State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1288

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jason David Hoversten,
Appellant.

Filed July 17, 2017
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-15-11857

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Edwin W. Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, St.
Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Pr esiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of fi rst degree-burglary and domestic assault,
resulting in a 90-month sentence. Appellant argues that the district court abused its
2
discretion in (1) admitting a witness’s prio r inconsistent stat ements; (2) denying
appellant’s request to instruct the jury on the definition of licensee; (3) admitting an expert
witness’s testimony; (4) admitting evidence of appellant’s prior domestic conduct as
relationship evidence; and (5) denying appe llant’s motion for a downward dispositional
sentencing departure and imposing an upward durational departure. Appellant also argues
that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by stating that a witness
lied. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Jason David Hovers ten and A.P. have been in volved in an on-and-off
relationship for 13 years and have a child, T.H. A.P. lived in an apartment with T.H.,
A.P.’s sister, and A.P.’s sister’s two sons. On December 29, 2015, A.P.’s neighbor called
911 to report a domestic dispute between appellant and A.P. While speaking with A.P., a
police officer took both an in formal recording, without A.P.’s knowledge, and a formal
recording of A.P.’s statements.
While being informally recorded, A.P. to ld the officer that she did not want
appellant to enter her residence. Appellant, however, made his way inside and took A.P.
into the bedroom where he h it her twice in the face and grabbed her on the throat,
constricting her airway while she screamed fo r help. During the informal recording,
appellant’s mother called A.P. A.P. told appellant’s mother that appellant “just busted into
[her] house, beat the crap outta [her] and the kids ran upstai rs and got the neighbor.”
Appellant also called A.P., and A.P. put the call on speaker phone. A.P. said to appellant,
“[Y]ou asked to come into my house and gather things, I told you no, I did not want you
3
here, I did not want you around me and then you barge in my house and pin me down and
put your hands on me.”
The officer then took a fo rmal recording of A.P.’s st atement, and A.P. reiterated
what she said during the informal recording. A.P. informed the officer that appellant does
not have a key to her residence. A.P. also told the officer that she thought appellant was
going to kill her.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appe llant with burglary in the first degree
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c) (2014), domestic assault by strangulation
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2247, subd. 2 (2014), and two counts of felony domestic
assault in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4 (2014). Prior to the jury trial, the
state filed a motion for an upward durational sentencing departure on the aggravating factor
that a child saw, heard, or witnessed the crime. Appellant waived his right to a jury trial
on the aggravating factor pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531
(2004). For the felony domestic assault charges, appellant stipulated that he was previously
convicted of domestic assault against A.P. in 2010 and convicted of violating a domestic
abuse no contact order (DANCO) that prohibited him from contacting A.P. in 2011.
At the trial, multiple witnesses testified for the state, including: A.P.; the police
officer; T.H.; D.R., one of A.P.’s nephews; and A.P.’s sister. The state also called Scott
Miller as an expert witness to testify about domestic violence.
A.P.’s trial testimony was inconsistent with her prior statements to the police. On
direct examination, A.P. testified that she could not recall the 2010 domestic assault, the
2011 DANCO violation, or the details of the events that took place on December 29, 2015.
4
On cross examination, A.P. te stified that appellant was livi ng with her during the weeks
leading up to December 29, she let appellant into her residence, she could not remember if
a verbal or physical confrontation occurred while they were in the bedroom, and she could
not remember what she said to the police on that day. At closing argument, the state
asserted that “[A.P.] lied on the stand to protect [appellant.]”
Appellant’s mother testified for the defens e, stating that appellant was living with
A.P. in the weeks leading up to December 29 and that A.P. called her after the incident.
During its closing argument, the state said that appellant’s mother lied.
The jury found appellant guilty of first-degr ee burglary and the two counts of felony
domestic assault but not guilty of domestic assault by strangulation. The district court also
found that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating factor of the actual
presence of a child for these counts.
The presentence investigation report (PSI) recommended that appellant be
sentenced to supervised probation for 20 year s. At sentencing, appellant moved for a
downward dispositional depart ure to probation in accordan ce with the PSI. The state
moved for an upward durational departure to 162 months in prison. The district court
entered judgment of conviction on the burglary count and imposed a 90-month sentence,
an upward departure from the top-of-the-box se ntence of 81 months. The district court
also imposed a concurrent 18-month prison sentence on one of the felony domestic assault
counts. This appeal follows.
5
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its di scretion in admitting A.P.’s prior
inconsistent statements.
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted the
informal and formal recordings of A.P.’s statements to the polic e officer because the
statements did not meet the requirements of circumstantial guarantees of reliability under
Minn. R. Evid. 807. Specifically, appellant asserts that A.P.’s prior inconsistent statements
were not made under oath, were not against A.P.’s penal inte rests, and were inconsistent
with testimony from T.H., D.R., and appellant’s mother. We disagree.
We review objected-to evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v. Amos,
658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003). On appeal, the appellant bears the burden of
establishing that the district court abused its discretion. Id.
“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn. R.
Evid. 801(c). Hearsay is inadmissible unless an exception applies. Minn. R. Evid. 802.
Minn. R. Evid. 807 provides a residual exception to the hearsay rule where
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B)
the statement is more probativ e on the point for which it is
offered than any other eviden ce which the proponent can
procure through reasonable e fforts; and (C) the general
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence.
For hearsay evidence to be admitted under rule 807, th ere must be circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness, which are show n when (1) there is no confrontation issue;
(2) the identity of the declarant or the content of the statement is undisputed; (3) the
6
statement is against the witness’s penal interest; and (4) the statement is consistent with the
other evidence introduced. State v. Ortlepp, 363 N.W.2d 39, 44 (Minn. 1985) (holding that
witness’s prior inconsistent statement was admissible under catchall exception of Minn. R.
Evid. 803(24)1). The Ortlepp factors “are not an exclusive list,” and our analysis under
rule 807 requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances. State v. Martinez, 725
N.W.2d 733, 738 (Minn. 2007).
Here, prior to trial, the district court an alyzed the three rule 807 factors, considered
the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness of A.P.’s prior statements, and concluded
that A.P.’s statements were admissible as s ubstantive evidence under rule 807 if A.P.
testified inconsistently with those statements. First, A.P.’s prior statements were admitted
as evidence of the material fact that appe llant committed the charge d offenses. Second,
A.P.’s statements were the most probative ev idence on whether appellant assaulted A.P.
because she was the only person in the bedroom with appellant. Third, the general purposes
of the rules of evidence and interests of just ice were served because, as discussed below,
the statements were trustworthy and integral to the state’s case.
With reference to the circumstantial guara ntees of trustworthiness, the first and
second Ortlepp factors are clearly satisfied. There is no confrontation issue because A.P.
testified and was cross examined. There is also no issue regarding identity or content
because A.P. is the declarant and the prior statements were recorded and undisputed.

1 After Ortlepp, rule 803(24) was combined with Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(5) into rule 807.
7
The third Ortlepp factor may be satisfied where a witness’s prior statement is against
her relationship interest with the defendant. State v. Plantin, 682 N.W.2d 653, 659 (Minn.
App. 2004). At trial, A.P. was hostile toward the prosecution and supportive of appellant,
seeming to protect her relationship with him, which indicates that A.P.’s prior statements
were against her relationship interest. Id. Therefore, the third Ortlepp factor is met.
The fourth Ortlepp factor is also satisfied. At tr ial, the state presented testimony
from other witnesses, including T.H., D.R., and A.P.’s sister, that was consistent with
A.P.’s prior statements. T.H. testified that appellant “had a mad face,” A.P. looked scared,
and that he heard appellant “growling” and A.P. screaming from behind the closed
bedroom door. D.R. testified, consistently with A.P.’s prior statements, that A.P. did not
want to let appellant into her residence, but that appellant grabbed A.P. and took her into
the bedroom. D.R. also heard A.P. screaming through the bedroom door. D.R. then went
to ask the upstairs neighbor to call the police. D.R. testified that, after the event, A.P. called
D.R.’s mother, and A.P. seemed a “little bit” scared. A.P.’s sister testified that A.P. called
her and told her that appellant beat her up. A.P. “was crying an d she sounded upset and
sad. Probably a little scared maybe.”
The state also presented text messages se nt between appellant and A.P. on the date
of the offense that show that A.P. did not want appellant to enter her residence. Moreover,
the responding police officer testified that A. P. had redness on her cheek and neck. The
evidence the state presented was consistent with A.P.’s statements to the officer, both of
which indicate that appellant came into A.P.’s residence and assaulted her. Thus, A.P.’s
prior inconsistent statements have circumst antial guarantees of trustworthiness, and the
8
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statements substantively under
rule 807.
Appellant also argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting A.P.’s
prior statements because State v. Dexter, 269 N.W.2d 721 (Minn. 1978), precludes the state
from calling a witness to testify only to impe ach the witness with a prior inconsistent
statement. Where A.P.’s prior inconsistent statements are properly admitted as substantive
evidence under rule 807, there is no Dexter issue. See Ortlepp , 363 N.W.2d at 43
(concluding that no Dexter violation occurred where prio r statement was admissible as
substantive evidence). Thus, appellant’s argument fails.2
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s request to
instruct the jury on the definition of licensee.
Appellant argues that the district court “erred” when it denied appellant’s request to
instruct the jury on the definition of licensee because in the absence of the instruction, the
jury was unable to determin e whether appellant was in la wful occupancy of A.P.’s
residence with regard to the burglary charge. Appellant’s argument lacks merit.
This court reviews the district court’s jury-instruction determination for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Koppi , 798 N.W.2d 358, 361 (Minn. 20 11). “A jury instruction is
erroneous if it materially misstates the applicable law.” Id. at 362.

2 Even if we were to assume that the district court erred in admitting A.P.’s prior statements
under rule 807, the error is harmless becaus e A.P.’s statements could also be admitted
under the excited-utterance exception of Mi nn. R. Evid. 803(2) wh ere the statements
related to a starting event and were made soon after the event. See State v. Copeland, 656
N.W.2d 599, 602 (Minn. App. 2003) (noting that district court’s erroneous admission of
evidence is harmless if evidence was also admissible on different basis).
9
Under Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c) (2014):
Whoever enters a building withou t consent and with intent to
commit a crime, or enters a building without consent and
commits a crime while in the building, either directly or as an
accomplice, commits burglary in the first degree . . . , if:
. . . the burglar assaults a person within the building or
on the building’s appurtenant property.
One meaning of “enters a building without consent” is that the person in lawful possession
did not consent to the entry. Minn. Stat. § 609.581, subd. 4(a) (2014). A person in lawful
possession for the purpose of the burglary statute has “the right to consent to the entry of
others into that building.” State v. Spence, 768 N.W.2d 104, 109 (Minn. 2009).
Here, Appellant did not have a key to the apartment, but he had stayed overnight
and had some personal belongings there. However, A.P. was the only individual listed on
the lease agreement for the residence, and A.P.’s prior statements indicate that she did not
consent to appellant entering on December 29. Moreover, the Minnesota burglary statute
does not contain an expr ess-licensee defense. Compare Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1,
with Model Penal Code § 221.1 (Am. Law Inst . 1980) (describing defense to burglary
where “actor is licensed or privileged to enter”). Therefore, the district court did not abuse
its discretion because declinin g to instruct the ju ry on the definition of licensee did not
render the jury instruction incorrect.
10
III. The district court did not abuse its di scretion in admitting Miller’s expert
witness testimony.
Appellant argues that the district court “erred” in allowing Miller to testify because
he was not qualified as an expert, and his testimony was not helpful to the jury. We
disagree.
First, because appellant did not object to M iller’s qualifications at trial, we review
the district court’s determination for plain error. State v. Mosley , 853 N.W.2d 789, 797
(Minn. 2014) (noting that, where appellant objects on different ground at trial than
appellant argues on appeal, it is reviewed under plain-error analysis). Under the plain-error
analysis, an appellant is entitled to a new trial if she establishes that there was (1) an error,
(2) that was plain, and (3) that affected her substantial rights. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d
736, 740 (Minn. 1998). If appellant satisfies this burden, this court determines whether the
error should be addressed “to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.”
Id.
Miller has worked for 15 years at a company that facilitates domestic-abuse
intervention programs and that devised a mode l for criminal-justice agencies to use to
address domestic abuse. He runs a men’s nonviolence progra m created with the input of
female domestic-violence victims. And Mille r had testified about domestic violence 20
times prior to this trial. Based on Miller’s experience and training , we agree with the
district court that he is qualified to testify about domestic violence. See Minn. R. Evid 702
(noting that witness qualifies as expert based on “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education”); see also State v. Valentine , 787 N.W.2d 630, 639 (Minn. App. 2010)
11
(concluding that police officer with degree in criminal justice qualified to testify as expert
witness on battered-woman syndrome). Ther efore, there was no error, which ends the
plain-error analysis.
Next, because appellant objected at trial, we review the district court’s admission of
Miller’s testimony on the basis th at it was helpful to the jury for an abuse of discretion.
Valentine, 787 N.W.2d at 638. Expert testimony is admissible if the witness’s “specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to unde rstand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue.” Minn. R. Evid. 702. Expert testimony on the behavior of domestic-violence victims
“is admissible since it would help to expl ain a phenomenon not within the understanding
of an ordinary lay person.” State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Minn. 1989). This
evidence, however, is “ limited to a description of the general syndrome,” and an expert
witness must not testify about whether a particular witness e xhibits characteristics of a
victim of domestic violence. Id. at 799.
Miller testified on the characteristics of a buse victims and abuser s, and he did not
draw conclusions about appellant and A.P. M iller described different tactics that abusers
use to carry out domestic violence, such as coercion and threats of suicide. Miller further
testified that many domestic-violence victim s recant after telling the truth to police and
decide that they do not want to pursue prosecution. In addition, Miller testified that leaving
an abusive relationship is “about the hardest thing” a victim can attempt to do.
It is reasonable to conclude that Mill er’s testimony assisted the jury in
understanding the inconsistency between A.P.’s statements to the police officer and A.P.’s
conduct on the witness stand. See State v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 189, 195 (Minn. 1997)
12
(“[T]he jury might believe th at a woman who is beaten by her mate would immediately
seek to have him arrested and that such a woman would not recant such a statement despite
threats made by the batterer.”). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing Miller’s testimony.
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of
appellant’s prior domestic conduct as relationship evidence under Minn. Stat.
§ 634.20 (2014).
Appellant asserts that the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence
of his prior domestic conduct because, in light of the other evidence, the prior acts were
overly prejudicial. We are not persuaded.
We review a district court’s admission of relationship evidence for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Bell , 719 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn. 2006). “Evidence of domestic
conduct by the accused against the victim of domestic conduct . . . is admissible unless the
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Minn. Stat.
§ 634.20. Unfair prejudice “is not merely damaging evidence, even severely damaging
evidence; rather, unfair prejudice is evidence that persuades by illegitimate means, giving
one party an unfair advantage.” State v. Schulz , 691 N.W.2d 474, 478 (Minn. 2005).
“‘Domestic conduct’ includes, but is not limited to, evidence of domestic abuse” or
violation of an order for protection. Minn. Stat. § 634.20. “[E]vidence of prior [domestic]
conduct between the accused and the alleged victim” may put “the crime charged in the
context of [their] relationship,” State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Minn. 2004), and
may bolster its probative value. State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 392 (Minn. 1998).
13
Here, the district court admitted into ev idence appellant’s prior domestic conduct,
including the stipulated 2010 and 2011 convictions, a 2013 jail call between appellant and
A.P., and a February 2016 vide o visit between appellant and A. P.’s sister. The district
court reasoned that the probative value of the evidence in establishing the relationship
between appellant and A.P. was not substa ntially outweighed by th e danger of unfair
prejudice to appellant.
We agree. The evidence was probative because it prov ided the jury with an
understanding of why A.P.’s testimony was inconsistent with her prior statements. State
v. Meyer , 749 N.W.2d 844, 850 (Minn. App. 2008) (prior acts of domestic violence
probative of relationship history and provided context to analyze witness’s credibility). In
addition, the district court’s cau tionary instructions to the ju ry, before the introduction of
the evidence and in the final jury instructions, decreased the potential for unfair prejudice
to appellant. See Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d at 392. Thus, it cannot be said that the admission
of the prior domestic-conduct evidence gave the state an unfair advantage at trial.
Accordingly, the district court’s decision to admit the evidence was not an abuse of
discretion. See McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 161 (admission of domestic-conduct evidence not
abuse of discretion where vic tim, only eyewitness, testified that she could not remember
what she told police regarding alleged assault).
Even if it was error for th e district court to admit prior domestic-conduct evidence,
we conclude that any error was harmless because the state presented other evidence, in the
form of T.H.’s and A.P.’s sister’s testimony, on the rela tionship between appellant and
A.P. The district court also gave a cautiona ry instruction before the introduction of the
14
domestic-conduct evidence and in the final jury instruction. Further, the prosecutor did not
dwell on the relationship evidence during closing argument. Finally, as described
previously, the evidence supporting appellant’s convictions was strong. Thus, any alleged
error in admitting the relationship evidence was harmless.
V. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s motion
for a downward dispositional departure to probation and imposed an upward
durational departure of ni ne months from the to p-of-the-box presumptive
sentence.
Appellant asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed the 90-
month sentence for the burglary count because the sentence exaggerated the criminality of
appellant’s conduct, the aggravat ing factor of the actual presence of children during the
offense “should not have made a difference,” and the district court sentenced appellant for
“other, uncharged misconduct.” We are not persuaded.
A. Downward dispositional departure
We review a district court’s sentence determination for an abuse of discretion. State
v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (M inn. 2014). The determinat ion of whether to depart
dispositionally focuses on a defendant’s characteristics indicating amenability to probation.
State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016). The district court may consider “the
defendant’s age, his prior record, his remorse, his cooperation, his attitude while in court,
and the support of friends and/or family.” State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982).
A district court is not required to impose a downward dispositional departure even when
mitigating circumstances are present. State v. Pagel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 253-54 (Minn. App.
2011) (quotation omitted). We will affirm where the record demonstrates that “the district
15
court carefully considered circumstances for and against depart ure and deliberately
exercised its discretion.” Id. at 255.
Here, appellant moved for a downward di spositional departure to probation based
on the following Trog factors: appellant’s age; support from family, friends, and
community; amenability to past treatment programming; successful completion of
treatment programming; his co operation during trial; and hi s completion of parenting
classes. Additionally, at the sentencing hearing, appellant testified about his remorse for
his actions and the steps he had taken toward rehabilitation.
The district court declined to impose a downward dispositi onal departure after
considering multiple times the PSI’s recommendation for probation, appellant’s arguments
in support of the dispositional departure, and other relevant factors. The district court
stated that it could not “get past” what appellant has said and done to A.P. over time. The
district court also noted that “statistically [appellant’s] next step is killing [A.P.], and [the
district court judge] could not risk that.” The district court then stated that it did not find
that appellant was particularly amenable to probation.
The district court did not abuse its disc retion in declining to impose a downward
dispositional sentencing departure. Further, we defer to the district court’s determination
of whether appellant’s statement of remors e “was genuine or should be given much
weight.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 311.
B. Upward durational departure
A district court may impose an upward durational departure only if aggravating
circumstances are present and they provide a substantial and compelling reason to depart.
16
Id. at 308. An upward durational departure ma y be based on one aggravating factor.
Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 624.
Here, the state moved for an upward durational departure that would result in a 162-
month sentence. The district court ordered an upward durational departure to 90 months,
which was nine months above the top-of-the-box presumptive sentence, based on the single
aggravating factor proved of the actual presence of children at the time of the offense.
Appellant’s argument that the district c ourt considered improper factors in its
sentencing decision misconstrues the district court’s reasoning. The district court’s
statements at the sentencing hearing clearly distinguished its reasons for ordering the
upward durational departure and declin ing appellant’s motion for a downward
dispositional departure. Thus, the district c ourt did not abuse its di scretion in sentencing
appellant.
VI. The state did not commit prosecutorial misconduct when it asserted in its
closing argument that A.P. lied on the stand.
Appellant argues that the state committ ed error that was plain because the
prosecutor expressed a personal opinion abou t A.P.’s credibility during closing argument
and the state cannot show that the error did no t affect appellant’s substantial rights. We
disagree.
This court reviews unobjected-to prosec utorial misconduct under the modified
plain-error test. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). Under this standard,
“there must be (1) error; (2) that is plain; and (3) the error must affect substantial rights.”
Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 740. An appellant bears the burden to prove that an error occurred
17
and that the error was plain. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302. If the appellant satisfies his
burden, the state must prove that the plain error does not affect the appellant’s substantial
rights. Id. Where the plain error affects the appe llant’s substantial rights, this court
determines whether the error should be addre ssed to ensure the fairness and integrity of
judicial proceedings. Id.
Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when a prosecutor “expresses a personal opinion
as to a witness’s credibility.” State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 106 (Minn. 2009) (quotation
omitted); see also State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 656 (Minn. 2006) (concluding that
prosecution impermissi bly vouched for credibility of w itness when it said that state
“believed” witness was “believable”). Howeve r, a prosecutor’s statement that a witness
lied is not automatically misconduct. State v. Anderson, 720 N.W.2d 854, 865 (Minn. App.
2006) (concluding that no plain error occurred where prosecutor stated that witness “flat
out lied” because prosecutor drew reasonable inference from evidence, “did not insinuate
that he knew anything the jury did not, and he did not misrepresent any testimony”), aff’d
733 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. 2007). A prosecutor has the “right to analyze the evidence and
vigorously argue” about a witness’s credibility. State v. Googins , 255 N.W.2d 805, 806
(Minn. 1977).
Here, the prosecutor argued that A.P. “lied on the stand to protect the defendant.”3
The prosecutor’s statement was not misconduct. The prosecutor’s statement was not an
assertion of her personal opinion but a reasonable inference drawn from A.P.’s testimony

3 At closing argument, the state also asserted that appellant’s mother’s testimony was a
lie. Appellant does not argue that this was misconduct.
18
which was inconsistent with her prior statemen ts to the police office r. In addition, the
prosecutor’s statement did not misrepresent A.P.’s testimony. Thus, appellant cannot
satisfy his burden of proving that the prosecutor’s statement that A.P. lied on the witness
stand was error, which ends our analysis.
Affirmed.