State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1246

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Taylor Joseph Christianson,
Appellant.

Filed May 8, 2017
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge*

Chippewa County District Court
File No. 12-CR-15-654

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Michael Everson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

David Gilbertson, Chippewa County Attorney, Montevideo, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard Schmitz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge ; Reilly, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KLAPHAKE, Judge
In this appeal from his conviction of felony domestic assault, appellant argues that
the district court committed reversible error by admitting as Spreigl evidence two prior
instances of physical abuse by appellant against the victim. We affirm.
D E C I S I O N
“Appellate courts largely defer to the trial court's exercise of discretion in
evidentiary matters and will not lightly overturn a trial court's evidentiary ruling.” State v.
Kelly, 435 N.W.2d 807, 813 (Minn. 1989). We will not reverse a district court’s
evidentiary rulings “absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Robertson, 884 N.W.2d
864, 872 (Minn. 2016). On appeal, Taylor Joseph Christianson must establish that the
district court abused its discretion and that, as a consequence, he was prejudiced. State v.
Meyer, 749 N.W.2d 844, 848 (Minn. App. 2008).
Generally, evidence of prior bad acts by a criminal defendant is inadmissible for
purposes of showing action in conformity therewith. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b); see also State
v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 490, 139 N.W.2d 167, 169 (1965). However, this evidence,
often referred to as Spreigl evidence, may be admitted for limited other purposes provided
certain requirements are met. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). These other purposes include “proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.” Id.
3
Before admitting Spreigl evidence, a district court must determine “(1) that the
evidence is clear and convincing that the defendant participated in the other offense;
(2) that the Spreigl evidence is relevant and material to the state’s case; and (3) that the
probative value of the Spreigl evidence is not outweighed by its potential for unfair
prejudice.” State v. Shannon, 583 N.W.2d 579, 583 (Minn. 1998). Christianson concedes
that his prior acts of domestic violence were proved by clear and convincing evidence, but
nevertheless argues that those acts should not have been admitted because they were not
relevant and were unfairly prejudicial.
“Spreigl evidence is relevant and material when there is a sufficiently close
relationship between the charged offense and the Spreigl offense in terms of time, place,
or modus operandi.” State v. Gomez, 721 N.W.2d 871, 878 (Minn. 2006). Christianson
was charged with felony domestic assault by strangulation and felony domestic assault.
The district court determined that Christianson’s prior acts of domestic violence against
the victim, G.P., were relevant and material because the “assaults are both similar to the
offense charged in that they occurred in the context of a relationship, were committed
against the same victim, and follow a consistent pattern.” One of the prior assaults involved
strangulation, and both involved physical violence in G.P.’s dwelling. While not identical,
the past acts of domestic violence between Christianson and G.P. were sufficiently similar
to be relevant for purposes of Spreigl.
The district court determined that the probative value of the past acts of domestic
violence was high and outweighed any potential for unfair prejudice. In the context of
Spreigl evidence, unfair prejudice “is not merely damaging evidence, even severely
4
damaging evidence; rather, unfair prejudice is evidence that persuades by illegitimate
means, giving one party an unfair advantage.” State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn.
2006) (quotation omitted). We agree with the district court that a pattern of domestic
violence by Christianson during his ongoing relationship with G.P. is highly probative of
the nature of that relationship and could assist the jury in reconciling otherwise unusual
facts, such as why G.P. waited to report the incident or why G.P. did not leave the house
immediately after the assault.1
We conclude that because Christianson’s past acts of domestic violence against G.P.
were both material and not unfairly prejudicial, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in allowing evidence of those acts to be heard by the jury.
Affirmed.

1 We also note that the district court provided the jury with an appropriate limiting
instruction both when the evidence was admit ted and again at closing. A proper limiting
instruction weighs against a finding of unfair prejudice. See Gomez, 721 N.W.2d at 879–
80.