In re the Marriage of:

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1281

In re the Marriage of:

Crystol Kevan Caudullo, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Michael Anthony Caudullo,
Respondent.

Filed May 8, 2017
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69HI-FA-14-7

Rachel C. Sullivan, Richard E. Prebich, Prebich & Sullivan, P.C., Hibbing, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Michael A. Caudullo, Hibbing, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg , Presiding Judge; Stauber, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
This is the second appeal in this marri age-dissolution case. Appellant Crystol
Caudullo (mother) challenges the district c ourt’s parenting-time order after our earlier
remand. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2014, mother sought to dissolve the parties’ marr iage. She requested sole
physical custody of the parties’ four minor children, alleging that respondent Michael
Caudullo (father) had emotionally and physically abused her and the children on multiple
occasions. Father initially requested sole lega l and physical custody of the children. At
trial, he admitted two incident s in which he abused mother, but he denied that he ever
abused the children.
After a trial, and as discussed in more de tail in our opinion in the earlier appeal,
Caudullo v. Caudullo, No. A15-0314, 2016 WL 687350, at *3 (Minn. App. Feb. 22, 2016),
the district court awarded the parties joint le gal and physical custody of the children, and
established a parenting-time schedule. The di strict court partially granted mother’s post-
trial motion to amend, but it denied mother’s requests that she be awarded sole physical
custody of the children or, alternatively, that there be a new trial.
Mother appealed. We affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district
court. Id. at *5. We held that the district court incorrectly analyzed the four joint-custody
factors enumerated in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 2 (2014). Specifically, we held that the
district court’s finding of domestic abuse “tri ggered the statutory presumption that joint

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physical custody is not in the best interests of the children,” and that father had not rebutted
the presumption. Id. We concluded that “Father’s domestic abuse of mother undermines
the ability of the parties to cooperate in sharing joint physical custody.” Id. We therefore
reversed the district’s court’s award of join t physical custody, determined that mother
should be awarded sole physi cal custody of the children, and remanded the case “to the
district court to order parenting time consistent with [our] opinion.” Id. at *7.
On remand, the district court declined to hold an additional evidentiary hearing on
the issue of parenting time, and issued amende d findings of fact and order based on the
record as then constituted. In its memorandum of law, the dist rict court stated that it was
“uncertain what, specifically, the appellate court is asking be done,” and that it was
“perplexed by the appellate court’s conclusion that mother and father are incapable of co-
parenting.” Still, the district court amended its findings by adding and deleting findings of
fact, and it added a finding that the parties ar e disposed to have fre quent and continuing
contact with each other. The district court gr anted mother sole physical custody of the
children, and ordered parenting time on a schedule that was similar to that ordered before
the first appeal. But it orde red a “week on/week off” pa renting-time schedule during
summer months. Mother again moved for amended findings, arguing that the district court
did not properly recognize th e significance of father’s abus e toward her. She therefore
asked the district court to reduce father’s parenting time. The district court denied mother’s
motion, stating that father’s domestic a buse “though serious and inexcusable, was
situational—not the abuse of on-going power and control,” and finding that the parenting
time ordered was in the best interests of the children.

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This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Mother raises two issues. First, she argues that the district court’s findings of fact
and award of parenting time ar e inconsistent with our inst ructions on remand after the
earlier appeal. Second, mother argues that the district court’ s best-interests findings are
unsupported by the record.
I. The district court’s findings of fact an d its award of parenting time are not
inconsistent with our remand instructions.

Mother contends first that the district court failed to follow our remand instructions.
A district court’s compliance with remand instructions is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, LLP , 704 N.W.2d 759, 763 (Minn. 2005). District courts
have broad discretion on remand, and they may “act in any wa y not inconsistent with the
remand instructions provided.” Id.; Duffey v. Duffey , 432 N.W.2d 473, 476 (Minn. App.
1988).
Mother identifies four ways in which she claims the district court’s order on remand
was inconsistent with our remand instructions. First, she argues that the district court’s
decision to award father a “near equal” share of parenting time is in consistent with our
earlier determination that mother should be awarded sole phys ical custody. Our earlier
opinion remanded to the district court “to reconsider its best-interests findings,” noting the
oft-quoted holding in Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 477 (Minn. App. 2000),
that the best-interests determination is uni quely for resolution by the district court.
Caudullo, 2016 WL 687350, at *7. We ordered th e district court to “review and modify,

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where appropriate, its findings on the best-interests factors,” and did not otherwise restrict,
limit, or direct the district court in its exercise of discretion. Id. at *7. Nothing in our
earlier opinion directed the district court to make any particular parenting-time allocation.
Our remand directions related only to joint ph ysical custody. The district court was to
“review and modify” its best-interests findings concerning parenting time. Id. It did so.
Second, mother argues the district court’ s finding that “there is no history of
domestic abuse in this case” and its characterization of father’s abuse as “situational—not
the abuse of on-going power and control” is inconsistent with our conclusion in the earlier
appeal that father’s conduct amounted to domestic abuse under Minn. Stat. § 518B.01,
subd. 2(a)(3) (2012). See id. at *5. The district court’s continuing reluctance to
unequivocally denounce father’s admitted actions for what they were—domestic abuse—
remains concerning. But the district court di d recognize the existence of domestic abuse.
Read in context, its finding that “there is no history of domestic vi olence” seems to refer
to the absence of domestic abuse before January 1, 2014. This does not amount to a failure
to follow remand instructions.
Third, mother argues that the district court “ignore[d] completely the court of
appeals’ reasoning on the [parents’] ability to cooperate.” Mother strongly disagrees with
the district court, but does not identify any specific finding on remand that conflicts with
our remand instructions, stating only that the order is “contrary to law and public policy.”
On careful examination, we see no failure of the district court to follow “law and public
policy” on remand.

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Finally, mother argues that the district c ourt’s order after remand is inconsistent
with our previous opinion because it requires her to “constantly navigate disputes with her
abuser without an appropriate dispute resolution mechanism in place.” However, mother
does not specifically identify how the district court’s order is inconsistent with our remand
instructions.
The district court’s order on remand is not inconsistent with our remand instructions.
II. The district court’s findings of fact and parenting-time order are supported by
the record.

Mother next argues that the district court’ s findings of fact are unsupported by the
evidence and its award of parenting time is not in the best interests of the children.
District courts have broad discretion to decide parenting-time questions, and we will
only reverse an award of parenting time if the district court misapplies the law or makes
findings of fact not su pported by the record. Newstrand v. Arend, 869 N.W.2d 681, 691
(Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 2015). “A district court’s findings of
fact underlying a parenting-time decision will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.”
Dahl v. Dahl, 765 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Minn. App. 2009). “A finding is clearly erroneous if
we are left with the definite and firm convict ion that the [district] court made a mistake.”
SooHoo v. Johnson , 731 N.W.2d 815, 825 (Minn. 2007). When deciding if a district
court’s findings of fact are erroneous, we view the record in the light most favorable to the
district court’s findings. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 472. We ar e not required to discuss
the evidence in detail, and only need to consider all the evidence and determine whether it
reasonably supports the findings. Peterka v. Peterka, 675 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn. App.

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2004). As we noted in our earlier opinion in this case, there is “scant if any room for an
appellate court to question the [district] court’s balancing of best-interests considerations.”
Caudullo, 2016 WL 687350, at *7 (quoting Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 477).
When deciding parenting-time issues, distri ct courts must “grant such parenting
time on behalf of the child and a parent as will enable the child and the parent to maintain
a child to parent relationship th at will be in the best interest s of the child.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.175, subd. 1(a) (2014).
A. We decline to take judicial notice on appeal of an order for protection
issued after the district court’s order.

Mother asks that we take judicial notice of an order for protection involving these
same parties and issued in January 2017 as part of our review of the district court’s findings
on remand regarding the best interests of the children. We generally confine our analysis
to the record before the district court when it made its determination, and do not base our
decisions on matters outside the record on appeal. Plowman v. Copeland, Buhl & Co., 261
N.W.2d 581, 583 (Minn. 1977); In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T. , 814 N.W.2d 76, 86-87
(Minn. App. 2012).
Here, the order for protection to which mother points was issued after the district
court order from which mother appeals. The di strict court could not have considered the
order for protection when it decided the pare nting time issue. The later order cannot
logically establish clear error in the findings that predate it.1

1 While we do not consider the order for protection on appeal , the district court retains
discretion to modify or defer its grant of pa renting time to father to protect the ongoing
interests of the children in this case while the appeal to this court is pending, Perry v. Perry,

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B. The record supports the district court’s finding of fact and its parenting-
time order.

Mother argues that eight of the district court’s factual findings are unsupported by
the record. However, mother’s arguments all revolve around her disagreement with the
district court’s decision to give more weight to father’s testimony and the guardian ad
litem’s (GAL’s) report than it gave to her own testimony. Many of mother’s arguments
derive from her claim that the district court incorrectly relied on the GAL’s second report—
which we discredited in the previous appeal —to find that father has a good relationship
with the children and that his abuse of mother did not affect the well-being of the children.
However, the challenged findings are all supported by the GAL’s first report, which found
that the children are well-adjusted, that the children desired to spend time with father, and
that father is a capable parent . These findings are also sup ported by father’s testimony.
While we do not minimize the dangers of domesti c abuse, or the impact of the abuse that
father admitted to committing, it is one of many best-interests factors relating to parenting
time. We view the evidence on appeal in the light most favor able to the district court’s
findings of fact. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 472. In that light, the record supports the
district court’s findings of fact. The district court is best positioned to resolve credibility
and best-interests issues, and we defer to it.

749 N.W.2d 399, 403 (Minn. App. 2008), and may in the future, on an appropriate motion,
consider the order for protection together with all other relevant evidence.

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Because the district court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and because
these findings support the district court’s c onclusions and its parenting-time order, the
district court acted within its discretion.
Affirmed.