Father John Dee Czaplewski, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1253

Father John Dee Czaplewski,
Appellant,

vs.

City of Minneapolis,
Respondent.

Filed May 15, 2017
Affirmed
Kalitowski, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-15-21172

Father John Dee Czaplewski, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Susan L. Segal, Minneapolis City Attorney, Gregory P. Sautter, Assistant City Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and
Kalitowski, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KALITOWSKI, Judge
In this appeal challenging the district court’s affirmance of a special assessment for
the costs of repairing sidewalks, appellant -homeowner argues that the assess ment was
improper because the repairs were unnecessary. Appellant also asserts that evidentiary and
procedural errors require reversal of the district court’s decision. We affirm.
D E C I S I O N
I.
Initially, we reject t he city ’s contention that because appellant was granted an
evidentiary hearing before the hearing officer, the district court should have deferred to the
hearing officer’s findings. See St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Minn. Publ. Serv.
Comm’n, 312 Minn. 250, 258, 251 N.W.2d 350, 356 (1977) (concluding that substantial -
evidence standard applied when commission acted in quasi -judicial capacity). St. Paul
Area Chamber of Commerce was decided under the Administrative Procedure Act, and
does not control here. Moreover, the city concedes that because the district court found
that the assessment was properly adopted, any error in conducting a trial de novo and not
deferring to the hearing officer’s findings was harmless. We, therefore, review the district
court’s factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. See Am. Bank
of St. Paul v. City of Minneapolis, 802 N.W.2d 781, 789 (Minn. App. 2011) (applying that
standard).
Generally, when a special assessment is appealed, a special -benefit test applies.
Carson-Lang Realty Co. v. City of Windom , 307 Minn. 368, 369, 240 N.W.2d 517, 519

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(1976). But “the Minnesota Supreme Court [has] recognized a distinction between revenue
collected under the taxing power and regulatory service fees collected under the pol ice
power.” Am. Bank, 802 N.W.2d at 786. When property violates a city regulation or creates
a public nuisance, the city may act under its police power to correct the violation and assess
the costs to the property at issue. See id. at 786-87 (providing examples to explain the
difference between taxing and police power ). Such an “assessment . . . is subject to a
reasonableness standard rather than the special benefit standard.” Id. at 787. Under the
reasonableness standard, a court considers whether “t he assessment amount was
proportionate to the cost of the service rendered, and [whether] the cost was unreasonable
or not reasonably related to the regulatory expense.” Id. at 786.
Appellant owns a corner lot with two sidewalks located in respondent Cit y of
Minneapolis. Following two inspections, city sidewalk inspectors determined that almost
all of the sidewalk panels on appellant’s property needed to be replaced. The record
evidence shows that one of the sidewalk panels that was replaced on appellan t’s property
had an unsafe slope and that all of the others had multiple cracks.
The district court found:
10. The evidence shows that [appellant’s] sidewalk
panels were in violation of Minneapolis City Charter, Chapter
8, Section 12, which requires property owners to “maintain
[sidewalks] in good repair.” As seen in Exhibit 3, there were
several deep cracks in the panels, and Mr. Glenn credibly
testified that one of the panels was at an incline of
approximately 4%. This was double the maximum allow able
cross-slope, and increased the risk of a pedestrian tripping or
falling.

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11. While [appellant] had filled several of the cracks
with vinyl cement, such patches last only one to three years,
and the City only inspects a given sidewalk once every ten to
fifteen years. Indeed photographs 5 -8 of Exhibit 3 show that
in less than one year, several of [appellant’s] vinyl patches had
started to wear down and expose the underlying cracks.
Accordingly vinyl cement patches were not a sufficient means
of repair.

The district court’s findings are supported by the record evidence, including the
photographs of appellant’s sidewalks, and testimony by a city sidewalk inspector about the
city’s 10- to 15-year rotation period for sidewalk inspections and repairs and the temporary
nature of vinyl patches. The findings, therefore, are not clearly erroneous, and the findings
support the district court’s determination that the city’s decision to replace appellant’s
sidewalk panels was reasonable.
The assessed costs included the costs incurred by the city plus a $50 administration-
and-inspection fee. Appellant argues that the district court erred in finding that the city
replaced 94.5 feet of sidewalk covering 12 panels. But even if this finding is erroneous,
appellant has not shown that the costs incurred by the city were unreasonable. To prevail
on appeal, a party must show that the district court erred and that the error was prejudicial.
Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr., Inc., 306 Minn. 352, 356, 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (1975).
II.
“The admission of evidence rests within the broad discretion of the [district] court
and its ruling will not be disturbed unless it is based on an erroneous view of the law or
constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Kroning v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 42,
45-46 (Minn. 1 997) (quotation omitted). “Entitlement to a new trial on the grounds of

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improper evidentiary rulings rests upon the complaining party’s ability to demonstrate
prejudicial error.” Id. at 46 (quotation omitted).
Appellant argues that the district court erred in excluding as hearsay his proffered
statement by a licensed contractor. An out-of-court statement made by a nonparty and
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted is generally inadmissible hearsay. Minn.
R. Evid. 801(c), (d). And a ppellant has not provided a citation to an exception to the
hearsay rule that applies to the contractor’s statement.
Appellant argues that the district court erred in considering a statement made by a
council member at the public committee hearing. But t he statement is in the hearing
transcript, and appellant did not object to the admission of the transcript. The failure to
object to evidence during a legal proceeding generally waives the right to raise a later
challenge. Town of Forest Lake v. Minn. Mun. Bd. , 497 N.W.2d 289, 290 (Minn. App.
1993), review denied (Minn. Apr. 29, 1993) . Also, nothing in the district court’s order
indicates that the court relied on the council member’s statement to support its decision.
Appellant argues that the district court did not give sufficient weight to the
testimony of his witnesses. This court defers to the district court’s credibility
determinations. Sefkow v. Sefkow , 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). In addition, no
evidence in the record supports appellant’s conspiracy and perjury claims.
Finally, appellant argues that costs and disbursements should not have been imposed
on him due to his in forma pauperis status. But in every district court action, the prevailing
party “shall be allowed reasonable disbursements paid or incurred.” Minn. Stat. § 549.04,
subd. 1 (2016). The supreme court has interpreted this statute as to mandate that a district

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court must not relieve the nonprevailing party of the obligation to pay rea sonable
disbursements based on the nonprevailing party’s indigent status . Dukowitz v. Hannon
Sec. Servs., 841 N.W.2d 147, 15 5-56 (Minn. 2014). The in forma pauperis statute states
that judgment may be rendered for costs as in other actions. Minn. Stat. § 563.01, subd.
10 (2016). Based on the applicable law, the district court did not err in awarding the city
costs and disbursements despite appellant’s in forma pauperis status.
Affirmed.