State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1327

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

DeQuan Ramel Bares-Stewart,
Appellant.

Filed June 5, 2017
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-2932

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Cheri A. Townsend, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Pres iding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant DeQuan Ramel Bares-Stewar t appeals his conviction of unlawful
possession of a firearm. Bares-Stewart argues th at the district court abused its discretion

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(1) by allowing the state to impeach him with two “sanitized” 1 felony convictions and
(2) by sanitizing the second-degree-murder conviction used to impeach a prosecution
witness. Because we conclude that the di strict court did not a buse its discretion in
permitting impeachment of either Bares-Stewart or the prosecution witness with sanitized
convictions, we affirm.
FACTS
On the morning of January 28, 2016, po lice executed a search warrant at Bares-
Stewart’s residence, where he lived with his roommate, K.A. Police found Bares-Stewart
lying in bed in the southeast bedroom. In th e same bedroom, on top of a dresser, police
found a lockbox containing a firearm and ammunition. On the same dresser, police found
receipts bearing Bares-Stewart’s name and a wallet containing Bares-Stewart’s Minnesota
ID. When police found the key to the lockbox, Bares-Stewart became noticeably nervous.
He made remarks such as “back to jail I go” and “I’m just hoping for anything less than
five.” Bares-Stewart was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm.2
A jury trial took place. The state move d to impeach Bares-Stewart with two felony
assault convictions if he decided to testif y. Bares-Stewart objected, arguing that the
admission of the prior convictions would be “c learly prejudicial.” The district court

1 A district court “sanitizes” a felony conv iction when it permits a party to impeach a
witness with a prior felony co nviction pursuant to Minn. R. Evid. 609 but does not allow
the impeaching party to offer ev idence about the details or nature of the conviction. See
State v. Hill, 801 N.W.2d 646, 650 n.1 (Minn. 2011).

2 Bares-Stewart was also initially charged w ith fifth-degree possession of a controlled
substance, but that charge was dismissed by the state.

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allowed the state to impeach Bares-Stewart with the felony convictions but prohibited the
state from referencing “the nature of the convictions.” Bares-Stewart did not testify.
The state called as witnesses K.A. and the police officers who executed the search
warrant. Bares-Stewart moved to impeac h K.A. with a 1999 second-degree-murder
conviction. The state objected, arguing that the conviction was old, did not bear on his
truthfulness, and would be “very prejudicial.” The district court decided that Bares-Stewart
could impeach K.A. with the felony conviction but could not reveal the nature of the
conviction.
The jury found Bares-Stewart guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm.
Bares-Stewart appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Prior convictions are admissible for impeach ing a witness if the crime is a felony
and the district court determines that its prob ative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.
Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(1).
3 A district court must make a re cord of its analysis of whether
the probative value of the prior conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect. State v.
Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 655 (Minn. 2006). We review a district court’s decision to
allow impeachment with a prior conviction for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hochstein,
623 N.W.2d 617, 624 (Minn. App. 2001). And we will not reverse a conviction because
of an evidentiary error unless “the error substantially influences the jury to convict.” State
v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 1981).

3 Crimes involving dishonesty are likewis e admissible for impeachment purposes, Minn.
R. Evid. 609(a)(2), but that provision is not relevant here.

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I. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by permitting the state to
impeach Bares-Stewart with two sanitized felony convictions.
Bares-Stewart argues that the district cour t abused its discretion by allowing the
state to impeach Bares-Stewart with two san itized felony convictions because the district
court improperly applied the Jones factors.
When the state seeks to imp each a defendant with a prior conviction, the district
court must weigh the fi ve factors outlined in State v. Jones to determine whether the
probative value of the prior conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect:
(1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the date of
the conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history, (3) the
similarity of the past crime with the charged crime (the greater
the similarity, the greater the reason for not pe rmitting use of
the prior crime to impeach), (4) the importance of defendant’s
testimony, and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue.
271 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Minn. 1978). 4 “If a court finds that the prejudicial effect of
disclosing the nature of a felony conviction outweighs its probative value, then it may still
allow a party to impeach a witness with an un specified felony conviction if the use of the
unspecified conviction satisfies the ba lancing test of Rule 609(a)(1).” State v. Hill , 801
N.W.2d 646, 653 (Minn. 2011). In deciding whether to sanitize a felony conviction, the
district court assesses (1) whether the prejudicial effect of disclosing the nature of a felony
conviction outweighs its probativ e value, and then (2) whethe r the prejudicial effect of

4 Jones was decided before the adoption of Minn. R. Evid. 609(a) but has been reaffirmed
as the appropriate balancing test when the state seeks to impeach a defendant with a prior
conviction. State v. Zornes, 831 N.W.2d 609, 626-27 (Minn. 2013) (applying Jones).

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allowing impeachment with the unspecified conviction outweighs its probative value. Id.
at 652-53. The decision to sanitize a prior conviction is left to the district court. Id. at 652.
In this case, the district court determin ed that introducing the nature of Bares-
Stewart’s assault convictions would have some prejudicial effect and therefore barred the
state from referencing “the nature of the convictions.” See id. at 652-53. The district court
then applied the Jones factors and concluded that it would not be prejudicial to allow the
state to impeach Bares-Stewart with sanitized felony convictions:
First, there is impeachment value in the jury seeing the
whole person and knowing one way or the other that the
convictions exist or don’t exist. In this case that they do.

Second, the date of the convictions and the defendant’s
subsequent history weighs in favor of them being admitted
because they are within the ten-year period of time.

Third, the similarity of the past crimes with the charged
crime is a factor that really has no bearing because I have
eliminated any description othe r than the felony description
and so that will also weigh in favor [of] them being admitted.

Lastly, factors four and five, the importance of the
defendant’s testimony and the centrality of the credibility
issue, I can and do consider t hose together under the case law
and I do see that if the defendant takes the stand his credibility
will be very important and will be central to the jury deciding
one way or the other whether he possessed or didn’t possess
the firearm or ammunition, and so I find those factors also
weigh in favor, should the defendant testify.
The district court properly applied the Jones factors and followed the guidance of Hill in
allowing the state to impeach Bares-Stewart with sanitized felony convictions. See Jones,
271 N.W.2d at 538; see also Hill, 801 N.W.2d at 652-53.

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Bares-Stewart argues that the district court was required to weigh the five Jones
factors before deciding whether to sanitize the convictions. According to Bares-Stewart,
if the district court had applied the Jones factors before sanitizing his felony conviction,
the district court should not have allowed th e state to impeach Bares-Stewart with the
sanitized felony convictions because the assault convictions have little impeachment value
and are too similar to the firearm offense. See Jones, 271 N.W.2d at 538 (describing the
first and third Jones factors).
Bares-Stewart’s argument is unpersuasive. First, Bares-Stewart’s suggestion that a
district court can sanitize a prior conviction onl y if it first finds that the prior conviction
would be admissible if left unsanitized is antithetical to Hill. Hill provides district courts
an alternative way to allow parties to impeac h witnesses with prior convictions when the
district court finds that “the prejudicial effect of disclosing the nature of a felony conviction
outweighs its probative value.” Hill, 801 N.W.2d at 652-53. Sanitization is a tool for the
district court to cure the prejudice that knowledge of the nature of the conviction presents.
Under Bares-Stewart’s argument, a district court could neve r sanitize a prior conviction
unless it first found that the unsanitized felony conviction was admissible.
Second, Bares-Stewart’s position is inconsis tent with the rationale underlying the
first Jones factor. The Minnesota Supreme Court has st ated that “it is the general lack of
respect for the law, rather than the specific nature of the conviction, that informs the fact-
finder about a witness’s credibility” and that “ any felony conviction is probative of a
witness’s credibility.” Id. at 652. Bares-Stewart’s assa ult convictions therefore have
impeachment value.

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Finally, the third Jones factor is irrelevant with respect to a sanitized felony
conviction because there can be no prejudicial effect resulting from “the similarity of the
past crime with the charged crime” if the jury does not know the nature of the past crime.
See Jones, 271 N.W.2d at 538. In any event, a district court does not abuse its discretion
in allowing impeachment by a past crime if only the third Jones factor weighs against
admission of the prior conviction. See State v. Irby , 820 N.W.2d 30, 37- 38 (Minn. App.
2012), aff’d on other grounds , 848 N.W.2d 515 (Minn. 2014 ). The district court here
concluded that the four other Jones factors weighed in favor of allowing the state to
impeach Bares-Stewart with sanitized felony convictions.
We therefore conclude that the district c ourt did not err in a llowing the state to
impeach Bares-Stewart with two sanitized felony convictions. Hill, 801 N.W.2d at 652-
53.
II. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by sanitizing K.A.’s felony
conviction.

Bares-Stewart argues that the district court should not have sanitized K.A.’s second-
degree-murder conviction because (1) Hill does not apply to prosecution witnesses and
(2) the district court improperly weighed the probative value versus the prejudicial effect
of allowing Bares-Stewart to introduce the nature of the conviction.
First, Bares-Stewart argues that Hill does not permit a district court to sanitize a
prosecution witness’s fe lony convictions because Hill addresses only a defendant’s
convictions. It is true that Hill concerns impeachment of a defendant and not a prosecution
witness. Hill, 801 N.W.2d at 648. But Hill does not preclude sanitization of a prosecution

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witness’s prior conviction. Id. Sanitization of a prosecution witness’s prior conviction
affords the defendant the opportunity to im peach the witness while remedying concerns
that the prior conviction may embarrass the w itness, confuse the jury, or unnecessarily
prolong the trial. See State v. Lanz-Terry , 535 N.W.2d 635, 639-40 (Minn. 1995)
(describing these concerns). Just as a di strict court does not abuse its discretion by
sanitizing a defendant’s prior conviction, see Hill, 801 N.W.2d at 684, we conclude that a
district court does not abuse its discretio n by sanitizing the felony conviction of a
prosecution witness.
Next, Bares-Stewart argues that the district court abused its discretion by concluding
that the prejudicial effect of allowing evidence about the nature of the offense outweighed
its probative value. See Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(1). We di sagree. When a court fails to
weigh the probative value versus the prejudicial effect on the record, appellate courts apply
the relevant factors to determine whether th e prior conviction would be admissible for
impeachment purposes. See Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 655 (applying the Jones factors to
assess the impeachment value of the defendant’s prior convic tion when the district court
did not). As noted above, the Minnesota Su preme Court described factors relevant to
allowing impeachment of a prosecution witness in Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d at 639-40.
Under Lanz-Terry, the district court should consid er whether introducing the prior
conviction could confuse and mislead the jury. Id. Bares-Stewart’s brief on appeal
suggests that “the court’s impeachment ruling limited Appellant’s ability to fully cast doubt
on [K.A.’s] testimony that he knew nothing ab out a gun or ammunition in the house.”
Bares-Stewart’s argument suggests that re vealing the second-degree-murder conviction

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could have led the jury to believe that K.A. did know about the gun or ammunition. In
effect, Bares-Stewart argues that the nature of the conviction could have suggested that
K.A. was an alternative possessor of the firearm. Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(1) is appropriate
for impeachment only—not substantive evidence. Revealing that K.A. had been convicted
of second-degree murder may have “confused and misled” the jury. See Lanz-Terry, 535
N.W.2d 639-40. The district court’s decision to sanitize K.A.’s prior conviction afforded
Bares-Stewart the opportunity to impeach K. A. while remedying the concerns expressed
in Lanz-Terry. The district court thus did not a buse its discretion in concluding that
sanitizing K.A.’s second-degree-murder conviction was necessary to prevent prejudice.
In any event, a reviewing court will not re verse a conviction based on an evidentiary
error unless “the error substantially influences the jury to convict.” Loebach, 310 N.W.2d
at 64. In conducting this analysis, the reviewing court examines whether the jury’s verdict
is “surely unattributable” to the district court’s error. State v. King, 622 N.W.2d 800, 811
(Minn. 2001).
Substantial evidence shows th at the jury’s verdict is “surely unattributable” to
whether the jury found K.A. credible. Id. K.A. testified that he lived with Bares-Stewart
and that the southeast bedroom belonged to Bares-Stewart. K.A. also testified that nothing
in the southeast bedroom was his and that he had never seen Bares-Stewart with a gun.
The state referenced K.A.’s testimony in cl osing arguments to demonstrate that Bares-
Stewart occupied the southeast bedroom. But other evidence supported the conviction and
established that Bares-Stewart resided at the searched address in the southeast bedroom.
The state introduced documents that listed Bares-Stewart’s name and residential address.

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When the police entered Bares-Stewart’s residence, they found Bares-Stewart lying in bed
in the southeast bedroom. Th e lockbox with the firearm and the key to the lockbox were
found on a dresser in the southeast bedroom. On the same dresser, police found receipts
bearing Bares-Stewart’s name and Bares-Stew art’s wallet containing his Minnesota ID.
An investigating officer also testified that Bares-Stewart became nervous once the lockbox
was found and that Bares-Stewart made incrim inating comments, such as “back to jail I
go.” The verdict thus is “surely unattributable ” to the district court’s decision to sanitize
K.A.’s felony conviction. Id.
Moreover, Bares-Stewart was still afforded the opportunity to impeach K.A. It is
K.A.’s general lack of respect for the law that gives the second-degree-murder conviction
impeachment value, not the nature of the conviction. Hill, 801 N.W.2d at 652. The district
court’s decision preserved Bares-Stewart’s right to impeach K.A. with the prior conviction
and provided the jury with the opportunity to see K.A.’s “whole person” and assess his
credibility. Id. at 651 (quotation omitted).
Because the district court did not abus e its discretion by allowing the state to
impeach Bares-Stewart with tw o sanitized felony convictions, or by sanitizing K.A.’s
second-degree-murder conviction, we affirm.
Affirmed.