am going to allow
the [ Spreigl] evidenc e solely for the purpose of establishing knowledge of the
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methamphetamine. So given [the state’s evidence] so far, . . . there is at least an argument
that [Oltz] did not know that the methamphetamine was present.” It concluded that the
potential prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence.
The district court gave a cautionary instruction before admitting the Spreigl
testimony. State Patrol Sergeant Aaron Dix testified that he stopped a Chrysler Sebring in
Sauk Rapids on April 8, 2014. The Chrysler had three occupants, including Oltz. Sergeant
Dix found two pipes in Oltz’s backpack: one that “appeared to be used for marijuana, and
the other . . . that appeared to be used for methamphetamine.” The second pipe was clean.
Sergeant Dix also identified the pipe discovered by Officer Bosma as a methamphetamine
pipe similar to the pipe he discovered in Oltz’s backpack in 2014. Sergeant Dix said that
he had known the style of pipe to be used only for smoking methamphetamine. The district
court included a final cautionary instruction limiting the jury’s use of the Spreigl evidence.
The jury found Oltz guilty. The district court sentenced him to 25 months in prison.
Oltz appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Oltz asks us to reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial because the district
court erroneously admitted the Spreigl testimony. We review a district court’s decision to
admit Spreigl evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Griffin , 887 N.W.2d 257, 261
(Minn. 2016). The appellant bears the burden “of showing an error occurred and any
resulting prejudice.” Id. If the district court erred, we ask whether there is a “reasonable
possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” Id. at
262.
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I
We consider first whether the district court abused its discretion. Id. at 261.
Evidence of a defendant’s prior “crime, wrong, or act,” otherwise known as “ Spreigl”
evidence, is inadmissible to demonstrate the defendant’s propensity to act, but it can be
admissible for legitimate purposes. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b); see State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn.
488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965). Spreigl evidence generally faces a five -step admission
process: (1) the state gives notice of its intent to admit the evidence; (2) the state indicates
what the Spreigl evidence will be offered to prove; (3) clear and convincing evidence must
prove the act and the person’s participation; (4) the evidence must be relevant to the state’s
case; and (5) the probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its potential
for unfair prejudice. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b); State v. Ness , 707 N.W.2d 676, 686 (Minn.
2006). Oltz argues that the Spreigl evidence was improperly admitted as propensity
evidence and that its potential for unfair prejudice outweighed its probative value.
A. Purpose
“A person is guilty of [a] controlled substance crime in the fifth degree . . . if . . . the
person unlawfully possesses one or more mixtures containing [certain controlled
substances.]” Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(a)(1). To convict Oltz, the state had to prove
that: (1) Oltz actually or constructively possessed the methamphetamine; (2) Oltz knew or
believed that the substance was methamphetamine; (3) Oltz ’s possession was unlawful;
and (4) Oltz’s act took place on November 10, 2015, in Benton County. See id.; see also
State v. Barker, 888 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Minn. App. 2016) (“Actual possession, also referred
to as physical posse ssion, involves direct physical control.” (quotation omitted)); State v.
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Florine, 303 Minn. 103, 105, 226 N.W.2d 609, 611 (1975) (“ [I]n order to prove
constructive possession the stat e should have to show (a) that the police found the
substance in a place under defendant's exclusive control to which other people did not
normally have access, or (b) that, if police found it in a place to which others had access,
there is a strong probability (inferable from other evidence) that defendant was at the time
consciously exercising dominion and control over it.”). Spreigl evidence can be offered to
prove “knowledge.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). The parties here address two types of
knowledge: one s pecific to possession and one specific to knowledge that the substance
possessed was methamphetamine.
The state clearly indicated that the Spreigl testimony would be offered to prove
Oltz’s knowledge that the substance was methamphetamine. It contends that the “prior
possession of paraphernalia that has such an exclusive function” of smoking
methamphetamine demonstrated that Oltz was familiar with methamphetamine. And by
extension, if Oltz “was aware of the presence of the substance found in his vehicle,
[Sergeant] Dix’s testimony tended to prove that [Oltz] was also aware that it was
methamphetamine.”
Oltz claims that the district court admitted the evidence for a different purpose: t o
prove that he knew the methamphetamine was in his vehicle . The record is somewhat
ambiguous as to what the district court understood the Spreigl testimony’s purpose to be.
The district court admitted the evidence “solely for the purpose of establishing knowledge
of the methamphetamine, ” and observed that there was “at least an argument that [Oltz]
did not know that the methamphetamine was present .” Oltz believes that this shows that
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the district court admitted the evidence to prove only Oltz’s knowledge that the substance
was in the car (not that the substance was methamphetamine).
Oltz essentially asks us to conclude that the district court admitted the evidence for
a purpose other than the state’s proffered purpose, reflected in the state’s written notice and
also in two on -the-record clarifications. A more plausible understanding of the district
court’s assessment is that after the district court heard the state declare one purpose and
Oltz address a different purpose, it recognized that Oltz’s defense was directed at a different
element of the offense. And Oltz’s argument is contradicted, in part, by the district court’s
immediate determination that the probative value was not outweighed by any potential for
unfair prejudice. Oltz is correct on appeal, just as he argued to the district court, that the
Spreigl testimony is not relevant to whether he knew there was methamphetamine on the
floor of his vehicle. Because we know that the district court determined that the probative
value outweighed the potential for unfair prejudice , we must infer that the d istrict court
accepted the Spreigl testimony to prove the relevant fact of the substance’s nature as
methamphetamine, consistent with the state’s clarification of the testimony’s legitimate
use. This resolves any ambiguity in the district court’s statement s. The Spreigl evidence
was not admitted as improper propensity evidence, and it therefore does not reflect an abuse
of discretion.
B. Potential for Unfair Prejudice
Oltz argues that t he district court erroneously determined that the Spreigl
testimony’s proba tive value outweighed any potential prejudice. He failed to raise this
argument to the district court. We generally do not reach issues that were not raised in the
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district court. Roby v. State , 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996). We briefly address the
issue in the interests of efficiency.
Oltz bases his argument on the notion that the “real” issue was not whether he knew
the substance was methamphetamine but whether he knowingly possessed the substance
because “whether Oltz was f amiliar with meth was not a disputed fact.” The argument
ignores the fact that state must prove every element of the offense, including that Oltz knew
that the substance was methamphetamine, and it also overlooks that the state may generally
prove its case using whatever legitimate evidence it chooses. As the supreme court has
explained, “[P]rejudice does not mean the damage to the opponent’s case that results from
the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather, it refers to the unfair advantage that
results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.” State v. Welle,
870 N.W.2d 360, 366 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted and emphasis added ). Oltz
suggested at oral argument that the probative value was at least diminished becaus e the
jury could have inferred Oltz’s familiarity with methamphetamine by his association with
Severtson. But Oltz’s general familiarity with methamphetamine is not the same as his
knowing that the substance on his floor was methamphetamine. Oltz’s prejudice argument
fails.
II
We add that, even if the district court abused its discretion, Oltz would still not be
entitled to a new trial. If we assume that the Spreigl evidence was erroneously admitted,
we then ask “whether there is a reasonable possibility th at the wrongfully admitted
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evidence significantly affected the verdict.” See id. at 366 (quotation omitted). The answer
is no.
To answer the question, w e may consider how the evidence was presented, the
strength of the state’s other evidence, whether the state relied on the evidence in closing,
whether the district court gave a cautionary instruction, and the strength of the defense. See
State v. Clark , 738 N.W.2d 316, 347 –48 (Minn. 2007); State v. Bolte , 530 N.W.2d 191,
198–99 (Minn. 1995). Oltz argues that Severtson’s testimony refuted his possession, that
the untidiness of his vehicle casts doubts on his possession, that the state relied on the
evidence in its closing argument, and that there is a substantial risk that the jurors convicted
Oltz because the Spreigl evidence was used to demonstrate propensity. The argument fails.
The state’s case was strong. Officer Bosma testified that the methamphetamine and
pipe were in plain sight when he stopped Oltz. And Oltz’s defense was weak. Its
centerpiece was the self-incriminating testimony of Severtson, whose long friendship with
Oltz and acceptance of blame resulting in no additional punishment were facts tha t might
reasonably leave the jury skeptical. The guilty verdict demonstrates how the jury weighed
Severtson’s credibility.
And the district court ’s two cautionary instructions on the use of the Spreigl
evidence undermine Oltz’s argument. The district cour t forbade the jury from convicting
Oltz based on the 2014 incident ; and w e presume jurors follow the court’s instructions ,
minimizing any prejudicial effect of Spreigl evidence. See State v. Clark, 755 N.W.2d 241,
261 (Minn. 2008). The prosecutor’s closing argument likewise reminded the jury, “You
shouldn’t find [Oltz] guilty because of what happened in 2014, but you can consider how
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that affects whether he knowingly possessed methamphetamine in this case.” And in
context, this statement relat ed to Oltz’s k nowledge that the substance was
methamphetamine, consistent with the state’s offered purpose.
In sum, the district court did not erroneously admit the Spreigl testimony and there
also is no reasonable possibility that this evidence significantly affected the verdict.
Affirmed.